Beranda blog Halaman 3

Pilpres 2024

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Tidak seperti Pilpres 2014 & 2019 yang begitu “heroik” mendukung Jokowi karena alasan yang saya anggap fundamental saat itu, Pilpres kali ini (Pilpres 2024) saya cenderung pasif dan kurang bergairah.

Saya tahu banyak temanku yang mendukung dan bahkan menjadi “advokat” dan “cheerleaders garis keras”-nya Ganjar-Mahfud, Prabowo-Gibran, atau Anies-Imin.

Silakan saja mau memilih paslon yang mana. Itu hak masing-masing sebagai warga negara. Sebagaimana kalian, saya juga memiliki pilihan: baik memilih memilih atau memilih tidak memilih.

Saya hanya berharap, dalam menyalurkan dukungan tersebut harus “berkelas” dan “beradab”, jangan menggunakan cara-cara kotor dan biadab seperti dalam kontes Pilpres sebelumnya.

Pula, saya berharap para paslon, timses, dan pendukungnya juga menggunakan cara-cara elegan, bukan cara-cara menjijikkan dan memuakkan hanya demi memenangkan kontes Pilpres.

Misalnya: manipulasi suara dan aturan, “memperkosa” ayat dan agama, menyogok sana-sini, provokasi, intimidasi, kampanye hitam, dlsb. Betul-betul “njelehi” alias “menjelehkan.”

Ingat: kepentingan bangsa, negara, dan rakyat banyak harus tetap didahulukan ketimbang kepentingan diri dan kelompok primordial.

Entoh nanti setelah Pilpres, paslon manapun yang menang dan menjadi Pres-Wapres, paslon yang kalah beserta timses-nya akan mendapat jatah sebagai mentri ini-itu, wamen ini-itu, dubes sana-sini, dan jabatan fulitik menggairahken lainnya.

Sementara kaliyen wahai “rakyat jelatah” yang dedel-duel mendukung sampai putus persahabatan dan persodaraan cuma mendapat “kentutnya” doang. Betul-betul mbelgedes kakeane gombal mukiyo pret koprat kapret.

Religious Studies in Higher Education

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Can Perguruan Tinggi (PT) Islam (Islamic Higher Education) in Indonesia become a pioneer in studying non-Islamic religions and non-Muslim societies?

It is interesting to question and ponder: why are there so many non-Islamic universities, especially those with Christian and Jewish affiliations, that have study programs, departments, departments or research institutes on Islam and society Muslim?

On the other hand, why is it almost difficult to find Islamic tertiary institutions (or those managed by Muslims) that have study programs, majors, departments, or research institutions on non-Islamic religions and non-Muslim communities, such as Christian studies, Jewish studies, Buddhism, Hinduism, local religions, and the like?

Various HEIs in the West, such as the United States (US), Canada, Australia, or European countries—public or private, large or small campuses, research campuses or teaching colleges, both denominational (affiliated to certain religions/religious groups) and non-denominational—have study programs to study the phenomena of various religions in the world, both local and transnational religions, including Islam.

Not only in Western countries, but in the past few years, universities in East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan) have also started opening Islamic studies programs. Universities in Singapore, particularly the National University of Singapore, have had Islamic studies programs for a long time.

This Islamic study program is spreading to various departments and majors, especially in the fields of social sciences and humanities (history, anthropology, sociology, political science, archaeology, and so on), not just in religious departments or majors. Even in the law faculty (like at Harvard), they also have a strong Islamic law division.

Denominational campuses in the US, such as those affiliated with Catholicism (University of Notre Dame, Georgetown University, Boston College, etc.), Judaism (such as Brandeis University), Mormonism (such as Brigham Young University), or some “Protestant campuses” (Emory University, Graduate Theological Union, Union Theological Seminary, etc.) have excellent Islamic studies programs.

The alma mater of the author, Boston University, which is affiliated with the Methodist Christian denomination, also has a multitude of Islamic study programs spread across various faculties and departments.

To meet the needs of the Islamic study program, these campuses recruit experts and specialists (lecturers, researchers, orfellows), both “secular scholars” (atheists or agnostics) and scholars from certain religions (including Muslim scholar), who focuses in the field of religious studies Islam or Muslim society.

In other words, not only non-Muslim graduates, but Muslim graduates from several countries (including Indonesia) have also become many educators and researchers about Islam and Muslim communities on Western campuses.

The tradition of Islamic studies in the West

Translation: The tradition of Islamic studies in the West began with groups of orientalists, consisting of scholars and historians who studied various aspects of traditions and “oriental cultures” – meaning Asia and the Middle East (MENASA), including religion, language, literature, philosophy, law, and history in the 18th/19th century CE.

It should be noted that not all orientalists study Islam and Muslim society. However, there are orientalists who are experts in the field of Islamic studies, Muslim society, or the famous Arab/Central Asian region at that time, such as Ignaz Goldziher from Hungary, Theodor Noldeke from Germany, and Christian Snouck Hurgronje from the Netherlands.

By many scholars, this trio of orientalists is considered as pioneers of Islamic studies in the West. Among the three orientalists, Hurgronje is the most popular in Indonesia. Among Muslims, Hurgronje is considered as an “intellectual stooge” of the Dutch, even though he has contributed in the field of Islamic and Muslim studies.

Other renowned Orientalists in the field of Islamic studies, Muslim society, or Timteng’s history and geoculture are Joseph Schacht, Hamilton HR Gibb, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Philip K Hitti, or Montgomery Watt. They have written many academic works about Islam, Muslims, and/or Timteng.

Social scientists, particularly sociologists and anthropologists, were initially not interested in the study of Islam despite Max Weber, who is considered one of the founding trio of sociology (alongside Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx), mentioning Islam in his works.

As for the founders of Anthropology, such as Franz Boas or Bronislaw Malinowski, they did not touch upon Islam/Muslim at all in their works.

In anthropology, to the best of the writer’s knowledge, British anthropologist Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard began studying Islam and Muslim society through his work, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (published in 1949), which discusses the Sufi group or Sanusiyah order in Libya.

Following the tradition of Evans-Pritchard, an American anthropologist, the late Clifford Geertz, then researched Islamic communities in Indonesia (Kediri, East Java) and Morocco in the 1950s/1960s.

Aside from Geertz, the late Fredrik Barth of Norway was also a pioneer in the study of Islamic anthropology. Barth conducted extensive research on Muslim communities in Oman, Iran, Pakistan, and Bali.

Islamic studies in the West have experienced a boom since the 9/11 terrorism tragedy in the US. Since then, many universities in the West have opened Islamic study programs or research institutions to research “the Islamic world.”

Religious Studies in the Islamic World

If in the West there are many companies that open Islamic studies, in the Islamic world on the contrary, it’s difficult to find Islamic companies or “public companies” managed by Muslims that have study programs or research institutions that focus on non-Islamic studies and non-Muslim societies.

In general, HEIs owned by Muslims focus on the field of study of Islamic sciences (for example Islamic law, tafsir, hadith, etc.) or secular sciences (exact sciences, engineering, information technology, economics, business, computers, artificial intelligence (artificial intelligence), and so on).

This trend is not only in central Indonesia but also in other Islamic regions, such as North Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

What is interesting, especially in the context of Central Indonesia, is that Jewish-affiliated companies in Israel (such as The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, The University of Haifa, and so on), as well as Christian universities in Palestine (such as Jerusalem University College) or Lebanon (such as Saint Joseph University of Beirut), also offer Islamic studies programs, in addition to language, literature, and Arab/Central Indonesian culture.

However, not a single Islamic affiliated institution offers study programs on Judaism, Christianity, or Hebrew language.

Companies in Indonesia, especially those with Islamic affiliations or managed by Muslims, do not have any programs that offer non-Islamic religious studies or cater to non-Muslim communities. There are several universities and research centers that have programs or research centers for Central and Eastern Indonesia, but they are predominantly focused on Islam.

Despite being known as a Muslim community, Timteng also serves as a shelter for Christians, Jews, Yazidis, Druzes, Khaldeans, Baha’is, Hindus, and so on.

Can PT Islam Indonesia emulate the intellectual work ethic and academic spirit of Abu Raihan al-Biruni (973-1048), a Persian Muslim scholar from the 10th/11th century CE who was dubbed the “Father of Comparative Religion” for his study of non-Islamic religions (including Hinduism) and their languages (including Sanskrit)?

A number of fundamental factors

In addition to being driven by political motivations (such as colonialism or to study politics and Islamic/Muslim radicalism), Islamic studies in Western universities are also based on a scientific spirit, academic ethos, and a strong desire to understand the intricacies of Islam and the Muslim world.

