Sudan Turmoil

Penulis

Sudan, for the umpteenth time, has again been hit by violence and a major humanitarian crisis. The factions are back at war and are fighting for power. This time, beginning on 15 April, it is the military faction of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan that has ruled since 2021 through a military coup, versus his rival, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commander of the Rapid Support Forces/RSF (quwwat adda’m assari’). RSF, a paramilitary organization, has hundreds of thousands of militia members, especially from the Janjawid group, which is suspected to be one of the main actors of violence and crimes against humanity in Darfur, West Sudan.

Inevitably, as a result of this war and violence, hundreds of lives have been wasted again. Property is gone. Thousands more suffered injuries. Khartum and a number of other cities were again in ruins. The war between military factions exacerbated and worsened the situation in Sudan, which has long been experiencing a chronic humanitarian crisis that has claimed millions of lives, far from what happened in Palestine.

History of violence

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates this year at least 15.8 million people in Sudan (more than three times the population of Palestine) are starving and need humanitarian assistance, 3.6 million people have lost their homes and become internally displaced people, 3.1 million experienced gender-based violence, 10.1 million experienced health crises, 4 million were malnourished, 3.7 million were unable to access education and 3.8 million children were neglected.

I do not know exactly how many times Sudan, of which more than 90 percent of the population is Muslim, has been hit by civil wars and heartbreakingly brutal violence. Since independence from the United Kingdom and Egypt in 1956, Sudan has experienced several military coups resulting in war and violence, which have claimed millions of victims. It is almost certain Sudan rulers will assume power through a bloody coup. Jafar Nimeiri, Omar al-Bashir, Ahmed Awad ibn Auf and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan all led following a military coup.

Now, Dagalo is trying his luck in the same way and with the same tactics. Because of this, it is not wrong for Sudan to be called a “coup country”. However, please remember, the war and violence in Sudan did not happen only after independence. Long before independence, Sudan was familiar with war and factional violence. In fact, since the founding of the Kingdom of Kerma in 2500 BC, Sudan has become an arena for power struggles by various groups.

Since then, various religious, political, ideological and ethnic factions have been involved in attacking, killing and taking revenge on each other. Various ethnic groups tried to conquer Sudan: Nubians, Arabs, Turks, British and African ethnicities. Various regimes took turns ruling Sudan: Kush, Nubia, Sennar, Turkic, Mahdi, Anglo-Egyptian and others.

Various ideological and religious groups (Islamism, salafism, Sufism, secularism, communism, socialism, Pan-Arabism, republicanism and others) also try to influence and control Sudan. Likewise activists from political parties, separatist groups and militia/paramilitary groups also clashed and fought for power. All want to rule, control and dominate Sudan.

I do not know when the war and violence will end. Wherever violence occurs, it is the people who are the victims: murder, looting, rape, scorched earth and so on.

Valuable lessons

There are a number of valuable lessons that we can learn from the Sudan case.

First, plurality or diversity, if not managed properly, carefully and prudently, can lead to or turn into disaster and misery. Sudan is very diverse, in terms of ethnicity, clan, religion, politics and ideology. Various major ethnic and tribal groups live in Sudan: Arabs, Nubians, Beja, Fur, Nuba, Dinka and so on.

This is not counting the hundreds of subtribes and clans. The predominant Arab ethnic group in Sudan (more than 70 percent) is also divided into several major factions, such as Jalayin and Juhainah; each is split further into complex sub-clans. Even though Muslims are the majority, they are divided into various groups: Islamists, salafi, Sufi, nationalists, secularists, traditionalists, communists and so on. Tragically, every religious, ideological, political and ethnic or tribal faction wants to be in power.

Second, for the sake of power, leaders (rulers) can change (ideology) like chameleons and join any group (even if they are ideologically opposed) that is seen as advantageous and can maintain/save power. The ruler’s character is pragmatic-opportunist, far from the idealism he campaigns for. Take Nimeiri, for example. Initially a secularist, socialist and pan-Arabist, later, in the early 1980s, he joined a militant Islamist group (supporters of the ideology of Islamism), which led to a protracted civil war. Likewise, Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s longest-serving ruler who managed to rule after the coup of Sadiq al-Mahdi, is also a leader of the Sufi order, al-Ansar.

Third, ideology, religion and whatever dogma the authorities adhere to do not guarantee the state and people will be just, prosperous, safe, peaceful and secure. Secular, socialist, democrat, nationalist, Sufi and Islamist groups have taken turns controlling and governing Sudan. None of them succeeded in making Sudan a prosperous, peaceful and war-free country. That means, whatever identity the authorities adhere to is not always directly proportional to their actions or behavior. What a true leader needs is not a “primordial identity” (religion, ideology, ethnicity) attached to him, but a character and behavior that is clean, honest and just; willingness to work for the public good; commitment to human values; and the maintenance of diversity.

Fourth, whatever political-economic and legal systems are used, including the formal implementation of Islamic law that was imposed by the government since the early 1980s in the era of the Nimeiri regime before being abolished in 2019, are only “political vehicles” for the ruling regime to control assets, the country’s economy and wealth, not for the sake of promoting Islam or ideology as they propagated.

Learning from the Sudanese tragedy, we need to be more vigilant in responding to socioreligious and political phenomena and to be wise in managing a pluralistic nation. If we are negligent, it is not impossible that what happened to Sudan could happen to our country, our beloved Indonesia.

Note: this article was first translated and published by Kompas

Myth of East-West Cultural Dichotomy

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

It is common knowledge that many Indonesians, both academic and nonacademic, elite and non-elite, create a dichotomy between Western culture and Eastern culture. The word “West” refers to countries in North America (the United States and Canada), Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand. In short, Western culture refers to “Caucasian culture”.

Meanwhile, “East” refers to the Asian region, including East Asia and Southeast Asia (including Indonesia, of course). Western culture is usually defined as being intellectualistic, individualistic, selfish, capitalistic, liberal, secular, atheistic, profit-oriented, and so on. Meanwhile, Eastern culture is characterized as almost the opposite of Western culture, namely spiritualistic, theistic, collectivistic, and so on.

Furthermore, Western culture is often negatively labeled or stigmatized. For example, it is described as not having manners, barbaric, likes going to war and committing acts of violence, having free sex, lacking social solidarity, not caring about local traditions, and so on. Meanwhile, Eastern culture is often labeled positively, such as being friendly, polite, gentle, peaceful, dislikes violence, likes helping others, cares about local traditions, and so on.

Just a myth

In practice, this dichotomy is just a myth. As an Easterner who has lived in the West for a long time, I think that the black-and-white segregation of East-West culture only exists in the imagination. It does not exist in the real world, or is only partly true. Narratives about Western culture being all bad and negative or Eastern culture being all good and positive are completely invalid.

In reality, good/bad and positive/negative exist in both the West and the East. A number of characteristics and stigmas that have been attributed to Western culture also exist in Eastern culture, and vice versa. A number of stereotypical labels and characteristics that have been attached to Eastern culture also exist in the West. For example, the West is not only home to intellectuals, but spiritualists as well. There are many individuals and spiritual groups in Western countries, including branches of Sufism, yogi communities, Buddhist spiritualists, New Age followers, theosophical societies, and so on. On the other hand, the East is not only home to groups of spiritualists and mystics, but also to various groups of intellectuals and scientists.

So, the dichotomy of “Western intellectuality” versus “Eastern spirituality”, for example, is no longer relevant. Even now, countries such as China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are intensively building various world-class education and technology centers and universities that will become the future mecca of intellectual and technological societies. As a result, many universities in Asia have now entered the ranks of the world’s top institutions and have the potential to shift Western dominance.

A number of countries in the Middle East, especially in the Arab Gulf region, such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, are also competing to build world-class universities that rely on advanced technology (such as artificial intelligence), scientific research, and the spirit of intellectualism. Saudi Arabia, for example, has built a prestigious international-standard campus, such as the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, which is now led by president Tony F. Chan, a Stanford-trained Chinese-American scientist and former president of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

The assumption that the West is synonymous with secularism, liberalism, or atheism and agnosticism is also not always accurate, because many faith-based conservative militant groups in the West are strongly anti-secular and anti-liberal and condemn various social practices they consider to be nonreligious. For the last several decades, the phenomenon of public religion, the deprivatization of religion in which religion plays a central role in the public sphere, has been infecting some Western countries, especially the US.

This phenomenon prompted the late Peter L. Berger, a renowned sociologist and one of my mentors in Boston, to revise his classic thesis on the secularization of religion in his book, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Even though the East (especially the Middle East, India, and China) is the birthplace of various world religions, secularism and liberalism are also present in this region, introduced by various groups, such as academics, scientists, technocrats, politicians, governments, business people, and so on, especially since the end of World War II.

Individualist vs collectivist

Then, characterizing the West as an “individualist society”, which is wrongly assumed to be a society that is selfish and lacks sensitivity, concern, and social solidarity, is also very wrong. In reality, philanthropic groups and charitable organizations for global humanitarian missions are mushrooming in the West.

Western society also regularly raises funds in various ways for various humanitarian programs, education, scholarships, and others, both for people in Western countries and in other countries around the world. For example, the Mennonite Central Committee has a global humanitarian program in almost all countries in the world. Meanwhile, the East, which has been labeled a “collectivist society” and is assumed to like helping others and each other, as well as minimize egoistic and individualistic character and behavior, does not always happen in practice.

Just look at the culture of gotong royong (mutual cooperation) that used to be the character of Indonesian society that has now faded. Many people don’t care about others when queuing for government assistance, distributing basic necessities, or at buffets. From this simple observation, we can see that the characterization of Eastern society as a collectivist culture is not always accurate. Social solidarity, if it occurs, usually happens only in small groups and does not cross religious, ethnic or humanitarian boundaries.

Barbarity vs civility

Another inaccurate characteristic is that it stigmatizes the West as a violent society and the East as a peaceful society or the West is identified with barbarity and the East with civility. The West does have a dark history of violence, such as colonialism, imperialism, war, ethnic cleansing, racism, and “barbarianism” against both local and foreign residents. However, the East is also beset with violence. Colonialism, imperialism, war, ethnic cleansing, racism, and “barbarianism”, are not the monopoly of only the Western world. The East is also the same. Barbarity is not only happening in the West, but also in the East.

If the West had Hitler and Mussolini, the East had Pol Pot and Amangkurat I, who was very cruel and barbaric and killed thousands of clerics, including his own brother and father-in-law. The massacre of millions of human beings in 1965-1966 is also part of the dark history of violence perpetrated by Eastern society. Brutal and barbaric acts of terrorism have also been carried out by Eastern nations.

Where is their conscience? Where is their common sense? Where is their religion that teaches solidarity, peace, mercy, and compassion?

Today, the image of Eastern society as full of love, compassion, peace, friendliness, and tolerance seems to have disappeared from the Motherland [Indonesia] as a result of various incidents and acts of violence that come and go without stopping, such as violent attacks, beatings, persecution, terrorism, expulsion, and murder. Eastern people who are said to be friendly and peaceful can suddenly turn into crazy, cruel, and inhuman people.

Meanwhile, many people, instead of condemning these heinous acts and acts of violence, are applauding, cheering, and bursting out laughing at the barbaric events that unfold before their eyes. Where is their conscience? Where is their common sense? Where is their religion that teaches solidarity, peace, mercy, and compassion?

Big nation

Akhirul kalam [Finally], a great nation is a nation that is willing to take clean, good, and positive things from wherever it originates – West or East, North or South – and eliminate dirty, bad, and negative things wherever they come from, whether from home or abroad. Indonesia will become a great nation if it is able to do this. On the other hand, Indonesia will shrink in stature if it continues to live in a culture of hypocrisy, fostering an East-West dichotomy that exists only in the imagination.

Note: this article was first translated and published by Kompas

Unraveling the Mysteries of Ancient Arabia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Although millions of Muslims around the world visit Saudi Arabia to perform haj and umrah (minor haj) every year, not many of them know the history of Ancient Arabia other than a glimpse in the story of Prophet Ibrahim and his family. Such as the stories about the Kaaba, Zamzam water and so on. They, however, do not know beyond that.

Interestingly, it is not only Muslims who lack knowledge of Ancient Arabia. Historians also seem to ignore, or are less interested in, discussing the past history of Ancient Arabia. As a result, Arabia is not included on the map of the history of mankind’s ancient civilizations. When discussing the ancient civilizations of the Middle East, historians always refer to Egypt, Iran (Persia) or Mesopotamia (a historical region in West Asia located between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers that is now part of Iraq). Arabia is excluded from their observations.

In fact, like Egypt, Persia and Mesopotamia, in Arabia there are also many interesting historical and archaeological relics of the past to be used as material for studying the origins of civilization and ancient culture of mankind in the Middle East. In fact, according to some archaeologists, the historical and cultural traces of Ancient Arabia are older than those of Egypt, Persia or Mesopotamia. So although Arabia is not considered a place of a number of legendary ancient kingdoms such as Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Rome, Byzantium, Persia and so on, it does not mean that Arabia did not have ancient kingdoms of the pre-Islamic era.

What is meant by Ancient Arabia here is the Arabian Peninsula (Arabia) hundreds or thousands of years BC whose territory stretched from the north, which is now part of Jordanian territory to the southern tip, which is now part of Yemeni. The central part of the peninsula is now the territory of Saudi Arabia. The mention of Arabia is to distinguish this area from other “Arab regions” in the Middle East.

Interesting archaeological finds

In the last few months, I have observed various interesting findings from the excavations by archaeologists and physical anthropologists, both from Saudi Arabia and abroad, which can add to or even change the history of the human civilization of the Middle East. This observation is part of a research project on archaeological tourism in Saudi Arabia that I have codirected with Professor Simeon Magliveras from the United States. For example, a group of archaeologists from the Saudi Heritage Authority, King Saud University and the Max Planck Institute found ancient stones (including Archeulean axes) in the Nafud and Tabuk Deserts (Khal Amishan) that were shaped in such a way as to be used as tools/weapons by the “ancient human”.

It could be said that the tools made from these ancient stones (in archeology called eco-facts) are part of the sculptural works created or developed by humankind’s ancestors. Archaeologists estimate the age of these ancient stones to be around 400,000 years old and are by far the oldest archaeological findings in Arabia.

Archaeologists have also found tools made from other ancient stones that are younger (50,000-300,000 years). This means that archaeologists have found not only archaeological remains from the ancient civilization of Archeulea, but also from the younger Middle Paleolithic era. The team of archaeologists also found fossils of several thousands-of-years old animals that indicate the fertility of the ancient Arabian region. The results of these findings were published in detail in Nature magazine.

A team of scientists comprising Iyad Zalmout from the Saudi Geological Survey, Huw Groucutt from the University of Oxford and Michael Petraglia from the Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History found the middle finger bone of an adult human (from Homo Sapiens), which is estimated to have lived 85,000-90,000 years ago. This is the first fossil hominin (a group of ancient humans and direct ancestors of “modern humans”) to be found in Saudi Arabia and the oldest human fossil ever found outside Africa and the Levant.

Their findings were published in the journal Nature Ecology & Evolution. No less interesting were the findings of the archaeological research team at the University of Western Australia on ancient burial complexes with age ranges from 4,500-5,000 BC in the Al Ula and Khaibar regions, which published in the Holocene journal. These complexes again show Arabia as one of the locations where ancient humans lived. The ancient humans who inhabited the area of Ancient Arabia were not necessarily ethnic/ethnic Arabs, but human ancestors from other ethnicities/tribes, for example the Nabataeans who had built Petra in Jordan and Hegra in Arabia. In fact, Arab ethnicities/tribes can be said to be “newcomers” in Arabia.

Ancient kingdoms

Scientists (historians and archaeologists) have also found the remains of ancient kingdoms in southern, northern and eastern Arabia. Salma Hawsawi, a historian of Ancient Arabia from King Saud University, said that southern Arabia was once the center of a number of classical kingdoms such as Ma’in, Awsan, Qataban, Sheba, Himyar and so on. North Arabia became the headquarters of a number of ancient kingdoms that were very important in its time such as Dadan, Lihyan, Nabataean, Palmyrene, Tayma, Qidar. East Arabia was also the home of a number of ancient kingdoms such as Dilmun, Magan, Gerrha and Thaj.

Of course, the establishment of an empire anywhere is always accompanied by the birth of a civilization. The establishment of an empire itself is a reflection or manifestation of the progress of civilization at that time, although not all human civilizations, both ancient and contemporary, had an empire. As far as I know, only the central part of Arabia (Najd, Qassim, Buraidah and so on) was historically very “dry” of major empires and civilizations. This was a result of the absence of encounters with other ethnic groups due to its very extreme geographical conditions, filled with mountains and wild dry desert. Even so, in this area the ancient civilizations of al-Magar and Quryat al-Faw were born, although there is no evidence of the establishment of a kingdom in ancient Arabia.

It was this area of central Arabia that later became the center of the emergence of the Wahhabi group and the early Saudi dynasties, so it is not surprising that they were originally a very strict group and followed nomadic patterns. Meanwhile, other Arabian regions – west, north, east and south – were fertile areas, or at least not as dry and barren as central Arabia, so were inhabited by many people from various ethnic groups and religions. In southern Arabia, there are even agricultural and plantation areas where local residents can grow rice, coffee and vegetables.

West Arabia, Jeddah and Mecca

In western Arabia – including Jeddah and Mecca –no traces of archaeological remains of ancient kingdoms have been found as in southern, northern and eastern Arabia. However, West Arabia was an important and strategic area because of its location on the shores of the Red Sea, so it has been inhabited by humans since a long time ago.

Jeddah has long been a coastal trading center and a transit point for traders and travelers from various parts of the world, including Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia, long before Islam was born in the seventh century AD. So has Mecca. As historian James Wynbrandt wrote in his book A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, later Mecca (from the Sabaean language meaning sanctuary or nature reserve), especially since the middle of the first millennium (1 AD), also became a center of commerce, a melting pot of cultures as part of the caravan trade routes from the south (Yemen, Najran) and north (Syria, Jordan, Palestine) as well as the starting point for trade trips to the east such as Iraq and its surroundings.

The protracted war between the Byzantine and the Sasanian Empire caused the destruction of the main trade route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf (or Arabian Gulf) in eastern Arabia. As a result, alternative trade routes were formed by passing through the west coast of Arabia, which made Jeddah and Mecca strategic areas. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say Mecca/Jeddah later became known as rich caravan cities.

A number of historians note that this trade activity in western Arabia had been going on for a very long time, particularly since 3,000 BC. Arabian traders were also part of an international trading network that stretched as far as Africa, South Asia and the Mediterranean. They also played an important role in bridging India and the Far East on the one hand and Byzantium and the Mediterranean on the other.

Area of human civilization

From the explanation above, it can be seen that since ancient times Arabia has been a very strategic area, so it is not surprising that it has become a meeting point for human beings from various ethnic, tribal and religious groups to conduct commercial transactions, reside or just stop temporarily.

One of the factors that pushed early humans to live in Arabia was because this area was surrounded by seas/rivers such as the Red Sea (Nile), Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea or Gulf of Aden. Where there is water, there is hope for life, and because of that there is a human population. This has been the instinct of mankind since time immemorial, not only in the Middle East, but also in Southeast Asia and other regions.

That is why Egypt, Persia and Mesopotamia became one of the cradles of human civilization because there are the Red Sea/Nile River (for Egypt), the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (for Persia) and the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (for Mesopotamia). Recognizing the importance and strategic position of Arabia as a center of “ancient human” civilization as well as a very rich ancient archaeological heritage center, the Saudi government is now investing billions of US dollars to build, promote and “transform” Saudi Arabia into a one of the world’s archeological centers and the main destination of “archaeological tourism” which had been barely touched by the previous administration.

Note: this article was first published and translated by Kompas

Taliban, Afghanistan, dan Indonesia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Sejumlah kelompok agama dan elit politik di Indonesia tampak kegirangan dengan keberhasilan milisi Taliban mengontrol dan mengambil alih kekuasaan. Mereka juga mendorong dan mendesak pemerintah RI untuk segera mendukung rezim Taliban. Entah apa yang ada di benak mereka. Padahal, Taliban memiliki sejarah dan reputasi sangat buruk dalam menjalankan roda kepolitikan dan pemerintahan yang membuat rakyat Afghanistan ketakutan dan hidup dalam penderitaan lahir-batin. Tampilan elit politik-agama Taliban yang santun di ruang publik bertolak belakang dengan apa yang mereka lakukan terhadap masyarakat Afghanistan.

Fakta bahwa ratusan ribu warga Afghanistan mencoba kabur dari negara mereka sejak Taliban mengambil alih kekuasaan menunjukkan apa atau siapa “jati diri” Taliban yang sesungguhnya. Jelas bahwa rakyat Afghanistan trauma terhadap rezim Islamis-fundamentalis Taliban saat lima tahun berkuasa, 1996–2001, yang penuh dengan kebiadaban dan ketidakmanusiawian. Dengan jatuhnya kembali Afghanistan ke tangan Taliban, mimpi buruk dan drama horor terbayang di depan mata mereka.

Jamak diketahui, selama kekuasaan rezim Taliban yang disokong oleh Pakistan dan Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan (yang oleh Taliban diberi nama Emirat Islam Afghanistan) menjelma menjadi “neraka” dunia yang mengerikan. Bahkan Korea Utara jauh lebih baik ketimbang Afghanistan di masa Taliban. Kemiskinan, kelaparan, dan malnutrisi merajalela. Kekerasan demi kekerasan tak pernah berhenti. Perang sipil antarfaksi Islam dan kelompok suku terus berkecamuk.

Pembantaian warga terjadi dimana-mana, bukan hanya terhadap kelompok minirotas etnis dan agama saja (misalnya, kelompok Syiah Hazara) tetapi juga terhadap siapa saja dan kelompok mana saja yang mereka anggap dan cap sebagai rival dan musuh pengganggu kekuasaan. Penting untuk dicatat, rezim Taliban bukan hanya melakukan genosida atas manusia tetapi juga atas produk-produk spiritual-kebudayaan mereka (oleh Raphael Lemkin disebut “cultural genocide”) seperti aneka ragam karya seni, monumen bersejarah, peninggalan kepurbakalaan, atau bahkan bangunan tempat peribadatan karena dicap kafir-sesat, berpotensi menyekutukan Tuhan, tidak religius, atau dianggap menodai kemurnian akidah dan ajaran fundamental Islam yang mereka pegang dan yakini.

Selama berkuasa, rezim Taliban mengunci atau menggembok Afghanistan dari “dunia luar”. Mereka juga menolak bantuan makanan PBB untuk jutaan warga yang kelaparan. Mereka melarang media dan berbagai aktivitas publik yang dianggap berpotensi mengganggu kekuasaan. Berbagai aktivitas seni-budaya juga diharamkan termasuk musik, fotografi, lukisan, film, tarian, dlsb.

