Sahal Mahfudz — Scholar, Activist

Penulis

After the recent passing of the spiritual leader of the Shia Ismaili Dawoodi Bohra in India, Syedna Mohammed Burhanuddin, now the Sunni Nahdlatul Ulama of Indonesia has lost its supreme leader, Kyai Haji Muhammad Ahmad Sahal Mahfudz. A leading authority on Islamic law, Sahal, who was also a longtime chairman of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), died on Friday at the age of 78.

A former rector of the Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic Institute at Jepara, Sahal’s body was buried in a special cemetery in his hometown Kajen in Pati, Central Java,.

I was shocked and sad to hear about his death in part because he was my mentor and teacher, and a source of inspiration. Inspired by his brilliant progressive ideas about Islamic law, in 1999 I wrote a book about him and the new era of Islamic law in Indonesia.

Born in 1937, Sahal was not only a religious leader and an Islamic scholar, but also an activist, a prolific writer and a journalist — a rare mixture for a Javanese kyai (an honorific title used for religious leaders in Java).

A founding member and general chairman of the Jakarta-based Pesantren Journal, both of Sahal’s parents passed away when he was a child (his father, K.H. Mahfudz Salam, died in 1944, his mother, Hj. Badiah, in 1945). His father was murdered by the Japanese army in a military prison in Ambarawa, Central Java, due to his resistance (along with Sahal’s grandfather, K.H. Abdus Salam) against the Japanese occupation. Sahal’s older brother, Hasyim Mahfudz, also died fighting occupying forces, in this case the Dutch, in 1949. After the death of his parents, Sahal was raised by his uncle, K.H. Abdullah Salam, who was also his Islamic teacher.

This tragic family history shaped Sahal’s personality, both as a firm Islamic leader and as a scholar. The struggle of his father, grandfather and other relatives for Indonesian independence later also influenced Sahal’s nationalist vision and commitment to defend his home country from people and groups who wanted to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state by replacing its pluralist ideology, Pancasila, with Islam.

Having trained in Islamic studies in various pesantren (a Javanese Islamic seminary) and madrasah (Islamic schools), including those of Kediri (East Java), Rembang (Central Java), and Mecca (Saudi Arabia), where he learned under the guidance of Syeikh Muhammad Yasin al-Fadani, Sahal wrote numerous books and articles, in both Arabic and Indonesian, on various subjects, especially Islamic law (fiqh) and Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh).

In 1963, upon finishing his studies, Sahal returned home and began to lead two important educational institutions: Pesantren Maslakul Huda (founded by his father in 1922) and Perguruan Islam Matholi’ul Falah (founded by his grandfather in 1912). Unlike most “traditionalist kyais” at that time, who usually ran their pesantren in a conservative-traditional ways, Sahal’s effort was distinct and exceptional.

To give an example from the early 1980s, despite strong critiques from other religious leaders, Sahal invited a foreign teacher, Oxford University graduate Paul Musante, to teach English in his schools. At the time, teaching English in pesantren, much less with a non-Muslim teacher, was uncommon, not to say taboo, partly because all pesantren are run in Arabic, which is considered by Javanese traditional Muslims to be the sacred language of Islam. But Sahal broke the rule. Not only that, he also introduced “secular sciences” into his schools’ curricula, applied discussions and seminars as part of teaching methods, and encouraged his students to employ critical thinking in interpreting Islamic texts and understanding Islamic teachings.

Moreover, Sahal developed his pesantren not only as a center of learning and a place of worship and ritual ceremonies, but also a site of economic development for both students and local people. With the support of the Jakarta-based Institute of Economic and Social Studies and Development (LP3ES) and the German Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Sahal since early 1970s had built up his Pesantren Maslakul Huda as a hub of societal economic development: running a small-scale business, a saving and loan cooperative and a micro credit bank for low-income groups. Also, Sahal built partnerships with Chinese businessmen to help boost the economy in Pati and surrounding areas.

As a respected religious leader, Sahal’s role was also essential and distinctive in protecting two of the nations most important his Islamic organizations — NU and MUI — from political intervention.

During the New Order regime, particularly since the 1980s, when NU positioned itself as a civil society organization in opposition to Suharto, Sahal played a unique role. On one hand, he strongly criticized the government’s unpopular and undemocratic policies, but on the other he defended MUI, which was accused by democracy activists and anti-government NU leaders of being pro-Suharto. For Sahal, public institutions (including government and religious establishments) cannot be blamed for unfair economic-political policies since all depend on which people run the particular body. Sahal said that as long as good programs and policies are implemented, people need to support the organization (conversely we must remind and criticize it if it implements unjust policies).

Sahal’s contributions were also crucial in developing new forms of Islamic thought. Since 1984, Sahal led a halaqah (a regular informal meeting for kyais to discuss social-political issues through the lens of Islamic law) whose creative methods of Islamic legal theory and Islamic legal maxims resulted in the production of progressive Islamic ideas and decisions, while at the same time keeping the spirit and essence of Islam as a “prophetic religion.” His concept became known as “social fiqh,” a rational-contextual-based understanding of Islamic law trying to solve to contemporary social problems.

Unlike “conventional” Islamic law, typified by “Arabism,” “literalism,” “scripturalism,” and “theo-centricism” in understanding Islamic texts, notions and discourses, this new model of fiqh was built on the belief that Islam should be understood in accordance with the local contexts in which Muslims live, and classical Islamic texts must be interpreted in line with the modern condition of Muslim societies.

For Sahal, not all products of Arab-tribal “pre-modern” Islamic laws were necessarily suitable for Indonesia and other Muslim societies. In line with this argument, Sahal strongly opposed “out of date” Islamic laws such as hand-cutting for thieves or stoning to death for adultery, and resisted a “stone-age” concept of an Islamic state or a caliphate simply because such ideas were incompatible with Indonesia’s pluralist society and state ideology. Sahal suggested that Muslims should be able to differentiate between “Islamic doctrines” and “Arab cultures,” between Islam as “universal religious principle” and “particular political outcome.” In the schema of social fiqh, Islam is also introduced as a medium of social critique, not of political legitimacy. In brief, his concept comprises an intellectual effort to “synchronize” Islamic authenticity and modernity.

Apart from the mistakes that every human being makes, and Sahal’s apparent weaknesses — such as his failure to sideline anti-pluralist and intolerant religious leaders within his MUI or the more politics-minded figures within his NU — Sahal’s life and work have no doubt been of enormous significance for Islam, society and state.

His commitment, humbleness and modesty are an extraordinary gift for this nation and the wider world — which are filled with uncommitted, arrogant and greedy people.

—

Sumanto Al Qurtuby, is a research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, and co-founder of the North American branch of Nahdlatul Ulama.

On Act of Killing, No Easy Answers

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Ever since the release of The Act of Killing (or Jagal, in Indonesian, meaning Butcher) in 2012, the movie has been widely applauded by many foreign film lovers and critics, leading to a nomination for the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. But in Indonesia, the film has provoked controversy. The government regarded the film a hyperbole and an inaccurate portrayal of Indonesia’s past anti-communist campaigns. Muslim leaders also condemned the movie for discrediting Islam and Indonesia. While some Indonesians welcome the film, many have responded negatively.

The Act of Killing is basically an old story — the 1965-66 anti-communist pogroms — in a new format. The filmmakers narrate an account of death squads involved in mass murders in North Sumatra. They have long been celebrated as heroes.

The content of the film is, of course, not new for Indonesians. During the 32 years of Suharto’s rule, each year in late September, Indonesians watched the government’s version of the story on state-owned television network TVRI. Since there were no other TV channels, I watched that state-sanctioned film, too.

In my village at that time, only one person had a television set, and even though it was black and white, the screening attracted a big crowd. When the army and the death squads succeeded in slaughtering what they called “communists,” villagers cheerfully clapped their hands.

The New Order no doubt succeeded in brainwashing Indonesians, including myself, by declaring that Communism was a common enemy and a continuous threat for the nation. It argued that deadly violence against communists and their sympathizers was legitimate, and that the perpetrators had to be considered heroes.

A popular song

Like other villagers (indeed most citizens) at the time, I thought Suharto and the death squads were heroes. But this changed when I found out that my grandparents on my mother’s side were among the victims. For a long time, my parents, especially my mom, refused to tell me what really happened. Indeed all my grandparents (from both dad’s and mom’s side) died before I was born. My father, who passed away three years ago, often took me to visit his parents’ graves. But what about my mom’s parents?

Later on I understood that my mom stayed silent because she did not want her children to know the tragic truth. One day, when I insisted, she answered my questions about what happened to her parents with tears instead of words.

When she was finally able to handle her emotions, she explained how her parents were brutally killed by an angry mob. She also told me that many of those murdered, including her parents, actually were not communists. They were killed, she said, simply because they sang “Genjer-Genjer,” a popular song that was also commonly sung by members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Traumatized, my mom and her older brother fled to a faraway district and hid in the middle of wild jungle with nothing but the clothes they wore.

My mom’s story does not stand alone. Many people killed during this period actually had nothing to do with Communism or the PKI, much less with atheism, as the New Order regime propagated. Ordinary people, including my grandparents (who were mostly, if not all, illiterate), did not understand what Communism meant, much less Marxism-Leninism. Membership of the PKI in the 1960s reached more than three million people, making it the largest Communist Party outside the Soviet Union and China, but most people sympathized with the party simply because they admired its pro-people agenda.

It is true that since the rise of the PKI in the early 20th century, people and some members of the Javanese elite, including Muslim preacher and revolutionary Haji Mohamad Misbach (d. 1926), were attracted to the party due to its populist agenda, promise of change and fierce anti-colonial agenda. This is why the Dutch cracked down hard on the communist revolt that broke out in 1926-27.