Therefore, the tradition of Islamic studies in the West, to borrow a term from Mahmood Mamdani, former professor at Columbia University, can produce unfriendly orientalists (who are biased and less friendly towards Islam/Muslims) and friendly orientalists (which is fair and friendly to Islam/Muslims).

Despite varying motives and objectives, the tradition of Islamic studies in the West has produced many non-Muslim scholars (especially Christians, Jews, or secular) who are experts in the field of Islamic religion and Muslim society.

Meanwhile, the lack of Islamic universities that offer non-Islamic/ Muslim community religious studies programs has resulted in a scarcity of Islamic scholars knowledgeable in the study of other religions and non-Muslim communities.

There are several fundamental factors that cause the lack or even absence of Islamic PT (or those managed by Muslims) that open non-Islamic religious or non-Muslim community study programs. For example, the low or nonexistent interest and academic and research interests among Muslims to study and learn about the religion and communities of other religions.

However, studying and learning about religions and other religious communities can improve knowledge of different religions, enrich religious perspectives, minimize misunderstandings about other religions, and strengthen interfaith relations.

Can PT Islam in Indonesia become a pioneer in studying non-Islamic religions and non-Muslim societies?

Can PT Islam Indonesia emulate the intellectual work ethic and academic spirit of Abu Raihan al-Biruni (973-1048), a Persian Muslim scholar from the 10th/11th century CE who was dubbed the “Father of Comparative Religion” for his study of non-Islamic religions (including Hinduism) and their languages (including Sanskrit)?

Note: this article was published by Kompas (27 October 2023) and was translated by using both Microsoft Azure Open AI and Google Translation AI.

Religious Tolerance in the United Arab Emirates

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The UAE is now known as a very tolerant country. An important lesson that can be drawn from the UAE is that in order to maintain and care for cultural pluralism and socio-religious harmony, it is not enough to make rules and policies.

Among the countries in the Middle East that have a majority Muslim population, United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one that is very interesting to observe. Although the UAE’s governance is considered authoritarian and conservative, the country is one of the most liberal when it comes to cultural expression and building social relations, as well as the most tolerant when it comes to religion and community. Women’s participation in the public sector is also considered phenomenal.

Some indicators of social and religious tolerance can be seen below. For example, unlike most countries in the Middle East – except for Morocco or Bahrain – which are still “shy” in socializing with Jewish communities, this small country with a population of 9.2 million and rich in the Arab Gulf region has recently dared to express harmony with Jewish citizens.

This is demonstrated in, among other things, becoming the host of Jewish wedding parties, which are attended by a number of government officials, or by allowing Jewish business ventures and the establishment of Jewish mass organizations (ormas).

Although not large in number, Jews also exist in the UAE. According to Rabbi Marc Schneier of the Foundation of Ethnic Understanding, their current number is around 3,000 people. In 2020, the UAE became the first country in the Persian Gulf region to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, which was later followed by its neighbor, Bahrain.

Tolerance for cultural and artistic diversity

The UAE is also known for being very tolerant of artistic and cultural diversity. The government guarantees the expression of celebration of the diverse artistic and cultural backgrounds of its citizens, thus making the UAE very colorful in terms of art and culture in general (whether it be traditional or non-traditional culture).

From the aspect of arts and culture expression, this semi-constitutional federal kingdom can be said to be the most diverse in the Middle East as it is home to a variety of domestic and foreign cultures.

The diversity of culture can be understood because the UAE has become a home to people of various tribes, ethnicities, nations and countries. Even the local Arab population (Emiratis) is only around 11 percent, and the rest (89 percent) are foreign residents (immigrants).

The majority of foreign residents who reside in the UAE come from South Asia (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). Among the South Asian countries, India has the most representation (about 38 percent) due to its long-standing history of occupying the UAE, since it was a colony of England. It was England that originally brought Indian residents to the UAE to work across various sectors.

Meanwhile, among the Middle Eastern countries, Egyptian citizens are the most dominant in the UAE; while from Southeast Asia, Filipinos occupy the highest population in the UAE. This diversity in society certainly has an impact on cultural and religious diversity.

Interreligious harmony

In terms of religion and religious life, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is also known for its high degree of tolerance. It is no stranger that the UAE, which is now led by Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, is home to a variety of religions and Islamic sects such as Sunni, Shia, Ibadi, and others.

Sunni has become the dominant sect of Islam, while the population of Shia citizens (including Arab Shias, Persian Shias, and others) is around 15-20 percent.

Although the relationship between the governments of UAE and Iran is not very harmonious due to conflicts over several islands in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region, it does not affect the good relationship between Sunni and Shia citizens. Sufi groups also continue to proliferate in the UAE.

The non-Muslim population is also significant in the UAE due to the large immigrant community. Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Bahais, Jains, and others breed and live peacefully alongside each other in the UAE.

Among non-Muslim communities, Christians (especially Roman Catholic and Protestant) are the most dominant (around 13 percent). They come not only from Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, or Latin America, but also from Eastern Christian communities, especially from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine.

Until the year 2020, there were approximately 54 Christian churches of various denominations in the UAE and even the Apostolic Vicariate of Southern Arabia from the Catholic church is headquartered in Dubai. The second largest religious minority after Christianity is Hindu (about 7 percent), followed by Buddhists (2 percent) and other communities.

Like the Christian community, they also have houses of worship that are guaranteed by the government.

The harmonious and tolerant relations between religious groups in UAE are proven by the absence of communal violence between religious groups (both inter-factional violence within Islam and Muslim versus non-Muslim violence) as well as structural violence against certain religious groups that are supported or sponsored (directly or indirectly) by the government and security forces.

The central role of government

The social-cultural-religious harmony that takes place in the UAE certainly cannot be separated from the central role of the government in managing the diversity of its citizens. There are quite a number of UAE government policies that aim to create social harmony on one hand, and to avoid social conflicts or tensions on the other hand.

For example, the UAE government has established a ministry that specifically deals with promoting tolerance and peaceful coexistence within society. The government has also provided land for the construction of non-Muslim places of worship, including churches and temples.

The government also fully protects the freedom of non-Muslim worshippers, thereby making Christians and other worshippers feel comfortable in carrying out their religious worship activities and celebrating their important religious holidays.

In 2019, the government designed the “Abraham Family House” (baiat al-ailat lil ibrahimiyah), namely a complex or area on Saadiyat Island (Abu Dhabi) built three places of worship for Muslims (mosques), Christians (church), and Judaism (synagogue), as a symbol of harmony between religions from the Semitic family.

In this area, Imam Al-Tayeb Mosque, St. Francis Church, and Moses Ben Maimon Synagogue were built. The construction of this complex was inspired by the Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, a joint statement between Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayeb (Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Egypt) on behalf of Muslims, and Pope Francis on behalf of Catholics.

The document was signed in Abu Dhabi, hence it is also referred to as the “Abu Dhabi Declaration”.

In 2016, the government launched the “National Tolerance Program” initiated by Sheikha Lubna binti Khalid Al Qasimi, State Minister for Tolerance.

According to Sheikha Lubna, the main goal of this program is to build a climate of tolerance, spirit of peace, multiculturalism practices, and a culture of acceptance towards others while firmly rejecting any acts of racism, radicalism, intolerance, discrimination, and hatred towards individuals and other groups.

The UAE does not tolerate any form of (physical or verbal) intolerance and radicalism.

The impact of government policy and firm stance

The government’s firm stance will certainly have an impact on the creation of a cool atmosphere and harmonious relations between groups in society in the UAE.

Furthermore, this policy “forces” radical-intolerant groups to be quiet. Hardline Salafi groups also exist in the UAE, but they “don’t cause much trouble” by forbidding various artistic and cultural products that are deemed to be contradictory to their beliefs and religious practices, or by declaring other religious groups and Islamic sects to be infidels and attacking them.

They also do not express hatred towards non-Muslims or other Islamic sects. It can be assured that if they were to do so, they would be quickly silenced and frozen by the government for being considered disruptive to diversity and potentially creating social chaos and disharmony among different groups of society.

Similarly, followers of Hizbut Tahrir can also be found in the UAE. However, like the Salafi group, they remain silent and are afraid to delegitimize or “taghut” the government, even though the UAE’s system, form, and mechanisms of government contradict the concept of a khilafah-style government which is depicted and idealized by Hizbut Tahrir. If they dared to do so, it is certain that they would be “dragged” by the government and its officials.

Thus, that is a glimpse of the story and “good news” from the United Arab Emirates. An important lesson that can be taken from the UAE is that in order to preserve and nurture cultural diversity and social-religious harmony, making rules and policies alone is not enough.