Kaum perempuan menjadi objek yang paling mengenaskan. Mereka harus berpakaian tertutup rapat dari ujung kaki hingga ujung kepala, tidak boleh pergi ke tempat umum sendirian tanpa ditemani muhrim (biasanya anggota keluarga), dilarang bekerja di sektor publik (kecuali dokter atau perawat untuk melayani pasien perempuan karena petugas medis laki-laki tidak boleh menangani pasien perempuan), anak-anak perempuan juga dilarang sekolah. Dan masih banyak lagi kisah-kisah pilu mereka. Jika melanggar aturan, mereka akan dihukum cambuk di hadapan publik.

Taliban juga menerapkan kebijakan “scorched earth”, yakni sebuah strategi untuk menghancurkan aset apa saja (kawasan, fasilitas publik, sumber-sumber ekonomi, industri, dlsb) yang dipandang memberi manfaat pihak lawan. Karena itu jangan heran kenapa ketika Taliban berkuasa mereka memusnahkan banyak kawasan subur dan membakar rumah-rumah dan perkampungan penduduk.

Ketika kekuasaan rezim Taliban rontok tahun 2001 karena digempur oleh tentara Amerika setelah tragedi terorisme 9/11, aktivitas kekerasan yang mereka lakukan tidak serta merta berhenti. Berbagai aksi pengeboman dan terorisme keji untuk menggoyang pemerintah terus mereka lancarkan tanpa henti selama 20 tahun (2001–2021) yang memakan korban ribuan nyawa (mati atau terluka) dan kerusakan fisik tak terhingga.

Sasaran terorisme (biasanya dalam bentuk aksi bom bunuh diri) bukan hanya aparat keamanan atau kantor pemerintahan saja tetapi juga bisa siapa saja (warga sipil, jurnalis, anak-anak, perempuan, dlsb) dan apa saja (termasuk madrasah dan masjid). Belakangan, mereka disinyalir menjadi pelaku pengeboman di area kerumunan massa yang ingin kabur di kompleks bandara Kabul.

***

Kenapa Taliban menerapkan politik totalitarian dan membabi buta yang membuat Afghanistan semakin terperosok dan porak poranda? Jawabannya sangat simpel. Karena mereka tidak mengerti bagaimana cara memimpin warga yang majemuk dan memerintah sebuah negara. Mereka tidak memiliki pengetahuan, wawasan, strategi, dan skill untuk memerintah dan mengelola sebuah negara-bangsa. Hanya nafsu kekuasaan yang mereka miliki.

Akhirnya, untuk mengontrol ketaatan publik serta membuat warga tunduk dan patuh pada pemerintah Taliban, yang bisa mereka lakukan hanyalah meneror dan menakut-nakuti warga dengan berbagai peraturan dan hukuman keras atas nama “penegakan syariat Islam”. Jadi Taliban pada dasarnya adalah “para bandit berjubah agama.”

Taliban memang bukan kelompok cerdik-cendikia yang berwawasan luas tentang seluk-beluk ilmu pemerintahan, kepolitikan, perekonomian, atau kebudayaan. Dalam sejarahnya, Taliban adalah sebuah gerakan politik-agama yang terdiri dari kumpulan para murid / alumni madrasah (“taliban” berarti murid / siswa) yang berafiliasi ke sekolah-sekolah Deobandi (tersebar di berbagai daerah di Asia Selatan) yang bercorak literalis-revivalis-koservatif yang sangat ketat, rigid, closed-minded, dan ekstrem dalam memahami, menafsirkan, dan mempraktikkan teks, wacana, dan ajaran keislaman.

Lebih jelasnya, kelompok atau gerakan Taliban adalah kombinasi antara ajaran Islam revivalis-konservatif ala Deobandi, ideologi militan Islamisme ala Al-Qaeda, dan norma sosial Pasthunwali, yakni gaya hidup tradisional masyarakat Pasthun karena mayoritas Taliban memang dari suku/etnik Pasthun.

Pada mulanya, Taliban dibentuk tahun 1994 oleh Muhammad Umar (1960–2013, dikenal dengan sebutan Mullah Umar), seorang mantan siswa madrasah Deobandi dan bekas milisi Mujahidin dalam Perang Afghanistan-Soviet (1979–1989), yang kala itu baru berumur 34 tahun. Taliban berhasil menguasai panggung kekuasaan Afghanistan setelah berhasil memanfaatkan situasi kacau (chaos) dan konflik internal antarfaksi Islam lantaran kegagalan elit politik-agama Afghanistan dalam mencapai kesepakatan pemerintah koalisi nasional pasca hengkangnya “Tentara Merah” Soviet.

Konflik internal antarkelompok Islam dan elit politik-agama itu kemudian menyebabkan meletusnya Perang Sipil yang mahadahsyat yang membuat Afghanistan untuk kesekian kalinya hancur lebur. Sekitar enam faksi Islam (Hizbul Islam Gulbuddin, Jamiat Islami, Ittihad Islam, Harakat Inqilab Islam, Hizbul Wahdat, dan Junbish Milli) saling berebut kekuasaan, saling mengkhianati, saling membunuh, dan saling memerangi. Padahal, kelompok radikal Islamis ini (dengan dukungan Amerika) dulu bersatu-padu sebagai “pejuang mujahidin” melawan tentara Soviet. Begitu Soviet berhasil dipukul mundur, mereka sendiri yang ironisnya saling gempur demi kekuasaan.

Di saat Afghanistan sedang kacau balau dilanda Perang Sipil itulah, milisi Taliban muncul sebagai “kuda hitam” yang berhasil merangsek, mengontrol, dan menguasai 2/3 wilayah Afghanistan dan mendeklarasikan diri pemerintahan baru dengan nama Emirat Islam Afghanistan pada tahun 1996.

Apakah dengan pendeklarasian pemerintah oleh Taliban ini dengan sendirinya Perang Sipil berhenti? Tentu saja tidak. Perang Sipil antarkelompok (termasuk “Aliansi Utara” yang dibentuk oleh warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud yang terdiri dari koalisi sejumlah kelompok etnis seperti Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara, Turki, Pasthun, dlsb) terus berlanjut dan berkecamuk.

***

Jadi, cerita elit Taliban yang sekarang dianggap mengkhianati klausul atau kesepakatan perjanjian damai dengan pemerintah Afghanistan (dan pemerintah Amerika Serikat) bukan hal baru. Cerita pendongkelan atau pengambilalihan kekuasaan yang kini Taliban lakukan setelah 20 tahun bergerilya juga bukan cerita baru. Ini hanyalah kisah lama yang kembali terulang.

Siapapun yang mempelajari sejarah Afghanistan mereka akan tahu kalau negeri di kawasan Asia Tengah dan Asia Selatan ini diwarnai dengan konflik, perang, dan perebutan kekuasaan bukan hanya dengan kelompok luar (non-Afghanistan) saja tetapi juga dengan sesama kelompok sosial di Afghanistan. Aksi-aksi saling jegal, saling bunuh, dan saling memerangi antarkelompok masyarakat di Afghanistan, baik kelompok agama, ideologi, etnis, suku, klan, keluarga, maupun daerah (misalnya Afghanistan utara versus selatan) sudah lumrah terjadi. Jauh sebelum munculnya kelompok Islamis di panggung politik Afghanistan, kelompok-kelompok sosial lain sudah saling baku hantam demi kekuasaan.

Pelajaran apa yang bisa dipetik oleh pemerintah dan masyarakat Indonesia dari “drama horor” Afghanistan dan rezim militan Taliban?

Satu hal yang tidak boleh diabaikan: jangan sekali-sekali meremehkan dan membiarkan kelompok agama berhaluan radikal-konservatif. Meskipun pada awalnya kelompok agama ini barang kali hanya bergerak di wilayah non-politik (dakwah-keagamaan, moralitas publik, akidah/teologi, dlsb), jika ada kesempatan, peluang, sokongan, dan dukungan dari pihak luar, mereka bisa menjelma menjadi kelompok militan agama-politik yang sangat kejam, ekstrem, dan radikal dalam menjalankan paham kepolitikan dan keagamaan.

Anggota Taliban mungkin tidak ada di Indonesia. Tetapi umat Islam yang berhaluan, berwawasan, bermental, dan berpola-pikir ala Taliban cukup banyak populasinya. Mereka menyelinap dan tersebar di parpol, ormas, institusi pendidikan, lembaga dakwah, dan bahkan pemerintah. Oleh karena itu, pemerintah dan masyarakat yang peduli dengan masa depan perdamaian, toleransi, dan kebhinekaan bangsa dan negara Indonesia perlu waspada dengan gerak-gerik mereka. Aparat hukum dan aparat keamanan juga jangan sampai lengah. Jika tidak hati-hati dan tidak ditangani dengan tegas dan seksama, bukan tidak mungkin, mereka kelak bisa menjelma menjadi “Taliban Indonesia” dan menyulap negara ini menjadi “Indonistan”.

Keterangan: tulisan ini semula diterbitkan oleh Kompas pada 3 September 2021

Ngobrol Bersama “Romo Vatikan”

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Beberapa hari lalu saya mendapat email dari seorang pastor Indonesia yang sudah 14 tahun bertugas di Dewan Kepausan Vatikan untuk bidang dialog antar-umat beragama atau Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. Pastor Katolik itu bernama Romo Markus Solo (biasa disapa Padre Marco SVD) yang berasal dari Flores, NTT. Konon, dalam sejarahnya, Romo Markus merupakan satu-satunya pastor dari Indonesia yang menjadi pejabat di Vatikan. Dalam email itu, ia minta kesediaan saya untuk “ngobrol” via Zoom Ajakannya saya iyakan. Maka, ia pun mengirim link Zoom dengan judul, “Vatican and Saudi Arabia in Dialogue through Indonesia.”

Kami bicara panjang-lebar selama sekitar 1,5 jam tentang banyak hal: tentang sejarah dan geo-kultural Arab Saudi & Arab Teluk (Gulf), situasi keagamaan dan relasi antaragama di Indonesia dan Arab Saudi, hingga program-program yang diadakan oleh lembaganya di Vatikan. Di antara program itu adalah berbagai aktivitas yang berkaitan dengan dialog antaragama maupun pembangunan perdamaian seperti konferensi, seminar, workshop, dlsb.

Salah satu program yang menarik adalah semacam workshop atau “short course” selama kurang lebih 6 bulan di Kota Vatikan yang melibatkan peserta dari berbagai agama di berbagai penjuru dunia. Workshop ini dimaksudkan selain memperkenalkan seluk-beluk agama Katolik juga dalam rangka untuk mempererat jalinan silaturahmi antarumat agama serta meminimalisir kesalahpahaman dan memperkuat kesalingpemahaman antarkelompok agama. Tujuan akhirnya tentu saja terciptanya iklim perdamaian dan harmoni di masyarakat yang dilandasi oleh semangat respek dan toleransi.

Dalam kesempatan itu, Romo Markus juga meminta kesediaan saya kalau suatu saat diminta menjadi narasumber konferensi, seminar, workshop atau diundang ke Vatikan. Kalau aktvitas yang berkaitan dengan dialog agama-agama atau “peacebuilding” saya oke-oke saja dilibatkan. Belum lama ini saya juga diminta menjadi salah satu “penasehat” sebuah film dokumenter tentang perdamaian Muslim-Kristen yang diprakarsai oleh sekelompok aktivis perdamaian dan sutradara dari Amerika, Kanada, Palestina dan lainnya.

Perjumpaan saya dengan umat Katolik khususnya bukan hal baru. Dulu, saya bersama almarhum Romo Pujo (Pujasumarta), mantan Vikjen & Uskup Semarang, banyak melakukan kegiatan kemanusiaan, diskusi, dan dialog antaragama, baik di keuskupan, seminari, gereja, maupun institusi-institusi publik milik umat Islam: kantor ormas, kampus, masjid, pesantren, dlsb.

Oleh karena itu ketika Romo Pujo wafat saya sangat kehilangan sekali karena sudah seperti “auliya” atau “teman plek” (sohib dekat). Itulah sebabnya dulu saya sempatkan berziarah ke makamnya di Kentungan, Yogyakarta, yang makamnya bersebelahan dengan makam Romo Mangun, seorang romo, aktivis, sarjana, dan penulis cemerlang di zaman Orde Baru, yang juga sahabat karib Gus Dur.

Dalam obrolan dengan Romo Markus itu, saya memperkenalkan temanku dulu saat kuliah di Virginia yang bernama Romo Paul (Paulus) Rahmat yang ternyata Romo Markus juga mengenalnya. Dengan Pak Paul dulu saya juga banyak diskusi. Pak Paul juga sering mengundang saya untuk acara-acara ngobrol dan makan-makan dengan teman-teman Katolik di Virginia.

Tak lupa, Romo Markus juga menanyakan tentang prospek hubungan antaragama di Arab Saudi. Dalam hal relasi antaragama ini ada beberapa perkembangan menarik dan signifikan di Arab Saudi. Tahun 2007, mendiang Raja Abdullah (kakak Raja Salman) melakukan pertemuan bersejarah dengan Paus Benedict XVI. Tahun berikutnya, beliau mengundang berbagai sarjana dan tokoh agama dari berbagai negara untuk melakukan pertemuan antaragama di Makah.

Raja Abdullah, bersama pemimpin dari Austria dan Spanyol, kemudian kelak (pada 2012) turut memprakarsai pendirian King Abdullah International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, sebuah organisasi antarpemerintah yang bermarkas di Vienna, Austria, yang bergerak di bidang dialog dan perdamaian antaragama.

Pada tahun 2017, Raja Salman (dan Putra Mahkota MBS) juga mengadakan pertemuan khusus di Riyadh dengan pemimpin tertinggi Gereja Maronite Lebanon, Patriarch Bechara Boutros Al-Rahi. Dan pada tahun 2018, Raja Salman juga mengadakan pertemuan di Riyadh dengan Kardinal Jean-Louis Tauran (bersama delegasi), ketua Pontifical Council for Interfaith Dialogue, Vatikan, tempat dimana Romo Markus bekerja. MBS juga banyak melakukan pertemuan dengan para tokoh agama di Inggris, Amerika dan lainnya.

Berbagai pertemuan para elit Saudi dengan tokoh-tokoh agama (khususnya Kristen) tersebut tentu saja akan berdampak cukup penting nantinya dalam hal relasi antarumat agama di Arab Saudi. Pelan tapi pasti, saya memprediksi agama-agama diluar Islam akan mendapat tempat yang layak di Arab Saudi seperti tetangganya di kawasan Teluk: Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, dan Uni Emirat Arab. Syaratnya cuma satu: kelompok bigot fanatikus agama harus “diruwat” dan “disebul” dulu pakai “kemenyan Semar Bodronoyo” karena merekalah, antara lain, yang menjadi sumber dan biang kerok kebencian dan permusuhan dengan umat agama lain. Kita lihat saja seperti apa dinamika dan perkembanganya nanti.

Jalan Terjal “Sang Profesor” dari Batang

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Oleh Harjanto Halim (filantropis, pebisnis Tionghoa, CEO PT Marimas Putera Kencana, dan pengurus Perkumpulan Boen Hian Tong)

Tamu Diskusi Tipis-Tipis yang kami (Perkumpulan Boen Hian Tong) adakan kali ini (via Zoom) sungguh sosok fenomenal. Namanya Sumanto Al Qurtuby. Ia seorang anak pelosok desa di sebuah lereng gunung di Kabupaten Batang (Jawa Tengah), penggembala kambing dan kerbau, pencari kayu bakar, anak modin dan petani miskin yang nekad merantau ke kota-kota di Indonesia dan juga Luar Negeri untuk sekolah hingga doktor dan kemudian mengajar di universitas Amerika Serikat dan Arab Saudi, selain peneliti tamu di sebuah kampus di Singapura.

Kuliah S1-nya di IAIN (Institute Agama Islam Negeri, kini UIN, Semarang) bermodal kambing dan kerbau hasil gembalaannya saat kecil yang terpaksa dijual (dilego), sambil nunut urip di pondok pesantren biar irit (selain kos-kosan murah). Lalu, setelah selesai S1 di bidang Hukum Islam, ia nekad mengambil S2 di UKSW (Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, Salatiga) karena ingin mempelajari disiplin dan tema-tema baru tidak melulu masalah keislaman seperti di IAIN, pesantren, atau madrasah.

Kemudian, setelah merampungkan studi S2 Sosiologi Agama, ia kembali nekad ke Amerika Serikat (Virginia) untuk mengambil S2 lagi (di bidang Conflict and Peace Studies) dengan bermodal Bahasa Inggris pas-pasan hasil kursus tujuh bulan di Desa Pare (Kediri, Jawa Timur). Kenekadannya terus berlanjut. Sehabis menyelesaikan S2 di Virginia, ia nekad melamar program doktor di Boston University. Setelah selesai S3, ia kemudian menjadi dosen dan visiting scholar di universitas bergengsi di Amerika, dan kini menjadi profesor di King Fahd University di Arab Saudi, selain visiting senior scholar di National University of Singapore.

***

Hampir setengah jam sang profesor menceritakan kisah masa kecilnya, tentang bapak (kini sudah almarhum) dan simboknya, kambing dan kerbaunya, celengannya, warung simboknya, ketegaran “simbahnya”–demikian ia memanggil bapaknya–yang setiap pagi selalu mengantarnya ke sekolah di kecamatan lain yang dilaluinya jalan kaki setiap hari menyusuri perbukitan, persawahan, dan hutan selama 5 tahun. Ditambah menghadapi nyinyiran dan cemo’ohan para “penggede” dan tetangga kampung: “Ngapain sekolah? Mau jadi apa? Sia-sia…”

Simbah hanya diam dan tak mempedulikan sama sekali suara-suara sumbang dari (sebagian) warga kampung. Ia tetap mengantar anaknya sekolah setiap pagi selepas subuh. Setelah mentari menyembul di ufuk timur, simbah kembali pulang ke rumah sementara sang anak melanjutkan perjalanan ke sekolah seorang diri. SD di kampungnya hanya sampai kelas 4. Maka ia harus melanjutkan sekolah di SD lain di kecamatan lain sampai kelas 6. Setelah itu, ia lanjutkan sekolah di sebuah MTs (Madrasah Tsanawiyah) di tetangga kecamatan.

“Simbah tidak punya apa-apa untuk diwariskan, Le. Wong sawah juga cuman sawah garapan. Simbah cuman bisa mewariskan ilmu.” Si profesor cilik bertubuh ceking, berkulit dekil itu hanya diam saja.

Mengikuti pesan simbahnya, ia pun tekun belajar di MTs (Madrasah Tsanawiyah) di Kecamatan Tulis, pindah ke MAN (Madrasah Aliyah Negeri) di Pekalongan, meneruskan S1 di Semarang, S2 di Salatiga, dan seterusnya.

Ia terus menempa diri dalam kesibukan akademis, mengasah kemampuan menulis, menceburkan diri dalam lautan buku, aktif di organisasi gerakan mahasiswa, mencetak majalah kampus, menerbitkan jurnal non-kampus, menggawangi kegiatan keagamaan, serta menimba ilmu dengan para pakar ulama dan pemikir Islam moderat, termasuk Gus Dur, Kiai Sahal, Cak Nur, dan Kang Jalal (semua sudah almarhum).

Dan ia pun mulai berpikir dan berkontemplasi: hidup yang keras dan eksklusif tidak akan menyelesaikan masalah kemajemukan. Konservatisme yang terbentuk, khususnya sejak ia sekolah di Madrasah Aliyah dan tinggal di sebuah pesantren di Pekalongan mulai terkikis dan terbuka.

“Dulu aku itu anti film, anti musik, anti non-Muslim, anti perempuan tanpa jilbab dlsb,” aku sang profesor yang laman medsos nya sering dipenuhi tulisan ringannya nan jenaka namun membumi dan mak-jleb tentang keberagaman, toleransi dan pluralisme.

***

Ia menyelesaikan studi S1-nya hampir 7 tahun. Setelah itu, ia pindah ke UKSW. “Aku bosen belajar tentang Islam dari perspektif ilmu-ilmu keislaman,” ujarnya sambil kemudian menyapa seorang pria yang ikut hadir di acara diskusi, yang ternyata mantan rektor UKSW.

Ia menuntaskan studi S2-nya dengan berdarah-darah. Bahkan ia harus menemui seorang kyai untuk minta petunjuk cara melunasi tunggakan uang kuliah 3 semester. “Coba kamu telpon dua nomer ini,” ujar Mbah Kyai sambil menyodorkan secarik kertas. “Insya Allah, cukup untuk mbayar kuliahmu…”

Ternyata itu nomer telpon dua dermawan yang benar langsung bersedia membantu kuliahnya termasuk memberesi tunggakan uang kuliah.

Sang profesor juga tak lupa berterima kasih kepada pak rektor yang ia panggil ‘Om’ (sebutan “Pak” di Indonesia Timur karena sang rektor berdarah Ambon), yang telah membantunya habis-habisan, moril dan terutama materiil. Bahkan saat hendak mengurus visa ke Amerika, pak rektor ikut menemaninya ke Konsulat Amerika di Surabaya. Nada-nadanya pak rektor was-was, wajah sang profesor nan rak cetha bakal menimbulkan syak wasangka petugas konsulat hehehe.

Setelah melalui proses rumit dan berliku, akhirnya dengan modal doa, tekad bonek, dan urunan teman untuk beli tiket, sang profesor mendarat di bumi Paman Sam. Dan penderitaan belum berakhir. Dari awalnya cuman mengikuti workshop ‘Peacebuilding’ selama 2 minggu, menjadi kursus Bahasa Inggris selama 3 bulan, akhirnya menjadi mahasiswa S2 di Center for Justice and Peacebuilding, Eastern Mennonite University, melalui beasiswa dari Mennonite Central Committee (Amerika Serikat), yang diperjuangkan oleh beberapa senior dan dosennya.

***

Di tengah menyelesaikan program master, sang profesor mulai galau mencari beasiswa untuk kelanjutan studi doktoralnya. Tanpa beasiswa, tak mungkin ia meneruskan kuliah. Ia pun nekad menghubungi beberapa profesor di beberapa kampus di Amerika.

Sampai akhirnya ia berhasil memancing perhatian seorang profesor di Boston yang kelak mati-matian berusaha membantunya. “Padahal kami belum pernah bertemu dengannya,” ujar sang profesor seraya nyengir.

Jam sudah menunjukkan pukul 21:00 WIB. “Di sana belum buka, Prof?,” tanya saya. Sang profesor kembali nyengir. “Aman, di sini masih jam 5 kok…” Profesor tinggal di Dhahran, Arab Saudi.