Roots of conflict

Much has been written about the PKI and anti-communist killings of 1965-66, and the role of Suharto, the army, Islamic organizations, and the US Central Intelligence Agency in orchestrating the campaigns as part of America’s global war against (Soviet) Communism. The work of Harry Benda, Ruth McVey, Robert Cribb, Ann Swift, among others, is noteworthy. What is clear from the literature is that the massacres were not without historical precedent. Rather, they were deeply rooted in wider societal rivalry, conflict and violence.

As historian Merle Ricklefs has rightly noted, the harsh rivalry between “kaum putihan” (devout Muslims who later became members of various Islamic organizations and political parties) versus “kaum abangan” (nominal religious or non-religious folk that later became members and supporters of nationalist and communist organizations and parties) had been going on since the 19th century. Old Javanese stories have documented tensions and antagonism between these groups.

The formation of Islamic organizations since the early 20th century was, among other things, a response to the rude attacks of the “kaum abangan” against Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, and the Koran. Muslim-Communist tensions peaked in 1948 at Madiun, where the communist militias took power and brutally murdered Islamic followers, clerics and leaders, and politicians who refused to make Indonesia a communist country. The rebellion was later defeated but had angered Muslim leaders.

Indonesian society has been bombarded with ideology ever since the colonial era. And it was during Sukarno’s Old Order when “aliranization” (the division of society in a limited number of ideological streams) became deeply politicized. During the course of Sukarno’s reign, nationalists, communists, traditionalists, and reformists were all trapped into unhealthy competition and even violent conflicts on behalf of primordial sectarian groups. Political and religious leaders provoked their opponents by invoking religion, Islamic schools of thought, organizations, ideologies and political parties. This wider societal conflict has to be taken into account when we try to understand what happened in 1965-66.

Although the violence is behind us, Indonesia still has to deal with the dark episodes from its past. For me, responding to the The Act of Killing is dilemmatic. On one hand, my own family has been directly affected by the bloodbaths. But I am also a functionary of Nahdlatul Ulama, an Islamic organization many of whose young activists were involved in the anti-Communist campaigns.

For the sake of the nation’s future, there is nothing we — including the government — can do but promote forgiveness and reconciliation. This is what Syarikat Indonesia, a group of NU activists, has been doing since 2000. At the same time, the vulgar comments about Islam and hostility against Muslims from the communist camp should not be overlooked. Only if there is a sincere willingness to forgive can there be reconciliation and will anti-communist sentiment in Indonesia decrease.

—

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is a research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, US, and a co-founder of the North American branch of Nahdlatul Ulama.

Idul Fitri Unites Indonesia’s Faiths And Acknowledges Our Humanity

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Unlike other Muslim-majority countries, Indonesia has an annual unique tradition of celebrating Idul Fitri, or in its Indonesian term, Lebaran (derived from a Javanese word lebar meaning “the end,” signifying the end of fasting during Ramadan) and Hari Raya, meaning the Great Day. In the archipelago, Idul Fitri is not merely a public holiday for Muslims but also for Indonesians in general, regardless of their ethnic and religious affiliations. With few exceptions, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Hindus, Confucianists, followers of local beliefs and even nonbelievers all celebrate Lebaran with joy as the Indonesian government declares it a national holiday.

Each year, following Idul Fitri, millions of Indonesians from diverse professions and various ethnic and religious groups residing in major cities in Indonesia or even abroad make their traditional homecoming, a custom commonly called mudik (back to a home village), to spend this special day with their families. They also utilize the holiday as a chance to meet with their old friends and former colleagues. It is thus not an exaggeration to state that Idul Fitri is a common cultural attribute of Indonesians, not simply a religious tradition of Muslims. In other words, Idul Fitri is a public festival, founded in religion, but celebrated in one way or another by people of all faiths.

In a sense, Idul Fitri is a kind of master symbol unifying Indonesia’s diverse culture. Borrowing the term of Arnold van Gennep in his classic book “The Rites of Passage,” Idul Fitri can be seen as the “liminal phase [from the Latin limen signifying threshold or edge] of rites de passage,” in which Muslims and non-Muslims celebrate this unusual holiday together without the realities of religious segregation and cultural separation. Boundary maintenance blurs and indeed there is no cultural barrier between Muslims and non-Muslims during Lebaran.

For most Indonesian Muslims, more specifically, the celebration of Idul Fitri is considered to be far more important than fasting during Ramadan. It is significant to note that many Muslims in the archipelago didn’t actually fast at all during Ramadan, or just fasted the first few days of the holy month. Perhaps only santri (students of Islamic boarding schools), urban-based devout Muslims and mualaf (new converts to Islam) kept their fast throughout the month.

Many of the Muslims in this nation, namely the abangan (Javanese Muslims who combine rituals with local customs and traditions) and wong nasional (“real Indonesians,” or Muslims who prioritize national identity over the Arabic origins of religion), make no attempt to maintain the fast — nor do they put up any pretense of doing so. They keep eating, drinking and smoking in public during the fasting month.

Regardless of the fasting, most Indonesians still regard themselves as faithful Muslims and faithfully cheer Lebaran by performing salat (praying) on Idul Fitri (albeit they typically didn’t practice the five daily prayers) and other ritual ceremonies following this holiday. They believe that by conducting salat once a year on this important day, their previous sins and mistakes committed throughout the year will be forgiven by God.

Based on the experience of the plurality of Indonesian Islam, it is thus misleading to state that Muslims worldwide are a monolithic entity performing the same ritual practices. In fact, on the contrary, Muslims are a pluralistic group subscribing to different cultural practices, religious ceremonies and socio-political interests.

The central ritual act of Idul Fitri is a personal begging of forgiveness characteristically patterned in terms of status differences. For instance, the child asks pardon of the parents, the young of the old, the worker of the boss, the politician of the party chief, the follower of the leader, the minister of the president, the student of the teacher, etc. Traditionally, each of these relatively lower status people goes to the home of the higher status one, where he/she is received, usually with tea and snacks, to formally beg the pardon of the host.

The most common phrase to state during halal bihalal (Arabic for a mutual begging of pardon) is as follows: “I request your pardon for my faults, inside and outside” or in Indonesian, “ mohon maaf lahir dan batin ” (“forgive my sins, both with regard to the world as well as those within me”).

The meaning of this act is that, in the phrase of the late American anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his book “The Religion of Java,” “The petitioner [usually those holding a lower status] wishes the host [typically those who have an upper class status] to forgive from the depths of his heart any injuries — intended or unintended — which the latter has done to him in the past year, so as to lighten the weight of his sins.” It is imperative to point out that this kind of annual forgiveness ritual is not only conducted by Muslims to their Muslim brethren — many non-Muslims during the days of Idul Fitri also perform this fine act toward others, religious beliefs aside. Each year, I receive the Idul Fitri greeting along with the forgiveness ritual from my non-Muslim friends.

Although begging pardon from those having a “lower status” — economically, socially and politically — to those holding a “higher status” by visiting their houses is common, it is also significant for those who are well-off to beg forgiveness of those holding a lower status, such as the boss of the employee, the leader of the follower, the government of the citizen, etc., to signify that we’re human — we all make mistakes and have our faults. As well, in this Great Day, it is critical for the perpetrator of political and religious violence to ask for forgiveness from the wounded. This makes Idul Fitri a means of mutual forgiveness, thus the objective and the soul of Idul Fitri, which literally means “return to human’s natural tendency or character,” as free from sins and mistakes as a newborn baby, can be achieved.

With these human rituals, Idul Fitri reveals the underlying unity of Indonesian people, regardless of their faiths and beliefs, since it is the most festive and the most genuinely collective of the country’s ceremonies.

Observing the Lebaran tradition, anthropologist Geertz aptly states: “In a broad, diffuse and very general way, it [Idul Fitri] stresses the commonalities among all Indonesians, stresses tolerance concerning their differences [and] stresses their oneness as a nation. It is, in fact, the most truly nationalist of their rituals, and, as such, it indicates the reality and the attainability of what is now the explicit ideal of all Indonesians — cultural unity and continuing social progress.” Although Geertz’s observation was made back in the 1950’s when he conducted ethnographic fieldwork on religion and social change in a small village in East Java, his comments are still valid in Indonesia today.

Giving the qualities and characteristics of Idul Fitri depicted above, it is hence not hyperbole to state that Idul Fitri is — and can be used as — a cultural means of establishing social integration, religious tolerance, interfaith brotherhood and national reconciliation so that interreligious relations in this country will improve in the years to come.

“Merry Idul Fitri to all Indonesians, and forgive me of any faults.”

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is the deputy chairman of North America’s Nahdlatul Ulama and a research fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Beyond the myth of Western-Muslim clash

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Since the rise of so-called “Western civilization” and “modernity,” the relationship between “the West” and the “Muslim world” is highly dynamic and unpredictable, marked by a constant ebb and flow. The encounter between the two has been marked by suspicions, tensions, clashes, and violent conflicts, as well as by cooperation and dialogue across these deep plural societies and overlapping cultures. During the Cold War, for instance, the U.S. forged alliances with some Muslim-majority countries to destroy communist regimes and weaken their influences from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Throughout the Afghan War from 1979 to 1989, the U.S. also worked hand in hand with some state and non-state Muslim allies, including the Mujahidin, to oppose — successfully — the “Red Army.”

However, since the U.S. declared “War on Terror,” followed by the deployment of military forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, following the terrorist attacks of the Pentagon and World Trade Center on 9/11, the relations between the two deteriorated. The phrase “War on Terror” was popularized in particular by former US president George W. Bush to denote a global military, political, legal, and ideological campaign against Islamist terrorist networks and militant Muslim organizations that were perceived as posing a threat to the U.S. and Western interests.

The U.S. government repeatedly said that the global war on terror and the political interventions in the “Muslim world” were aimed at establishing democracy or assisting Muslim regimes to secure democratic governance. However, many Muslims, unfortunately, responded to this rhetoric with pessimism. As shown by the Gallup Poll, Muslims around the world strongly doubt the United States is trying to build democracy in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim-majority world. The Gallup poll (www.gallup.com), conducted in 10 Muslim countries that comprise 80 per cent of the world’s Muslim population, found that an “average of only 31 per cent of respondents per nation believed US objectives were centered on building democracy and peace.”