There is a need for firm action against lawbreakers, those who damage cultural and religious diversity, as well as those who disrupt social harmony in society. Can the Indonesian government set an example for this?

Note: this article was published by Kompas (9 September 2023) and was translated by using both Microsoft Azure Open AI and Google Translation AI.

Middle East, Religion and Religiosity

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Why do some people in the Middle East become atheists? The phenomenon of atheism in the Middle East is actually the same as the phenomenon of theism in the US. Both are nothing strange because both are common social phenomena.

The virtual world has recently been busy talking about the phenomenon atheism in Middle East, especially in countries -Arabic countries. This follows a media report citing the results of opinion polls, surveys, and reports from a number of institutions regarding the phenomenon of the declining population of religious people on the one hand, and the growing trend of atheism, agnosticism or non-religious groups on the other.

The flurry of public response is not separate from the assumption that the Middle East is an “Islamic district” and its inhabitants are devout and even fanatical followers of the religion.

Although of course there are many residents of Central Timor who are religious, identifying them with righteousness and religious obedience is not always accurate because there are many residents who do not strictly follow religious teachings.

Furthermore, identifying them solely with Islam is not accurate since there are millions of followers of religions other than Islam, including Christians. Central Java is also not only home to Arab ethnic groups, but also to other ethnic groups such as Persians, Kurds, Yazidis, Druze, Jews, and Amazigh.

Survey findings

From the 40,000 surveyed respondents in Iran by The Group for Analyzing and Measuring in Iran in 2020, 47 percent stated that they have converted from religion to atheism (or at least not being affiliated with any religion).

The results of the 2019 BBC International survey show a similar trend, namely an increase in the percentage of non-religious people in Central and East Timor in general, from 8 percent in 2013 to 13 percent in 2019. The International Religious Freedom Reports (2022) published by the US government also show a trend of increasing percentages of non-religious people, especially among Arab communities.

In a report released by The Arab Barometer, a prominent polling agency in Lebanon, from a survey of 25,000 local residents, 43 percent stated experiencing “individual religiosity decline” or feeling no longer religious.

In 2012, WIN/Gallup International also released a surprising report: out of 500 Saudi Arabian citizens who were surveyed and interviewed, 19 percent stated that they were “not religious” and 5 percent declared themselves as atheists.

This report has evoked various responses from the government and community leaders. Some equate atheism with terrorism and believe it should be severely punished.

However, there are also those who offer a path of dialogue, such as Professor Yusuf al-Ghamdi from Umm al-Qura University, who considers atheism as an “intellectual phenomenon”, not a “behavioral phenomenon” like radicalism, and therefore needs to be addressed intellectually.

To respond to the phenomenon of the emergence of atheism, the Islamic University of Madinah reportedly established a special counseling center or institution to handle cases of individuals who are doubtful about their religion.

Why do some people in the Middle East community become atheists? This question is actually quite strange because atheism, like theism, is essentially a universal phenomenon that can happen to anyone and any ethnicity in the world.

The phenomenon of atheism in central-eastern Indonesia is actually the same as the phenomenon of theism in the United States. Neither is unusual because they are both ordinary social phenomena, in addition to being part of the normal individual transformation process that can happen to anyone.

A number of factors

Brian Whitaker in his book, “Arabs Without God: Atheism and Freedom of Belief in the Middle East,” identifies a number of factors that led to the emergence of atheism in the Middle East (and North Africa). These factors include (1) the discrepancy between the normative teachings of religion and the practices of its adherents in daily life; (2) violence and violations of civil rights that are widespread in society; (3) the process of modernization and secularization that has penetrated the Middle East/North Africa region since several decades ago.

In addition, (4) internet and social media technologies have made it easier for people to access various sources of information from anywhere without censorship from the government or religious groups, while also allowing interaction with anyone regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, or religion.

Some are accusing modernization and democracy as the cause of the emergence of atheism and the decline of religiosity in society. Others are pointing fingers at the Western education system for educating the East and Southeast Asian society to become liberal-secular.

The process of change or transformation from theism to atheism can be due to a loss of trust in religion after seeing various bad and inhumane actions committed by (some) religious groups (radicalism, terrorism, vandalism, dehumanism, and so on). ).

However, it could also be due to the process of intellectualization and rationalization of religious texts, teachings, doctrines and discourses that are seen as incompatible (or contradictory) with the spirit of science, common sense, knowledge, modernity and changing times. Saturation in carrying out a pile of religious dogmas that are not directly proportional to fate and life experiences can also be a cause for the emergence of atheism.

Historical roots

If we look at the history of Central Java, atheism is actually not something new that has recently emerged due to infiltration or invasion of foreign (Western) culture through democracy, modernization, or secularization projects as alleged by some parties.

The phenomenon of ilhad, which can be interpreted as atheism, apostasy (apostasy), or zindik, is very old in the history of the Middle East. Sarah Stroumsa in Freethinkers of Medieval Islam writes that in the 9th century there was a Shia Zaidiyah theologian from the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qasim bin Ibrahim al-Rassi, who wrote a work (Radd ‘ala al-Mulhid ) who attack counter-religious groups, namely atheists, non-theists, and zindik (heretics).

Two scholars from the Middle East (9/10th century) who are often associated with the idea of ​​atheism are Ibn al-Rawandi and Abu Bakr al-Razi. Both are known as “first-class” critics of religious doctrines, the concept of revelation, or prophetic ideas (prophecy) while advocating the optimization of the mind in understanding the socio-cultural phenomena around us.

Despite being challenged here and there by various religious and political groups, the ideas and practices of atheism have continued in the modern era of Middle East. For example, in the 1930s, Egypt was shocked by the appearance of Ismail Adham who wrote the book Limadza ana Mulhid (Why Am I an Atheist?). Inevitably this book stirred up the public and elicited heated reactions from various religious groups.

Meanwhile, the Saudi Arabian public was also shocked by the emergence of Abdullah al-Qassimi (1907-1996), a controversial writer-intellectual and staunch defender of atheism. Interestingly, he was born in Buraidah, which is one of the strongholds of the Wahhabi group. Prior to his conversion to atheism, he was known for his avid advocacy of Salafism.

Future prospects

Will atheism continue to exist in Timteng in the future? As part of individual dynamics, intellectual processes, and social changes of humanity, atheism (as well as theism) will always exist within society. Atheism will not die even though theistic groups try to kill and bury it. Similarly, theism will not go extinct even though atheist groups try to attack and demolish it.

Theism and atheism will always exist in any society, including in Central Sulawesi, although their relationship is rarely harmonious and often play “hide and seek”.

In societies dominated by theistic groups (like in Central Java and Indonesia), many atheist groups hide their identities because otherwise they would face serious punishment from political and religious authorities. Conversely, in societies dominated by atheist groups, theistic individuals usually do not openly display their identities in public spaces.

Can they both live together peacefully and harmoniously in the future, full of respect and tolerance without fear and suspicion or negating each other? Yes, if the country adopts the principle of secularism that does not consider religious or non-religious groups or theism and atheism as a problem. Another alternative is based on humanity, where the country provides political and legal guarantees/protections for the atheist/theist groups. However, in the context of the Middle East, it seems difficult to achieve this.

Note: this article was published by Kompas (17 June 2023) and was translated by using both Microsoft Azure Open AI and Google Translation AI.

Studi Agama di Perguruan Tinggi

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Menarik untuk dipertanyakan dan direnungkan: mengapa ada banyak perguruan tinggi (PT) non-Islam, khususnya yang berafiliasi Kristen dan Yahudi, yang memiliki program studi (progdi), jurusan, departemen, atau lembaga riset tentang Islam dan masyarakat muslim?

Sebaliknya, kenapa nyaris susah didapatkan PT Islam (atau yang dikelola oleh umat Islam) yang memiliki progdi, jurusan, departemen, atau lembaga riset tentang agama non-Islam dan masyarakat non-muslim (misalnya, studi kekristenan, keyahudian, Buddhisme, Hinduisme, agama lokal, dlsb)?

Berbagai PT di Barat seperti Amerika Serikat, Kanada, Australia, atau negara-negara Eropa–baik yang negeri maupun swasta, baik kampus besar maupun kecil, baik kampus riset maupun teaching college, baik yang denominasional (berafiliasi ke agama/kelompok agama tertentu) maupun yang non-denominasional–mempunyai progdi untuk mempelajari fenomena berbagai agama di dunia, baik agama lokal maupun transnasional, tak terkecuali Islam.

Bukan hanya di negara-negara Barat, sejak beberapa tahun terakhir, kampus-kampus di Asia Timur (China, Jepang, Korsel, atau Taiwan) juga mulai membuka progdi Islam. PT di Singapura, khususnya National University of Singapore, juga sudah lama memiliki progdi Islam. 