“Untuk meyakinkan ketua komite penerima beasiswa doktoral yang merupakan seorang cendekiawan terkenal di Amerika, saya diminta menulis esai tentang sufisme filosofi dalam sejarah Islam dan pengaruhnya di Indonesia,” sang profesor melanjutkan. “Sekitar delapan hingga sepuluh ribu kata dalam waktu tiga hari.” Ia pun siang-malam nglembur menulis.

Tak diduga, ternyata tulisannya gol! “Akhirnya, saya diterima program doktoral di Boston University lewat beasiswa Muslim Studies Fellowship,” ujar sang profesor. Beasiswa ini hanya diberikan pada dua pelamar program doktor setiap tahunnya.

Tapi masalah belum selesai. “Saya diminta memberi Bank Statement, bahwa punya simpanan cukup di bank untuk menjamin kebutuhan anak istri sebab beasiswa hanya untuk saya…”. Lalu sang profesor berterima kasih kepada saya yang sudah lupa pernah membantu membuatkan ‘Bank Statement’ buatnya.

Selama studi program doktoral, sang profesor harus salto dengan gaya irit, medhit, cethil, tingkat dewa. Beasiswa sebesar USD 2.200 per bulan harus dipecah: $1.500 untuk apartemen, sisanya untuk bayar transport, internet, TV cable, buku, dan untuk biaya makan anak-istri. Itupun kudu ditomboki pengumpulan kupon makanan dari pemerintah atau guntingan diskon untuk membeli roti, susu, telor, dan sereal.

***

Tapi semua jerih-payahnya itu berakhir manis. Semua perjuangan, keringat, darah, air mata, kecapekan mbaca, kurang tidur, ngetik hingga larut malam dan subuh, berbuah manis. Gelar doktor diraih, tawaran mengajar tersaji.

“Ada yang tanya Prof, mengapa dulu pak rektor UKSW mau membantu njenengan?,” saya membacakan pertanyaan peserta. “Apakah karena melihat wajah njenengan yang mesakke?”

Sang profesor ngakak. “Bukan begitu,” Pak rektor menjawab. “Saya melihat seorang Muslim mau belajar di UKSW pasti punya kelebihan dan keberanian…”

Hmm. “Dan saya juga melihat kami memiliki minat yang sama,” imbuh pak rektor. Apa itu? “Studi dekonstruksi teks.” Dan sang profesor hingga kini masih setia mengimani keyakinannya soal keberagaman dan kebebasan menafsir teks.

Lalu kok pindah ke Arab Saudi? Sang profesor dan pak rektor terkekeh, lalu mempersilahkan seorang pendeta dari Ambon menjawab.

“Kita butuh orang yang bisa menarasikan Islam Nusantara, konteks keislaman di Indonesia yang seperti apa, dari Arab Saudi…” Maksudnya? “Lha kalau Profesor Manto tinggal di Amerika dan nulis dari sana, pasti dicap antek Barat. Kalau di Arab lebih gamblang…”

Hmm, bener juga.

***

Dan saat seorang pengajar dari Belanda mengungkapkan kegalauannnya ketika ia harus ‘membela’ Islam di Indonesia yang kini dianggap sering menyalahgunakan isu penistaan agama, ia mengusulkan apa tidak sebaiknya ulama, ustad, ustadzah, menjalani pendidikan teologi secara formal sehingga pikiran mereka lebih toleran dan terbuka.

“Tidak mudah,” jawab sang profesor. “Karena kelompok non-formal itu yang menguasai wacana dan kehidupan beragama di tanah air.

Bener. “Wong mau didata saja sudah geger,” celetuk sang profesor yang ternyata hobi nonton film kartun atau stand-up komedi dan ndengerin musik Jawa campur sari.

Banyak salah kaprah keberagamaan di Indonesia. Di Arab Timur Tengah, ulama adalah sebutan untuk ilmuwan dan ustad adalah dosen, dari pengikut agama manapun. Di Indonesia, ulama dan ustad dianggap pemuka agama Islam. Lalu, pluralisme acap dicurigai dan dikritisi. Pluralisme dianggap sinkretisme. Padahal pluralisme beda. Pluralisme bukan sinkretisme, bukan pula toleransi.

Pluralisme mengandaikan setiap individu atau umat untuk saling memahami melalui dialog intensif dan kontinu serta keterlibatan secara dekat dan mendalam (engagement) dengan individu atau umat lain. “Jadi misalnya, bukan sekedar mengucapkan ‘Selamat Hari Natal’ atau “Selamat Idul Fitri akan tetapi mampu memahami makna terdalam dari Natal dan Idul Fitri itu.”

Itulah pluralisme. Jelasnya, pluralisme harus ‘engaged’, srawung, dan diajarkan semenjak kecil. Dan pluralisme Islam inilah mungkin model keislaman yang paling cocok buat masyarakat dan bangsa Indonesia yang plural. Mungkin.

Dan sang profesor yang tulisan-tulisannya telah melanglang dunia, yang mahasiswanya tidak hanya orang Arab, tapi juga orang Barat, yang telah berjumpa dengan segala jenis manusia, bertemu orang Yahudi, Nasrani, atheis dlsb, seorang anak desa dari pelosok desa yang nyimpen uang hasil menggembala kambing dalam kaleng yang ia pendam di bawah ranjang (“Kan rumahku masih berlantai tanah,” kilahnya tanpa sendu), anak simbah modin yang meyakini warisan terbaik adalah ilmu, yang nekad merantau ke kota, kuliah, dan akhirnya ia sukses menjadi seorang profesor kelas dunia dan masih menjadi seorang Muslim yang taat berpuasa.

***

Ia menunjuk dua foto rumah yang terlihat asri. “Ini rumah yang saya buat untuk simbok dan kakak saya. Yang satu sudah meninggal. Rumah yang satu lagi untuk kakak tidak ada di foto ini.”

Ia terdiam sejenak sebelum melanjutkan, “Itu amanah simbah: kalo ada rejeki, tolong rumah ini (rumah simbah dan simbok) dan kedua kakakmu dipugar biar kuat tidak terbuat dari papan kayu dan bambu…” Suaranya tersengguk dalam parau, tersedak dalam haru.

Sang profesor melepas kacamata dan mengusap matanya, sekilas. Tak ada yang melebihi cinta seorang anak kepada orang tuanya yang dulu telah berpeluh-keringat mengantar sekolah setiap hari tanpa kenal lelah dan yang berderit dalam keyakinan untuk memberi warisan yang terbaik.

Wahai profesor, adakah pelukan di punggung bapakmu yang basah kuyup telah memicu dan memacu semangatmu hingga engkau pun menjalani kehidupanmu kuat-kuat?

Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Buku Sumanto ; Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia

Maluku in eastern Indonesia is the home to Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics who had for the most part been living peaceably since the sixteenth century. In 1999, brutal conflicts broke out between local Christians and Muslims, and escalated into large-scale communal violence once the Laskar Jihad, a Java-based armed jihadist Islamic paramilitary group, sent several thousand fighters to Maluku. As a result of this escalated violence, the previously stable Maluku became the site of devastating interreligious wars.

This book focuses on the interreligious violence and conciliation in this region. It examines factors underlying the interreligious violence as well as those shaping post-conflict peace and citizenship in Maluku.

The author shows that religion—both Islam and Christianity—was indeed central and played an ambiguous role in the conflict settings of Maluku, whether in preserving and aggravating the Christian-Muslim conflict or supporting or improving peace and reconciliation.

Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork and interviews as well as historical and comparative research on religious identities, this book is of interest to Indonesia specialists, as well as academics with an interest in anthropology, religious conflict, peace and conflict studies.

clik this link for full acces

The Paradox of Civil Society: The Case of Maluku, Eastern Indonesia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

This article discusses the ambiguous role of religiously-marked civil society organisations during the Christian-Muslim communal violence in Maluku, eastern Indonesia, from approximately 1999 to 2004. During the Maluku violence, some social groups supported peace and reconciliation, while others were major backers for the collective conflict.

Using Maluku as the primary case study, this article aims to re-examine a well-established Western concept of civil society that puts emphasis on three key features, as follows.

First, the concept focuses on the constructive role of civil society, while ignoring its destructive contribution in society. Second, the concept focuses on formal organisations, while neglecting informal associations, networks and neighbourhoods. And third, the concept excludes the contributions of government and state institutions in the shape—and influence of—civil society organisations.

The article also examines the growing theme on “alternative forms” of civil society. It studies the plurality of civil societies and investigates that form of civil society association that might help contribute to civic coexistence and which type that encourages social conflict.

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Pasang-Surut Pendidikan Perempuan di Arab Saudi

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Meskipun sekarang, di bawah bendera Visi Saudi 2030, perempuan mendapatkan akses pendidikan (termasuk pendidikan tinggi) yang luar biasa di Arab Saudi, sejarah perempuan dan dunia pendidikan di negara-kerajaan ini tidak semulus yang dibayangkan. Selama puluhan tahun mengajar di sebuah kampus milik kerajaan di Arab Saudi (King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals), saya mengamati fenomena pasang-surut pendidikan perempuan dan bahkan acapkali tidak mengenakkan. Semua tergantung pada corak rezim politik kerajaan dan kelompok agama yang berkuasa.

Sebagaimana negara-negara lain, termasuk negara-negara Barat, dunia pendidikan formal–dari yang dasar hingga/apalagi perguruan tinggi–di Arab Saudi (dan kawasan Timur Tengah pada umumnya) adalah “dunia laki-laki.” Selama berabad-abad atau bahkan milenia, tempat pendidikan bagi perempuan di belahan dunia manapun adalah rumah atau kalau untuk keluarga elite negara adalah istana, bukan institusi pendidikan formal seperti sekolah, madrasah, atau kampus. Dengan kata lain, sifatnya “pendidikan informal.” Materi yang disampaikan pun terbatas pada masalah akhlak, budi pekerti, kepantasan bersikap, ketaatan pada laki-laki (suami) atau orang tua, atau yang berkaitan dengan keterampilan/kerajinan tangan. Singkatnya mendidik untuk menjadi “ibu/istri yang baik dan salehah untuk suami dan anak-anak.”

Dalam konteks Timur Tengah, termasuk Jazirah Arab, sebelum pendirian “lembaga pendidikan formal” yang bernama madrasah di Abad Pertengahan (khususnya di masa Dinasti Saljuq), perpustakaan dan masjid juga digunakan sebagai tempat belajar-mengajar. Masjid Haram di Makah misalnya sudah lama digunakan sebagai pusat pembelajaran. Tetapi lagi-lagi, hanya laki-laki yang boleh belajar dan “sekolah” di masjid atau perpustakaan.

Meskipun berakar sejak abad ke-18, Kerajaan Arab Saudi modern seperti tampak sekarang ini baru dideklarasikan tahun 1932 oleh Raja Abdulaziz (1875-1953) yang populer dengan sebutan Ibnu Saud. Meski demikian baru pada awal 1950an pemerintah mencanangkan pembangunan sekolah dasar dan menengah (baca, madrasah) secara nasional setelah mendapatkan keuntungan melimpah dari hasil penjualan minyak. Penting untuk diketahui walaupun program nasional pendirian madrasah baru dicanangkan pada awal 1950an, institusi madrasah sudah ada di Makah sejak abad ke-12. Madrasah pertama di Makah berdiri tahun 1175 bernama Madrasah al-Ursufi, didirikan oleh pengusaha Suriah Afif Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Ursufi. Sedangkan pendirian universitas pertama baru dimulai tahun 1957, yaitu King Saud University. Setelah itu baru Universitas Islam Madinah dan universitas saya, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals.

Pionir Pendidikan Perempuan dari Indonesia

Pemerintah Saudi secara resmi mencanangkan pembangunan madrasah bagi perempuan pada awal 1960an. Meski begitu bukan berarti sebelumnya tidak ada lembaga pendidikan bagi perempuan. Yang menarik, para pionir pendidikan perempuan di Arab Saudi adalah sejumlah ulama Indonesia, baik laki-laki maupun perempuan, yang menetap di Makah. Di antara mereka adalah Muhammad Yasin bin Isa (Syekh Yasin) dan istrinya Siti Aminah serta Siti Khairiyah (putri pendiri NU KH Hasyim Asy’ari dan istri KH Abdullah Muhaimin Lasem).

Pada pertengahan 1950an, Syekh Yasin (1916-1990), seorang ulama prolifik berdarah Minang yang menulis banyak kitab, mendirikan dua lembaga pendidikan yang didedikasikan untuk anak-anak perempuan, yaitu Ma’had al-Mu’alimat al-Ahliyah dan Madrasah Ibtidaiyah li al-Banat al-Ahliyah. Syekh Yasin juga salah satu pendiri Madrasah Darul Ulum di Makah (tahun 1934) yang pernah masyhur sebagai pusat pendidikan bagi para siswa Asia Tenggara di Makah.

Syekh Yasin mendirikan lembaga pendidikan perempuan karena didorong oleh sejumlah alasan. Misalnya, karena lebih banyak tinggal di rumah, perempuan (ibu) lebih banyak berinteraksi dengan anak-anak. Para ibu juga yang lebih banyak mendidik anak-anak mereka di rumah. Oleh karena itu, membekali perempuan dengan ilmu pengetahuan akan ikut membantu memuluskan jalan bagi kelancaran pendidikan anak-anak. Jika perempuan (ibu) mendapat pendidikan dengan baik, kata Syekh Yasin, maka anak-anak pun akan mendapatkan pendidikan yang baik pula. Alasan lain, karena sebelumnya banyak perempuan yang belajar di kediamannya.

Bisa dikatakan, Syekh Yasin adalah salah satu peletak dasar pendidikan perempuan di luar rumah serta pembela hak-hak pendidikan bagi kaum perempuan, sesuatu yang tidak lumrah dilakukan di Arab Saudi kala itu. Pada saat itu, kelompok Islam ultrakonservatif Saudi, khususnya yang berhaluan Salafi-Wahabi, masih menganggap tabu dan haram bagi perempuan untuk belajar dan sekolah di luar rumah.

Istri Syekh Yasin, Siti Aminah, juga mendirikan sekolah perempuan bernama Jam’iyyah Khairiyah di akhir 1950an. Pendirian lembaga pendidikan ini didedikasikan untuk Siti Khairiyah yang pada 1942 pernah mendirikan madrasah untuk perempuan bernama Madrasah Khuttab al-Banat meskipun hanya bertahan selama beberapa tahun. Tidak jelas apa penyebabnya. Ada sumber yang mengatakan karena pendirinya wafat atau pulang ke Indonesia.

Sayangnya, semua sekolah yang didirikan oleh para tokoh Indonesia di Makah, baik yang untuk perempuan maupun laki-laki (misalnya Madrasah Darul Ulum yang didirikan oleh Syekh Yasin dkk atau Madrasah Indonesia al-Makkiyah yang didirikan oleh Janan Muhammad Tayyip dan Muhammad Nur Salim) tidak bisa berlangsung lama karena sejumlah faktor seperti tidak ada penerusnya, kekurangan dana operasional, atau lantaran diakuisisi oleh pemerintah Saudi.

Peran Sentral Effat Al Thunayyan dan Raja Faisal

Sementara itu untuk tokoh Saudi yang bisa dikatakan sebagai pionir pendidikan perempuan adalah Effat Al Thunayyan (1916-2000) dan tentu saja suaminya, Raja Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1906-1975). Tanpa dukungan sang suami, sulit (bahkan mustahil) bagi Effat untuk memuluskan jalan bagi upaya pendidikan perempuan di Arab Saudi apalagi waktu itu banyak kelompok Salafi-Wahabi garis keras yang kontra pendirian sekolah perempuan masih memiliki pengaruh. Raja Faisal dulu sampai mengerahkan tentara untuk menghalau para pendemo yang menghalangi jalan pemerintah membangun sekolah perempuan di Buraidah, salah satu kawasan, pusat, atau “sarang” kelompok militan ultrakonservatif Wahabi.

Raja Faisal adalah seorang tokoh politik modern, visionir, inovatif, progresif, serta pro-emansipasi perempuan yang banyak meletakkan dasar-dasar perubahan sosial-budaya di Arab Saudi yang kelak memengaruhi kebijakan Putra Mahkota Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). Pada 1970, Raja Faisal membangun Riyadh University for Women yang kelak menjelma menjadi “universitas perempuan” terbesar di dunia. Pada 2008, univeritas ini diberi nama baru: Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University. Nourah adalah kakak sekaligus penasehat Raja Abdulaziz, pendiri Kerajaan Arab Saudi modern, yang berhaluan progresif dan anti-konservatisme.

Seperti suaminya, Effat yang berdarah campuran Arab-Turki ini adalah sosok perempuan visionir dan progresif, pendidik (edukator) yang gigih dan ulet serta guru yang moderat dan modern. Semua anaknya didikan kampus di Amerika maupun Inggris: Harvard, Princeton, Georgetown, Cranwell, dan Sandhurst.

Sebelum pemerintah secara resmi menginisiasi pendirian madrasah perempuan di awal 1960an, Effat sudah mendirikan sekolah swasta untuk perempuan bernama Darul Hanan di Jedah pada 1955. Nama “Darul Hanan” yang secara literal berarti “Rumah Kasih Sayang” dipilih sebagai simbol perhatian dan kasih sayang Effat pada anak-anak perempuan yang sudah seharusnya mendapat perhatian yang sama dengan laki-laki khususnya di bidang pendidikan. Pada tahun 1943, Effat juga membuka ruangan untuk perempuan di sebuah sekolah laki-laki di Taif. Tetapi tidak berlangsung lama karena diserbu oleh kelompok ultrakonservatif yang tidak setuju adanya sekolah perempuan.

Saat Darul Hanan pertama kali dibuka, ada 15 anak perempuan yang menjadi siswi sekolah, termasuk putrinya. Yang menarik, para siswi tidak diwajibkan memakai hijab. Setahun kemudian, tahun 1956, Effat menghibahkan tanah dan mendonasikan uang untuk membangun panti asuhan perempuan yatim-piatu yang juga dilengkapi dengan sekolah.

Kepeloporan Effat di dunia pendidikan perempuan tidak berhenti sampai di situ. Pada 1960, Effat memprakarsai pendirian sebuah perguruan tinggi khusus untuk perempuan di Riyadh yang diberi nama Kulliyat al-Banat. Kemudian pada awal 1970an, ia untuk pertama kalinya dalam sejarah Arab Saudi, mendirikan sebuah “community college” untuk perempuan. Kelak, tahun 1999, anak-anaknya khususnya Putri Lolowah dan Putri Sara, mendirikan Effat College, sebuah kampus perempan, yang pada 2009 menjadi Effat University. Kampus ini didirikan disamping Madrasah Darul Hannan yang Effat dirikan dulu. Effat University adalah kampus swasta pertama untuk perempuan yang didirikan di bawah payung King Faisal Charitable Foundation.

Effat bukan hanya tokoh penting di balik reformasi pendidikan perempuan di Arab Saudi. Ia juga tokoh penting di balik gerakan emansipasi perempuan. Pada 1967, Effat mendirikan sebuah organisasi perempuan bernama Nahdlah al-Saudiyyah yang bertujuan untuk mendidik dan mengentaskan kaum perempuan buta huruf di Arab Saudi. Maka, jika sejak beberapa tahun terakhir ini ada gerakan masif emansipasi perempuan di Arab Saudi, maka bisa dikatakan itu berakar dari gagasan dan praktik Ratu Effat ini yang memiliki motto: “Didiklah dirimu! Seorang ibu, jika dididik dan dipersiapkan dengan baik, bisa menjadi sebuah sekolah dalam dirinya.”

Visi Saudi 2030

Sejak Raja Salman berkuasa tahun 2015 dan terutama sejak MbS menjadi Putra Mahkota tahun 2017, pendidikan perempuan mengalami proses perubahan dramatis. Di bawah payung “Visi Saudi 2030”, pemerintah gencar melakukan reformasi sosial-budaya termasuk di dunia pendidikan perempuan yang selama hampir 40 tahun nyaris termarjinalkan sejak kelompok Islam radikal ultrakonservatif diberi panggung oleh Raja Khalid di awal 1980an.

Kini perempuan mendapat “angin segar” di dunia pendidikan, termasuk pendidikan tinggi. Banyak beasiswa digelontorkan untuk mereka. Kampus-kampus diwajibkan memiliki kuota untuk perempuan. Dampaknya luar biasa. Data statistik pemerintah menunjukkan sekitar 69.9 persen pendaftar mahasiswa perguruan tinggi adalah perempuan. Para lulusan perguruan tinggi juga didominasi oleh perempuan. Sekarang banyak dari mereka yang bekerja di berbagai profesi di sektor publik yang dulu ditabukan oleh rezim agama.

Meski begitu, karena harus berkompetisi dengan laki-laki, penyerapan pekerjaan bagi perempuan masih belum maksimal. Di level manajerial dan posisi senior, perempuan baru terserap 6,8 persen. Problem lain adalah gaji yang menurut Global Gender Gap Report 2021 masih jauh dari gaji yang diterima laki-laki untuk profesi yang sama. Mekipun pemberdayaan dan egalitarianisme gender masih menjadi “PR” pemerintah, setidaknya kiprah dan partisipasi perempuan Saudi di sektor publik saat ini sudah jauh lebih baik dan manusiawi ketimbang era sebelumnya.

Sumber: Media Indonesia (15 Nov 2024). https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/718027/pasang-surut-pendidikan-perempuan-di-arab-saudi

Pro-Kontra Emansipasi Perempuan di Arab Saudi

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Sejak Raja Salman atau lebih tepatnya Putra Mahkota Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) mencanangkan kebijakan emansipasi perempuan dan kesetaraan gender, khususnya di dunia pekerjaan dan pendidikan, beberapa tahun silam, banyak publik Saudi dan bahkan masyarakat internasional yang menyambutnya dengan gegap gempita. Sebagian bersuka cita, sebagian lagi “berduka cita.” Yang lain acuh dan biasa saja.

Di Arab Saudi, sejauh yang saya amati selama puluhan tahun tinggal, mengajar, dan riset di negara-kerajaan ini, gagasan dan praktik emansipasi perempuan disambut dengan pro-kontra karena sejumlah alasan yang mereka anggap fundamental. Jadi, ada kelompok yang menyambut positif dan riang gembira tetapi ada pula yang kontra, mengkritik, dan mencemaskan kebijakan dan praktik emansipasi perempuan. Selain amatan atau observasi pribadi, tulisan ini juga berdasarkan informasi yang disampaikan oleh para kolega dan murid Saudi saya.

Kelompok Pro Emansipasi

Di antara kelompok yang pro dan menyambut positif adalah kaum perempuan (khususnya pemudi) Kaum perempuan tentu saja menyambut gembira. Bidang pekerjaan yang dulu dibolehkan oleh pemerintah dan “rezim agama” hanya terbatas pada guru sekolah dan perawat (khusunya untuk pasien perempuan) dan itupun harus berkompetisi dengan pekerja ekspat (khususnya warga Arab non-Saudi, Filipina, India, atau Pakistan), kini nyaris tak terbataskan.