**The Innocence of Muslims and “clash of civilization” thesis**

Western-Muslim tension continues nowadays following the appearance of the American-made anti-Islam film, Innocence of Muslims. This movie provoked a firestorm of mass demonstrations against the U.S. from Libya and Egypt to Pakistan and Indonesia resulting in deaths, injuries, and destructions of public buildings and facilities. Many Muslim protesters, exploited by Islamist radical groups and America haters, condemned the US and accused Americans of behind the making of the movie. Even worse, anti-American Islamist leaders suggested that Muslim-majority countries discontinue their diplomatic relations with the US, despite the fact that the Obama administration strongly denounced the film and its offensive message as well as requested Google to remove the movie from You Tube.

Furthermore, an unlikely coalition of anti-American and anti-Islamic groups and commentators claimed in a rush to judgment that the violent protests against the movie are a sign of a “clash of civilizations” — to borrow the title of Samuel Huntington’s popular thesis (though the term was originally applied to Western-Muslim relations by Bernard Lewis). The same groups and commentators saw the movie and its aftermath as evidence of a fundamental incompatibility between Islam and Western ideas of freedom and liberal democracy. For both pro-Islamist and pro-Western essentialists, Islam and democracy are considered two distinct and radically incompatible values and worldviews.

Islam and democratic civility

Contrary to essentialist claims, however, recent studies on Muslim politics and civic culture show that major portions of the Muslim-majority world from North Africa to Southeast Asia have made significant progress with regard to democracy, civil liberties, religious freedom, civic pluralism, citizenship, and feminism The question of whether there is a fundamental compatibility between Islam and democracy is thus no longer interesting or useful. As anthropologist Jenny White has argued, the question should not be whether democracy is compatible with Islam, but rather “to what extent particular state ideologies nourish civic culture.”

Prominent scholars of Islam such as sociologist Asef Bayat and anthropologist Robert Hefner further argue that the question of the compatibility or incompatibility between Islam and democracy is ultimately misguided since democratic ideals per se have little to do with the essence of any religion. In their fine works (e.g. Making Islam Democratic and Civil Islam), both Bayat and Hefner have reminded us that social and political movements across the Muslim-majority world from the Middle East to Indonesia — pioneered by progressive Islamic leaders, human right activists, intellectuals, students, youth and women groups, and civil society institutions — have been successful in constructing “an inclusive faith that embraces democratic civility.” Some Muslim countries practice limited or “illiberal democracy,” while others, like Indonesia, adopt more liberal forms of democracy.

The internal diversity of “the Muslim world” and “the West”

Accordingly, essentialist constructions of an absolute opposition between the “Muslim world” and “Western democracy” are theoretically and empirically problematic.

This is true for the reasons noted above, but also because such a constructed opposition clearly does not account for the diversity and dynamism of culture and agency both in the “Muslim world” and the “Western world.” Even in America, as the champion of liberal democracy and civil rights, there have been growing numbers of religious people and conservative groups, so that dubbing the U.S. a “liberal nation” is clumsy at best. America is also the home to Muslims, not only Christians or Jews, who shape, or are reshaped by, American values, cultures, and politics. In other words, Islam is also part of American beliefs and practices, and Muslims are an integral part of American societies.

One must also emphasize that many non-Muslim groups — Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and many others — are a demographically and culturally significant part of many so-called “Muslim countries.” Many of the world’s largest and most important Muslim-majority countries have large non-Muslim minorities, such as Egypt with its Coptic community, Syria with its diverse Christian churches, Iraq with its Chaldean Christians and Sabean Mandeans, and Indonesia with its Balinese Hindus, Buddhists, Confucianists, and millions of Christians.

Ironically, while the essentialist scholars and followers of their views see “a one-note caricature of Islam,” to quote John Esposito, most Muslims “are gravitating toward a position that does not see the West as monolithic.” Indeed, the Muslim opposition to the West is more about policy than principles. In other words, most anti-American Muslim hardliners and Islamist conservative groupings are primarily motivated by US foreign policy toward Muslim countries, not by religion or culture. In fact, as the Gallup survey results indicate, many Muslims around the globe admire and praise American achievements of science, technology, as well as academic and political freedom.

It may be more accurate to conclude, then, that the real “clash” is not between the “Muslim world” and “the West” but between the extremist essentialists on both sides.

Recent protests and civilian uprisings in some parts of some Muslim countries against the American-made anti-Islamic and anti-Prophet Muhammad movie, The Innocence of Muslims, do not necessarily reflect Muslim hatred toward Western or American culture. In fact, the original Muslim protests against the film have been exploited and manipulated by some anti-American Islamist radical groups to advance their political agendas. Hence, in some Muslim countries, such as Libya and Indonesia, there has been a wave of counter-protests and strong criticism against the Islamist protesters and America haters for manipulating the initial demonstrations against the movie and for using violent means to promote their objectives.

Bridging the gap

Rather than exaggerate the myth of Western-Muslim conflict, it is urgent that Muslims, non-Muslims, and Westerners revise their essentialist views of the other. This means improving their relations with other societies, identifying common misunderstandings, recognizing the internal diversity and pluralism on both sides, and most importantly, respecting each other’s cultures and traditions. Such peacebuilding efforts are imperative.

They are imperative not least because many Americans, especially in the post-9/11 climate, conflate the mainstream Muslim majority with the beliefs and actions of an extremist minority. Equally, Muslims sometimes confuse American society as a whole with the rude and disrespectful actions of anti-Islamic individuals — such as the makers of the Innocence of Muslims or Terry Jones, the pastor of Dove World Outreach Center, who planned to burn the Qur’an in 2010, some religious conservative groups, and some policy makers in Washington, D.C.

Modernities will continue to be diverse and they will certainly continue to contend with each other. But their ongoing mutual contention and competition will be far less violent and far more fruitful if we can dispense with the destructive essentialisms recently in evidence in both Western and Muslim-majority societies.

—

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is cultural anthropologist, author, interfaith activist, and columnist. An Indonesian-born scholar of Islam, he is now a visiting research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame. A graduate of Boston University, Sumanto is co-founder and vice chairman of the American branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest moderate Islamic organization whose membership is more than 50 million in the country. Sumanto has authored, co-authored, and edited 13 books in Indonesian, and written dozens of journal articles and hundreds of popular essays.

Nahdlatul Ulama: good governance and religious tolerance in Indonesia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Notwithstanding its considerable contribution to Indonesian politics and cultures, Nahdlatul Ulama (which literally means the “awakening of religious scholars”), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, has been poorly understood in the West. While most Western political commentators and policy makers absorb an almost daily dose of news or intelligence regarding Islamist extremist organizations or terrorist groups in the predominantly Muslim countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, there is far less information and understanding of Muslim peacemakers, moderate-progressive groups, and organizations that advocate for tolerance and pluralism. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is one of the world’s foremost Muslim associations devoted to the spread of the Islamic message of justice, peace, and tolerance.

Established in 1926, NU today has a membership of more than 50 million. Founded as a critical reaction to the growth of Indonesia’s Wahhabi reformist and modernist groups, which were attempting to shrink Indonesian Muslim, practices of locally inspired religious traditions, cultures, and knowledge, NU developed a reputation as the guardian of traditions – both classical Islamic traditions of knowledge, and local traditions and cultures. Accordingly, NU has been dubbed a “traditionalist Islamic organization”—a label that can be easily misconstrued. Indeed, NU serves as one of Indonesia’s leading Muslim institutions dedicated to the protection and attainment not only of traditional values and practices of Islam, but also citizenship, democratic civility, inter-group conciliation, religious tolerance, and the public good. In this regard, NU is traditional and modern, conservative and progressive alike.

Defending pluralism

Since its founding, NU has conducted numerous large-scale national meetings aimed at evaluating contemporary political, social, and religious trends, and recommending paths forward to policy makers on ways of addressing problems facing both state and society. Attended by thousands of NU members, sympathizers, and Ulama or Kiai (a Javanese term for Muslim clerics and scholars, notably linked to NU), such meetings have provided the organization a platform from which to persuade state and society actors, religious and secular alike, to defend the country’s national pluralist ideology (Pancasila). NU also embraces the national constitution (UUD 1945) as the foundation of nationhood and ethno-religious brotherhood.

In a recent national gathering, Konferensi Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (the Great Conference of NU) recently held in the city of Cirebon in West Java, for example, NU issued a number of fatwas and recommendations concerning religious issues, inter-group relations, and public affairs facing today’s Indonesian societies.

Such advocacy on the part of a respected Islamic organization like NU is necessary for the common good. Since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order dictatorial regime, the archipelago has weathered a wave of small but militant trans-national Islamist groups which have attempted to impose the implementation of Islamic ideology and Shari’a (Islamic Law) as a replacement for Pancasila and UUD 1945, which they considered as secular, Western style, and “un-Islamic.” For NU, however, both Pancasila and UUD 1945, which guarantee freedom of religion and association for all Indonesian citizens regardless of their ethno-religious affiliations, are regarded as Islamic and suitable for Indonesian cultures and societies due to their roots in Islamic teachings, discourses, and practices of pacification. NU also points to the cultural grounding of these founding documents within Indonesia’s rich traditions of tolerance and cooperation.

Indonesian archipelago: “pluralist endowments”

The Indonesian archipelago, once described by historian Denys Lombard as having been blessed with an abundance of “pluralist endowments,” is home to the ancient philosophy of bhinneka tunggal ika (“oneness amid diversity”), which later became an official national motto of Indonesia. This philosophy inspired the founding fathers of Indonesia to create the inclusive state ideology of Pancasila and the state constitution, UUD 1945. NU leaders such as Syaikh Hasyim Ash’ari, K.H. Wahab Chasbullah, K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim worked hand-in-hand with secular nationalists, both Muslims and non-Muslims, to create a public culture of citizenship and establish a political basis for a deeply plural society in the newly established nation-state of Indonesia. Embracing the ideology of Pancasila, they challenged reformist and Islamist aspirations of establishing an Islamic state in the country – a legacy that continues today through NU’s defense of pluralism and the constitution.