Progdi Islam ini menyebar di berbagai departemen dan jurusan, khususnya bidang ilmu sosial dan humaniora (sejarah, antropologi, sosiologi, ilmu politik, arkeologi, dlsb), bukan hanya di departemen atau jurusan agama. Bahkan di Fakultas Hukum (seperti di Harvard) memiliki divisi Hukum Islam yang kuat.

Kampus-kampus denominasional di Amerika, misalnya yang berafiliasi ke Katolik (seperti University of Notre Dame, Georgetown University, Boston College, dlsb), Yahudi (seperti Brandeis University), Mormon (seperti Brigham Young University), atau berbagai “kampus Protestan” (misalnya Emory University, Graduate Theological Union, Union Theological Seminary, dlsb) mempunyai progdi Islam yang baik. Almamater saya, Boston University, yang berafiliasi ke Kristen Methodis juga mempunyai banyak sekali progdi Islam yang tersebar di berbagai fakultas dan departemen.

Untuk memenuhi keperluan progdi Islam ini, kampus-kampus tersebut merekrut para ahli dan spesialis (dosen, periset, atau fellow), baik “sarjana sekuler” (ateis atau agnostik) maupun sarjana dari agama tertentu (termasuk sarjana muslim), yang fokus di bidang studi agama Islam atau masyarakat muslim. Dengan kata lain, bukan hanya sarjana non-muslim, para sarjana muslim dari berbagai negara (termasuk dari Indonesia) juga sudah banyak menjadi tenaga pengajar dan peneliti tentang Islam dan masyarakat muslim di kampus-kampus Barat.

Tradisi Studi Islam di Barat

Tradisi studi Islam di Barat dimulai dari kelompok Orientalis, yakni sekelompok sarjana dan sejarawan yang mempelajari berbagai aspek tradisi dan “budaya Oriental” (maksudnya, Asia dan Timur Tengah) termasuk agama, bahasa, sastra, filosofi, hukum, dan sejarah, di abad ke-18/19 M.

Perlu diingat, tidak semua Orientalis mempelajari Islam dan masyarakat muslim. Adapun Orientalis yang ahli di bidang studi/kajian Islam, masyarakat muslim, atau Arab/Timteng yang masyhur kala itu termasuk Ignaz Goldziher dari Hungaria, Theodor Noldeke dari Jerman, dan Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje dari Belanda.

Oleh banyak sarjana, trio Orientalis ini dianggap sebagai pionir studi Islam di Barat. Dari ketiga Orientalis ini, Snouck Hurgronje yang paling populer di Indonesia. Oleh umat Islam, Snouck Hurgronje dianggap sebagai “antek intelektual” Belanda, meskipun ia telah berkontribusi di bidang kajian keislaman dan kemusliman.

Para Orienstalis lain yang masyhur di bidang kajian Islam, masyarakat muslim, atau sejarah dan geokultural Timteng, adalah Joseph Schacht, Hamilton H.R. Gibb, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Philip K. Hitti, atau Montgomery Watt. Mereka telah menulis banyak karya akademik tentang Islam, muslim, dan/atau Timteng.       

Para ilmuwan sosial–khususnya sosiolog dan antropolog–pada mulanya tidak tertarik dengan studi Islam, meskipun Max Weber yang dianggap sebagai salah satu trio pendiri sosiologi (bersama Emile Durkheim dan Karl Marx) pernah menyinggung tentang Islam dalam karya-karyanya. Adapun para pendiri antropologi seperti Franz Boas atau Bronislaw Malinowski sama sekali tidak menyinggung Islam/muslim dalam karya-karya mereka.

Dalam antropologi, sependek pengetahuan saya, antropolog Inggris Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard yang memulai mempelajari Islam dan masyarakat muslim lewat karyanya, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (terbit tahun 1949), yang membahas kelompok Sufi atau tarekat Sanusiyah di Libia. Mengikuti tradisi Evans-Pritchard, antropolog Amerika mendiang Clifford Geertz kemudian meneliti masyarakat Islam di Indonesia (Kediri, Jatim) dan Maroko pada tahun 1950an/1960an.

Selain Geertz, ada mendiang Fredrik Barth dari Norwegia yang juga menjadi pionir studi antropologi masyarakat Islam. Barth banyak meneliti masyarakat muslim di Oman, Iran, Pakistan, dan juga Bali. Studi Islam di Barat mengalami “booming” sejak tragedi terorisme 9/11 di Amerika. Sejak itu, banyak PT di Barat yang membuka progdi Islam atau lembaga riset guna meneliti “dunia Islam.”

Studi Agama di PT Timteng dan Dunia Islam

Jika di Barat banyak PT yang membuka studi Islam, di dunia Islam justru sebaliknya. Nyaris susah mendapatkan PT Islam atau “PT umum” yang dikelola oleh umat Islam yang mempunyai progdi atau lembaga penelitian yang fokus di bidang kajian non-Islam dan masyarakat non-muslim. Pada umumnya PT milik umat Islam fokus di bidang studi ilmu-ilmu keislaman (misalnya hukum Islam, ilmu tafsir, ilmu hadis, dlsb) atau ilmu-ilmu sekuler (ilmu eksakta, teknik, teknologi informatika, ekonomi, bisnis, komputer, AI, dlsb). Tren ini bukan hanya di Timteng saja tetapi juga di kawasan Islam lain seperti Afrika Utara, Asia Tengah, Asia Selatan, dan Asia Tenggara.

Yang menarik, khususnya dalam konteks Timteng, PT yang berafiliasi Yahudi di Israel (misalnya The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, the University of Haifa, dlsb) atau Kristen di Palestina (misalnya Jerusalem University College) atau Libanon (misalnya, Saint Joseph University of Beirut) juga membuka progdi Islam (selain bahasa, sastra, dan budaya  Arab/Timteng). Akan tetapi tidak ada satupun PT yang berafiliasi Islam yang membuka progdi agama Yahudi, Kristen, atau bahasa Ibrani (Hebrew).  

PT di Indonesia, khususnya yang berafiliasi Islam atau yang dikelola umat Islam, juga tidak ada yang membuka progdi agama non-Islam dan masyarakat non-muslim. Ada beberapa universitas yang membuka progdi atau pusat penelitian Timteng tetapi isinya juga “Timteng yang Islam.” Padahal Timteng bukan hanya menjadi rumah umat Islam tetapi juga Kristen, Yahudi, Yazidi, Druze, Khaldean, Baha’i, Hindu, dlsb.

Sejumlah Faktor Mendasar

Selain didorong oleh motivasi politik (misalnya kolonialisme atau untuk mempelajari politik dan radikalisme Islam/muslim), studi Islam di kampus-kampus Barat juga dilandasi oleh spirit ilmiah, etos akademik, dan keingintauan yang kuat untuk mengetahui seluk-beluk agama Islam dan dunia muslim. Karena itu tradisi studi Islam di Barat, meminjam istilah Mahmood Mamdani, mantan profesor di Columbia University, dapat menghasilkan “unfriendly Orientalists” (yang bias dan kurang bersahabat dengan Islam/muslim) dan “friendly Orientalists” (yang fair dan bersahabat dengan Islam/muslim).

Terlepas dari motif dan tujuan yang beragam, tradisi studi Islam di Barat telah melahirkan banyak sarjana non-muslim (khususnya Kristen, Yahudi, atau sekuler) yang ahli di bidang studi agama Islam dan masyarakat muslim. 

Sementara itu, minimnya PT Islam yang mempunyai progdi agama non-Islam/masyarakat muslim menyebabkan minimnya para sarjana Islam yang ahli di bidang kajian agama-agama lain dan masyarakat non-muslim. Ada sejumlah faktor mendasar yang menyebabkan minimnya atau bahkan tidak adanya PT Islam (atau yang dikelola umat Islam) yang membuka progdi studi agama non-Islam atau masyarakat non-muslim. Misalnya, rendahnya atau tidak adanya ketertarikan serta minat akademik dan riset di kalangan umat Islam untuk meneliti dan mempelajari agama dan umat agama lain.

Padahal dengan meneliti dan mempelajari agama dan umat agama lain dapat meningkatkan pengetahuan tentang agama-agama, memperkaya wawasan keagamaan, meminimalisir kesalahpahaman terhadap agama lain, dan memperkuat relasi antaragama.