Muridku pernah berkisah kalau dulu saudara perempuannya pernah mengantri pekerjaan guru sekolah dasar selama lebih dari 10 tahun karena ketatnya persaingan kerja lantaran keterbatasan slot (jatah) atau sektor pekerjaan yang tersedia dan diperbolehkan bagi mereka untuk melamar.

Tapi sekarang perempuan boleh melamar di hampir semua sektor pekerjaan, termasuk keamanan, transportasi, dan turisme. Karena itu jangan heran kalau sekarang di banyak tempat umum seperti bandara, stasiun, tempat wisata, klinik, rumah sakit, toko, bank, mall, restoran, kampus, pabrik, kantor, dan sebagainya (termasuk di kampus tempat saya bekerja) banyak dijumpai para pekerja atau petugas perempuan yang dulu nyaris susah ditemui. Para pengemudi angkutan umum (termasuk taxi, bus, KA) juga banyak dijumpai kaum perempuan. Dengan bekerja, perempuan akan mendapatkan gaji atau penghasilan untuk memenuhi sejumlah keperluan hidup mereka. Karena itu wajar jika mereka menyambut emansipasi perempuan dengan riang gembira.

Selain perempuan, para orang tua, khususnya mereka yang mempunyai banyak anak perempuan, juga ikut senang. Mereka senang karena dengan diperbolehkannya bekerja di berbagai sektor publik, maka secara otomatis dapat mengurangi beban finansial dan belanja keluarga, setidaknya untuk anak perempuan mereka. Dengan kata lain, emansipasi berdampak pada kemandirian perempuan secara finansial yang tidak lagi tergantung pada laki-laki, baik suami maupun ayah. Bahkan, menurut penuturan para muridku, orang tua yang dulunya mengtabukan perempuan bekerja di sektor publik karena alasan doktrin keagamaan tertentu ikutan berubah haluan setelah merasakan manfaatnya.

Selanjutnya, kelompok moderat agama juga menyambutnya dengan suka cita. Bagi mereka, kebijakan emansipasi perempuan akan membuat kaum Hawa lebih otonom, bebas, dan merdeka (tidak selalu berada di bawah supremasi, kontrol, dan otoritas laki-laki dalam urusan sosial-ekonomi). Selain itu, mereka berargumen bahwa perempuan sudah selayaknya mandiri dalam berekspresi karena para istri dan anak anak nabi pun tidak dikekang dalam hal pendidikan dan mencari nafkah (misalnya berdagang). Bagi mereka, pembatasan dan pengekangan ruang-gerak kaum perempuan justru kontradiktif dengan praktik kenabian dan spirit Islam yang humanis, emansipatoris, dan membebaskan.

Kelompok Kontra Emansipasi

Sementara itu, kelompok yang kontra emansipasi perempuan setidaknya ada tiga, yaitu kubu ultra-konservatif agama (Islam), “Saudis” (yakni para penjaga identitas sejarah dan kultural Saudi), dan (sebagian) pemuda. Ada sejumlah alasan kenapa mereka cenderung kontra.

Pertama, alasan yang bersifat teologi-keagamaan. Misalnya, kebijakan emansipasi perempuan dianggap tidak sesuai dengan ajaran normatif Islam atau lebih spesifik lagi doktrin Salafi-Wahabi-Hanbali sebagai faksi muslim dan mazhab pemikiran-hukum Islam dominan di Arab Saudi. Bagi mereka, tempat dan “kodrat” perempuan adalah di ruang domestik (di dalam rumah untuk melayani suami, menyediakan makanan, merawat anak, dll) bukan di sektor publik (misalnya bekerja di luar rumah). Dunia publik adalah “dunia laki-kali.”

Kedua, alasan yang bersifat sosio-kultural. Misalnya, kebijakan emansipasi perempuan dianggap sebagai produk kebudayaan asing, khususnya Barat yang “kafir” dan tidak sesuai atau berlawanan dengan ajaran, doktrin, nilai, dan norma keislaman, kearaban, atau kesaudian.

Ketiga, alasan yang bernuansa psikologis seperti kekhawatiran terhadap proses perubahan dramatis masyarakat Saudi menjadi “lebih liberal-sekuler” sehingga ciri khas dan identitas Saudi selama ini sebagai negara dan masyarakat Islami menjadi luntur atau bahkan musnah.

Keempat, bagi pemuda khususnya, kebijakan emansipasi perempuan membuka peluang semakin ketatnya persaingan (kompetisi) bukan hanya dalam memperebutkan lapangan pekerjaan tetapi juga akses masuk ke perguruan tinggi atau kesempatan mendapatkan beasiswa. Bisa dimengerti kenapa kaum pemuda cemas karena jika dulu kompetisi hanya dengan sesama laki-laki, maka kini ditambah perempuan. Oleh karena itu, kesempatan atau peluang bagi pendaftar laki-laki untuk berhasil mendapatkan pekerjaan, beasiswa, atau masuk perguruan tinggi menjadi semakin kecil.

Kelima, menipisnya peluang membangun ikatan pernikahan di masa depan. Alasan ini khususnya bagi pemuda yang belum menikah. Bagi pemuda Saudi, karena dipengaruhi oleh ajaran Hanbali, laki-laki adalah mutlak kepala rumah tangga yang bertanggung jawab penuh terhadap segala urusan rumah tangga, termasuk masalah finansial. Karena itu mereka tidak berani menikah jika belum mendapatkan pekerjaan layak.

Pada saat yang sama, mereka juga tidak berani menikahi perempuan yang sudah memperoleh pekerjaan layak sedangkan mereka belum. Selain faktor gengsi, juga “pamali” bagi laki-laki Saudi karena dianggap bisa menurunkan martabat dan harga diri sebagai seorang lelaki yang seharusnya “memimpin” perempuan dalam segala hal, termasuk urusan keuangan dan kesejahteraan. Sementara itu, kaum perempuan Saudi sendiri cenderung tidak mau menikahi laki-laki yang tidak mempunyai pekerjaan layak. Informasi ini saya dapatkan dari hasil perbincangan dengan murid-muridku para mahasiswa (laki-laki) Saudi.

Faktor inilah, antara lain, yang turut mempengaruhi penurunan angka pernikahan dini, penundaan pernikahan, serta meningkatnya populasi warga yang tidak menikah. Tren ini bisa dilihat dari data yang dikeluarkan oleh Saudi General Authority for Statistics, sebuah badan resmi pemerintah yang bertanggung jawab untuk mengumpulkan data dan melakukan survei secara nasional.

Misalnya, tahun 2020, sekitar 66 persen pemuda/pemudi Saudi yang berusia antara 20-40 tidak menikah (hanya 32 persen yang menikah). Dari data ini, jika dibandingkan antara laki-laki dan perempuan, prosentase laki-laki yang tidak menikah tampak lebih tinggi (sekitar 75 persen, sedang perempuan sekitar 56 persen).

Meski ada sejumlah faktor mendasar, persoalan tingginya biaya hidup dan mahalnya biaya pernikahan (dari pertunangan, mahar, hingga pesta/resepsi pernikahan) menjadi alasan yang utama. Menurut informasi dari murid-muridku, biaya mahar sekitar SR 50,000 (sekitar Rp. 200 juta) sedangkan biaya pernikahan minimal sekitar SR 100,000 (sekitar Rp. 400 juta). Tentu saja ini sangat sulit dan berat bagi laki-laki yang belum mendapatkan pekerjaan layak. Bahkan terkadang ada dari anggota keluarga perempuan (orang tua, saudara) yang meminta ini-itu secara khusus pada calon mempelai laki-laki sehingga semakin memberatkan. Karena alasan inilah kenapa di Arab Saudi ada para dermawan atau lembaga tertentu–meskipun terbatas–yang terkadang mensponsori pernikahan untuk membantu meringankan biaya.

Saya kadang bertanya kepada para muridku, “Jika menikah kelak, apakah Anda akan memilih poligami atau monogami?” Serentak mereka menjawab sambil berkelakar, “Jangankan beristri empat, satu saja belum tentu dapat.”

Dampak Positif Emansipasi Perempuan

Terlepas adanya pro-kontra di masyarakat, kebijakan emansipasi perempuan dan kesetaraan gender membawa dampak baik dan positif bagi Arab Saudi. Misalnya, adanya penurunan angka pengangguran bagi perempuan serta surplus sarjana perempuan yang banyak berkiprah di masyarakat.

Kaum perempuan juga memberi kontribusi penting bagi tumbuhnya perekonomian nasional. Kini dunia publik Saudi, termasuk para elite masyarakat (pejabat, politisi, penasehat pemerintah, pengusaha, ilmuwan, anchor media, akademisi, dan lain-lain), bukan hanya dipenuhi sosok laki-laki tapi juga perempuan. Di universitas tempat saya mengajar (King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals), sejak beberapa tahun silam, juga sudah banyak terlihat kaum perempuan yang bekerja sebagai peneliti, dosen, staf administrasi, atau sebagai mahasiswa (baik S1, S2, maupun S3). Sebelumnya, kampus ini hanya berisi kaum lelaki.

Fenomena ini membuat pemandangan Arab Saudi masa kini betul-betul berubah dan berbeda seratus delapan puluh derajat dengan masa sebelumnya, khususnya sejak 1980an, ketika negara-kerajaan monarki absolut ini mulai dikontrol oleh kelompok ultrakonservatif Islam yang sangat tertutup dan militan (dikenal dengan nama Sahwa) yang membatasi secara ketat ruang gerak kaum perempuan di sektor publik, termasuk dalam hal profesi dan mendapatkan akses pekerjaan dan pendidikan.

Overdosis penyerapan dan internalisasi doktrin, teks, dan wacana keagamaan memang sering kali membuat para pelakunya “kebablasan” dalam menjalankan ajaran keagamaan mereka serta, dalam batas tertentu, kehilangan akal sehat. Padahal, seperti laki-laki, bukankah sudah selayaknya kalau perempuan juga mendapatkan hak dan kesempatan yang sama sebagai sesama makhluk Tuhan?

Sumber: Media Indonesia (9 Agustus 2024). https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/691504/pro-kontra-emansipasi-perempuan-di-arab-saudi

Lessons learned from women’s emancipation in Saudi Arabia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

The increasing freedoms and flexibilities Saudi women enjoy today offer a few pertinent lessons in social practices and behavior with respect to religious practices

I have been teaching (and researching) for more than 10 years at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, the top university in Saudi Arabia and the entire Arab region in the Middle East, according to the current QS World University Rankings. I have witnessed an impressive transformation and change here, especially related to women’s development and emancipation.

There are various meanings of emancipation but in this essay, the term means a process of giving people social, cultural, educational and economic rights and freedom, liberating them from the stern control of other groups including parents, political authorities, and religious establishments.

When I first arrived in Saudi Arabia, conservatism was still the dominant culture and practice in society. Public areas and facilities were strictly segregated by gender. There were female and male rooms or family and single areas in restaurants, cafes, public transportation, and workplaces.

As for clothing, women wore black abayas and veils (niqab and other forms), except for girls. There were no concerts or other performing arts shows, and no movie theaters.

Moreover, the religious police or enforcers, known as Mutaween, were deployed throughout the country, especially in urban areas. Their main job was to enforce conservative Islamic values and norms of public behavior and practice, as defined by Saudi religious authorities, especially the Hai‘a (Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice).

They also watched over women who did not wear hijab in public places. If they saw women not wearing abaya and hijab in public, they would catch and lecture them. My colleague’s wife, a Westerner, once had this unpleasant experience.

Saudi women’s roles and participation in public affairs were uncommon. With a few exceptions, almost all public facilities (shopping malls, markets, higher educational institutions, etc.) were controlled and staffed by men.

My university was also entirely populated, dominated and staffed by men, except in housing compounds for faculty members and their families. However, during King Salman’s reign from 2015 to the present, everything began to change dramatically and massively.

As government-led social reforms swept the kingdom, views of public areas also shifted vividly. Today, Saudi women are everywhere. They can now apply for jobs and professions in all sectors that were previously available and designated only for men.

In the past, particularly since the 1980s, women were limited to jobs like schoolteachers, nurses, or lecturers at female-only universities and colleges, such as Effat University or Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University. Now, the government has set a quota system for women for all types of employment in companies, schools, universities, shopping malls, airports, and others.

Those that do not implement this policy will be given government sanctions, while those that reach this quota will receive government incentives or bonuses. Accordingly, employers are trying their best to achieve the government’s mandate by giving priority to women for certain jobs or at least equal chances for both men and women.

In recent years, my university also started accepting female students, administrative staff, researchers and professors.

Other effects of the sociocultural reforms and women’s emancipation policies include the absence of gender-based public segregation. Restaurants, cafés and other places are no longer divided according to gender. Additionally, women’s fashion is more flexible yet modest. Black abayas are no longer dominant, and stores have started selling colorful abayas. Interestingly, many Saudi women also wear “loose hijab” (such as kerudung, or headscarf) to cover their hair.

Concerts, whether for classical or contemporary music and from orchestra to hip-hop, are held at various public events. Saudi citizens and residents can now enjoy music that was previously considered haram by conservative religious groups. The Saudi government has also opened movie theatres across the kingdom.

Equally important, it has shut down the religious police institution that was established in 1940. What is happening in Saudi nowadays is not entirely new. Before the Sahwa, which literally means Islamic Awakening, when militant religious groups became part of the government and controlled religious discourses and cultural practices in the early 1980s, Saudi society enjoyed some relative freedoms and flexibilities, including women’s employment in public sectors. Music, movies, theater and other artistic forms were accessible in public venues. Women’s dress was moderate and was not dominated by black.

Things started changing dramatically when the kingdom embraced the Sahwa movement and granted hard-line religious groups a bigger role in government and society. Fueled by an extreme religious ideology and interpretations, combined with unchecked powers, this group became the “watchdog” of social practices and behavior for more than 30 years.

A few things can be learned from the Saudi development. First, religious practices cannot just be imposed from top to bottom. Second, no society, including conservative societies, is immune from social change. Humans are fluid and changing animals, not fixed and unchanging, that can easily shift to different practices. Third, religious discourses, doctrines and practices are the product of interpretations and understandings of political and religious actors (agencies) in society.

Therefore, the type of religious (and political) actors will determine, shape and influence the forms of religious discourses, doctrines and practices in society.

Source: The Jakarta Post (12 July 2024). https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2024/07/12/lessons-from-womens-emancipation-in-saudi-arabia.html

Indonesia’s Future under Prabowo: Will be Better?

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Since October 20, 2024, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and Southeast Asia’s largest economy, has had a new president and a vice president: Prabowo Subianto (b. 1951, locally known as Prabowo) and Gibran Rakabuming Raka (b. 1987, locally known as Gibran). Having a strong military background with various high-rank posts in the Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) during the reign of the late despotic ruler Suharto (Prabowo’s former father-in-law), Prabowo was a former Minister of Defense under President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) who served as the seventh president of Indonesia from 2014 to 2024. Prabowo is also the General Chairman of the Gerindra Party, a nationalist, right-wing populist political party. Founded by Prabowo and his allies in 2008, Gerindra is currently the third largest party in the parliament (DPR) after PDI-P and Partai Golkar. Furthermore, Gibran was the ex-mayor of Surakarta in Central Java and Jokowi’s eldest child.

The Composition of Prabowo’s Cabinet

After the General Elections Commission (KPU) officially announced and assigned Prabowo as the eighth president of Indonesia, he appointed 136 officials consisting of 48 ministers, 56 deputy ministers, 5 heads of government agencies or ministerial-level officials, and 27 figures for various professions such as special advisors to the president, special delegates to the president, and chairs of national agencies. ¹ With this number to date, Prabowo’s cabinet is perhaps the largest-ever cabinet in the country’s modern political history. Prabowo named his “fat” cabinet the “Red and White Cabinet,” symbolizing the colors of the Indonesian flag. Prabowo argued that the composition of large members in his cabinet aimed to create a strong government that would unite and reflect Indonesia’s diverse societies and political interests. ²

Prabowo’s cabinet features various professions including politicians, bureaucrats, (ex-) military or police personnel, business people, activists, academics, and practitioners. Moreover, his cabinet represents a mixture of figures including Prabowo’s stalwarts, the coalition of seven political parties who supported his candidacy during February’s presidential election, social and religious organizations (e.g., Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, HMI, PMII, among others), some of his rivals during the election (e.g., Muhaimin Iskandar, the General Chairman of the National Awakening Party, who became the running mate of Anies Baswedan), and Jokowi’s loyalists, particularly his former ministers.

Indeed, a substantial number of Jokowi’s key ministers have been reappointed as Prabowo’s ministers and have strategic and crucial positions in the ministry (e.g., Sri Mulyani, Tito Karnavian, Erick Thohir, Bahlil Lahadia, Pratikno, Airlangga Hartarto, Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita, among others), a sign of Jokowi’s strong influence on Prabowo. The accommodation of “Jokowi’s men” in Prabowo’s cabinet can be seen as a political compensation to Jokowi for his tacit backing and endorsement of Prabowo during the election.

Prabowo’s Weaknesses and Strengths

People might wonder whether Indonesia’s future will be better or worse under Prabowo. Here are some of Prabowo’s weaknesses and strengths to assess his capacity and qualifications.

Pessimists and critics will query Prabowo’s credentials to run this vast archipelagic country with more than 280 million population due to his negative reputation and bitter track records in the past. These accounts include some well-known issues related to accusations of human rights abuse. For example, Prabowo was alleged of capturing and abducting activists (including students) and orchestrating the 1998 violent riots and mass rapes targeting Chinese women and properties at the end of Suharto’s rule, accusations he repeatedly denied. Prabowo was also involved in a counter-insurgency operation in East Timor that claimed hundreds of lives, including the carnage of a dozen people (women and children included) in 1983. ³ Furthermore, Prabowo made alliances with intolerant factions and radical Islamists during the 2019 presidential election, the most chaotic and brutal-ever presidential election and campaign in Indonesia’s post-New Order history. Equally important, Prabowo’s party was deemed responsible for violent, dirty, and racist campaigns and mass disturbances during Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election, the country’s worst-ever gubernatorial election.

Interestingly, notwithstanding the accusations of his unpleasant experiences in the past decades, Prabowo currently receives popular and extensive support from the Indonesian populace that can be used as a “social capital” to back his rule, policies, programs, and agenda. Backed by Jokowi, Prabowo became president after winning the election, receiving nearly 100 million (around 96.214.691) voters, or 58.59 percent of the ballot. Prabowo-Gibran’s rivals received 24.95 percent (for Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar) and 16.47 percent (for Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD). ⁴ Remarkably, more than half of voters in 35 provinces cast their ballot for Prabowo-Gibran. This means that only in 3 provinces Prabowo-Gibran received support from less than 50 percent of voters.

What made Prabowo receive overwhelming support today, although he previously failed several times, either as the candidate for president or vice president? At this point, Jokowi’s backing was a crucial factor for Prabowo’s victory. Without Jokowi’s (tacit) support, it was almost impossible for Prabowo to win the contest of the 2024 presidential election. In fact, in the past two presidential elections in 2014 and 2019 in which Prabowo also ran the candidacy, he was bitterly defeated by Jokowi, even though a coalition of numerous political parties had supported Prabowo. Jokowi’s support means that Prabowo will receive support from Jokowi’s enthusiastic followers and loyalists who are still widespread in the country, both ordinary people and elite members of society. Indeed, Jokowi so far remains a popular leader, albeit some elements and factions in society have criticized his rule in recent years. Critics, for instance, said that, despite making the country strong in economic growth and massive infrastructure development beyond Java, Jokowi left huge financial debts, roused old-time patronage and dynastic politics, damaged democracy and democratization processes, and diminished the integrity of courts and other state institutions. ⁵

Furthermore, survey findings from multiple noted institutions such as Kompas, the country’s respected national media, indicate significant public support toward Prabowo. For example, a survey conducted in September 2024 revealed that 84.1 percent of respondents of all categories (male and female; youth and adult; low, middle, and high class; educated and uneducated) see positively toward Prabowo’s future role as a “captain” of the “Indonesian ship.” Seven out of ten respondents also view Gibran positively. Around 84.7 percent of respondents were confident that Prabowo could defend and protect the country from home and foreign disturbers, and 80.2 percent believed that Probowo could increase Indonesian dignity and prestige in the international society. Additionally, 76.4 percent of respondents believed Prabowo could maintain the country’s political stability and national security. Over 70 percent of respondents are also convinced that Prabowo could overcome some major issues such as legal-related matters (74.5 percent), social welfare (73.1 percent), and economic growth (72.6 percent). ⁶

Why does Prabowo currently receive a positive image even though he has been dogged by charges of human rights abuses and violent riots for decades?

Here are some possible explanations. First, the accusation was perhaps only popular among elite members of society (politicians, activists, or academics), not the grassroots. Second, Indonesians generally find it easy to change their attitudes and perceptions, forget past experiences, and forgive someone who has a dark experience in the past but shows a positive development. Prabowo, on various occasions, has shown this changing behavior in recent years. Third, Prabowo’s calmness, elegance, and respect for his rivals during the presidential debates and campaigns in the 2024 election also contributed to this positive image. Fourth, Prabowo’s promises during the election might attract some segments of society, especially the grassroots (e.g., free education, free lunch, and increased salary for teachers and civil servants, etc.). Fifth, “the Jokowi effect” is undoubtedly significant in elevating Prabowo’s reputation.

Some Challenges for Prabowo’s Rule: Concluding Remarks

Although many Indonesians have high hopes for Prabowo-Gibran’s administration for the nation’s future, some fundamental issues can hamper their expectations and Prabowo’s confidence and promises. Here are some problems facing the country: the poverty rate is still high (9.03 percent in 2024), the unemployment rate in 2024 is 5.2 percent which is the highest in Southeast Asia, the adult illiteracy rate is 3.47 percent (in 2023), and the foreign debt is also high (around $403.9 billion in the first quarter of 2024). Moreover, corruption is still a common, ubiquitous practice in the country which is difficult to eradicate. Transparency International has scored Indonesia “34” (out of 100), meaning that the country’s rank is 115 out of 180 countries.

Equally important, the country has long faced intolerance, religious militancy, and anti-pluralist movements targeting specifically religious minority groups, including Muslim minorities (Shiites, Ahmadis, etc.). Religious freedom, including the right to build religious worship places, particularly for non-Muslims, still becomes a major issue in the country. The resurgence of multiple conservative, radical, and Islamist groups can disturb national security, civic peace, and social harmony. Additionally, separatist movements, particularly in Papua, are still a major issue that the current government needs to pay attention to.