Struggling for good governance

NU has historically pressed Indonesian political elites and government officials to move beyond procedural democracy, and to embrace a “substantial democracy” that is typified by freedom from “money politics” or risywah siyasiyah (vote buying), voluntarily participation in elections, and the pursuit of the common public goods rather than sectarian interests. Moreover, NU pushes for the government to use tax money in an appropriate manner, supporting causes such as improving education, developing the economy, and assisting the poor. NU leaders threaten that failure by the government to work towards such goals would result in the issuance of fatwa’s that outlaw Muslims to pay taxes. Chairman of the NU Supreme Council, K.H.M.A. Sahal Mahfudh, has argued that the primary job of the government is to “create social justice, prosperity, and global peace” as well as to “protect ethno-religious minorities.” Therefore, he has affirmed that as long as a ruler contributes to the public good society is obliged to obey the ruler, but if not “they are free from such obligation.”

The NU has historically advocated for good governance in Indonesia, a fact which is highlighted through NU’s opposition to Suharto’s authoritarian New Order. Under the leadership of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, who became leader in 1984, NU evolved into a religiously-inspired civil society force aimed at providing a counterbalance to the power of Suharto’s regime, and struggling for the achievement of global justice, democracy, citizenship, and freedom of religion. Despite Suharto’s tireless efforts to weaken the political influences of NU’s Ulama, K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, along with other anti-New Order NU leaders, continued to resist Suharto’s regime by developing unique nonviolent models of opposition and “cultural protests.”

Protecting religious minorities

NU works together with secular and religious forces to secure religious freedom, guarantee interreligious tolerance, and to defend Indonesia’s plural ethno-religious societies from violent threats attempts posed by minority extremist groupings. This commitment to religious freedom and human rights was demonstrated through K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid’s instruction that NU’s youth wing, Banser, send its members to churches across the country in order to protect Christian places of worship and to guarantee the safety of Christians, especially during Christmas. One of the Banser’s members, Riyanto, tragically died while protecting the Eben Heizer Church in Mojokerto, East Java, from a terrorist bomb attack in 2000. Under the leadership of K.H. Sa’id Aqiel Siradj, NU continues to send thousands of Banser members to guard churches from “extremist onslaught.”

In a world torn by conflict between competing ideologies, Indonesia “continues to produce men and women whose nonsectarian vision remains every bit as pluralistic, tolerant and spiritual as that of our founding fathers” (Bisri & Taylor, Strategic Review 2:3, 2012). NU is just one of Indonesia’s many Muslim groupings and religious associations that are ardently devoted to extend the very fundamental teaching of Islam and the Quran as rahmatan lil ‘alamin—“a source of love and compassion for all humanity,” and to ensure that this message is embodied on earth.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is a cultural anthropologist, author, interfaith activist, and columnist. An Indonesian-born scholar of Islam, he is now a visiting research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame. A graduate of Boston University, Sumanto is co-founder and vice chairman of the American branch of Nahdlatul Ulama. Sumanto has authored, co-authored, and edited 13 books in Indonesian, and written dozens of journal articles and hundreds of popular essays.

Interfaith Women’s Peacemaking in Indonesia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

In 1999, in response to bloody communal violence that broke out in eastern Indonesia, a handful of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim women leaders and activists established the interfaith alliance Gerakan Perempuan Peduli, the Concerned Women’s Movement (GPP). Based in Ambon, the provincial capital of Maluku and the site of the most severe violence between Christians and Muslims, the group was one of the earliest interreligious civil society associations that initiated meetings and activities across religious boundaries to quell conflict and pursue peace in the conflict zone.

The idea to establish GPP came first from Catholic nuns, notably Sisters Francesco Moens PBHK, Brigita Renyaan, and Getruda Yamlean. The idea was supported by the Catholic vice governor of Maluku, Paula Renyaan. In subsequent clandestine meetings, the members discussed strategies and tactics to build peaceful campaigns and a nonviolent movement.

As the conflict raged over the next five years, the group engaged in various methods of peacebuilding and nonviolent action, ranging from street marches, mass mobilizations, civic education, anti-violence trainings, and peace sermons, to art performances, storytelling, and interreligious gatherings. They appealed with some success to their husbands and sons not to be involved in fighting. They worked together on information campaigns, trauma counseling, and training workshops for mothers and youth, in the hope reaching those particularly vulnerable to provocation.

“As the conflict raged, the women’s group engaged in peacebuilding and nonviolent action, from street marches to interreligious gatherings to training workshops.”

During the violence, Christian fighters wore red headbands while Muslim jihadists used white ones. The GPP activists wore and distributed green headbands with the writing “Stop Violence” as a sort of cultural resistance against those wearing the red and white headbands. After mobilizing large numbers of citizens to wear the “Stop Violence” headbands, GPP initiated a draft manifesto titled “Conscience of Women.” The draft called for government authorities to stop the violence and for Christians and Muslims to reconcile. The draft warned of decreasing food supplies as an effect of the conflict and underlined that violence threatened their children’s future by damaging school facilities.

The petition was approved and signed by a variety of members ranging from petty traders to religious leaders and high-ranking bureaucrats. Women peace activists marched to the provincial government office to read and submit the “Conscience of Women” to the governor of Maluku. The Maluku government adopted the points, including the call for the government and authorities to stop violence and rebuild brotherhood, which later became the embryo of the government-sponsored peace accord.

FORMING AMBASSADORS OF PEACE

GPP members also held secret meetings with child soldiers of militia groups. The women activists persistently approached the children to persuade them to stop fighting. Some of the militia members eventually responded and became “ambassadors of peace,” actively lobbying among their peers.

By bridging gaps between Christians and Muslims and engaging militia members in a series of informal meetings, the GPP influenced Maluku’s male leaders to bring local fighters into clandestine meetings that supported the eventual peace accord and reconciliation. Driven by the GPP’s success in facilitating intergroup cooperation, the government used the group’s models to sponsor interreligious peacebuilding initiatives involving selected members of Christian and Muslim militia groups and religious leaders.

Peace messengers played a key role in preventing the escalation of communal violence in the region.

The government also appointed two key GPP members to be delegates in the government-sponsored Malino II Peace Treaty. Elite members of the GPP were among those who composed the terms of the agreement that was signed in February 2002.

After the Treaty, women’s groups continued peacebuilding activities and sponsored hundreds of workshops that helped to recruit thousands of peacebuilders across the Moluccan islands, local peace messengers who played a key role in preventing the escalation of communal violence in the region.

A SUCCESS STORY

The GPP had a tremendous impact on ending violence in Ambon and was one of Maluku’s successful stories of interreligious collaboration. Its legacy can still be witnessed in today’s Ambon. Although the GPP no longer exists, activities to promote interreligious reunification and conflict prevention in post-war Ambon persist, led by two women’s organizations that are the offshoots of GPP: Genuine Ambassadors for Peace (GAP) and Young Ambassadors for Peace (YAP).

“We believe,” GPP co-founder Dr. Etha Hendriks said, “that our activities were able to create public awareness about the significance and beauty of peace and togetherness.” Their work continues.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby, a cultural anthropologist, is a visiting research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Sectarian Conflict and Grassroots Peacebuilding in Central Java

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Phelim Kine, deputy director of the Asia division at Human Rights Watch, offered a damning portrait of the world’s largest Muslim country when he wrote in a 2013 Huffington Post article that “across Indonesia, religious minorities, including several Protestant groups, Shia, and the Ahmadiyah, who consider themselves Muslims but are considered blasphemers by some other Muslims, are targets of harassment, intimidation, threats and, increasingly, acts of mob violence.”^[1]

No doubt, as others have reported, religiously-inspired anti-pluralist actions, vigilante attacks, Islamist extremism, and terrorism—as well as a spectrum of ethnically, regionally, and religiously-based civilian groupings and paramilitary bands—have figured in Indonesian politics since the downfall of Suharto’s New Order dictatorial regime in 1998.^[2] However, not all areas of the country have experienced sectarian violence. Not all Indonesian Muslims are fanatics or zealots, nor are Muslim radicals the only agents of conflict. On the contrary, there are many instructive and inspiring examples across contemporary Indonesia of local leaders and communities that have produced and sustained religious harmony.

***

The province of Central Java challenges the “conventional wisdom” that contemporary Indonesia is seething with religious intolerance and Islamist radicalism.^[3] Examples of peaceful civil coexistence, religious harmony, and grassroots peacebuilding abound, and local actors have been able to manage their differences in fruitful ways.

In the regency of Wonosobo, for instance, Shi‘a, Ahmadis, and followers of a Javanese form of “local Islam” called Islam Aboge,^[4] have for years lived peacefully beside mainstream majority Muslims, as well as adherents of Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and local beliefs. Located in the famous Dieng Plateau in the southern highlands of Central Java, Wonosobo, with 771,000 inhabitants, is home to the Nahdliyin, followers of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Whereas in some regions, Muslim hard-liners have been involved in harsh attacks against Ahmadis and Shi‘a, who they deemed blasphemers of Islamic teachings and the Prophet’s companions, Wonosobo’s Nahdliyin and Muslim villagers have a long-established friendship with the followers of Shi‘ism, Ahmadiyah, and Islam Aboge. These groups customarily engaged in various joint programs and mundane activities—both secular and religious—such as kerja bakti (community service), kenduri (ritual feasts), and tahlilan (communal prayers and ceremonies to venerate the deceased).

Ahmadiyah has existed in Wonosobo since 1924, when the preacher Sabitun introduced it to the region. At present, Wonosobo is home to some 6,000 Ahmadis, 250 Shi‘a, and roughly 200 Islam Aboge followers. This great achievement of peaceful interreligious coexistence cannot be divorced from the marvelous work of the Wonosobo regent Abdul Kholiq Arif, who is also a local leader of NU. Regent Arif often states that religious minorities are also Indonesian citizens whose political, cultural, economic, and religious rights need to be protected.