Bisakah PT Islam di Indonesia menjadi pionir studi agama non-Islam dan masyarakat non-muslim? Mampukah PT Islam Indonesia mencontoh etos intelektual dan spirit akademik Abu Raihan al-Biruni (973-1048), seorang ulama muslim Persia di abad ke-10/11 M yang dijuluki Bapak Perbandingan Agama karena menekuni agama-agama non-Islam (termasuk Hinduisme) serta mempelajari bahasa mereka (termasuk Sansekerta)?

Keterangan: artikel ini semula diterbitkan di Kompas (27 Oktober 2023)

Toleransi Agama di Uni Emirat Arab

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Di antara negara-negara di Timur Tengah (Timteng) yang mayoritas berpenduduk muslim, Uni Emirat Arab (UEA) termasuk yang sangat menarik untuk dicermati. Meskipun dari aspek pemerintahan UEA tergolong otoriter dan konservatif, negara ini menjadi salah satu yang paling liberal dalam hal ekspresi kebudayaan dan membangun relasi sosial serta paling toleran dalam beragama dan bermasyarakat. Dalam hal partisipasi perempuan di sektor publik juga tergolong fenomenal.

Beberapa indikator toleransi sosial-agama dapat dilihat berikut ini. Misalnya, tidak seperti umumnya negara-negara di Timteng (kecuali Maroko atau Bahrain) yang masih “malu-malu” dalam menjalin hubungan sosial dengan umat Yahudi, negara mini berpenduduk 9,2 juta yang kaya di kawasan Teluk Arab ini belakangan berani “buka-bukaan” mengekspresikan harmonisasi dengan warga Yahudi (antara lain, menjadi tuan rumah pesta pernikahan mereka yang dihadiri oleh sejumlah petinggi pemerintah atau membolehkan usaha bisnis dan pendirian ormas Yahudi).

Meskipun tidak besar, umat Yahudi juga eksis di UEA yang menurut Rabbi Marc Schneier dari Foundation of Ethnic Understanding ada sekitar 3000 jiwa. Tahun 2020, UEA menjadi negara pertama di kawasan Teluk Arab (atau Teluk Persi) yang membangun hubungan diplomatik dengan Israel, yang kemudian disusul negara tetangganya, Bahrain.

Toleransi Kemajemukan Seni-Budaya

UEA juga dikenal sangat toleran dengan keragaman seni-budaya. Pemerintah juga menggaransi ekspresi selebrasi kemajemukan seni-budaya penduduknya sehingga membuat UEA, dari aspek kesenian atau kebudayaan secara umum (baik kebudayaan bendawi maupun nonbendawi) sangat warna-warni.

Dari aspek ekspresi seni dan budaya, negara kerajaan semi-konstitusional berbentuk federal ini bisa dikatakan yang paling majemuk di Timteng lantaran menjadi rumah bagi aneka ragam kebudayaan dalam dan luar negeri. Keragaman budaya itu bisa dimaklumi karena UEA menjadi rumah umat manusia dari berbagai suku, etnis, bangsa, dan negara. Bahkan penduduk Arab lokal (Emirati) hanya sekitar 11 persen, selebihnya (89 persen) merupakan warga asing (imigran).

Warga asing terbanyak yang menempati UEA berasal dari Asia Selatan (India, Pakistan, dan Bangladesh). Di antara negara-negara di Asia Selatan, India yang paling banyak (sekitar 38 persen) karena sudah lama menempati UEA, yakni sejak menjadi “koloni” Inggris. Inggrislah dulu yang mula-mula mendatangkan warga India ke UEA untuk dipekerjakan di berbagai sektor. Sementara itu di antara negara-negara Timteng, Mesir yang paling dominan, sedangkan dari Asia Tenggara, warga Filipina yang paling banyak menempati UEA. Keragaman masyarakat tersebut tentu saja berdampak pada keragaman budaya dan juga agama.

Harmoni Antaragama

Dalam hal keagamaan dan kehidupan beragama, UEA juga dikenal sangat toleran. Sudah tidak asing lagi, UEA yang kini dipimpin oleh Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan menjadi rumah bagi aneka ragam agama dan sekte Islam seperti Sunni, Syiah, Ibadi, dan lainnya. Sunni menjadi sekte Islam dominan, sedangkan populasi warga Syiah (baik Syiah Arab, Syiah Persi, dan lainnya) sekitar 15-20 persen. Meskipun relasi pemerintah UEA dan Iran kurang harmonis karena konflik atas sejumlah pulau di kawasan Teluk Arab/Persi tetapi itu tidak mempengaruhi hubungan baik antarwarga Sunni dan Syiah. Kelompok Sufi juga berkembang biak di UEA.

Populasi non-muslim juga signifikan di UEA sebagai dampak dari besarnya kelompok imigran. Kristen, Yahudi, Hindu, Buddha, Sikh, Bahai, Jain, dan lain-lain berkembang biak dan hidup berdampiangan secara damai di UEA. Di antara umat non-muslim, umat Kristen (khususnya Katolik Roma dan Protestan) yang paling dominan (sekitar 13 persen). Mereka bukan hanya berasal dari Asia, Afrika, Eropa, Amerika Utara, atau Amerika Latin saja tetapi juga umat Kristen Timteng, khususnya dari Mesir, Libanon, Suriah, Yordania, dan Palestina.

Hingga tahun 2020, tercatat ada sekitar 54 gereja Kristen dari berbagai denominasi di UEA, dan bahkan Apostolic Vicariate of Southern Arabia dari gereja Katolik bermarkas di Dubai. Minoritas agama terbesar kedua setelah Kristen adalah Hindu (sekitar 7 persen) kemudian diikuti Buddha (2 persen) dan umat lainnya. Sebagaimana umat Kristen, mereka juga memiliki tempat ibadah yang digaransi oleh pemerintah.  

Relasi harmoni dan toleran antarkelompok agama di UEA dibuktikan dengan tidak adanya kekerasan komunal antarkelompok agama (baik kekerasan antarfaksi dalam Islam maupun muslim versus non-muslim) maupun kekerasan struktural terhadap kelompok agama tertentu yang didukung atau disponsori (baik langsung maupun tidak langsung) oleh pemerintah dan aparat keamanan.

Peran Sentral Pemerintah

Harmoni sosial-budaya-agama yang berlangsung di UEA tersebut tentu saja tidak lepas dari peran sentral pemerintah dalam mengelola kemajemukan warganya. Ada cukup banyak kebijakan pemerintah UEA yang bertujuan menciptakan harmoni sosial di satu sisi serta menghindari konflik atau ketegangan sosial di pihak lain.

Misalnya, pemerintah UEA membentuk kementerian yang khusus bertugas mengurusi toleransi dan koeksistensi damai di masyarakat. Pemerintah juga menyediakan lahan untuk pembangunan tempat-tempat ibadah non-muslim termasuk gereja dan kuil. Selain itu, pemerintah juga melindungi penuh kebebasan beribadah umat non-muslim sehngga membuat umat Kristen dan lainnya merasa nyaman dalam melakukan aktivitas kebaktian agama serta perayaan hari-hari penting agama mereka.

Tahun 2019, pemerintah mendesain “Abraham Family House” (baiat al-ailat lil ibrahimiyah), yakni sebuah komplek atau area di Pulau Saadiyat (Abu Dhabi) yang dibangun tiga tempat ibadah umat Islam (masjid), Kristen (gereja), dan Yahudi (sinagog), sebagai simbol harmoni sesama agama dari rumpun Semit. Di kawasan ini dibangun Masjid Imam Al-Tayeb, Gereja St. Francis, dan Sinagog Moses Ben Maimon.

Pembangunan kompleks ini diinspirasi oleh Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, sebuah pernyataan bersama antara Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayeb (Imam Besar Al-Azhar, Mesir) atas nama umat Islam dan Paus Fransiskus atas nama umat Katolik, yang ditandatangi di Abu Dhabi (karena itu dokumen ini juga dsebut “Deklarasi Abu Dhabi”). 

Kemudian tahun 2016, pemerintah meluncurkan “Program Toleransi Nasional” yang digagas oleh Sheikha Lubna binti Khalid Al Qasimi (Menteri Negara urusan Toleransi). Menurut Sheikha Lubna, tujuan utama dari program ini adalah untuk membangun iklim toleransi, spirit perdamaian, praktik multikulturalisme, dan kultur penerimaan terhadap yang lain serta menolak tegas segala tindakan rasisme, radikalisme, intoleransi, diskriminasi, dan kebencian terhadap individu dan kelompok lain. UEA memang tidak memberi ruang secuilpun pada tindakan (fisik maupun verbal) intoleransi dan radikalisme.