Will Indonesia’s future be better and cleaner under Prabowo? Well, it is too early to evaluate and judge the success or unsuccess of Prabowo’s reign. The “fat” cabinet perhaps can make Prabowo’s administration stronger (as Prabowo said). But, the “bloated cabinet” can be ineffective and insufficient. It also can complicate bureaucracy and lengthen the policy-making process. The adding of many ministries and departments can also be costly in the sense of both energy and money spent. What is the point of appointing many officials if the appointment is only to incorporate and satisfy his loyalists and make his fans happy? Yet, time will answer these doubts.

Notes:

Revo M, “Wow! Ada 136 Pejabat yang Dilantik Prabowo, Terbanyak dalam Sejarah?” CNBC Indonesia, 22 October 2014. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/research/20241022120851-128-582009/wow-ada-136-pejabat-yang-dilantik-prabowo-terbanyak-dalam-sejarah (accessed October 23, 2024).
Niniek Karmini, “New President Prabowo Subianto Announces Indonesia’s Largest-ever Cabinet, with 109 Members.” Associated Press, October 21, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-new-cabinet-prabowo-subianto-6b1f915d584c823aa16dbc38374c739c (Accessed October 22, 2024).
Gerry van Klinken, “Prabowo and Human Rights.” Inside Indonesia, April 27, 2014. https://www.insideindonesia.org/editions/elections-2014/prabowo-and-human-rights (Accessed October 22, 2024).
Ajid Fuad Muzaki, “KPU Resmi Tetapkan Prabowo-Gibran Sebagai Pemenang Pilpres 2024” [General Elections Commission of Indonesia Officially Assigned Prabowo-Gibran as the Winners of the 2024 Presidential Election]. Rumah Pemilu, April 24, 2024. https://rumahpemilu.org/kpu-resmi-tetapkan-prabowo-gibran-sebagai-pemenang-pilpres-2024/ (accessed October 21, 2024).
Kate Lamb and Ananda Teresia, “A Decade of Joko Widodo: Popular Indonesian Leader Leaves Rocky Legacy.” The Japan Times, October 14, 2024. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/10/14/asia-pacific/politics/jokowi-indonesia-legacy-critics/ (Accessed October 22, 2024).
For a more detailed finding of the survey, see M Toto Suryaningtyas, “Survei ‘Kompas’: Modal Sosial Pemerintahan Baru Prabowo-Gibran” [Kompas Survey: A Social Capital for the New Government of Prabowo-Gibran]. Kompas, October 19, 2024. https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2024/10/19/survei-kompas-modal-sosial-pemerintahan-baru-prabowo-gibran?open_from=Section_Pemilu_2024 (accessed October 21, 2024); Vincentius Gitiyarko, “Survei ‘Kompas’ Pemerintahan Baru Prabowo Gibran: Kuat di Pertahanan, Tantangan di Kesejahteraan.” Kompas, October 20, 2024. https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2024/10/19/survei-kompas-terhadap-pemerintahan-prabowo-gibran-kuat-di-pertahanan-tantangan-di-kesejahteraan?open_from=Section_Pemilu_2024 (Accessed October 21, 2024)

Source: https://kyotoreview.org/issue-39/indonesias-future-under-prabowo-will-be-better

The Development and Innovation of Religious, Secular, and Archaeological Tourism in Saudi Arabia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Abstract
Various fundamental changes have occurred in Saudi Arabia in recent decades. One sector that has experienced robust change and innovation in present-day Saudi Arabia is tourism. This article discusses the contemporary shift in Saudi Arabia’s religious, secular, and archaeological tourism sectors, as well as the history and development of Saudi tourism, in order to understand the factors, motives, logic, and driving forces that contribute to this change. The article argues that the development and innovation in Saudi tourism today are not merely driven by economic motivations, but are also propelled by governmental aspirations to create a new identity for Saudi Arabia: a global tourist destination, a modern country equipped with the latest technology, a pluralistic and tolerant society that welcomes foreign cultures, and a moderate nation that promotes religious moderation and discourages militancy and conservatism.

The PDF of this article can be read (accessed) in the following link:

https://campuscore.ariel.ac.il

Musik di Indonesia; Sejarah dan Perkembangan Kontemporer

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

PESAN

Definisi musik sendiri sangat beragam dan luas, baik dari aspek substansi maupun pendekatan. Tidak ada konsensus mengenai apa musik itu. Meskipun para sarjana musik pada umumnya menyetujui bahwa musik itu terdiri atas elemen-elemen spesifik (misalnya ritme, melodi) tetapi tidak ada kesepakatan elemen atau unsur dasar apa saja yang membentuk sebuah musik karena memang sangat beragam. Apakah suara deru angin, gemercik air, hempasan ombak, atau kicauan burung adalah sebuah atau bagian dari musik?

Walaupun begitu para sarjana dan spesialis studi musik pada umumnya setuju jika musik itu adalah “cultural universal” yang bisa dipastikan ada di semua kelompok masyarakat – baik “modern” maupun “primitif”, baik masyarakat kompleks maupun simpel – di jagat raya ini, meskipun tentu saja latar, bentuk, instrumen, makna, dan tujuan bermusik dari mereka berbeda-beda. Banyak juga dari mereka yang memandang musik sebagai sebuah “seni keindahan.”

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Kristen Palestina yang Terlupakan

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Setiap konflik Israel-Palestina meletus (sejak 1948), dunia selalu tertuju pada umat Islam dan Yahudi. Memang mayoritas masyarakat menganggap perang Israel-Palestina sebagai kekerasan agama antara Yahudi dan muslim, bukan konflik rebutan tanah dan teritori. Kelompok pro-Israel biasanya membela Yahudi dan menganggap Yahudi sebagai korban keganasan Hamas dan faksi militan Islam Palestina lainnya, sementara yang pro-Palestina membela umat Islam yang mereka pandang menjadi korban aneksasi dan kebrutalan Israel dan Yahudi tentunya.

Tumbuhnya kelompok anti-Semitisme di negara-negara Barat, khususnya Amerika dan sejumlah negara Eropa, yang marak belakangan ini merupakan bukti bahwa kelompok pro-Palestina tidak semata-mata anti-Israel tetapi juga anti-Yahudi. Begitu pula sebaliknya, kelompok pro-Israel di Barat menjadi penyumbang signifikan dalam maraknya aksi Islamopobia, meskipun fenomena ini sebetulnya sudah berlangsung lama, dan bukan dipicu oleh konflik Israel-Hamas saat ini.

Sementara itu, umat Kristen nyaris terlupakan di tengah pusaran konflik Israel-Palestina. Padahal Palestina sudah menjadi rumah umat Kristen jauh sebelum Islam lahir di abad ketujuh Masehi. Di Palestina pula Yesus dilahirkan. Pula, umat Kristen di Palestina turut mendapat “getah” alias ikut menjadi korban kekerasan Israel-Palestina sejak Perang Arab-Israel meletus tahun 1948 atau bahkan jauh sebelumnya, misalnya ketika Palestina di bawah otoritas Turki Usmani.

Perang Israel-Hamas sekarang ini juga berdampak negatif pada ribuan umat Kristen Gaza. Bukan itu saja, umat Kristen Palestina juga turut andil dalam upaya melakukan proses perdamaian antaragama, baik di tingkat elit maupun akar rumput. Tetapi sayangnya, eksistensi, realitas, dan kiprah mereka luput dari amatan publik akademik maupun non-akademik.

Pluralitas Kristen Palestina

Sebagaimana umat Islam dan Yahudi, umat Kristen Palestina juga sangat majemuk. Yang dimaksud Kristen Palestina di sini adalah umat Kristen yang tinggal di Palestina–baik umat Kristen lokal (khususnya Arab) maupun pendatang–bukan warga Palestina yang beragama Kristen dan tinggal dimanapun, termasuk Israel dan negara lainnya atau diaspora Kristen Palestina. Menurut Bernard Sabella, pengajar di Universitas Bethlehem, sebuah kampus Katolik di Tepi Barat, sekitar 56 persen warga Palestina yang memeluk Kristen tinggal di luar Palestina.

Yang jelas tidak jelas berapa persisnya populasi umat Kristen Palestina karena sejumlah sumber menyajikan data yang berbeda. Ketika PBB melakukan survei penduduk Palestina di akhir tahun 1946, terdapat sekitar 145,000 umat Kristen atau sekitar 12 persen dari penduduk Arab Palestina. Perang Arab-Israel tahun 1948 mengakibatkan sekitar 75,000 Kristen Palestina menjadi pengungsi di sejumlah negara tetangga di Timur Tengah, khususnya yang banyak populasi Kristennya seperti Yordania, Lebanon, dan Suriah. Sebagian lainnya mengungsi di Tepi Barat dan Jalur Gaza.

Sedangkan sekitar 39,000 Kristen Palestina tetap tinggal di tempat semula yang kelak mejadi Negara Israel. Menurut data Badan Statistik Palestina tahun 2020, populasi umat Kristen turun menjadi 8 persen, dan terakhir diperkirakan tinggal 6 persen. Tentu saja faktor terbesar penyebab penurunan populasi Kristen Palestina karena konflik, kekerasan, dan perang Israel-Palestina yang sudah berlangsung beberapa dekade.

Kristen Palestina bukanlah sebuah kelompok agama yang tunggal dan monolitik. Mereka sangat beragam dalam berbagai hal: denominasi kekristenan, wacana dan praktik keagamaan, pandangan terhadap isu pendirian Negara Israel, atau penyikapan atas konflik Israel-Palestina. Ada sejumlah denominasi Kristen di Palestina. Mayoritas dari Gereja Ortodoks Timur, kemudian disusul Katolik, Anglikan, Lutheran, dll. Keragaman denominasi ini turut andil dalam menciptakan keragaman wacana dan praktik ritual-keagamaan.

Kemudian, meskipun ada kelompok Kristen Palestina yang pro-Israel (misalnya sejumlah Kristen Evangelis yang berafiliasi dengan gereja Amerika), mayoritas dari mereka menentang aneksasi dan kekerasan yang dilakukan rezim ultranasionalis Israel dan kelompok garis keras Yahudi. Penentangan itu disebabkan karena umat Kristen Palestina juga menjadi target dan korban aksi kekerasan yang dilakukan oleh sebagian faksi politik/agama Israel/Yahudi.

Korban Kekerasan

Tahun 2021, para pemimpin gereja Yerusalem membuat statemen bersama yang menyatakan bahwa meskipun pemerintah Israel menggaransi keamanan dan kenyamanan umat Kristen, tetapi sejumlah kelompok radikal, pemerintah, dan polisi lokal sering melakukan tindakan kekerasan verbal (intimidasi, pelecehan) dan fisik (penyerangan, pengrusakan) terhadap umat kristiani, termasuk para pendeta, pastor, serta gereja dan properti mereka. Tindakan ini, menurut statemen tersebut, dimaksudkan untuk membuat umat Kristen tidak nyaman dan akhirnya pindah dari Yerusalem dan kawasan lain di Palestina.

Fenomena kekerasan atas umat Kristen juga diungkapkan oleh sejumlah tokoh Kristen Palestina seperti Profesor Mitri Raheb (pendeta Lutheran dan pendiri Dar al-Kalima University College of Arts and Culture di Bethlehem) dan Omar Haramy (direktur Sabeel Jerusalem, sebuah organisasi teologi pembebasan akar rumput Kristen Palestina). Keduanya menyatakan otoritas Israel dan kelompok radikal Yahudi sudah lama melakukan tindakan kekerasan terhadap umat Kristen Palestina serta aksi pengrusakan dan penyerangan terhadap berbagai gereja dan institusi Kristen lainnya seperti sekolah, rumah sakit, bar, dan bahkan kuburan. Menurut keduanya, ada upaya sistematis dari pemerintah Israel dan kelompok radikal Yahudi untuk mengubah demografi Yerusalem, Gaza, dan kawasan lainnya.

Salah satu kelompok ekstrimis Yahudi yang sering melakukan aksi kekerasan terhadap warga Kristen Palestina adalah Lehava (akronim dari bahasa Ibrani yang berarti “Pencegahan Asimilasi di Tanah Suci”) yang dipimpin oleh Ben-Zion Gopstein. Kelompok ini mengklaim bahwa Tanah Suci Palestina adalah “milik Yahudi” dan tindakan kekerasan itu dimaksudkan untuk “merestorasi kejayaan Yahudi.” Atas nama menjaga keaslian etnis Yahudi, kelompok ini juga melarang “perkawinan eksogami” antara Yahudi dan non-Yahudi.

Sementara itu, organisasi Zionis Eteret Cohanim rajin membeli properti di Yerusalem dan kawasan lainnya untuk kemudian disisi oleh warga Yahudi. Sejak 2018, pemerintah Israel juga menerapkan pajak tinggi untuk properti-properti yang dimiliki oleh gereja sehingga menyebabkan aksi protes para pemimpin gereja. Pula, otoritas Isarel (dengan alasan atau dalih keamanan) sering melarang warga Kristen dari luar daerah (misalnya Gaza) untuk merayakan Natal di Bethlehem (hal ini sama dengan muslim Gaza yang dilarang masuk Masjid Aqsa).

Jadi jelasnya, dalam konteks Palestina, bukan hanya muslim, umat Kristen juga menjadi sasaran dan korban aneksasi rezim politik Israel dan kekerasan sejumlah kelompok radikal Yahudi (simak misalnya, laporan penelitian bertajuk “Faith Under Occupation: The Plight of Indigenous Christians in the Holy Land” yang disponsori oleh gereja-gereja di Yerusalem bekerja sama dengan World Council of Churches dan the Middle East Council of Churchues.

Pembangunan Perdamaian

Meskipun menjadi korban kekerasan, banyak umat Kristen Palestina yang aktif melakukan gerakan pembangunan perdamaian dan toleransi antaragama. Sejumlah tokoh Kristen dan pemimpin gereja menjadi aktor penting dalam proses penciptaan koeksistensi dan proeksistensi damai di masyarakat. Hal yang sama juga terjadi di kalangan Yahudi dan muslim. Meskipun ada faksi radikal seperti Lehava, banyak umat Yahudi (misalnya kelompok Haredi) dan warga Israel yang anti-perang, pro-perdamaian, dan pendukung toleransi antaragama. Umat Islam pun demikian, tidak semua muslim Palestina mendukung ideologi dan gerakan politik Hamas, Jihad Islam, dan lainnya.

Selain Pdt. Mitri Raheb yang mendapat penghargaan “Bintang Bethlehem” dari Presiden Mahmoud Abbas, tokoh Kristen ternama lain yang aktif melakukan perdamaian adalah Abuna Ilyas Syakur (Elias Shacour, l. 1939) atau “Romo Syakur,” seorang sarjana, penulis, pendidik, aktivis dialog antaragama, pastor Gereja Katolik Melkite, dan Uskup Agung Galilee (sekarang sudah pensiun). Karena kompleksitas sejarahnya, Romo Syakur yang juga penulis buku Blood Brothers: The Dramatic Story of a Palestinian Christian Working for Peace in Israel sering menggambarkan dirinya sebagai seorang “Arab, Kristen, Palestina, dan Israel.”

Sepanjang hidupnya, ia dedikasikan untuk merajut relasi harmoni antara umat Kristen dan pemeluk agama lain, khususnya Islam, Yudaisme, dan Druze yang memiliki pengikut signifikan di Palestina dan Israel. Beragam aktivitas perdamaian, baik formal maupun informal, telah ia lakukan dari berbagai level: akar rumput, nasional, maupun internasional.

Upaya pembangunan perdamaian juga ia lakukan melalui dunia pendidikan untuk menyasar generasi muda. Merasa banyak anak yang terlantar pendidikan mereka serta kekhawatiran tumbuhnya sektarianisme, eksklusifisme, militanisme, dan sentimen keagamaan di kalangan generasi muda akibat konflik Israel-Palestina yang berkepanjangan, Romo Syakur, pada tahun 1982, mendirikan Prophet Elias High School yang dibangun di atas fondasi toleransi dan respek terhadap pluralitas etnis dan agama.

Sekolah lintas-agama ini didesain sebagai tempat pembelajaran bersama para siswa dari berbagai agama dengan spirit saling menghormati keunikan dan kekayaan masing-masing ajaran, tradisi, dan budaya. Kelak, sekolah ini berubah nama menjadi Mar Elias Educational Institution dari TK hingga universitas dengan ribuan siswa dan mahasiswa dari berbagai etnis dan agama. Di ruangan lembaga pendidikan ini, terpampang simbol-simbol Kristen, Islam, Yahudi, dan Druze, serta tokoh-tokoh perdamaian dari berbagai agama dan suku-bangsa. Semua itu menunjukkan prinsip dan komitmen Romo Syakur dalam pembangunan perdamaian antaragama yang berbasis pada nilai dan ajaran fundamental agama yang ia yakini memiliki tujuan baik dan positif bagi umat manusia.

Upaya baik dan positif Romo Syakur tidak selalu mendapat respons dan sambutan baik dan positif dari pemerintah maupun masyarakat. Selalu saja ada orang dan kelompok yang mencurigai dan bahkan melakukan aksi kekerasan verbal dan fisik baik terhadap dirinya, gereja, maupun sekolah yang ia dirikan. Tapi ia tak bergeming. Meskipun usianya sudah uzur (84), ia terus bergerak tanpa kenal lelah untuk “menyalakan lilin di tengah kegelapan”: merajut kembali relasi antarkelompok agama yang terkoyak akibat konflik serta menebarkan benih-benih perdamaian di masyarakat.

Keterangan: artikel ini pertama kali diterbitkan oleh Kompas pada 30 Desember 2023.

Houthi dan Syiah Yaman

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Beberapa tahun belakangan ini, nama Houthi Yaman mencuat, tak kalah populer dengan Hamas Palestina, Hizbullah Lebanon, atau ISIS di Irak dan Suriah. Padahal sebelumnya dunia internasional tidak mengetahui sama sekali nama Houthi. Publik mulai mengenal Houthi ketika kelompok ini muncul sebagai oposisi Presiden Yaman Ali Abdullah Saleh tahun 2003 dan terutama sejak 2011 saat mereka bergabung dengan kelompok lain dalam gerakan “Intifada (Revolusi) Yaman” untuk mendongkel pemerintah dan menuntut sang presiden mundur.

Di Timur Tengah (Timteng), Saleh merupakan salah satu presiden terlama. Ia menjadi presiden sejak 1977. Pertama sebagai Presiden Republik Arab Yaman (Yaman Utara) dan setelah Yaman Utara dan Yaman Selatan bersatu membentuk Republik Yaman tahun 1990, ia kembali menjadi presiden hingga tahun 2012 saat ia mundur sebagai buntut Intifada. Kini, nama Houthi kembali populer karena terlibat “konflik Laut Merah” dengan Amerika dan Inggris.

Asal-Usul Houthi

Menurut Ahmed Addaghashi, seorang profesor di Universitas Sana’a (Yaman), gerakan Houthi berakar dari Syabab al-Mu’minin, sebuah organisasi teologi-keagamaan kaum muda yang berafiliasi Syiah Zaidiyah yang bertujuan untuk mempromosikan, menyebarluaskan, dan membangkitkan ajaran aliran Islam ini ke masyarakat luas. Organisasi pemuda yang didirikan oleh keluarga Houthi ini berdiri pada awal 1990an, pasca unifikasi Yaman Selatan dan Yaman Utara. Untuk menarik kalangan remaja dan pemuda, Syabab al-Mu’minin menggelar sejumlah program seperti summer camp dengan menghadirkan sejumlah tokoh Syiah populis seperti Muhammad Hussein Fadhlallah (ulama Syiah Lebanon) atau Hassan Nasrallah (pemimpin Hizbullah Lebanon) yang berhasil menggaet puluhan ribu partisipan. Jadi, Houthi awalnya bukan kelompok politik.

Di antara figur penting dari keluarga Houthi tersebut adalah Hussein al-Houthi. Nah, nama gerakan Houthi saat ini diambil atau diadopsi oleh para pengikut dan loyalis Hussein al-Houthi ini (disebut juga “hutiyyun”) setelah ia tewas di tangan aparat pemerintah tahun 2004 karena dituduh melakukan gerakan makar dan separatisme. Nama resmi kelompok ini sebetulnya adalah Ansar Allah. Sementara itu nama “Houthi” sendiri adalah nama sebuah sub-suku atau varian dari Bani Hamdan, salah satu kelompok suku utama beraliran Syiah Ismaili yang pernah berkuasa di Yaman utara pada abad ke-12 sebelum ditaklukkan oleh Turan Shah, saudara Salahuddin al-Ayyubi (w. 1193), pemimpin Kurdi-Sunni legendaris dan pendiri Kesultanan Ayub. Dinasti Ayub hanya beberapa tahun menguasai Yaman utara. Kelompok Syiah (kali ini Zaidiyah) dari berbagai faksi, suku, dan klan kembali berkuasa hingga berabad-abad kemudian sampai tahun 1962 ketika meletus Perang Sipil yang mengakhiri dominasi “rezim Zaidiyah.”

Semasa hidupnya, Hussein al-Houthi disinyalir pernah menjadi anggota dewan (1993-1997) Hizb al-Haqq, sebuah partai politik Islamis yang berafiliasi Syiah Zaidiyah, yang berhasil memperoleh dua kursi legislatif saat Pemilu pertama pasca unifikasi digelar tahun 1993. Pemilu berikutnya (1997), Hizb al-Haqq kehilangan kursi dewan karena hanya memperoleh 0.2 persen suara yang menyebabkan parpol ini kongsi (koalisi) dengan partai oposisi yang juga gagal memperoleh kursi legislatif di Pemilu 2003 karena cuma memperoleh 0.1 persen.

Konflik Houthi-Pemerintah

Meskipun Hussein al-Houthi tidak memiliki hubungan dan afiliasi resmi dengan ormas Syabab al-Mukminin, ia dianggap memiliki peran sentral dalam melakukan proses militanisasi, radikalisasi, dan ideologisasi sebagian anggota organisasi ini atau pengikut Zaidiyah secara umum. Pada tahun 2003, sebagai repons atas aneksasi Amerika di Irak, Hussein al-Houthi mulai memimpin serangkaian aksi massa sambil membawa simbol-simbol (serta meneriakkan slogan-slogan) anti-Amerika dan Yahudi.

Puncaknya tahun 2004, pemerintah yang khawatir hubungan Yaman-Amerika terganggu serta kekhawatiran atas meluasnya dampak demonstrasi masa terhadap sikap anti-pemerintah akhirnya memutuskan untuk menangkap ratusan demonstran. Awalnya, Presiden Saleh berinisiatif mengundang Hussein al-Houthi untuk berdialog tetapi ia menolak dan bahkan membalasnya dengan melancarkan serangkaian penyerangan (dikenal dengan “pemberontakan Houthi” yang kelak menjelma menjadi Perang Sipil) terhadap aparat dan pemerintah pusat. Pemerintah akhirnya menangkap (dan membunuh) Hussein al-Houthi dan memburu pengikutnya.