To safeguard interreligious relations, uphold interfaith peace, and build trust among religions, Arif has involved all of the region’s religious elements, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, Confucians, Sunnis, Shi‘a, and Ahmadis, in the local government-sponsored Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama (Forum for Communication for Religious Adherents). This forum serves as an avenue for engaging in what Leonard Swidler has described as a “deep dialogue” among religions. Moreover, Arif has proposed a regional law for regulating interreligious relationships aimed at protecting religious minorities’ rights. It is notable that Arif is concerned with protecting the rights not just of religious minorities, but also those of political minorities (such as ex-members of the Indonesian Communist Party or victims of the 1965-66 national tragedy), and of gender minorities (such as gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgenders). To balance his “civilized, liberal governmental programs,” Arif has involved—and engaged with—state and non-state actors, including the military, police, village leaders, adat chiefs, and street hoodlums, in order to nurture a sense of belonging that ultimately contributes to peace and security in the area. Religious leaders from Ahmadiyah, Shi‘ism, Islam Aboge, and non-Islamic religions also recognize his role in creating and sustaining the peace and religious tolerance in Wonosobo.^[5]

The region of Jepara on the northern coast of Central Java is another example of how local religious communities have been able to handle their discrepancies in ways that foster civil cooperation. Whereas in some areas of the country—such as Sampang, Bogor, and Lombok—Shi‘a have been the targets of violence and hostilities by Sunnis, in Jepara the two religious groups have long maintained good relations. Conversions from Sunni to Shi‘i, as well as the reverse, do not arouse sectarian rage in the region. As elsewhere in Indonesia, Sunni Muslims, most of them members of NU, have been the dominant group in Jepara. Although only a few hundred Shi‘a live in this region, they feel safe to practice their beliefs and traditions. In fact, they have built a Java-style Islamic seminary, Pesantren Darut Taqrib, in the village of Banjaran. The leader of this pesantren, Miqdad Turkan, said, “We have a good friendship between Sunni and Shi‘a followers. We respect each other regardless of our beliefs. We also frequently arrange social activities such as blood drives and helping disaster victims.”^[6] Sunni and Shi‘i leaders in the region such as Achmad Zaelani and Abdul Qadir Bafaqih attest that people in Jepara have understood plurality not only as a unique feature of this area, but also as a rahmah, or a blessing from God, that everyone needs to esteem and safeguard.

Christian-Muslim harmony also prevails in Jepara. The narratives of Christian-Muslim peace and tolerance can be found, for instance, in the districts of Pekoso and Tempur, where Christians and Muslims have worked together not only in mundane activities but also in religious ones such as celebrations of religious holidays like Christmas and Eid al-Fitr. Widely known as a model of religious harmony, these areas are home to Muslims and Christians linked to Gereja Injili Tanah Jawa (GITJ), a Javanese Mennonite Church. Located in the highlands of Muria, the regions became well known because the GITJ church is fittingly located in front of the Asyuhada Mosque. Both church and mosque were built together by Christians and Muslims. During Christmas, Muslims, including village officials and religious figures, attend church, greet their Christian fellows, and help cook for the Christmas celebration. Christians do the same during Eid al-Fitr. Christians freely go to the mosque to attend prayer sessions while Muslims freely attend church services. To avoid time conflicts in religious services and prayer sessions, church and mosque officials always discuss schedules of worship and religious activities.

In addition to visiting and helping each other in everyday life and during the holidays, residents have been able to freely convert without fear―a situation that sharply contrasts with that of West Java. A local village leader said, “Converting to another religion is a common thing at the moment here. Muslims can convert to Christians, Christians can convert to Muslims. No one will attack them. We believe in the principle of ‘be to you your religion and be to me my religion.’” As an outcome of free conversion, some families consist of both Christians and Muslims. The village chief, a Muslim named Sutoyo, said that keeping the peace—which he believes to be a sanctioned mandate from the village’s ancestors—is much more fruitful than engaging in discord and violence.^[7]

Similar stories of Christian-Muslim tolerance and cooperation can be found elsewhere across the province of Central Java—in Solo, Boyolali, Kebumen, Purwokerto, Salatiga, Semarang, Kudus, Kendal, Blora, Pati, and Batang—as well as in certain areas of “outer Java,” including in the “conflict zones” of Ambon, Halmahera, and Poso.^[8] In Solo, Muslims and Christians, championed by courageous religious leaders such as KH Muhammad Dian Nafi and Rev. Paulus Hartono, have cultivated a solid friendship and collaborated on humanitarian service initiatives, interreligious dialogues, and peacemaking activities. Dian Nafi and Paulus Hartono built the Forum for Peace across Religions and Groups as a cultural medium for interfaith gatherings aimed at transforming destructive conflict into productive peace. Both religious leaders have also worked together for years to promote humanity and harmony with some members of Hizbullah, a Solo-based Islamist paramilitary group not related to Lebanon’s Shi‘i Hezbollah. Previously involved in various sectarian conflicts, many members of this group have now become peace activists and humanitarian workers.^[9]

In Semarang, the provincial capital of Central Java, a group of Muslims and non-Muslims (Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Hindus, Confucians, and even atheists) led by Tedi Kholiludin, Ronny Chandra Kristanto, and Lukas Awi Tristanto, built a House of Peace (“Pondok Damai”), an informal forum of interfaith gatherings. The group’s main activities include retreats in which participants share stories and discuss issues facing religious/non-religious communities, as well as visits to sacred sites associated with certain religious group.^[10] Such activities have built mutual trust and understanding among the groups.

Additionally, members of the Institute for the Study of Social and Religion have long worked across religious divides to provide advocacy for victims of religious violence, protect religious minority rights, and establish religious freedom and peace in the area.^[11] Semarang is also a base for an interfaith/ethnic group called Kopi Semawis. Coordinated by Harjanto Halim, a Chinese philanthropist and interfaith activist, the group has played a major role in keeping the region free from radicalism and intolerance.

***

Indonesia is not immune to ethno-religious tensions, conflicts, and violence, some of which have been triggered by the appearance of transnational Islamist groups and others by the state apparatus and locally-based Muslim and Christian groups.^[12] But, as the province of Central Java illustrates, there are also numerous examples of interfaith grassroots peacebuilding―of local social actors working tirelessly and successfully to build trust and cooperation across ethno-religious lines. Nevertheless, grassroots peacemaking alone cannot create a stable, enduring peace. The future of interfaith relations and intergroup peace in this archipelago will certainly depend on serious, positive collaborations between society and state actors. State-society synergy is the key to future strategic peacebuilding.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby
Department of General Studies, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

[1] Phelim Kine, “Washington’s Statue of Hypocrisy: Putting a Smiley Face on Indonesia’s Religious Intolerance,” The Huffington Post, 20 August 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/phelim-kine/washingtons-statue-of-hyp_b_3785936.html.

[2] The Dutch scholar of Indonesian Islam, Martin van Bruinessen, characterizes post-Suharto Indonesia as an era of conservatism and radicalism, typified by the growth of radical Islamic organizations and hard-line Muslims. A number of research/advocacy centers such as the Setara Institute for Peace and Democracy (Jakarta) and the Institute for the Study of Social and Religion (Semarang) have well-documented cases of religious intolerance and religious freedom violations in contemporary Indonesia. See Martin van Bruinessen, ed., Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn” (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). The reports of the two institutes on issues around anti-pluralist acts and religious intolerance can be seen at http://www.setara-institute.org and http://elsaonline.com.

[3] The contributions of “grassroots peacemakers” in keeping the peace in their areas can be seen at http://edsus.tempo.co/Perekat-republik.

[4] Aboge is an acronym for “Alif Rebo Wage,” a Javanese form of local Islam (sometimes called “Kejawen”), which is mostly organized under the organization Paguyuban Tunggul Sabdo Jati.

[5] See the role of Regent Arif in maintaining the peace in his territory at http://edsus.tempo.co/Perekat-republik. Regent Arif is an example of a “civil state,” namely a political ruler who has done an effective job governing society by establishing democratic rules and conducting tolerant, pluralist acts.

[6] See the Sunni-Shi‘i harmonious relations in Jepara at http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2012/11/28/feature-03.

[7] See how Jepara’s Muslims and Christians overcome their tensions and disagreements in order to maintain peace and harmony in Camelia Pasandaran, “Central Java Village Shows that Unity in Diversity is Possible,” Jakarta Globe, 17 January 2014, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/central-java-village-shows-that-unity-in-diversity-is-possible.

[8] Sumanto Al Qurtuby, “Peacebuilding in Indonesia: Christian-Muslim Alliances in Ambon Island,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 24, 3 (2013): 349-367 and “Religious Women for Peace and Reconciliation in Contemporary Indonesia,” International Journal on World Peace XXXI, 1 (2014): 27-58.

[9] Sumanto Al Qurtuby, “Engaging Extremists Key to Peace,” Jakarta Globe, 29 January 2013, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/engaging-extremists-key-to-peace/568211.

[10] See “Membumikan Dialog Agama,” Koran Tempo, 30 October 2011.

[11] See http://elsaonline.com.

[12] See International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Christianization and Intolerance”, Asia Briefing No. 114, 24 November, (2010): 1-18.

King Salman’s Historic Visit to Indonesia: Mirror of a Changing Saudi Arabia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

On March 1, 2017 King Salman of Saudi Arabia, accompanied by a 1,500-member entourage, arrived in Indonesia to cheering crowds. Top Indonesian government officials and politicians described the visit as extraordinary, while enthusiastic onlookers in the tens of thousands lined the route taken by the king’s heavily guarded motorcade from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport in Jakarta to the Bogor Presidential Palace.^[1] For days, the Indonesian mass media were saturated with accounts of the king’s visit and activities.