Dampak Kebijakan dan Sikap Tegas Pemerintah

Sikap tegas pemerintah ini berdampak pada terciptanya iklim sejuk dan relasi harmoni antarkelompok masyarakat. Pula, kebijakan ini “memaksa” kelompok radikal-intoleran untuk bungkam. Perlu diketahui, kelompok Salafi garis keras juga eksis di UEA tetapi mereka “tidak banyak tingkah” dengan mengharamkan berbagai produk seni-budaya yang dianggap bertentangan dengan akidah dan praktik keagamaan mereka atau dengan mengafirkan dan menggeruduk kelompok agama dan sekte Islam lain. Mereka juga tidak melontarkan ujaran-ujaran kebencian terhadap non-muslim maupun sekte-sekte Islam lain. Bisa dipastikan jika mereka melakukan hal itu segera “dibungkam” dan “dibekukan” oleh pemerintah karena dianggap mengganggu kemajemukan serta berpotensi menciptakan kekacauan sosial dan relasi tidak harmonis antarkelompok masyarakat.

Begitu pula, pengikut Hizbut Tahrir juga ada di UEA tetapi sama seperti kelompok Salafi, mereka juga diam tidak berani mendelegitimasi atau “mengtaghutkan” pemerintah meskipun sistem, bentuk, dan mekanisme pemerintahan UEA bertentangan dengan konsep pemerintahan model Khilafah yang digambarkan dan diidealkan oleh Hizbut Tahrir. Jika mereka berani melakukan itu, bisa dipastikan akan “digelandang” oleh pemerintah dan aparat.

Demikianlah sekelumit cerita dan “kabar gembira” dari UEA. Pelajaran penting yang bisa diambil dari UEA adalah demi atau untuk menjaga dan merawat kemajemukan budaya dan harmoni sosial-keagamaan, membuat aturan dan kebijakan saja tidak cukup. Perlu tindakan tegas bagi para pelanggar hukum, perusak kemajemukan budaya dan agama, serta pengganggu keharmonisan sosial di masyarakat. Bisakah pemerintah Indonesia mencontohnya?

Keterangan: tulisan ini semula diterbitkan di Kompas (9 September 2023) dengan judul “Toleransi Agama di Timur Tengah.”

Ateisme di Timteng?

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Jagat maya Indonesia belakangan ramai membicarakan fenomena ateisme di Timur Tengah (Timteng), khususnya negara-negara Arab, karena laporan sebuah media yang mengutip hasil polling, survei, dan laporan sejumlah lembaga (seperti pemerintah Amerika Serikat, The Group for Analyzing and Measuring in Iran, BBC International, dan The Arab Barometer) tentang fenomena menurunnya populasi umat beragama di satu sisi serta tren berkembangannya kelompok ateisme, agnotisisme, atau non-agama di pihak lain.

Ramainya respon publik tersebut tidak lepas dari asumsi bahwa Timteng merupakan “kawasan Islam” dan penghuninya merupakan pengikut agama yang taat dan bahkan fanatik. Meskipun tentu saja ada banyak masyarakat Timteng yang religius, mengidentikkan mereka dengan kesalehan dan ketaatan beragama tidak selamanya akurat karena memang ada banyak masyarakat yang tidak saleh dan agamis (baca, tidak menjalankan ajaran agama secara ketat).

Pula, mengidentikkan mereka dengan Islam saja juga tidak akurat karena ada jutaan pengikut agama selain Islam, termasuk umat kristiani. Timteng juga bukan hanya rumah bagi suku-bangsa Arab saja tetapi juga suku-bangsa lainnya seperti Persi, Kurdi, Yazidi, Druze, Yahudi, Amazigh, dlsb. 

Temuan Survei

Di antara hasil temuan survei tersebut, antara lain, 47 persen dari 40,000 responden penduduk Iran yang disurvei oleh The Group for Analyzing and Measuring in Iran tahun 2020 menyatakan telah beralih dari beragama ke ateis (atau minimal tidak beragama). Hasil survei dari BBC International (2019) juga menunjukkan tren serupa, yakni peningkatan persentase umat non-agama di Timteng secara umum dari 8 persen (tahun 2013) menjadi 13 persen (tahun 2019).

Hasil temuan International Religious Freedom Reports (2022) yang dirilis oleh pemerintah Amerika juga menunjukkan tren peningkatan persentase umat non-agama, khususnya di kalangan masyarakat Arab. Kemudian, dalam laporan yang dikeluarkan oleh The Arab Barometer (sebuah lembaga polling ternama di Libanon) belakangan ini disebutkan bahwa, berdasarkan survei terhadap 25,000 warga setempat, 43 persen dari responden menyatakan mengalami “kemerosotan kesalehan individu” alias merasa tidak religius lagi.

Pada tahun 2012, WIN/Gallup International juga pernah mengeluarkan laporan mengejutkan: dari sekitar 500an warga Arab Saudi yang disurvei dan wawancarai, 19 persen menyatakan “tidak religius” dan 5 persen menyatakan sebagai ateis. Laporan ini menimbulkan respon yang beragam dari pemerintah maupun tokoh masyarakat.

Ada yang menghukumi ateisme dengan terorisme yang harus dihukum berat tetapi ada pula yang menawarkan jalan dialog (misalnya Profesor Yusuf Al-Ghamdi dari Universitas Umm al-Qura) karena menganggap ateisme sebagai “fenomena intelektual” bukan “fenomena perilaku” seperti radikalisme sehingga perlu dihadapi secara intelektual. Guna merespon fenomena munculnya ateisme, Universitas Islam Madinah dikabarkan pernah membuat lembaga atau pusat konsultasi yang khusus menangani masyarakat yang ragu dengan agama mereka (baca, Islam).  

Sejumlah Faktor

Kenapa sebagian masyarakat Timteng menjadi ateis? Pertanyaan ini sebetulnya cukup aneh karena ateisme, sebagaimana teisme, sejatinya merupakan fenomena universal yang bisa terjadi pada siapa saja dan etnik mana saja di dunia ini. Fenomena ateisme di Timteng sebetulnya sama dengan fenomena teisme di Amerika. Keduanya tidak ada yang aneh karena sama-sama sebagai sebuah fenomena sosial yang lumrah, selain sebagai bagian dari proses perubahan individu yang biasa dan bisa terjadi pada siapa saja.

Brian Whitaker dalam bukunya Arabs Without God: Atheism and Freedom of Belief in the Middle East mengidentifikasi sejumlah faktor yang menyebabkan munculnya ateisme di Timteng (dan Afrika Utara), antara lain, (1) ketidaksinkronan antara ajaran normatif agama dan praktik pemeluknya dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, (2) kekerasan dan pelanggaran hak-hak sipil yang marak di masyarakat, (3) proses modernisasi dan sekularisasi yang merambah kawasan Timteng/Afrika Utara sejak beberapa dekade silam, dan (4) teknologi internet dan media sosial yang memudahkan masyarakat untuk mencari berbagai sumber informasi dari mana saja tanpa censorship dari pemerintah maupun kelompok agama sekaligus berinteraksi dengan siapa saja tanpa batas negara, etnis, dan agama.

Sebagian menuding westernisasi dan demokrasi sebagai penyebab munculnya ateisme dan menurunnya religiusitas masyarakat. Yang lain mengarahkan jari telunjuk ke dunia pendidikan Barat yang telah mendidik masyarakat Timteng menjadi liberal-sekuler.

Apapun faktor penyebabnya, saya melihat ateisme di Timteng dan dimanapun, termasuk di Indonesia, sebagai fenomena sosial dan individual yang wajar yang bisa menimpa siapa saja dan kapan saja. Proses perubahan atau transformasi dari teisme ke ateisme bisa disebabkan karena hilangnya kepercayaan (trust) terhadap agama setelah melihat berbagai tindakan buruk dan tidak manusiawi yang dilakukan oleh (sebagian) kelompok agama (radikalisme, terorisme, vandalisme, dehumanisme, dlsb).

Tetapi bisa juga karena proses intelektualisasi dan rasionalisasi atas teks, ajaran, doktrin, dan diskursus agama yang dipandang tidak sesuai (atau bertentangan) dengan spirit sains, common sense, pengetahuan, kemodernan, dan perubahan zaman. Kejenuhan dalam menjalankan tumpukan dogma agama yang tidak berbanding lurus dengan nasib dan pengalaman hidup juga bisa menjadi penyebab munculnya ateisme.