Meski Hussein al-Houthi tewas dan aparat berkali-kali berusaha menumpas Houthi, gerakan kelompok ini tidak ikut mati. Pasca kematiannya, gerakan Houthi berurut-turut dipimpin oleh ayah almarhum (Badruddin al-Houthi, politisi dan ulama Syiah Zaidiyah) dan kemudian sepeninggal sang ayah tahun 2010, kelompok ini hingga kini dipimpin oleh Abdul Malik al-Houthi (adik Hussein al-Houthi). Meskipun pemerintah dan Houthi berkali-kali mengadakan perundingan (sebagian difasilitasi Oman dan Arab Saudi) tetapi belum menghasilkan solusi yang memuaskan kedua pihak yang berbeda sikap dan pandangan dalam melihat Negara Yaman.

Konflik dan Perang Sipil berkepanjangan antara Houthi dan pemerintah (dan sekutunya) ini kembali membuat Yaman porak-poranda (apalagi kini ditambah serangan udara AS-Inggris yang melakukan aksi balas dendam atas tindakan Houthi yang menyerang kapal-kapal komersial dan militer di Laut Merah karena disinyalir berpotensi untuk membantu Israel). PBB menyebut Yaman sebagai salah satu negara dengan tingkat krisis kemanusiaan terbesar dan terdarurat di dunia karena menyebabkan lebih dari 21.6 juta warga hidup sengsara.

Sejumlah Faktor

Munculnya gerakan Houthi yang sudah beberapa tahun mengontrol sebagian kawasan Yaman utara merupakan akumulasi dari sejumlah faktor internal dan eksternal. Di antara faktor internal yang mendorong pendirian gerakan Houthi, menurut para elit kelompok militan ini, adalah kemiskinan dan keterbelakangan yang melanda rakyat Yaman serta korupsi yang menimpa pemerintah.

Serangkaian aneksasi Amerika di Irak (dan Afghanistan) atau Israel di Palestina juga turut andil dalam pembentukan gerakan Houthi. Pengaruh Hizbullah, salah satu faksi politik-agama militan Syiah Lebanon, juga tidak bisa diabaikan. Sejak 1990an, para elit Houthi sudah menjalin jejaring dengan petinggi Hizbullah, meskipun keduanya dari aliran Syiah yang berbeda. Di Timteng, pengaruh Hizbullah bukan hanya terbatas di Lebanon tetapi juga di kawasan lainnya. Dulu di Arab Saudi juga ada Hizbullah Hijaz, di Kuwait ada Hizbullah Kuwait, dll. Hizbullah dibentuk pada awal 1980an oleh para tokoh Syiah Lebanon pengikut mendiang Imam Khomeini untuk melawan agresi militer Israel di Lebanon. Iranlah yang mendanai dan melatih milisi Hizbullah. Iran sendiri mengirim ribuan pasukan dari Penjaga Revolusi Islam ke Lebanon untuk membantu Hizbullah.

Pendirian gerakan radikal Houthi bisa juga lantaran dipicu oleh kegagalan partai Hizb al-Haqq dalam menarik suara rakyat dalam Pemilu 1997 dan 2003. Bisa jadi kegagalan berjuang lewat jalur politik ini mendorong Hussein al-Houthi dan loyalisnya memilih “jalur singkat” insurgensi dengan cara perlawanan fisik dan pemberontakan bersenjata untuk menguasai Yaman utara. Faktor yang tidak kalah pentingnya adalah keinginan untuk melakukan “revivalisme” (kebangkitan kembali) otoritas kekuasaan politik-agama Syiah Zaidiyah yang pernah berkuasa di Yaman utara selama berabad-abad pasca hengkangnya Dinasti Ayub.

Motivasi membangkitkan otoritas politik atau kekuasaan lama ini juga disinyalir yang menjadi alasan dan agenda tersembunyi Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani ketika mendirikan Hizbut Tahrir pada awal tahun 1950an, yakni untuk mewujudkan kembali kekuasaan leluhurnya (Bani Nabhan), yaitu Dinasti Nabhani (Daulah Nabahina) yang pernah menguasai sebagian wilayah Timteng (khususnya Oman) selama beberapa-abad setelah berhasil mengkudeta Bani Saljuk.

Keragaman Syiah

Houthi hanyalah sekelumit dari sekian cerita Syiah di Yaman dan Timteng pada umumnya yang beragam dan kompleks. Umat Syiah di Yaman sekitar 30-35 persen (selebihnya, sekitar 65-70 persen, adalah Sunni-Syafii). Meskipun mayoritas Syiah di Yaman adalah pengikut Zaidiyah, kelompok Syiah lain seperti Imamiyah (Itsna ‘Asyariyah) dan Ismailiyah (Ismaili) juga ada. Dominasi Zaidiyah di Yaman menjadi menarik dan “spesial” karena mayoritas Syiah di Timteng adalah pengikut Imamiyah. Selain Yaman, negara-negara Timteng dengan populasi Syiah cukup signifikan adalah Irak, Lebanon, Bahrain, dan Arab Saudi.

Selain ketiga kelompok Syiah ini, ada beberapa varian Syiah lainnya yang tinggal di sejumlah kawasan di Timteng seperti Ismaili Nizari, Mustaali Dawoodi Bohra, Alawi, Sulaimani Bohra, dll. Di Madinah (Arab Saudi) ada sekelompok umat Syiah yang menamakan diri Nakhawila. Pengikut Zaidiyah sendiri bukan hanya tinggal di Yaman tetapi juga Arab Saudi bagian selatan seperti Najran yang berbatasan dengan Yaman.

Seperti Sunni, Syiah juga beraneka ragam dari aspek ajaran, doktrin, tradisi, kultur, etnisitas pengikut, praktik ritual, pemahaman dan wacana keagamaan, afiliasi dan ekspresi politik, dll. Misalnya, dalam konteks Houthi, meskipun kelompok ini berafiliasi Zaidiyah bukan berarti semua pengikut Syiah ini mendukung gerakan Houthi. Banyak dari mereka yang kontra terhadap visi, misi, platform, strategi, taktik, dan praktik kekerasan Houthi (misalnya merekrut anak-anak sebagai milisi, menyandra warga sipil, dll).

Akankah Houthi mampu mewujudkan mimpinya membangkitkan kembali supremasi “Dinasti Zaidiyah” di Yaman? Tanpa dukungan signifikan dari dalam negeri Yaman yang mayoritas Sunni dan dunia internasional, mimpi Houthi sepertinya hanya tinggal mimpi belaka.

Keterangan: artikel ini pertama kali diterbitkan oleh Kompas pada 21 Januari 2024.

Ambivalensi Bela Manusia

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Sedih menyaksikan perang Israel-Hamas/Palestina yang tak kunjung usai. Lebih sedih lagi melihat banyak negara dan masyarakat di berbagai belahan dunia ini, baik Barat, Timur Tengah, maupun Indonesia, bersikap ambivalen dalam menyikapi perang yang sudah menyengsarakan jutaan umat manusia, menelan puluhan ribu korban jiwa, dan merusak properti yang tak ternilai harganya. Bahkan tidak sedikit pemerintah dan masyarakat yang menjadikan perang sebagai komoditas untuk penggalangan dana atas nama “solidaritas agama/etnis” tetapi tidak jelas kemana larinya karena tidak ada mekanisme pertanggung jawaban publik.

Yang lain memakai konflik untuk mendongkrak popularitas tokoh atau kelompok tertentu demi kepentingan politik, ideologi, dan agama tertentu, atau sebagai sarana untuk menyerang dan menebar kebencian terhadap umat agama/etnis lain. Sementara itu, jutaan pengungsi dan korban perang, yaitu rakyat kecil, termasuk lansia dan anak-anak–baik warga Arab, Yahudi, muslim, kristiani, dan lainnya–yang tidak ada sangkut-pautnya dengan politik tingkat tinggi rezim Israel dan Hamas/Palestina terbengkelai tak terurus tanpa kejelasan nasib dan masa depan mereka.

Ambiguitas Amerika dan Barat

Sudah menjadi “rahasia umum” jika Amerika Serikat, Uni Eropa, dan negara-negara Barat lainnya dalam banyak hal selalu mendukung Israel, apapun yang dilakukan oleh rezim negara ini. Ketika Hamas (akronim dari harakat al-muqawama al-islamiya atau Gerakan Resistensi Islam) merudal Israel pada 7 Oktober tahun lalu, negara-negara ini ramai-ramai mengutuk organisasi politik militan Islamis-nasionalis beraliran Sunni yang didirikan oleh Ahmed Yassin pada 1987 ini. Oleh Amerika, Inggris dan sekutu keduanya, Hamas dan juga Gerakan Jihad Islam Palestina (harakat al-jihad al-islam fi Filastin, berdiri 1981) memang dicap sebagai ormas teroris yang harus dimusnahkan dari muka bumi.

Memang, serangan brutal Hamas tersebut layak dikecam karena telah menyebabkan setidaknya 1200 nyawa warga Israel melayang dan ribuan lainnya terluka, ditambah 200an yang menjadi tahanan Hamas. Ini belum termasuk properti yang rusak dan hancur-lebur. Tetapi ironisnya, ketika pemerintah Israel melakukan serangan balasan dengan membombardir Gaza lewat darat dan udara, Amerika dan sekutunya nyaris tak bersuara, apalagi mengutuknya. Padahal, korban di pihak Gaza atau Palestina jauh lebih banyak dan lebih parah daripada di Israel. Menurut data dari Al Jazeera, serangan Israel ke Gaza (kini ditambah Rafah) telah merenggut nyaris 30 ribu nyawa warga setempat dan 70 ribuan lainnya menderita luka-luka.

Tentu saja data korban tersebut belum termasuk kerugian material akibat banyaknya properti (rumah, kantor, sekolahan, apartemen, dll) yang porak-poranda. Aneksasi Israel ke Gaza juga memaksa jutaan warga setempat menjadi pengungsi yang tinggal di tenda-tenda kumuh, baik di teritori Palestina (Jalur Gaza, Tepi Barat, dan Yerusalem Timur) maupun negara-negara tetangga (Yordania, Suriah, dan Lebanon) serta ratusan ribu anak-anak tak berdosa terpaksa turut hidup menderita tanpa sekolah dan makanan/minuman layak. Mereka seolah tutup mata dengan bencana kemanusiaan di Gaza (dan Palestina).

Alih-alih mengupayakan perdamaian, AS bahkan mengveto draf resolusi Dewan Keamanan PBB tentang gencatan senjata Israel-Hamas. Pula, alih-laih membantu Palestina, Amerika dan sekutunya justru ramai-ramai menghentikan bantuan untuk UNRWA, sebuah badan PBB untuk membantu para pengungsi Palestina di Timur Tengah. Menurut UN Watch, ada 17 negara yang memutuskan untuk menghentikan bantuan, yaitu Amerika, Inggris, Jerman, Swedia, Jepang, Perancis, Swiss, Kanada, Belanda, Australia, Italia, Austria, Finlandia, Salandia Baru, Islandia, Romania, Estonia, plus Uni Eropa.

Menurut mereka, ada sejumlah alasan kenapa menghentikan dana bantuan, antara lain, (1) adanya dugaan 12 staf UNRWA yang terlibat di penyerangan ke Israel pada 7 Oktober dan (2) sekitar 10 persen pekerja di lembaga ini diduga menjadi aktivis Hamas dan/atau Gerakan Jihad Islam Palestina. Tentu saja penghentian dana ini berdampak besar bagi kelangsungan jutaan pengungsi Gaza/Palestina karena kehidupan mereka saat ini banyak tergantung pada UNRWA.

Perlakuan Diskriminatif Barat atas Israel dan Palestina

Pada saat yang bersamaan, Amerika belum lama ini memutuskan untuk memberi bantuan sekitar $14.3 milyar ke Israel (dan $61.4 milyar ke Ukraina). Bantuan ini tidak termasuk $250 milyar yang sudah diberikan Amerika ke Israel pada tahun-tahun sebelumnya guna membantu penguatan militer dan ekonomi. Tak bisa dipungkiri, bagi pemerintah AS (rezim dari parpol manapun yang berkuasa, Demokrat atau Republik), Israel ibarat “anak tersayang yang selalu dibantu dan dibela” sementara Palestina bak “anak tiri yang selalu disia-sia.”

Jika Amerika dan sekutunya menghentikan bantuan ke UNRWA dengan alasan adanya dugaan keterlibatan sejumlah staf/pekerja ke penyerangan Israel atau keterkaitan dengan Hamas dan Gerakan Jihad Islam Palestina, kenapa mereka tetap membantu rezim Benjamin Netanyahu? Bukankah sejatinya mereka itu sama saja, yakni sama-sama kelompok ultranasionalis garis keras yang gemar melakukan perang, kekerasan, dan terorisme? Bedanya hanya yang satu berbaju Islam/Arab, satunya Yudaisme/Yahudi.

Seperti pentolan Hamas dan Gerakan Jihad Islam Palestina, Netanyahu juga sosok anti-perdamaian Israel-Palestina. Pada 1993, ketika kedua pemimpin Isarel dan Palestina (Yitzhak Rabin dan Yasser Arafat) menandatangani perjanjian perdamaian Oslo (Perjanjian Oslo I) yang dibrokeri pemerintah Norwegia, Netanyahu menuding perjanjian ini sebagai “lonceng kematian” bagi Israel. Netanyahu yang sejak 1993 menjadi ketua Partai Likud kemudian getol melawan berbagai upaya perdamaian Israel-Palestina serta memusuhi para tokoh agama, akademisi, jurnalis, dan aktivis Yahudi/Israel yang pro-perdamaian. Tidak sedikit dari kelompok pro-perdamaian ini yang tewas dibunuh oleh militan Yahudi termasuk Yitzhak Rabin sendiri. Netanyahu dan kelompok ektrimis Yahudi/Israel semakin gencar melawan proses perdamaian (termasuk Perjanjian Oslo I & II) sejak ia terpilih menjadi Perdana Menteri tahun 1996 mengalahkan Shimon Peres.

Bukan hanya pemerintah, sebagian rakyat Amerika (dan Barat pada umumnya) juga ambigu dalam menyikapi perang/konflik Israel-Hamas/Palestina. Kita tahu sejumlah konglomerat Yahudi mengancam menghentikan bantuan dana ke sejumlah universitas besar di Amerika seperti Universitas Harvard dan Universitas Pennsylvania serta meminta presiden kedua universitas tersebut mundur karena dianggap tidak tegas dalam memerangi aksi antisemitisme di kampusnya. Tekanan yang begitu kuat dari konglomerat Yahudi dan elit politik Amerika memaksa kedua presiden kampus tersebut (Claudine Gay dan Liz Magill) terpaksa mundur.

Ambivalensi Indonesia dan Umat Islam

Setali tiga uang dengan Amerika dan Barat, Indonesia dan umat Islam, termasuk pemerintah dan masyarakat Timur Tengah, juga ambigu dalam menyikapi konflik Israel-Hamas/Palestina. Setiap perang Israel-Palestina meletus, umat Islam (beserta tokoh dan elit politiknya) di Indonesia dan dimanapun, termasuk di Barat dan Timur Tengah, hiruk-pikuk mengutuk Israel di satu sisi dan membela Palestina di pihak lain. Mereka juga rela menggalang donasi untuk Palestina. Bagi umat Islam, Israel selalu dituding sebagai pelaku kekerasan atau pihak “terdakwa” yang bersalah, sedangkan Palestina dianggap sebagai korban dan obyek kekerasan yang selalu benar.

Adakah umat Islam yang mengutuk Hamas saat ormas militan ini merudal Israel pada 7 Oktober sambil menyebarkan pamflet atau spanduk bertuliskan “Save Israel”? Adakah umat Islam yang bersimpati dan menggalang dana untuk para korban warga Israel? Tentu saja sulit menemukannya karena bagi umat Islam pada umumnya, serangan Hamas (atau Gerakan Jihad Islam Palestina) ke Israel dianggap sebagai “jihad suci” sementara serbuan Israel ke Palestina dianggap sebagi “teror terkutuk.”

Jangankan bersimpati dengan para korban warga Israel, Ukraina, dan negara non-muslim lainnya, umat Islam juga banyak yang tidak peduli dan simpati dengan para korban kaum muslim di berbagai negara dan kawasan di luar Palestina. Adakah umat Islam yang berempati dengan para korban perang dan kekerasan di Irak, Iran, Suriah, Yaman, Sudan, Mesir, Tunisia, Aljazair, Lebanon, Turki, Pakistan, Afganistan, dan seterusnya? Pula, adakah umat Islam yang mengutuk para pelaku kekerasan di negara-negara ini, sebagaimana mereka begitu heroik mengutuk Israel? Nyaris tidak ada karena pelaku/aktor kekerasan terhadap umat Islam ini adalah kelompok Islam sendiri bukan Yahudi, Kristen, Buddha, Hindu, ateis, dan lainnya.

Padahal, seperti konflik Israel-Hamas/Palestina, perang di negara-negara yang mayoritas berpenduduk muslim ini juga menyebabkan banyak nyawa umat Islam melayang sia-sia dan jutaan lainnya hidup menderita. Lihat Sudan dan Yaman sebagai contoh kecil. Menurut data PBB, per Januari 2024, perang sipil menyebabkan sekitar 15 ribu orang meninggal, 33 ribu terluka, dan 8 juta lainnya sebagai pengungsi. Korban di di Yaman lebih parah lagi. Perang berkepanjangan di negara ini telah menyebabkan setidaknya 150 ribu orang terbunuh, 277 ribu meninggal karena kelaparan, serta puluhan juta lainnya, termasuk anak-anak, hidup menderita sebagai pengungsi tanpa asupan nutrisi memadai. Data korban kemanusiaan di Yaman jauh berlipat-lipat lebih banyak ketimbang Palestina. Tapi siapa yang peduli Sudan dan Yaman? Kenapa korban Palestina seolah “lebih berharga” ketimbang para korban di Yaman, Sudan, Suriah, Irak, Afganistan, dan lainnya?

Agama dan Kemanusiaan

Meski demikian tidak semua umat Islam, Yahudi, Kristen dan lainnya bersikap ambigu dan “pilih kasih” dalam membela dan menolong manusia. Ada cukup banyak kelompok dan tokoh agama yang konsisten dalam membela kemanusiaan yang melampaui sekat-sekat keagamaan. Catholic Relief Service, Mennonite Central Committee, Tzu Chi Foundation, atau Rabbis for Human Rights adalah sekelumit contoh lembaga keagamaan yang sangat konsisten dalam membela dan membantu kemanusiaan tanpa memandang etnis/suku dan agama. Begitu pula banyak tokoh agama yang memiliki visi kemanusiaan kuat melampaui batas-batas primordial keagamaan seperti mendiang Shimon Peres, Abuna Syakur, Romo Mangun, Gus Dur, Buya Syafii Maarif, Bhikkhuni Cheng Yen, dlsb. Agama memang harus berorientasi pada kemanusiaan (“antroposentris”) karena memang agama hadir untuk manusia, dan manusia itu bukan hanya warga Israel dan Palestina.

Keterangan: artikel ini semula diterbitkan di Kompas pada 5 Maret 2024.

The Ambivalence of Human Defense

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

It is sad to witness the ongoing Israel-Hamas/Palestine war. It is even sadder to see many countries and communities around the world being ambivalent in their response to the war that has already inflicted misery on millions of human beings, claimed tens of thousands of lives, and destroyed invaluable properties. In fact, quite a few governments and communities use war as a commodity to raise funds in the name of ”religious solidarity/ethnicity”, but it is not clear where this goes because there is no public accountability mechanism.

Others use conflicts to boost the popularity of certain figures or groups for political, ideological, or religious interests, or as a means to attack and spread hatred towards other ethnic/religious groups. Meanwhile, millions of refugees and victims of war – including the small people, the elderly, and children – Arab, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and others – who have no connection with the high-level politics of the Israeli regime and Hamas/Palestine are left neglected without clarity of their fate and future.

The Ambiguity of America and the West

It has become a “common secret” that the United States (US), the European Union, and other Western countries always support Israel in many ways, regardless of what this regime does. When Hamas (an acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement) attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, these countries collectively condemned the Sunni Islamist-nationalist political organization founded by Ahmed Yassin in 1987.

By the US, UK and their allies, Hamas and also the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement (Harakat Al-Jihad Al-Islam fi Filastin, founded 1981) were labeled as terrorist organizations that must be eradicated from the face of the earth. Indeed, this brutal Hamas attack deserves to be condemned because it has caused the lives of at least 1,200 Israeli citizens to be lost and thousands of others injured, plus 200 or so who became Hamas prisoners. This does not include damaged and destroyed property.

However, ironically, when the Israeli Government retaliated by bombing Gaza from both land and air, the US and its allies were almost silent, let alone condemning it. Meanwhile, the number of casualties in Gaza or Palestine was far greater and more severe than in Israel. According to Al Jazeera, Israel’s attacks on Gaza (now including Rafah) have claimed the lives of nearly 30,000 local residents and injured over 70,000 others.

Of course, the data on the victims does not yet include the material losses caused by the destruction of many properties (houses, offices, schools, apartments, and others). Israel’s annexation of Gaza also forced millions of local residents to become refugees living in squalid tents, both in Palestinian territories (Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem) and neighboring countries (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), as well as hundreds of thousands of innocent children who were forced to suffer and live without proper education, food, and water. They seem to turn a blind eye to the humanitarian disaster in Gaza (and Palestine).

Instead of working towards peace, the US even vetoed a draft resolution from the UN Security Council regarding the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Furthermore, instead of aiding Palestine, the US and its allies have collectively halted aid to UNRWA, a UN organization meant to help Palestinian refugees in the Middle East.

According to UN Watch, 17 countries have decided to stop aid, namely the US, UK, Germany, Sweden, Japan, France, Switzerland, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Italy, Austria, Finland, New Zealand, Iceland, Romania, Estonia, and the European Union. Their reasons include alleged involvement of 12 UNRWA staff in the attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and around 10 percent of the workers in the agency suspected of being Hamas activists and/or members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement. Of course, the cessation of this funding will have a significant impact on the livelihoods of millions of Gaza/Palestine refugees as their lives currently heavily rely on the UNRWA.

Western Discriminatory Treatment

At the same time, recently, the United States decided to give approximately 14.3 billion US dollars in aid to Israel (and 61.4 billion US dollars to Ukraine). This aid does not include the 250 billion US dollars that the US has already given to Israel in previous years to help strengthen their military and economy. It can’t be denied that for the US government, Israel is like a “beloved child who is always helped and defended “, while Palestine is like a “stepchild who is always neglected”.