This article examines the outcome and implications of King Salman’s historic trip to Indonesia in March 2017 — the first such visit by a Saudi monarch since King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1906–1975) met with President Suharto in 1970 in Jakarta. The article first provides a brief overview of the bilateral relationship. Next, it considers the extent to which King Salman’s visit succeeded in strengthening diplomatic ties and boosting economic cooperation. The article then examines the visit through the lens of some of the socio-cultural and religious changes that have been taking place in the Kingdom in recent years, which could help dispel some of the negative images of Saudi Arabia held by many Indonesians.

***

Saudi–Indonesian relations have ebbed and flowed throughout their history — sometimes marked by tension and at other times by dialogue and cooperation. In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, for instance, the shared interest in blunting the influence of Iranian Shiism in their respective societies drew Saudi Arabia and Indonesia closer together.^[2] However, the relationship has also been marked by friction; for example, numerous complaints have been lodged regarding the alleged maltreatment by some Saudi employers of Indonesian domestic workers in the Kingdom (especially housemaids).^[3] On the economic front, the level of trade and investment between the two countries has always been relatively low. Since oil prices plummeted, the value of bilateral trade and Saudi foreign direct investment in Indonesia have declined. Meanwhile, statements by local officials and the press have tended to reinforce negative Indonesian attitudes toward Saudi Arabia.^[4]

Against this backdrop, King Salman arrived in Jakarta, on the second leg of a five-nation tour of Asia. The King’s visit to Indonesia culminated in the signing of 11 memoranda of understanding (MOUs), including in the areas of trade, education, health, culture, pilgrimage, tourism, information, science, technology, civil aviation, fisheries, defense, security and combatting transnational crime.^[5] In addition, Indonesian and Saudi companies concluded investment agreements in the housing construction, medical service, power generation, and tourism sectors.^[6] The visit resulted in a Saudi pledge of $8.8 billion in development finance — substantially less than the $25 billion in new investment that the Indonesian side reportedly had hoped to obtain^[7] though far exceeding the sums of previous years. The visit also left unresolved the issues raised by labor activists regarding the treatment of Indonesian migrant workers and the families of Indonesian victims of two deadly accidents in 2015 related to the hajj.

But King Salman’s visit to Indonesia should be viewed not simply not only in terms of what it did or did not accomplish in advancing political and business but also in terms of the image of Saudi Arabia it conveyed and the contribution it might have made to changing Indonesians’ perceptions of Saudi Arabia. Like most societies in other parts of the world, Indonesians have generally tended to regard Saudi Arabia as the fountainhead of strict Salafism (or Wahhabism), which they associate with radicalism and intolerance. The negative image of Saudi Arabia held by many Indonesians prior to the King’s visit was partly attributable to the role played by some Indonesian Islamic studies alumni of Saudi educational institutions as well as Islamist groups that use Saudi as a “religious cloak” for their religious extremist views and actions.^[8]

Expressions of goodwill to all of the country’s religious communities are noteworthy, and might well be remembered as a significant step in countering some of these stereotypes. During the visit, King Salman (and his staff) held a series of interfaith meetings and dialogues with Muslim and non-Muslim leaders and religious scholars, as well as with Chinese and non-Chinese political leaders and business people. The King exchanged handshakes with women and graciously acceded to requests from some of them to be photographed with him. In Bali, King Salman was accompanied by an Indonesian Christian priest conversant in Arabic. He took the opportunity during his multiple meetings with civic and political leaders to laud Indonesia’s remarkable diversity and religious harmony, and to emphasize his personal and his country’s commitment to fight against terrorism, extremism and radicalism as well as to foster tolerance and dialogue across religions and cultures.^[9]

King Salman’s rhetoric and conduct during his visit pleasantly surprised, and perhaps even “shocked” many Indonesians. Images of the interfaith meetings in which he participated and handshakes with female leaders, along with excerpts from the speeches he made, were widely circulated on Indonesian television and radio, the Internet, and social media.

***

King Salman’s visit served as a mirror of shifting phenomena in Saudi Arabia. His warm and enthusiastic engagement with non-Muslims and women leaders, as well as his stance for religious moderation and anti-extremism, reflects rapid social changes taking place in contemporary Saudi society.

In fact, it is fair to say that since the late King Abdullah (1924–2015) assumed power following the death of his half-brother Fahd in 2005, Saudi Arabia has undergone major changes in domestic and global affairs. During his reign, King Abdullah instituted a wide range of reform initiatives ranging from policies on education and women to interfaith dialogue and Islamic moderation, which his successor, King Salman, has continued and built upon.

Commenting on King Abdullah, Rob Sobhani, author of “King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia: A Leader of Consequence,” wrote in Forbes Magazine that the King’s domestic policies, coupled with his active involvement in religious peacemaking and interfaith meetings, has contributed to the creation of a “new climate of dialogue and openness, challenged the obscurantist clerical establishment, created openings for women, and liberalized the economy.”^[10]

Among numerous changes happening in Saudi Arabia, at least four issues deserve special mention: education, religious affairs, interfaith engagement and women’s emancipation. In education, the government has applied a vast scholarship program that has enabled male and female Saudi students to study at the world’s top universities, particularly in North America, Western Europe, and Australia. The program, which provides funds for tuition and living expenses for up to four years, resulted in hundreds of thousands of students pursuing undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in some 25 countries. In future, graduates of these Western schools will almost certainly leave their own mark on the Kingdom’s religious and political reformation.

Moreover, in religious education, the Kingdom has allowed Muslim minorities such as Shiites, who make up roughly three percent of the nation’s total population, and followers of non-Hanbali schools of law (mazhab) to use their own religious texts in schools. The Kingdom also revised national curricula by incorporating non-Hanbali religious traditions. It also permitted Shiites to celebrate publicly their religious holidays. Religious engagement is another breakthrough. Long before King Salman ascended the throne in 2015, the Kingdom had initiated a series of intra-religious meetings with non-Wahhabi and Hanbali leaders, clerics and scholars in the country, including the celebrated Shiite scholar Hasan al-Saffar.^[11]

Both King Abdullah and King Salman deeply engaged with non-Muslim leaders across the world. After subsequent visits to, and encounters with, non-Muslim religious leaders in many parts of the world, the monarchs call for a brotherly and sincere dialogue between believers of all religions. Both King Abdullah and King Salman appealed to Muslim clerics and Wahhabi leaders to engage with their non-Muslim counterparts to build a global, international peace and religious tolerance as well as to forge a cross-religious alliance to fight against extremism and terrorism. The founding of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (based in Vienna) and King Salman Center for Global Peace (based in Malaysia) reflects their commitment to these issues.

In recent years, the Kingdom has also made significant progress with respect to women’s issues. In 2013, signaling a relaxation of the practices of gender segregation, King Abdullah issued a decree appointing 30 women to the previously all-male 150-member Shura Council, an advisory body charged with reviewing laws and questioning ministers. This decree followed one issued two years earlier that had granted women the right to vote and run as candidates in local elections.^[12] Despite strong protests from “old-fashioned” Salafis, King Abdullah stood firm.^[13]

King Salman has continued his brother’s efforts to empower women. His many impressive decisions and policies on women’s issues include a decree that allows women to drive, and that features a less prominent role for the religious police. There are indeed many other signs of progress in increasing the participation of women in the workforce and public affairs — a key objective of Vision 2030.

Conclusion

Years from now, King Salman’s March 2017 visit to Indonesia might well be remembered less for the pomp and pageantry that accompanied his arrival or the 11 MOU’s that were signed than for the image it conveyed of a rapidly changing, more progressive Saudi Arabia. Such changes in social, cultural and religious matters could offer a more favorable environment within which to pursue more expansive diplomatic, business, and cultural relations with the Indonesian government and society in the years to come.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby
Department of General Studies, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

[1] See Nicola Smith, “1,500 people, two Mercedes Benzes, 459 tonnes of luggage and a golden escalator: how the Saudi King travels,” The Telegraph, March 1, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/01/1500-people-two-mercedes-benz-459tonnes-luggage-golden-escalator/.

[2] Merlyna Lim, “Radical Islamism in Indonesia and Its Middle Eastern Connections.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 15, 2 (2011): 31-41; and Mohamed Nawab, “Transnational Islamism and Its Impact in Malaysia and Indonesia.” Middle East Review of International Affairs15, 2 (2011): 42-52.

[3] Graeme Hugo, “Labour Export from Indonesia: An Overview,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 12, 2 (1995): 275-298; Rachel Silvey, “Transnational Domestication: State Power and Indonesian Migrant Women in Saudi Arabia,” Political Geography 23 (2004): 245-264; and Yon Machmudi, “Muslim Intellectual or Housemaids? The Saudi Perceptions of the Indonesian Domestic Workers,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 5, 2 (2011): 225-247.

[4] Fred R. von der Mehden, “Saudi Religious Influence in Indonesia,” Middle East Institute, December 1, 2014, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/saudi-religious-influence-indonesia.

[5] Interview with Ambassador Agus Maftuh Abegebriel, Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia, on April 14, 2017. See also Rachid Hasan, “Landmark visit to Indonesia by King Salman will usher in new era: Envoy,” Arab News, March 1, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1061456/saudi-arabia.

[6] “Saudi Businesses Invest $2.4bn in Indonesia During King Salman’s Visit,” Jakarta Globe, March 2, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, http://jakartaglobe.id/business/saudi-businesses-invest-2-4b-in-indones….

[7] Nivell Rayda, “Indonesia’s Joko Widodo laments Saudi investment of ‘only’ $8.8bn,” The Australian, April 15, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesias-joko-widodo-laments-saudi-investment-of-only-88bn; Krithika Varagur, “Indonesians Air Grievances With Saudi King During Historic Visit,” VOA News, March 2, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-saudi-king-salman-visit/3748266.html.

[8] Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, 1 (2007): 83–94.