Akar Sejarah

Jika melihat sejarah Timteng, ateisme sebetulnya bukan sesuatu yang baru yang muncul belakangan akibat infiltrasi (penyusupan) atau penyerbuan budaya asing (Barat) melalui proyek demokrasi, modernisasi, atau sekularisasi seperti dituduhkan sejumlah pihak. Fenomena ilhad yang bisa dimaknai sebagai ateisme, apostasi (pemurtadan), atau zindik sudah sangat tua dalam sejarah Timteng. Sarah Stroumsa dalam Freethinkers of Medieval Islam, menulis kalau pada abad ke-9 ada seorang teolog Syiah Zaidiyah dari Semenanjung Arab bernama Al-Qasim bin Ibrahim al-Rassi yang menulis sebuah karya (Radd ‘ala al-Mulhid) yang menyerang kelompok kontra-agama, yakni ateis, non-teis, dan zindik (heretics).

Dua sarjana Timteng masa lampau (abad ke-9/10) yang sering dikaitkan dengan gagasan ateisme adalah Ibnu al-Rawandi dan Abu Bakar al-Razi. Keduanya dikenal sebagai pengkritik nomer wahid atas doktrin-doktrin keagamaan, konsep wahyu, atau gagasan kenabian (prophecy) seraya menganjurkan optimalisasi akal-pikiran dalam memahami fenomena sosial-kultural di sekeliling kita.

Meskipun mendapat tantangan sana-sini dari berbagai kelompok agama dan politik, gagasan dan praktik ateisme terus berlanjut di era modern Timteng. Misalnya, pada tahun 1930an, Mesir pernah dikejutkan dengan munculnya Ismail Adham yang menulis buku berjudul Limadza ana Mulhid (Mengapa Saya Ateis?).

Tak pelak buku ini menggegerkan publik dan memunculkan reaksi panas dari berbagai kelompok agama. Sementara itu publik Arab Saudi juga dikejutkan dengan munculnya Abdullah al-Qassimi (1907-1996), salah satu penulis-intelektual kontroversial dan pembela gigih ateisme yang menariknya lahir di Buraidah, salah satu pusat (sarang) kelompok Wahabi. Sebelum pindah haluan menjadi ateis, ia sempat menjadi advokat Salafisme paling getol.

Prospek Masa Depan

Apakah ateisme di Timteng akan terus eksis di masa depan? Sebagai bagian dari dinamika individual, proses intelektual, dan perubahan sosial umat manusia, ateisme (sebagaimana teisme) akan selalu ada di tengah masyarakat. Ateisme tak akan mati meskipun kelompok teis berusaha membunuh dan menguburnya. Demikian pula sebaliknya, teisme tak akan punah meskipun kelompok ateis berusaha menyerang dan melumatkannya.

Teisme-ateisme akan selalu hadir di masyarakat manapun, termasuk Timteng, meskipun relasi keduanya jarang harmonis dan sering main “petak umpet.” Di masyarakat yang didominasi kaum teis (seperti Timteng dan Indonesia), banyak kelompok ateis yang menyembunyikan identitas mereka karena, jika tidak, akan mendapat hukuman serius dari penguasa politik dan agama. Sebaliknya, di masyarakat yang didominasi oleh kelompok ateis, kaum teis biasanya juga tidak menunjukkan identitas mereka secara vulgar di ruang publik.

Mampukah di masa depan keduanya hidup berdampingan secara damai dan harmoni penuh respek dan toleransi tanpa diiringi rasa takut dan curiga atau saling menegasikan satu sama lainnya? Keduanya sebetulnya bisa hidup berdampingan secara damai jika negara mengadopsi prinsip sekularisme yang tidak mempermasalahkan kelompok agama maupun non-agama atau teisme dan ateisme. Alternatif lain, atas dasar perikemanusiaan, negara memberi jaminan/perlindungan politik dan hukum terhadap kelompok ateis/teis. Tetapi dalam konteks Timteng, sepertinya ide ini sulit terwujud alias hal yang mustahil, kecuali jika terjadi keajaiban yang entah kapan hadirnya. 

Keterangan: artikel ini semula terbit di Kompas dengan judul “Timur Tengah, Agama, dan Religiositas” pada 17 Juni 2023

Beyond Liberal Peace: Religious Violence and Tactical Peacebuilding in Indonesia

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Abstract

Since the downfall of Suharto’s authoritarian government in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed a variety of violent conflicts, intergroup tensions and Islamist radicalism, which in turn pose threats to the country’s security, safety and peace. This article examines various forms of religious violence, particularly Islamist violence, and ways of overcoming them tactically or strategically in post-Suharto Indonesia. This article underscores the need to go beyond the liberal peace framework, underlines the significance of the implementation of tactical peacebuilding and highlights the central roles of domestic religious actors in the peace and reconciliation processes. This article suggests that tactical peacebuilding requires multiple approaches that utilise various sources, including religion and culture, and needs a strategic collaboration among manifold actors—religious and secular, state and society, domestic and foreign. The Indonesian case shows that religion is not only a source of conflict, violence and ‘violence-building’ but also a useful resource for reconciliation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

The PDF of this article can be read (accessed) in the following link

https://journals.sagepub.com

Potret Dunia Islam; Kumpulan Esai

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Bagaimana potret “dunia Islam” sekarang? Yang dimaksud dengan “dunia Islam” di buku ini bukan sebuah belahan dunia khusus yang dihuni oleh umat Islam melainkan situasi dan kondisi umat Islam di dunia ini dimanapun mereka tinggal, baik di negara (country) atau kawasan (region) yang mayoritas berpenduduk muslim maupun bukan. Karena itu di dalam buku ini juga berisi uraian tentang situasi-kondisi umat Islam di negara/kawasan dimana muslim bukan penduduk mayoritas seperti Amerika Serikat atau Myanmar.

Selain itu, kata “dunia Islam” juga mengacu pada situasi-kondisi negara/kawasan yang populasinya, dari aspek kuantitatif, didominasi oleh umat Islam. Ada banyak negara di dunia ini yang penduduknya mayoritas muslim seperti negara-negara di Timur Tengah (selain Israel), Afrika Utara, Asia Tengah (kecuali Mongolia), atau Asia Selatan (misalnya Afganistan, Pakistan, dan Bangladesh). Sejumlah negara di Asia Tenggara juga mayoritas berpenduduk muslim seperti Indonesia, Malaysia, dan Brunei Darussalam.

——

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Rumitnya Hadis

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Dibanding dengan Al-Qur’an, seluk-beluk, sejarah, konten, dan pluralitas Hadis (perkataan Nabi Muhammad) jauh lebih rumit. Hadis itu cem-macem. Berbeda dengan Al-Qur’an, ada banyak buku tentang koleksi hadis ini. Setiap mazhab atau aliran teologi memiliki koleksi hadis sendiri-sendiri yang tidak jarang saling bertentangan dan saling-menegasikan otentisitas hadis yang dikoleksi, dipegangi, dan dipedomani oleh mazhab lain. Apa yang diklaim sebagai hadis oleh pengikut mazhab tertentu belum tentu dianggap hadis oleh pengikut mazhab lain.

Hadis yang dianggap sahih oleh kelompok Islam tertentu, belum tentu dianggap sahih dan valid oleh kelompok Islam lain. Begitu seterusnya. Kalau Al-Qur’an, masing-masing mazhab, termasuk Syiah, memiliki kitab yang sama, meskipun kitab tafsir Al-Qur’annya berbeda-beda. Perbedaan dalam memandang dan memahami hadis itu sudah terjadi sejak era awal perkembangan Islam, misalnya ditunjukkan dengan adanya perseteruan antara “faksi tradisional” dan “faksi rasional” atau antara kubu “ahlul hadis” dan kubu “ahlu ra’yi.” 

***

Misalnya, kaum Muslim dari Mazhab Sunni yang merupakan mayoritas memedomani enam kitab-kitab hadis utama yang dijadikan sebagai rujukan dalam pengambilan hukum Islam atau pedoman dalam kehidupan sosial-keagamaan sehari-hari setelah Al-Qur’an, yaitu:

(1) Sahih Bukhari atau Bukhari Syarif yang ditulis oleh Abu Abdullah Muhammad Al-Bukhari (w. 870), seorang sarjana Muslim Persi kelahiran Bukhara (kini Uzbekistan). Koleksi hadis Imam Bukhari ini juga dipakai oleh kaum Muslim Syiah aliran Zaidiyah. Oleh Sunni, Kitab Sahih Bukhari ini dianggap yang paling valid atau sahih.

(2) Kitab Sahih Muslim yang ditulis oleh Muslim al-Hajjaj (w. 875), yang juga seorang sarjana Muslim Persi (kelahiran Nishapur, Iran). Oleh Sunni, kitab ini dianggap sebagai yang tersahih kedua setelah Kitab Sahih Bukhari. Kitab Sahih Muslim ini juga dipakai oleh Syiah Zaidiyah atau Zaidi (mayoritas di Yaman utara).