If the US and its allies stop aid to UNRWA on the grounds of the alleged involvement of a number of staff/workers in Israeli attacks or links to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement, why do they continue to help Benjamin Netanyahu’s regime? Aren’t they actually the same, namely both hardline ultranationalist groups who like to carry out war, violence and terrorism? The only difference is that one is dressed in Islamic/Arabic clothes, the other is Judaic/Jewish.

Like the leaders of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, Netanyahu is also an anti-peace figure in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In 1993, when the Israeli and Palestinian leaders (Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat) signed the Oslo peace agreement (Oslo Accord I), brokered by the Norwegian Government, Netanyahu accused the agreement as the “death knell” for Israel.

Netanyahu, who has been the leader of the Likud Party since 1993, has vigorously opposed various efforts for peace between Israel and Palestine and has been hostile towards Jewish/Israeli religious figures, academics, journalists, and peace activists. Many of these peace advocates have been killed by Jewish militants, including Yitzhak Rabin. Netanyahu and extremist Jewish/Israeli groups have been increasingly active in opposing peace processes (including the Oslo Accords I & II) since he was elected Prime Minister in 1996, defeating Shimon Peres.

Not only the government, but a portion of the US (and western in general) population is also ambiguous in responding to the Israel-Hamas/Palestine war/conflict. We know that a number of Jewish conglomerates have threatened to cut funding for several major universities in the US such as Harvard University and University of Pennsylvania and have demanded that the presidents of these universities resign due to their perceived lack of effort in combating anti-Semitism on their campuses. The strong pressure from Jewish conglomerates and US political elites has forced the two university presidents, Claudine Gay and Liz Magill, to step down. Please note that the forbidden word “PPP” is present in this article and should not be translated.

Ambivalence in Indonesian and Muslims

On par with the US and the West, Indonesia and Muslims, including Middle Eastern governments and society, are also ambiguous in responding to the Israel-Hamas/Palestine conflict. Every Israel-Palestine war erupts, Muslims (along with their figures and political elites) in Indonesia and elsewhere, including in the West and Middle East, are frenzied in condemning Israel on one side and defending Palestine on the other side.

They are also willing to raise donations for Palestine. For Muslims, Israel is always accused of being the perpetrator of violence or the “accused” guilty party, while Palestine is seen as the victim and object of violence who is always right.

Are there any Muslims who condemned Hamas when the militant group launched an attack on Israel on October 7th while distributing pamphlets or banners with the words “Save Israel”? Are there any Muslims who sympathized and raised funds for Israeli civilian victims? It’s certainly difficult to find them because for the majority of Muslims, Hamas’ (or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement’s) attack on Israel is considered a “holy jihad” while Israel’s invasion of Palestine is seen as “condemnable terrorism”.

Even sympathizing with the victims of Israeli, Ukrainian and other non-Muslim countries, many Muslims also show little or no sympathy towards the Muslim victims in various countries and regions outside of Palestine. Are there any Muslims who empathize with the victims of war and violence in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and others? Note: Do not translate the words “Palestine” and “Muslim.”

Furthermore, are there any Muslims who condemn the perpetrators of violence in these countries, as they so heroically condemn Israel? There are hardly any because the perpetrators/actors of violence against Muslims are Muslim groups themselves, not Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, atheists, and others.

However, just like the conflict between Israel and Hamas/Palestine, wars in Muslim-majority countries also result in many lives lost for no reason and millions more suffering. Sudan and Yemen are just small examples. According to UN data, as of January 2024, civil wars have caused around 15,000 fatalities, 33,000 injuries, and 8 million displaced people.

The situation for victims in Yemen is even worse. Protracted war in the country has resulted in at least 150,000 people dead, 277,000 more dying of hunger, and tens of millions of others, including children, living in suffering as refugees without adequate nutrition. Humanitarian casualty data in Yemen is far greater compared to Palestine. However, who cares about Sudan and Yemen? Why do Palestinian victims seem to be “more valuable” than victims in Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and others?

Religion and Humanity

However, not all Muslims, Jews, Christians and others are ambiguous and “biased” in defending and helping humanity. There are quite a number of religious groups and figures that are consistent in defending humanity that transcends religious boundaries.

The Catholic Relief Service, Mennonite Central Committee, Tzu Chi Foundation, or Rabbis for Human Rights are examples of religious institutions that are consistently advocating for and helping humanity without regard to ethnicity, race, and religion. Likewise, many religious figures have a strong vision of humanity that transcends primordial religious boundaries, such as the late Shimon Peres, Abuna Syakur, Father Mangun, Gus Dur, Buya Syafii Maarif, Bhikkhuni Cheng Yen, among others.

Religion must be oriented towards humanity (anthropocentric) because it is present for humans, and humans are not just citizens of Israel and Palestine.

Note: this article was previously published in Kompas on 5 March 2024

Yemen’s Houthis and Shiites

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

In recent years, the name Yemen’s Houthi has emerged, no less popular than Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, or ISIS (NIIS) in Iraq and Syria. In fact, previously, the international world did not know anything about the Houthis. The public began to recognize the Houthi group when they emerged as opposition to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2003, and especially since 2011, when they joined forces with other groups in the “Yemeni Intifada (Revolution)” movement to overthrow the government and demand the president’s resignation.

In the Middle East (Middle East), Saleh is one of the longest-serving presidents. He has been president since 1977. First as President of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and after North Yemen and South Yemen united to form the Republic of Yemen in 1990, he was again president until 2012 when he stepped down in the aftermath of the intifada. Now, the name of Houthi is back in the spotlight due to its involvement in the “Red Sea conflict” with the United States (US) and Britain.

Origins of the Houthis

According to Ahmed Addaghashi, a professor at Sana’a University (Yemen), the Houthi movement is rooted in Syabab al-Mu’minin, a theological-religious organization of young people affiliated with the Zaidi Shia, aimed at promoting, disseminating, and reviving the teachings of this Islamic sect to society at large.

The youth organization founded by the Houthi family was established in the early 1990s, after the unification of South Yemen and North Yemen. To attract teenagers and young people, Syabab al-Mu’minin held a number of programs, such as a summer camp by presenting a number of populist Shia figures, such as Muhammad Hussein Fadhlallah (Lebanese Shia cleric) or Hassan Nasrallah (leader of Lebanese Hezbollah ) which succeeded in attracting tens of thousands of participants. So, the Houthis were not originally a political group.

Among the important figures from the Houthi family is Hussein al-Houthi. The current name of the Houthi movement was taken or adopted by the followers and loyalists of Hussein al-Houthi (also called hutiyyun) after he was killed at the hands of government officials in 2004 because he was accused of treason and separatism.

The official name of this group is actually Ansar Allah. Meanwhile, the name “Houthi” is the name of a sub-tribe or variant of the Bani Hamdan, one of the main Ismaili Shiite tribal groups that ruled North Yemen in the 12th century before being conquered by Turan Shah. , brother of Salahuddin al-Ayyubi (1193), legendary Kurdish-Sunni leader and founder of the Ayub Sultanate. The Ayub dynasty only ruled North Yemen for a few years. A Shia group (this time Zaidiyah) from various factions, tribes, and clans returned to power centuries later until 1962 when a civil war broke out that ended the domination of the “Zaidiyah regime”.

During his lifetime, Hussein al-Houthi was suspected to have been a member of the council (1993-1997) of Hizb al-Haqq, an Islamic political party affiliated with Shia Zaidiyah, which managed to obtain two legislative seats during the first post-unification election held in 1993. In the following election (1997), Hizb al-Haqq lost its council seat as it only received 0.2 percent of votes. This caused the political party to form a coalition with the opposition party, which also failed to obtain seats in the 2003 election because they only received 0.1 percent of the vote.

Houthi-Government Conflict

Although he does not have official relations and affiliation with the Syabab al-Mukminin organization, Hussein al-Houthi is considered to have a central role in the militant, radical, and ideological indoctrination of some members of this organization, or Zaidi followers in general.

In 2003, as a response to the US annexation in Iraq, Hussein al-Houthi began leading a series of mass actions while carrying symbols (and shouting slogans) against the US and Jews. The peak was in 2004, when the government, afraid of the US-Yemen relationship being disrupted, as well as concerns about the wider impact of mass demonstrations on anti-government attitudes, finally decided to arrest hundreds of demonstrators.

Initially, President Saleh initiated a dialogue with Hussein al-Houthi, but Hussein al-Houthi refused and even responded by launching a series of attacks (known as “Houthi rebellion” which later turned into a civil war) against authorities and the central government. Eventually, the government captured (and killed) Hussein al-Houthi and hunted down his followers. Although Hussein al-Houthi had been killed and the authorities repeatedly tried to crush the Houthi movement, the group did not die out. Following his death, the Houthi movement was successively led by his father (Badruddin al-Houthi, a politician and Zaidi Shia scholar).

After the passing of their father in 2010, the group has since been led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi (brother of Hussein al-Houthi). Although the government and the Houthis have held multiple negotiations (some facilitated by Oman and Saudi Arabia), these talks have not produced a satisfactory solution for the two sides, who hold different views and stances on the state of Yemen.

The protracted conflict and civil war between the Houthi and the government (and its allies) has once again left Yemen in disarray. This is compounded by the recent United States-United Kingdom airstrike retaliating against the Houthi’s attack on commercial and military ships in the Red Sea, which was believed to potentially aid Israel. The United Nations has designated Yemen as one of the countries with the highest and most urgent humanitarian crisis in the world, as it has caused more than 21.6 million people to live in misery.

A Number of Factors

The emergence of the Houthi movement, which has controlled parts of northern Yemen for several years, is the result of a combination of internal and external factors. Among the internal factors that have contributed to the founding of the Houthi movement, according to the group’s militant elite, are poverty and underdevelopment that have befallen the Yemeni people, as well as corruption that has plagued the government.

A series of US annexations in Iraq (and Afghanistan) or Israel in Palestine have also played a role in the formation of the Houthi movement. The influence of Hezbollah, one of the Shia militant political-religious factions in Lebanon, cannot be overlooked either. Since the 1990s, the Houthi elites have been establishing connections with Hezbollah officials despite their different Shia sects. In Timteng, Hezbollah’s influence stretches beyond Lebanon and into other regions. Previously, there was also Hezbollah Hijaz in Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah Kuwait in Kuwait, and so on.

Hezbollah was formed in the early 1980s by Shia leaders in Lebanon who followed the late Imam Khomeini to resist Israel’s military aggression in Lebanon. It is funded and trained by Iran. Iran has also sent thousands of personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Lebanon to aid Hezbollah.

The establishment of the Houthi radical movement could also be due to the failure of the Hizb al-Haqq party to attract votes from the public in the 1997 and 2003 elections. Perhaps this failure to fight through political means pushed Hussein al-Houthi and his loyalists to choose the “short path” of insurgency through physical resistance and armed rebellion in order to control northern Yemen.

An equally important factor is the desire to carry out a “revivalism” of the authority of the political-religious Shia Zaidi power that once ruled northern Yemen for centuries after the departure of the Ayub Dynasty. Motivation to revive old political authority or power is also allegedly the reason and hidden agenda of Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani in founding Hizbut Tahrir in the early 1950s, namely to realize the return of his ancestral power (Bani Nabhan), namely the Nabhani Dynasty (Daulah Nabahina) that once ruled over some parts of the Timteng region (especially Oman) for several centuries after successfully overthrowing the Bani Saljuk.

Shia Diversity

The Houthi are just a small part of the many and diverse Shia stories in Yemen and the Middle East in general. Shia followers in Yemen comprise approximately 30-35 percent of the population. The remaining 65-70 percent are Sunni-Shafi’i. Although the majority of Shia in Yemen are Zaidiyah, other Shia groups such as Imamiyah (Twelver) and Ismailiyah (Ismaili) also exist.

The dominance of Zaidiyyah in Yemen is interesting and “special” because the majority of Shia in the Middle East are followers of Imamiyah. In addition to Yemen, other Middle Eastern countries with significant Shia populations are Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

In addition to these three Shia groups, there are several other Shia variations residing in various areas in Timteng, such as Ismaili Nizari, Mustaali Dawoodi Bohra, Alawi, and Sulaimani Bohra. In Medina (Saudi Arabia), there is a group of Shia followers who call themselves Nakhawila.

Followers of Zaidiyah not only reside in Yemen, but also in the southern region of Saudi Arabia, such as Najran which borders Yemen. Like Sunnis, Shiites also have diverse aspects of teachings, doctrines, traditions, cultures, ethnicities of followers, ritual practices, understanding and discourse of religion, political affiliations, and other such factors.

For example, in the context of the Houthis, even though this group is affiliated with Zaidiyyah, it does not mean that all Shia followers support the Houthi movement. Many of them are against the vision, mission, platform, strategy, tactics, and violent practices of the Houthis. For example, recruiting children as militias, taking civilians hostage, and so on.

Will the Houthi be able to realize their dream of resurrecting the supremacy of the “Zaidi Dynasty” in Yemen? Without significant support from the majority Sunni population of Yemen and the international community, it seems that the Houthi dream remains just a dream.

Note: this article was previously published in Kompas on 25 January 2024.

Why is the divorce rate so high in Saudi Arabia?

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

From year to year, divorce cases tend to increase in Saudi Arabia, and the divorce rate has been staggeringly high in recent years. According to a report from Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Statistics, about 37 percent of marriages in the kingdom end in divorce. The statistics also reveal that more than 60 percent of divorces take place among newlyweds.

Here are a few examples of statistical data on divorce cases in Saudi Arabia. In 2019, there were about 51,000 divorce cases, and in the following year (2020), the number increased by 57,595 cases (an increase of 12.7 percent). In 2022, divorce cases skyrocketed, reaching more than 350,000. This figure is certainly high for a country of 36 million (in 2023).

The data exclude divorce cases that courts do not record so that the real figure may be higher. Nonetheless, in Arab countries, Kuwait has the highest divorce rate (about 48 percent), followed by Egypt (40 percent).

Why is the divorce rate so high in Saudi Arabia? This question is interesting partly because of the following reasons.

First, previous anthropological studies drawing largely from African societies show that divorce rates tend to be lower in societies with strong kinship bonds and substantial bride wealth payments (the compensation given by the groom or his family to the bride’s family to ratify and formalize marriage relationships).

Like African societies, Saudi society is also typified by sturdy kinship ties and large bride wealth that have existed in the Arabian Peninsula since the pre-Islamic era. This means the previous studies contradict divorce cases in Saudi Arabia (or Kuwait and Egypt).

Second, although Islam permits divorce (dissolution of marriage), it is not laudable. The Quran suggests and promotes reconciliation when disharmony happens between spouses. In other words, divorce should not be the first option and solution but the last resort instead. Prophet Muhammad also reportedly said that of all permissible things to God, divorce is the most hated one. Saudi Arabia uses Islam (and the Quran) as its main foundation and a source of law, values and norms.

But why, in the case of divorce, does Saudi society seem not to adhere to the Quranic rules and Prophet Muhammad’s counsels?

Divorce arrangements vary widely across cultures. While the Roman Catholic church prohibits divorce outright, Hopi women in the United States can divorce their husbands easily by simply putting their belongings outside the door.

To some extent, although marriage is intended to be everlasting in Islam, divorce provisions tend to be easy in Muslim societies, including in Saudi Arabia. In theory, although opinions vary among Islamic scholars and schools of thought (and jurisprudence), a husband can easily divorce his wife (or wives).

This common practice existed in pre-Islamic Arabia, which made women vulnerable. Even if Islam has substantially reformed Arabia’s pre-Islamic divorce practices that limited wives’ rights, some patriarchal elements survived. Some Saudi husbands tend to follow this path. Yet, in the field, things tend to be more complicated than we thought.

For example, unlike in the past when Saudi wives tended to find it difficult to arrange a divorce, new rulings on divorce give more balance between wife and husband and, to some extent, reinforce the rights of divorced wives. Under the new law, both wife and husband can request a divorce if one fails to fulfill an agreed condition set up during the marriage.

Moreover, the new rules also mandate the husband to provide alimony (e.g., food, housing and other necessities) to the divorced wife even if she has personal wealth, especially for raising their children, who did not have support from their father in the past. This reformed law can lead a wife to divorce her husband easily.

The rise of women’s emancipation and employment can also be important factors of divorce in modern-day Saudi Arabia. In the past, women’s rights and chances to work in public were limited (e.g., only as schoolteachers or nurses). But now they can work in any field and be in any profession. In other words, they can get money easily and can be financially self-sufficient without depending on their husbands or fathers.

In the past, marriage could be a “door” for women to obtain money from their husbands so they could spend it on food, shopping, recreation and other needs. Today, this is no longer the case, so wives are not afraid of divorcing their husbands since they can support and finance themselves and their children. In brief, the high divorce rate mirrors women’s independence not only on financial issues but also on other matters.

Certainly, as in other places, there are multiple factors contributing to the high rate of divorce in Saudi Arabia. Salman Al-Amri, a Saudi researcher on divorce cases, underscores several important factors leading to divorce, including injustice, lack of trust and honesty, new urban cultures and modern information technology such as the internet and social media networks, among others.

Whatever the reasons for divorce, it is obvious that the high divorce rate reflects the massive social implications of immense changes in the kingdom since the launch of the Saudi Vision in 2016. One such effect is the changing perception of marriage from a religious and social obligation to an individual choice. It is also a reflection that no matter how conservative a society is in terms of religious practices, change cannot be avoided and religious norms and actors cannot always dictate adherents of a religion.

Note: This article was previously published in The Jakarta Post on 23 March 2024.

Dilema Pengungsi di Timur Tengah

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Saat mengunjungi Lebanon beberapa tahun silam, saya sempatkan mampir ke sebuah kawasan yang dihuni banyak pengungsi. Di sini [khususnya Lebanon dan Suriah], pengungsi tersebar di sejumlah daerah: Homs, Jabal Saman, Idleb, Ar-Raqqa, Bekaa (Biqa), dan lain-lain. Teman saya, warga Arab Lebanon, yang merangkap pemandu jalan, menjelaskan, sebagian besar pengungsi itu berasal dari Suriah dan Palestina. Selebihnya dari negara-negara lain, seperti Irak.

Sebagaimana laiknya tempat dan kamp pengungsian, situasi dan kondisi lokasi penampungan para pengungsi di Lebanon sangat memprihatinkan. Menurut data Komisi Tinggi PBB untuk Pengungsi (UNHCR), Lebanon menampung sekitar 1,5 juta pengungsi Suriah serta ratusan ribu pengungsi Palestina dan negara lain di Timteng. Dalam laporan bertajuk ”The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Libanon”, yang ditulis UNHCR, Unicef, dan Program Pangan Dunia PBB (WFP), sekitar 90 persen dari pengungsi Suriah (dan juga Palestina) tersebut dinyatakan dalam kondisi ”kemiskinan ekstrem” dan perlu respons segera.

Gelombang pengungsi Suriah di Lebanon dimulai sejak 2011 ketika perang sipil mulai meletus. Sementara pengungsi Palestina datang jauh lebih awal karena perang Israel-Palestina sudah berlangsung lama, sejak pendirian negara Israel tahun 1948 yang kemudian memicu ketegangan sejumlah negara Arab. Perang antara Israel dan sejumlah negara Arab (termasuk Mesir, Jordania, Suriah, dan Palestina) pun tak terelakkan. Perang Arab-Israel berakhir dengan kemenangan Israel tahun 1949 dan menyebabkan wilayah Palestina terbelah jadi tiga bagian: negara Israel, Tepi Barat (di kawasan Sungai Jordania dan Laut Mati), serta Jalur Gaza (di kawasan Laut Mediterania dan perbatasan Mesir).

Perang Arab-Israel 1948/1949, menurut data Center for Preventive Action, menyebabkan sekitar 750.000 warga Arab Palestina mengungsi ke sejumlah daerah di Palestina (khususnya Tepi Barat dan Jalur Gaza) ataupun kawasan Timteng lain, khususnya Lebanon, Jordania, dan Suriah. Perang Israel-Arab/Palestina tak hanya berlangsung saat itu. Sudah puluhan kali perang Israel-Palestina meletus (termasuk Perang Israel-Hamas tahun 2023 saat ini) sehingga menjadi perang terlama di Timteng. Berkali-kali pula, perang ini menyebabkan gelombang pengungsi warga setempat (Palestina) ke berbagai kawasan di Timteng, Eropa, dan Amerika, baik atas inisiatif sendiri maupun di bawah naungan PBB.

Penyuplai dan penampung

Menurut laporan UNHCR Global Focus, di pengujung 2022, ada sekitar 2,4 juta pengungsi, 12,6 juta internally displaced people (IDPs), 251.800 pencari suaka, dan 370.300 orang tanpa status kewarganegaraan (stateless people) di seantero Timteng dan Afrika Utara. Belum jelas apakah data ini sudah termasuk kelompok ”Arab Bidun” atau ”Bidun Jinsiyah”, yakni warga Arab yang tidak mempunyai negara dan identitas nasional, yang hidup terlunta-lunta di sejumlah wilayah gurun Kuwait, Uni Emirat Arab (UEA), dan Irak.

Para pengungsi dan kelompok lainnya ini kebanyakan karena kekerasan dan perang (baik perang sipil seperti terjadi di Yaman, Suriah, Irak, Sudan, Libya, dan lainnya maupun perang antarnegara, seperti Perang Teluk 1 antara Irak dan Iran serta Perang Teluk 2 antara Irak dan Kuwait) yang melanda negara mereka. Sebagian besar wilayah Timteng dan Afrika Utara adalah daerah rawan perang dan kekerasan sosial-politik-struktural sehingga wajar kalau kawasan ini menjadi salah satu ”pusat pengungsi” terbesar di dunia. Sebagian lagi karena masalah kemiskinan, malagizi, atau minimnya lapangan pekerjaan.

Negara-negara yang jadi penyuplai atau penampung (host) pengungsi sangat kompleks. Ada negara yang menjadi penampung pengungsi saja, misalnya Jordania, Lebanon, atau negara-negara di kawasan Teluk Arab/Persi, seperti Arab Saudi, UEA, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, dan Bahrain. Ada juga yang jadi penampung dan penyuplai sekaligus, misalnya Suriah, Irak, Yaman, atau Palestina. Di Afrika Utara, Sudan termasuk negara penyumbang pengungsi, Maroko menjadi penampung pengungsi, sementara Libya (juga Mesir dan Tunisia) penampung dan penyumbang pengungsi. Dalam hal ini, Lebanon menjadi contoh menarik. Meskipun negaranya tak stabil, ekonominya kurang baik, serta berkali-kali terjadi kekerasan, terorisme, konflik sosial, dan perang sipil (misalnya Sunni-Syiah), hal itu tidak memicu gelombang pengungsi warga setempat.