[9] See for example, “Saudi king calls for a united fight against terrorism during landmark visit to Indonesia,” Agence France Presse, reported in South China Morning Post, March 2, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2075498/saudi-king-calls-united-fight-against-terrorism-during; and Dandy Koswaraputra, “I appreciate inter-religious unity in Indonesia: King Salman,” The Jakarta Post, March 4, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/04/i-appreciate-inter-religious-unity-in-indonesia-king-salman.html; and “King Salman Calls on Religious Leaders to Maintain Tolerance,” Tempo, March 3, 2017, accessed October 29, 2017, https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/03/03/055852421/King-Salman-Calls-on….

[10] See Rob Sobhani, “Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud: The Most Important Man In The Middle East,” Forbes Magazine, December 17, 2012, accessed October 29, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/12/17/saudi-king-abdullah-bi….

[11] See Mark C. Thompson, Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

[12] In a response to this “controversial” policy, a group of Wahhabi hard-liners and conservative clerics protested on the streets outside the royal palace in Riyadh. They saw the decree as a dangerous change for the country and a violation of Islamic Shariah.

[13] King Abdullah’s remarkable efforts and policies sketched above might provide one important reason why the political unrest that has rocked the Arab and North African region since late 2010 has only lightly touched Saudi Arabia. This may be more important than the “bribery” of the people into obedience and loyalty by means of massive fiscal stimulus and welfare benefits, as many analysts have assumed.

Indonesia’s Islamist Mobilization

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Although Islamist movements are not new in Indonesian history, Islamist mobilization become more noticeable on the country’s political stage after the late President Suharto stepped down in 1998. For the Islamists, the end of Suharto’s authoritarian regime provided impetus to express their religious, cultural, ideological, political and economic interests.

Although there have always been multiple factors that contribute to the rise of Islamist movements in the post-New Order Indonesia, the demise of the Suharto regime has been critical. The fall of Suharto opened the doors to civil liberty, democracy and civic pluralism, but a side-effect of this has been the growth of intolerance, radicalism and Islamic militancy.

Despite notable social, political, and economic developments, post-Suharto Indonesia has also been bedeviled by the influx of local and transnational Islamist groups that have challenged Indonesia’s nascent democracy and fragile pluralism, as well as the image of Indonesian Muslims as tolerant and moderate when compared to their co-religionists in central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Middle East. As a result of the growth of these Islamist groups, the modernist and liberal views of moderate and progressive Muslims are increasingly challenged and even rejected.

Indonesian democracy, hence, provides room for the Islamists to flourish. In the name of freedom and democracy, a variety of Islamist groups have established Islamic centers, organizations, schools, and even political parties across the archipelago. They freely produce Islamic books and other publications (and distribute them to the society through their extensive networks) that are in line with their Islamic ideas, interpretations, and understandings, as well as their socio-political agenda. Although these groups thrive in a democratic system, they paradoxically use these Islamic institutions to disseminate intolerance, ethnocentrism and anti-pluralism, as well as to oppose democracy, which they criticize as a Western secular product.

U. S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen (left), meets with Indonesian President Suharto at his residence in Jakarta on January 14, 1998.

Multiple Types of Islamist Groups

It is imperative to underline that not all Islamist groups commit physical violence, and it is a mistake to claim that Islamist mobilizations always takes violent or radical form. Much as certain sects of Judaism and Christianity push their adherents to improve personal piety, many Islamic revivalist movements encourage Muslims to become more observant.

Peaceful or less-violent Islamist mobilizations may comprise the following actions: forming political parties, contesting elections, establishing alliances, developing state–civil society partnerships, and starting civil society organizations. It also may consist of working with government agencies to espouse Syariah–based policies. Violent or radical Islamist mobilizations may include attacks on property, acts of intimidation, or targeting individuals or groups that oppose the Islamists’ goals or strategic choices, minority religious sects, minority ethnic groups, and certain segments of the population, as well as rioting, civilian unrest, communal violence, or rebellion.

Examples of non-violent Islamists include Tablighi Jamaat, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, or some Salafi (or neo-Salafi) groups, while organizations such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front), Laskar Jihad (Jihad Forces), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Jihadist Council), Forum Umat Islam (Islamic Umma Forum), Jamaah Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood), and Koalisi Nasional Anti-Syiah (Anti-Shia National Alliance) can be categorized as violent, radical Islamist groups.

Much literature on Indonesia’s Islamist movements puts emphasis on the destructive roles of the violent, radical Islamist groups. Only a handful scholars that dedicated to the study of less-violent Islamist movements.

Jakarta’s Islamist Mobilizations during Gubernatorial Election

Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election was one of the most controversial of the post-Suharto era. It was so because the election was preceded by a series of violence, tension, uproar, terror, hatred, intimidation, racism, ethnocentrism, and mobilization of sectarian sentiments by multiple Islamist groups.

In the first round of the election, the Islamists’ support was divided between Anies Baswedan (Anies), of Arab Hadrami origin, and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the son of former Indonesian president Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, in the second round (Agus lost in the first round), they were all united against the incumbent candidate Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known by his nickname Ahok, a Christian–Chinese) and his running mate Djarot Saiful Hidayat (Djarot). ¹

Although tensions between supporters of the candidates were evident before the first round of the election, the fierce conflict and competition took place in the second round which pitted Anies against Ahok. Concerned that their candidates (Anies and his running mate Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno, who is known by his nickname Sandi, a businessman) would lose, Islamists mobilized and intimidated Jakarta residents through various means: mass rallies, public gatherings, religious sermons, Friday sermons, billboards, posters, and social media, among others. Islamist and their political allies who backed Anies-Sandi routinely mobilized ordinary masses and “cheerleaders” of Islamism for marches, Friday sermons in town squares, prayers in carriageways, and various public meetings. Islamist clerics provided doctrinal underpinnings to this mobilization by using Qur’anic texts and Islamic discourses to provide theological and religious basis for the support for Anies. Through religious sermons, they regularly preached that, for Muslims, selecting a Muslim (i.e. Anies) as their political and governmental leader is compulsory (wajib), and it is unlawful (haram) to choose a non-Muslim (i.e. Ahok).

Islamist leaders, furthermore, used (or misused) mosques, Islamic centers, television channels, and other means to intimidate Muslims saying that those who choose Ahok would enter Hell after the death. They also threatened Muslims by saying that they would not pray for nor bury the bodies of those who supported Ahok. Worst yet, Islamists terrorized Jakarta residents, threatening that if Ahok won the election they would transform Jakarta into “hell” by attacking Chinese, Christians, and Ahok supporters. They routinely warned people of the “May Tragedy” in Jakarta in 1998 when the Chinese population became target of violence by angry mobs (Kingsbury 2005; Sidel 2006). Worth noting is the fact that various Islamist groups which hitherto had their own differences with each other were suddenly united in opposition to Ahok who they saw as the “common enemy of Islam”, despite the fact that Ahok’s running mate, Djarot, is a devout Muslim.

In the event, these Islamist mobilizations proved successful when Anies eventually defeated Ahok by winning 57.95% of the votes (Ahok won 42.05%). Several post-mortems suggest a great number of Jakarta residents, particularly Muslims, did not cast votes for Ahok especially in the second round because they: (1) were afraid of the recurrence of anti-Chinese / Christian riots, (2) feared for breaking the rules of the Qur’an and God’s punishment, (3) were worried that if they or their family members died, no one would pray for and bury their bodies, and (4) wanted to obey the “Qur’anic injunction” that required the faithful to support Muslim candidates for political leadership. It was evident that religion and Islamic identity mattered in the Jakarta gubernatorial election.

Factors of Jakarta’s Radical Islamist Mobilizations

According to media reports, a major rallying point for Islamists in the Ahok controversy was an allegation of blasphemy. This allegation was based on a video edited and uploaded by Buni Yani, a supporter of Anies Baswedan, on social media which conveyed the impression that Ahok had deliberately misquoted the Qur’an. The video catalyzed widespread protests among large segments of the Muslim community, and prompted calls for his arrest on charges of blasphemy (for which he was eventually convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two years).

However, it is incorrect to state that the Ahok’s speech was the main reason for the Islamist mobilization, for Islamist resentment against the incumbent was already building up prior to the controversy. Recognized as an effective if somewhat abrasive governor, Ahok’s focus on governance, anti-corruption and pluralism ran athwart local political and business interests that eventually joined forces with Islamists to undermine and eventually challenge him. Their campaign to unseat Ahok was predicated on: (1) mobilizing Muslims to defend the faith (2) conducting mass rallies, (3) creating a sectarian mood with hate speeches, (4) abusing mosques for political purposes, (5) interpreting religious texts and discourses to justify their agenda, and (6) bribery.

In other words, radical Islamist mobilization proved a medium to pursue economic-political-ideological aims. Islamic narratives and ethnic identity were tools used in service of political interests.

Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, Indonesia is the largest mosque in Southeast Asia and the third largest Sunni mosque in term of capacity.

Indonesia is not only Jakarta

However, it is imperative to underline that developments surrounding the Jakarta gubernatorial elections should not be seen as representative of patterns of growing religiosity in Indonesian society. For a start, there were significant numbers of Chinese and non-Muslims who voted for Anies, just as there were Muslims who voted for Ahok. Furthermore, there were 101 regions (provinces, districts or municipalities) across Indonesia that conducted direct elections for governor, resident or mayor in 2017, yet it was only Jakarta that witnessed the “unholy alliance” between radical Islamists and political and business interests stoke the flams of secularism for purposes of mobilization to advance their own agendas. Such mobilization was noticeably absent in other contests that featured non-Muslim and ethnic Chinese candidates, such as Singkawang, Ambon, Landak, Kupang, Bolaang Mongondow, Maluku Tenggara Barat, Seram Bagian Barat, Maluku, West Papua, and many others ²

The point is that in these other contests, the majority of the electorate voted not on the basis of religious or ethnic identity but on the candidate’s track record, quality, credibility, capacity and capability. Some non-Muslims in several regions (e.g. Solo, Ambon, Landak, West Kalimantan, and others) even succeeded in winning elections. In the district of Singkawan of West Kalimantan, in particular, a non-Muslim Chinese woman, Tjhai Chui Mie, won the municipal election. Even in Jakarta, there was a great number of Muslims, especially those linked with Nahdlatul Ulama, the country’s largest Muslim organization, nationalist political parties and organizations, as well as numerous middle class Muslim groups that opposed radical Islamist mobilization for gubernatorial elections.