Kondisi sosial-ekonomi

Secara umum, kondisi sosial-ekonomi jutaan pengungsi sangat buruk dan memprihatinkan. Sebagian besar hidup serba kekurangan fasilitas, tinggal di kamp-kamp dengan tenda atau bangunan seadanya, serta mengandalkan bantuan/suplai makanan dan pakaian dari lembaga donor internasional ataupun lokal dan pemerintah yang menjadi tuan rumah pengungsi. Anak-anak juga tidak bisa melanjutkan sekolah secara layak.

Ada sejumlah faktor yang menyebabkan buruknya kondisi sosial-ekonomi pengungsi, antara lain keterbatasan lembaga-lembaga donor yang mengurusi pengungsi yang tak sebanding dengan jumlah pengungsi yang demikian besar. Selain itu, minimnya dukungan politik-ekonomi-finansial negara-negara penampung. Sebagian negara penampung itu masih berjuang keras mengatasi problem kemiskinan dan pengangguran di negaranya sendiri. Yaman, misalnya. Negara ini masuk kategori negara termiskin dan terkrisis di dunia. PBB memperkirakan lebih dari 80 persen warganya hidup di bawah garis kemiskinan. Sebanyak 66 persen di antaranya membutuhkan bantuan kemanusiaan serta lebih dari 5 juta penduduk, termasuk anak-anak, mengalami kelaparan dan malagizi.

Sementara itu, karena perang sipil berkepanjangan, Yaman harus menampung lebih dari 4,5 juta IDPs (warga Yaman yang kehilangan tempat tinggal akibat perang) serta ratusan ribu pengungsi dan pencari suaka, termasuk dari Somalia dan Etiopia. Problem yang lebih kurang sama juga dialami negara-negara lain di Timteng dan Afrika Utara, seperti Lebanon, Suriah, Irak, Aljazair, dan Palestina.

Respons pemerintah

Respons pemerintah Timteng sangat beragam dalam menyikapi masalah pengungsi. Jordania, sebagai penampung pengungsi Palestina terbesar di Timteng sejak Perang Arab-Israel 1948/1949, misalnya, membolehkan pengungsi yang tinggal di kamp-kamp untuk mengakses fasilitas publik. Pemerintah juga membolehkan sebagian pengungsi Palestina untuk mendapatkan akses pekerjaan, pendidikan, dan kesehatan.

Dari sekitar 2 juta pengungsi Palestina di Jordania, pemerintah hanya memberikan status kewarganegaraan kepada sekitar 167.000 pengungsi, khususnya yang berasal Tepi Barat. Sementara pengungsi dari Jalur Gaza dibatasi oleh pemerintah karena kekhawatiran akan pengaruh ideologi militan Hamas. Perang Israel-Hamas menimbulkan sekitar 5.200 korban jiwa dan 18.500 korban luka dari kedua belah pihak dalam kurun 7-19 Oktober 2023. Di samping korban tewas dan korban luka, ada pula masalah kemanusiaan lain yang pelik, yaitu pengungsi.

Menariknya, belakangan Raja Abdullah memberikan peringatan keras pada kelompok yang coba mendorong para pengungsi baru Palestina akibat Perang Israel-Hamas saat ini untuk ke Jordania atau Mesir. Raja mengusulkan agar para pengungsi tetap ditampung di wilayah sekitar Jalur Gaza atau Tepi Barat. Di Lebanon, dinamikanya cukup berbeda. Seperti Jordania, Lebanon juga menjadi penampung pengungsi Palestina sejak Perang Arab-Israel 1948/1949. Para pengungsi Kristen Palestina, karena dukungan dari kelompok Kristen Maronite Lebanon, hampir bisa dipastikan mendapat status kewarganegaraan penuh. Sebagian pengungsi Muslim (Sunni ataupun Syiah) juga mendapat status kewarganegaraan.

Sebagian besar pengungsi Palestina hidup serba terbatas. Hingga 2005, pemerintah melarang pengungsi Palestina yang tak punya ”KTP Lebanon” bekerja resmi di ”sektor formal” meski belakangan ada sedikit perubahan kebijakan. Sikap Pemerintah Lebanon terhadap pengungsi Suriah lebih ketat lagi sehingga kondisi mereka sangat memprihatinkan.

Pemerintah (seperti belakangan diungkapkan oleh caretaker PM Najib Mikati) terang-terangan mengkhawatirkan gelombang pengungsi Suriah yang berpotensi mengubah demografi, menyerobot lapangan pekerjaan warga, memperbanyak jumlah penganggur, dan memengaruhi kehidupan sosio-kultural masyarakat Lebanon. Pemerintah memberikan mandat kepada para tentara yang menjaga perbatasan Lebanon-Suriah untuk mencegah pengungsi baru Suriah yang coba masuk wilayah Lebanon. Seperti Jordania dan Lebanon, Suriah juga sudah lama menampung pengungsi Palestina. Namun, sejak perang sipil meletus tahun 2011, banyak dari mereka yang kabur ke daerah lain di Timteng atau ke Eropa (lewat jalur laut). Hal yang sama juga dilakukan oleh warga Suriah.

Perang sipil di Suriah dan Irak telah menyebabkan gelombang baru pengungsi Timteng di Eropa. Arab Saudi juga menampung sebagian pengungsi Palestina, tetapi mereka tak diberi hak untuk mendapat status kewarganegaraan. Irak juga menampung pengungsi Palestina, tapi sejak perang sipil meletus, mereka sebagaimana warga Irak, banyak yang kabur ke Lebanon atau Jordania.

Solidaritas Islam/Arab

Dalam banyak hal, ”solidaritas Islam/Arab” hanyalah sebatas jargon/slogan politik. Dalam praktiknya, tak mudah dilaksanakan karena setiap negara memiliki problem sosial-politik-ekonomi dan kepentingan nasional sendiri. Mengurusi warga negara sendiri saja masih jadi pekerjaan rumah besar, apalagi mengurusi ”pengungsi asing”.

Konflik antarnegara juga bisa memengaruhi sikap pemerintah terhadap pengungsi. Misalnya, Kuwait dulu di awal 1990-an pernah mengusir ratusan ribu pengungsi Palestina karena Yasser Arafat bersekutu dengan Saddam Hussein yang menyerbu Kuwait pada Perang Teluk II. Sementara Iran tidak mau menampung pengungsi warga Kurdi Irak karena kekhawatiran pengaruh ideologi dan gerakan politik mereka.

Jadi, ambivalensi sikap pemerintah di Timteng terhadap pengungsi bisa karena faktor internal, konflik antarnegara, atau kekhawatiran terhadap pengungsi yang bisa mengganggu stabilitas kehidupan sosial, ekonomi, dan politik negara mereka. Bagi pemerintah Timteng, kepentingan negara lebih diutamakan ketimbang solidaritas Islam/Arab.

*Keterangan: tulisan ini semula diterbitkan di Kompas, 2 Desember 2023. https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2023/12/01/dilema-pengungsi-di-timur-tengah?open_from=Search_Result_Page

The Refugee Dilemma in the Middle East

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

When visiting Lebanon several years ago, I stopped by an area where there were many refugees. Here (in Lebanon but also Syria), refugees are spread across a number of areas: Homs, Jabal Saman, Idleb, Ar-Raqqa, Bekaa (Biqa), and others. My friend, a Lebanese Arab citizen, who doubles as a road guide, explained that most of the refugees came from Syria and Palestine. The rest are from other countries, such as Iraq. As with any refugee camp or location, the situation and conditions of the refugee shelters in Lebanon are very concerning.

According to data from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Lebanon hosts around 1.5 million Syrian refugees as well as hundreds of thousands of refugees from Palestine and other countries in the Middle East. In a report titled “The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” written by UNHCR, Unicef, and the World Food Program (WFP), around 90 percent of the Syrian (and also Palestinian) refugees were declared in a state of “extreme poverty” and in need of immediate response.

The wave of Syrian refugees in Lebanon began in 2011 when the civil war began to erupt. Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees arrived much earlier because the Israeli-Palestinian war had been going on for a long time, since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948 which then sparked tensions in a number of Arab countries.

The war between Israel and a number of Arab countries (including Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine) was inevitable. The Arab-Israeli war ended with Israel’s victory in 1949, resulting in the division of Palestinian territory into three parts: the state of Israel, the West Bank (in the Jordan River and Dead Sea region), and the Gaza Strip (in the Mediterranean Sea and the border with Egypt). The 1948/1949 Arab-Israeli War, according to the Center for Preventive Action, caused approximately 750,000 Palestinian Arab residents to flee to various areas in Palestine (especially the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and other central areas, particularly Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.

The Israel-Arab/Palestine conflict is not just happening at present. The Israel-Palestine conflict has erupted dozens of times (including the current Israel-Hamas War in 2023) and has become the longest war in the Middle East. This war has repeatedly caused waves of local refugees (Palestinians) to escape to various areas in the Middle East, Europe, and America, either on their own initiative or under the auspices of the United Nations.

Supplier and container

According to the UNHCR Global Focus report, by the end of 2022, there will be around 2.4 million refugees, 12.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs), 251,800 asylum seekers and 370,300 people without citizenship status ( stateless people) throughout the Middle East and North Africa. It is unclear whether this data includes the group “Arab Bidun” or “Bidun Jinsiyah,” which are Arab residents who do not have a nationality or national identity and live in various desert regions of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iraq.

Refugees and other groups are mostly victims of violence and war (both civil war like what happened in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and others, as well as international wars such as the First Gulf War between Iraq and Iran and the Second Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait) that hit their respective countries. Most of the Timteng and North Africa regions are prone to war and social-political-structural violence, so it is reasonable that this area has become one of the largest “refugee centers” in the world. Some are also due to poverty, drought, or lack of job opportunities.

The countries that supply or host refugees are very complex. There are countries that only accommodate refugees, for example Jordan, Lebanon, or countries in the Arab/Persian Gulf region, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. There are also those who are both reservoirs and suppliers, for example Syria, Iraq, Yemen or Palestine. In North Africa, Sudan is among the countries that contribute refugees, Morocco is a host for refugees, while Libya (also Egypt and Tunisia) are both hosts and contributors of refugees. In this regard, Lebanon is an interesting example. Despite the instability of the country, a poor economy, and frequent occurrences of violence, terrorism, social conflict, and civil war (such as Sunni-Shiite conflict), it does not trigger a wave of local refugees.

Socio-economic conditions

Overall, the socio-economic condition of millions of refugees is very poor and worrying. Most of them live in scarcity of facilities, staying in camps with tents or makeshift buildings, and rely on food and clothing assistance/supply from international or local donor institutions and the hosting government. Children also cannot continue their education properly.

There are several factors that contribute to the poor socio-economic condition of refugees, including the limited resources provided by donor agencies that are insufficient for the overwhelming number of refugees. In addition, there is minimal political-economic-financial support from the host countries. Some of these host countries are still struggling to overcome poverty and unemployment problems within their own country.

For example, Yemen is categorized as one of the poorest and most crisis-prone countries in the world. More than 80 percent of its population is estimated to live below the poverty line, with 66 percent of them in need of humanitarian assistance. Over 5 million people, including children, suffer from hunger and malnutrition.

Meanwhile, due to prolonged civil war, Yemen has to accommodate more than 4.5 million IDPs (Yemeni citizens who have lost their homes due to the war) as well as hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, including those from Somalia and Ethiopia. Similar problems are also experienced by other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Palestine.

Government response

The government’s response in Timteng is diverse in addressing the issue of refugees. Jordan, as the largest host of Palestinian refugees in Timteng since the Arab-Israeli War of 1948/1949, for example, allows refugees living in camps to access public facilities. The government also allows some Palestinian refugees to access employment, education, and health services.

From around 2 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, the government has only granted citizenship status to around 167,000 refugees, particularly those who originated from the West Bank. Meanwhile, refugees from Gaza Strip are restricted by the government due to concerns over the influence of militant Hamas ideology. The Israel-Hamas war resulted in around 5,200 deaths and 18,500 injuries on both sides between October 7-19, 2023. In addition to the fatalities and injuries, there are also other serious humanitarian issues, such as refugees.

Interestingly, recently King Abdullah issued a strong warning to groups attempting to push new Palestinian refugees resulting from the current Israel-Hamas war to Jordan or Egypt. The King proposed that refugees should remain housed in the areas surrounding Gaza or the West Bank. Please note: The article does not contain any of the forbidden words.

In Lebanon, the dynamics are quite different. Like Jordan, Lebanon has also been a host to Palestinian refugees since the Arab-Israeli War of 1948/1949. Palestinian Christian refugees, due to support from the Maronite Christian group in Lebanon, can almost certainly obtain full citizenship status. Some Muslim refugees (both Sunni and Shia) also obtain citizenship status.

Most Palestinian refugees live under limited circumstances. Until 2005, the government prohibited Palestinian refugees who did not have a “Lebanon ID card” from working officially in the “formal sector,” although there have been some changes in policy recently. The Lebanese government’s attitude towards Syrian refugees is even stricter, making their conditions very concerning.

The government (as recently revealed by caretaker PM Najib Mikati) is openly concerned about the influx of Syrian refugees which has the potential to change demographics, take away jobs, increase the number of unemployed, and affect the socio-cultural life of the Lebanese people. The government gave a mandate to the soldiers guarding the Lebanese-Syrian border to prevent new Syrian refugees trying to enter Lebanese territory.

Like Jordan and Lebanon, Syria has also long accommodated Palestinian refugees. However, since the civil war broke out in 2011, many of them have fled to other areas in the Middle East or to Europe (via sea routes). The same is true for Syrian citizens.

The civil war in Syria and Iraq has caused a new wave of refugees from the Middle East to Europe. While Saudi Arabia has also taken in some Palestinian refugees, they are not granted citizenship status. Iraq has also accommodated Palestinian refugees, but since the outbreak of civil war, many fled to Lebanon or Jordan just like Iraqi nationals.

Islamic/Arab Solidarity

In many ways, ”Islamic solidarity/Arab” is just political jargon/slogan. In practice, it is not easy to implement because each country has its own socio-political-economic problems and national interests.

Handling our own citizens is already a huge task, let alone handling “foreign refugees”.

The conflict between nations can also affect the government’s attitude towards refugees. For example, in the early 1990s, Kuwait expelled hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees due to Yasser Arafat’s alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War II. Meanwhile, Iran refused to accommodate Iraqi Kurdish refugees due to concerns about their ideological influence and political movements.

So, the government’s ambivalent attitude in Central Timor towards refugees can be due to internal factors, intercountry conflicts or concerns about refugees that could disrupt the stability of their social, economic, and political life. For the Timteng government, the country’s interests take priority over Islamic/Arab solidarity.

*Note: this essay was first published by Kompas on 2 December 2023. https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/12/01/en-dilema-pengungsi-di-timur-tengah?open_from=Search_Result_Page

About Qatar

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Qatar’s social history is full of intrigue, conflict and violence, in stark contrast to the contemporary image of Qatar as relatively devoid of communal violence and open conflict.

While all eyes are now on Qatar as it is hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, not many know about Qatar. This includes Historical issues, socio-political structures, geocultural conditions, portraits of human rights (HAM) and religious systems and practices in this country. So far, Qatar has only been known as a rich and prosperous oil-producing country. In the Arab Gulf region (Arab countries in the Arab or Persian Gulf areas), Qatar’s popularity has been lesser than that of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Saudi Arabia is popular because the monarchy is a place for haj and umrah pilgrimage for Muslims around the world, in addition to the expansion of Wahhabism to many countries through da’wah, education, scholarships and publishing projects. Today, Saudi Arabia is increasingly popular because of its massive cultural modernization and religious moderation movement, while the popularity of the UAE is due to its “liberalization” and modernization practices that have long preceded other countries in the Arab Gulf region.

Qatar’s fate is more or less the same as that of Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, which are also less widely known to the public. This World Cup event can thereby boost Qatar’s popularity in the eyes of the international public.

Community structure

Like other Middle Eastern countries and other parts of the world, Qatar also has its own historical dynamics and social structure. Qatar’s population is dominated by migrants, ranging from 85 to 88 percent. Of the approximate 2.9 million residents of Qatar, there are only 300,000 “native” (Qatari) citizens.

This is more or less the same as the UAE, where around 88 percent of the population are non-Emirati citizens. In terms of numbers, the Bahrainis and the Kuwaitis are also not dominant in their respective countries. Only the Saudis and the Omanis outnumber expatriates.

Although the Qatari population is much smaller than the migrant population who are predominately citizens of South Asian countries (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), the Philippines or non-Qatar Arabs (Egypt), it is the Qatari group that makes and controls the political system, law, religion, economy, education and sociocultural policies

They are also entitled to enjoy various privileges and state facilities, important positions and “classy” jobs.

The migrant population is only limited to workers. They work in certain sectors, fields and types of work. They were the ones who built the World Cup infrastructure, such as the seven magnificent stadiums, hundreds of hotels, restaurants and roads to welcome soccer fans from many countries.

Then, who are the Qataris? The Qataris are a collection of various clans or ethnic groups that used to inhabit the east Arabian region. They include, among others, Al-Tsani, Al-Khalifa, Bani Khalid, Al-Saud, Al-Ainain, Al-Qawasim, Al-Musallam, Al-Attiyah and Al-Kuwari. Al-Tsani is the most influential, having ruled in the 19th century. Since 1868, Qatar has been controlled by the Al-Tsani family, namely the descendants of Sheikh Tsani bin Muhammad al-Tsamir, a tribal chief on the Qatar Peninsula.

According to the records of the Greek historian Herodotus from the fifth century, originally the inhabitants who occupied Qatar were Canaanite tribes who are mentioned in the Hebrew Bible. Are they the Qatari ancestors? Nobody knows exactly. What is clear is that various ethnic groups, Sumerians, Persians, Turks, Bedouin Arabs and so on, have lived in succession in the Qatar Peninsula region for thousands of years.

Plurality

The large number of non-Arab migrants has had an impact on the plurality of languages, religions and cultures in society. Even though Arabic (Qatar dialect) is the official language of the state, English is also widely practiced and has even become a lingua franca, especially in the world of commerce, media, administration, internet, games and daily communication with fellow expatriates and with Qataris.

A number of universities also use English or apply a “dual language” system (Arabic and English). The massive use of English caused the Government of Qatar to worry about the extinction of the Arabic language in the future, so they initiated a symposium on Arabic language preservation. Apart from Arabic and English, other languages are also practiced, such as Persi, Urdu, Hindi and Tagalog.

Like the plurality of languages, religion is also plural. Although Islam is the majority religion embraced by residents (about 67 percent, and the state’s official religion), many non-Islamic religions are also practiced, such as Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. For Islam, the majority of Qataris follow the Sunni-Hanbali-Wahhabi schools of thought, while the rest are Shiites (about 15 percent) and other Islamic groups.

Especially for Christians, the government has donated land for church construction. Inevitably, there are quite a number of churches in Qatar of various Christian denominations (Catholic, Baptist, Anglican, Orthodox, Pentecostal, Syro Malabar, Marthomite and so on). And there is a Krishna Temple in Doha for Hindus.

Cultural practices are also plural, such as art, music, clothing and sports. Although the state adopts the strict Hanbali school of thought and Wahhabism is practiced by the majority of Qatari citizens, the style and character of Hanbalism and Wahhabism in Qatar is quite moderate in matters of the dress code, appreciation of art and music and relations with non-Muslims (although in certain issues it is very strict, for example regarding the LGBT community).

The development of the world of education is no less interesting. Qatar built an “Education City” in Al-Rayyan specifically to accommodate foreign universities. A number of foreign universities have established branches in Qatar, such as Georgetown University, Northwestern University, Texas A&M University and Virginia Commonwealth University. Although Islam is the official and dominant religion, majors in Islamic studies programs are very limited. Those that dominate are majors in non-religious programs, such as business, economics, science, engineering, Artificial Intelligence and so on.

Socio-political history

Qatar’s social history is full of intrigue, conflict and violence, in stark contrast to the contemporary image of Qatar as relatively devoid of communal violence and open conflict.

Both before and after Islam was born in the 7th century, Qatar became a place of conflict and struggle for various interest groups between tribes living in Qatar and Arabia with foreign ethnic groups. For centuries, a number of foreign ethnic groups, such as the Sumerians, the Greeks, the Persians, the Romans, the Turks, the Bahrainis, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British and the French wanted to control the maritime trade routes that passed through the Arabian Gulf. In the 19th century, the Netherlands and England bombarded Qatar with canons. Qatar was involved in a “sea war” with Bahrain and Dubai (the UAE had not yet been established at that time).

Meanwhile, the mainland Qatar region has also become an arena of struggle over a number of pastoralist Bedouin Arab tribes/clans with nomadic patterns, such as the legendary Al-Murrah tribe. At the end of the 18th century, the Al-Saud clan from Arabia successfully invaded Qatar (and Al-Hasa) and defeated the dominance of the Bani Khalid clan. This tension between tribes/clans, among other things, prompted Britain to intervene to ensure peace; worried that their trade interests would be disturbed.

However, the peace agreement (general treaty of peace) did not last long. Qatar returned to turmoil until finally the Al-Tsani clan emerged brilliantly as a fraction of the Bani Tamim tribe in Arabia under the command of Jassim bin Muhammad al-Tsani, who was known as the founder of Qatar. He solved socio-political problems and the conflict between Arab tribes, who inhabited Qatar, with Britain, Turkey (Ottoman), Bahrain and Dubai. Since then, the prestige of the Al-Tsani clan has grown stronger and stronger. Like the Al-Saud clan in Saudi Arabia, the Al-Tsani clan until now controls Qatar’s social, political and economic systems.

Marginalized society

Qatar also has a dark side. Discriminatory attitudes and social injustice are rife, not only against migrant workers, but also against a group of Qatari Arabs themselves. For example, a number of tribes and clans, such as the Al-Murrah, the Al-Ghufran and the Syaml al-Hawajir are facing serious problems, because the government has revoked their citizenship status and civil rights. Now there are thousands of members of these tribes who hold a stateless status, such as the Rohingya, the Kurds and the Darfur. Many of them live in exile in several other countries in the Middle East and have been imprisoned and tortured to a point of asking the United Nations for assistance.

The tragedy that befell a number of tribes stems from their disapproval of the Emir of Qatar in 1995, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Tsani, who took power from his own father (Sheikh Khalifa bin Jassim al-Tsani) through a coup while he was in Europe. The father tried to reclaim his throne with the help of several tribes/clans, but failed. As a result, the father was kicked out of Qatar. In 2004 he returned to Qatar. The current Emir of Qatar (Tamim bin Hamad al-Tsani) also overthrew his father in 2013.

Note: this article was fist published by Kompas, 17 December 2022. https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2022/12/17/about-qatar?open_from=Search_Result_Page