Mention should also be made of the fact that across Indonesia, considerable numbers of Muslims have mobilized to oppose the presence and activities of Islamist groups and to reject efforts by extremist preachers seeking an audience in their respective communities. Instead, these civil-pluralist democratic movements, championed by moderate, nationalist and traditionalist Muslim groups, labour throughout the country to raise public awareness about how Islamism undermines the Indonesian Constitution and the state ideology of Pancasila. As a result of this, the Indonesian government has enacted legislation to curb the activities of Islamist groups. ³

All this is to say that while the Jakarta gubernatorial elections might be a setback, there is hope yet for “civil Islam” in Indonesia that celebrates diversity, tolerance, democracy, and pluralism. To be sure, conservative Islamist forces are hardly a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Yet it is also true that Islamists have always struggled to advance their agenda, whether via elections, social mobilization, or the use of violence. This is because in Indonesia, the Islamist agenda runs up against the history, traditions, and cultures of Indonesian society that favour peace and tolerance, and that celebrates religious diversity.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby
Department of General Studies, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Bibliography

Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2017. “Ethnic Minority Politics in Jakarta’s Gubernatorial Election,” Perspective No. 39: 1–6.
Hatherell, Michael and Alistair Welsh. 2017. “Rebel with a Cause: Ahok and Charismatic Leadership in Indonesia,” Asian Studies Review 41 (2): 174–90.
Kingsbury, Damien. 2005. Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia. Australia: Monash Asia Institute.
Sidel, John T. 2006. Riots, Pogroms, Jihad. Religious Violence in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Notes:

Anies was nominated by Gerakan Indonesia Raya or Gerindra for short (i.e. Great Indonesia Movement Party, founded by ret. Lieut. Gen. Prabowo Subiyanto) and the Islamist political party Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Welfare and Justice Party), while Ahok was nominated by the nationalist political party Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, headed by former president Megawati Soekarnoputri).
Indonesian General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) listed at least 22 regions during the 2017 election where non-Muslim run for candidacy. See http://kbr.id/berita/02-2017/ini_22_pasangan_calon_kepala_daerah_nonmuslim_yang_diusung_partai_islam/88775.html. Access 10 October, 2017.
The Indonesian government, for instance, has issued a regulation (e.g. Perppu No. 2/2017) that bans any organizations and social groups (especially Islamist ones) whose platform, objectives and agenda contradict with the Indonesian state ideology and Constitution.

Agama Cinta dan Perdamaian

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Buku ini merupakan refleksi (“catatan jurnalistik” atau “dokumentasi pribadi”) atas pengalamanku selama kurang lebih dua tahun hidup dan bergumul dengan komunitas Kristen Mennonite di Amerika Serikat, khususnya di Harrisonburg, Virginia, sebuah komunitas agama yang memiliki sejarah yang sangat dramatis dan memilukan. Kesan saya Mennonite adalah komunitas Kristen “konservatif” dan “illiberal” dalam pemahaman keagamaan dan wawasan teologinya tetapi mempunyai visi dan spirit kemanusiaan, forgiveness, rekonsiliasi, toleransi dan perdamaian yang sangat kuat melintas batas etnis, bangsa dan agama. Bagi saya ini sangat unik dan inspiring karena biasanya kelompok agama yang memiliki sistem teologi dan pemahaman agama konservatif akan bersifat tertutup dan kurang peduli dengan aspek-aspek sosial-kemanusiaan karena energi mereka dihabiskan untuk “pengabdian kepada Tuhan” dalam bentuk ibada-ibadah ritual. Oleh karena itu sangat disayangkan kalau pengalaman hidup saya bersama kelompok Mennonite itu dibiarkan berlalu begitu saja. Jika berminat, silakan kontak WA: 082225129241 (Salam)

Arus Cina Islam Jawa

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Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Arus China-Islam-Jawa: Peran Tionghoa dalam Penyebaran Islam di Jawa Abad ke-15 dan 16

Buku ini mendiskusikan tentang sejarah Muslim Tionghoa serta peran dan kontribusi mereka dalam proses penyebaran Islam di Tanah Jawa. Secara umum masyarakat berpandangan kalau Islam dibawa ke Nusantara oleh para pedagang Arab, India (Gujarat), atau Persia. Kontribusi Tionghoa Muslim nyaris tak dibicarakan. Padahal, dari catatan berbagai sumber klasik– Tionghoa, Jawa, Melayu, Portugis, dlsb serta dilengkapi dengan berbagai peninggalan tradisi dan arkeologis menunjukkan bahwa sejarah keislaman di Nusantara, Jawa khususnya, tidak bisa dilepaskan dari peranan para Tionghoa Muslim. Jika berminat, silakan kontak WA: 082225129241 (Salam)

Dialog Agama & Peradaban

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Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Buku ini membahas tentang bagaimana agama—khususnya Islam dan Kristen yang menjadi sorotan utama disini—“berdialog” dengan realitas peradaban manusia yang kompleks, plural, dan dinamis. Bagaimana kedua “agama raksasa” yang sama-sama dari rumpun agama Semit ini menyikapi fakta-fakta sosial-kesejarahan masyarakat yang begitu warna-warni? Bagaimana kedua “agama misionaris” ini menghadapi beragam problem kemasyarakatan dan tantangan-tantangan kemanusiaan yang begitu rumit: dari masalah ateisme, feminisme dan isu-isu menyangkut kaum perempuan, hak-hak kewarganegaraan (citizenship), kemodernan, relasi antar-agama, pluralisme sipil, sampai masalah kekerasan global dan pembangunan perdamaian? Pula, bagaimana kedua “agama dunia” (world religion, untuk meminjam istilah sosiolog agama Peter L. Berger) ini dalam beradaptasi dengan “dunia baru”: masyarakat baru, daerah baru, kebudayaan baru dan seterusnya. Nah, buku ini berusaha menjawab beragam pertanyaan dan permasalahan kemanusiaan dan kemasyarakat yang sangat pelik ini. Jika berminat, silakan kontak WA: 082225129241 (Salam)

Indahnya Keragaman

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Banyak buku petualangan, baik fiksi maupun non-fiksi, yang di antaranya kemudian menjadi buku populer dan abadi sepanjang masa. Di antara buku-buku petualangan klasik ini misalnya Kitab al-Hind karya Abu Raihan al-Biruni, Yingyai Shenglan karya Ma Huan atau Chung-dau, atau The Travels of Marcopolo karya Rustichello da Pisa. Buku yang ada di tangan Anda ini tentu saja tidak bermaksud menyejajarkan dengan para petualang legendaris seperti Al-Biruni, Ma Huan, Ibnu Battuta, Ibnu Fadlan, Marcopolo, atau Sir Richard Francis Burton. Buku ini hanya sekadar ingin mengingatkan pembaca tentang arti pentingnya sebuah petualangan.

Melalui buku ini, kita diajak oleh penulis melanglang buana ke berbagai negara dan masyarakat untuk menyelami keragaman tradisi dan budaya, menikmati indahnya persahabatan antarbangsa, mengapresiasi kemajemukan agama, menghormati perbedaan keyakinan umat manusia, serta menghargai warna-warni kehidupan masyarakat dari Saudi hingga Amerika. Buku ini lebih dari sekadar sebuah “reportase perjalanan.” Ia memberi pencerahan yang luar biasa bagi pembaca karena di dalamnya terkandung banyak pelajaran berharga. Pengalaman penulis yang memiliki “jam terbang” di berbagai kampus dunia membuat kualitas buku petualangan ini semakin berkualitas. Penulis ingin mengajak Anda berkelana dan menghayati indahnya keberagaman hidup di dunia ini. Buku tersedia di Google Play Books, Bukalapak, Shopee, dlsb, atau hubungi penerbit Nuansa Cendekia (Bandung).

Islam Postliberal

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Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Islam Postliberal: Agama, Kebebasan, dan Kemanusiaan

Buku ini mendiskusikan tentang keterkaitan agama dengan konsep kebebasan dan kemanusiaan. Secara khusus, buku ini menandaskan tentang pentingnya (1) kebebasan (dalam hal ini adalah kebebasan berpikir atau memaksimalkan akal pikiran untuk memahami misteri keagamaan) dan (2) nilai-nilai kemanusiaan dalam Islam. Esai-esai di buku ini bernuansa “pemberontakan intelektual” terhadap wacana keagamaan. Studi ini berisi kritik dan ketidakpuasan terhadap wacana keislaman baik yang berkembang dalam masyarakat muslim maupun yang terdapat dalam tumpukan buku-buku keagamaan. Jika berminat, silakan kontak WA: 082225129241 (Salam) | 082134000213 (Admin). Atau, silakan cari di https://elsaonline.com/

NU dari Politik Kekuasaan Sampai Pemikiran Keagamaan

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Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Nahdlatul Ulama: Dari Politik Kekuasaan Sampai Pemikiran Keagamaan

Buku ini secara khusus mengulas tentang dinamika sejarah politik Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) serta pemikiran keagamaan para tokoh sentral ormas Islam terbesar di Indonesia ini, termasuk pembahasan mengenai keputusan-keputusan penting para ulama NU dalam muktamar atau Munas Alim Ulama yang sering kali menghasilkan pemikiran-pemikiran dan keputusan genial mengenai solusi masalah problem keagamaan, keumatan, kebangsaan, dan kenegaraan. Jika berminat, silakan kontak WA: 082225129241 (Salam) | 082134000213 (Admin). Atau, silakan cari di https://elsaonline.com/

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