(3) Kitab Sunan Abu Dawud (ditulis oleh Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, w. 889, yang juga sarjana Persia kelahiran Sistan, Iran).

(4) Kitab Sunan al-Tirmidhi atau Jamiut Tirmidhi (ditulis oleh Abu Isa Muhammad al-Tirmidhi, w. 892. Beliau juga sarjana Persia).

(5) Kitab Sunan Nasai atau Al-Sunan al-Sughra (dituis oleh Imam Nasai, w. 915. Beliau kelahiran Nasa, Turkmenistan).

(6) Kitab Sunan Ibnu Majah, ditulis oleh Imam Ibnu Majah, seorang sarjana Persi yang wafat sekitar 887 M. Khusus pengikut Sunni Mazhab Maliki, mereka menolak otoritas Kitab Sunan Ibnu Majah dan menggantinya dengan Kitab Muwatta, karya Imam Malik, pendiri Mazhab Maliki.

Menariknya dari 6 Kitab Hadis yang dipedomani atau dijadikan rujukan oleh kaum Sunni, tidak ada satupun yang ditulis oleh sarjana Muslim Arab! Hampir semuanya beretnis Persi.

Kemudian kelompok Syiah Itsna Ats’ariyah atau Syiah Imamiyah yang merupakan Syiah mayoritas memiliki 4 kitab koleksi hadis yang dijadikan sebagai rujukan utama, yaitu (1) Kitab al-Kafi (ditulis oleh Muhammad bin Ya’kub al-Kulaini), (2) Kitab Man La Yahdhuru al-Faqih (ditulis oleh Abu Ja’far Muhammad al-Qummi atau Ibnu Babawaih), (3) Kitab Tahdhib al-Ahkam (ditulis oleh Abu Ja’far Muhammad Tusi atau Syaikh Tusi), dan (4) Kitab Al-Ibtisar yang juga ditulis oleh Syaikh Tusi. Kitab Al-Ibtisar adalah ringkasan dari Kitab Tahdhib al-Ahkam. Mereka semua adalah ilmuwan Hadis dari Persi.

Sementara itu kaum Muslim aliran Ibadiyah (Ibadi) memiliki dua kitab hadis utama, yaitu Jami al-Shahih (ditulis oleh al-Rabi bin Habib al-Farahidhi) dan Kitab Tartib al-Musnad (dikoleksi oleh Abu Ya’qub al-Warjilani).

Lalu, umat Syiah Ismaliyah, kitab hadis yang dijadikan rujukan adalah Kitab Daim al-Islam yang ditulis oleh al-Qadi al-Nu’man.

Itu hanya sekelumit contoh saja tentang sejumlah kitab hadis yang dijadikan sebagai rujukan dan pedoman oleh berbagai kelompok umat Islam.

Selanjutnya, setiap mazhab dan kelompok keislaman juga memiliki tokoh-tokoh idola yang kitab-kitab kumpulan hadisnya dipercaya sebagai yang paling valid. Bukan hanya itu saja, setiap mazhab juga mempunyai tokoh-tokoh idola yang dipercayai dan dijadikan sebagai rujukan utama dalam periwayatan hadis. Misalnya, kaum Alawi di Suriah dan Libanon mempercayai tokoh Sulaiman Al-Farisi sebagai yang paling sahih. Sementara kaum Ibadi mempercayai hadis yang diriwayatkan oleh Jabir bin Zaid. Begitu seterusnya.

***

Kemajemukan hadis itu, antara lain, disebabkan oleh tidak adanya orang (sahabat Nabi) yang ditunjuk secara spesifik untuk menulis, mengarsip atau mendokumentasikan perkataan Nabi Muhammad sewaktu beliau masih hidup. Hal itu terjadi mungkin karena umat Islam mula-mula sibuk mengurusi eksistensi mereka dari serbuan orang-orang dan kelompok suku yang memusuhi Nabi Muhammad dan pengikutnya. Atau, ada sebagian riwayat yang mengatakan, Nabi Muhammad sendiri konon melarang perkataannya ditulis agar tidak “jumbuh” atau bertabrakan dengan ayat-ayat Al-Qur’an yang bisa membingungkan umat: mana ayat Al-Qur’an, mana Hadis Nabi.

Sependek pengetahuanku (tolong dikoreksi kalau keliru), upaya pendokumentasian hadis tertua secara “agak profesional” dilakukan oleh Imam Malik bin Anas (711-795) dalam Kitab Al-Muwatta, lebih dari seabad pasca wafatnya Nabi Muhammad (w. 632). Konon Hafsah atau Aisyah juga pernah mengoleksi sejumlah perkataan nabi tapi tidak seprofesional Imam Malik. Imam Maliki ini dikenal sebagai pendiri Mazhab Maliki yang berpengaruh di sejumlah kawasan umat Islam khususnya di negara-negara di Afrika Utara dan Afrika Barat. Konon beliau membutuhkan waktu selama 40 tahun untuk mengoleksi hadis ini.

Meski begitu, beliau cuma “mengoleksi” (sebagian) hadis saja, belum melakukan sistematisasi dan kanonisasi hadis secara metodologis-sistematis yang baru dilakukan sekitar abad ke-9 (sekitar 200 tahun setelah wafatnya Nabi), era ketika dunia Islam mengalami surplus para ilmuwan, termasuk ilmuwan hadis yang keren-beken seperti saya sebutkan di atas.

Lalu, apakah ada kelompok umat Islam yang menolak otoritas hadis sama sekali? Ada. Namanya Qur’aniyyun, yaitu kelompok mazhab Qur’aniyyah (didirikan oleh Ibrahim al-Nadham). Kelompok ini semacam gerakan Karaite di Yahudi atau Sola Scriptura di Protestan. Kapan-kapan saja jelaskan tentang kelompok ini. Jadi, jelasnya memahami hadis itu sangat kompleks sekali. Karena itu, boleh saja “mendalil hadis” tapi santai dan terbuka saja tak perlu ngotot: “Hadisnya begini…” apalagi sambil bawa golok, clurit, atau keris. Karena hadismu belum tentu hadis bagi yang lain [SQ]  

Seni di Arab Saudi dan Indonesia: Sejarah dan Perkembangan Kontemporer

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Buku ini mengkaji dinamika sejarah dan perkembangan kontemporer dunia seni di Arab Saudi dan Indonesia. Di saat dunia seni di Indonesia sedang “lesu darah”, kesenian di Arab Saudi justru sedang bergairah. Kenapa bisa demikian?

Membandingkan dunia kesenian di Arab Saudi dan Indonesia ini menarik karena keduanya memiliki bentuk dan corak sistem politik-pemerintahan, struktur masyarakat, kompleksitas religiusitas, atau geo-kultural berlainan yang turut membentuk dan mempengaruhi sejarah dan perkembangan kesenian di kedua negara.

Sejumlah pertanyaan yang ingin digali dalam studi ini, antara lain, bagaimana asal mula munculnya kesenian di Arab Saudi dan Indonesia? Bagaimana nasib aneka ragam kesenian di kedua negara itu saat ini? Apa faktor penyebab perkembangan, kemerosotan, atau kebangkitan kembali dunia seni di kedua negara ini?

Bukan hanya mengkaji sejarah dan perkembangan mutakhir, studi ini juga untuk menjaring opini publik masyarakat Arab Saudi dan Indonesia tentang pandangan mereka terhadap dunia seni serta cara atau strategi merawat, melestarikan, menghidupkan, memperjuangkan, dan memajukan aneka ragam kesenian tersebut supaya tetap eksis dan lestari sepanjang masa.

*Jika berminat edisi cetak, silakan kontak WA: 082225129241 (Salam)

Studying Secular Sciences in the Middle East

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For most Indonesians, education in the Middle East, especially higher education, is associated with “Islamic education”. What is meant by “Islamic education” here is education to study Islamic sciences, such as fiqh (Islamic law), ushuluddin (philosophy), tafsir (interpretation) and hadith science. That assumption could be because they think that the Middle East is an “Islamic region”.

Another factor is the role, influence and dominance of Middle East alumni. For the past few decades, many Indonesian students have studied Islamic sciences at a number of universities in the Middle East, including their branch campuses in Indonesia, such as the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Language Sciences (LIPIA). This does not include those who study Islamic sciences in a number of noncollege Islamic educational institutions, particularly in Yemen and also Saudi Arabia.

After completing their studies, they then set up foundations, madrasas, Islamic boarding schools, Islamic centers or recitation groups and spread certain styles, teachings, insights, discourses, understandings or Islamic ideologies in Indonesia, either through online or offline methods.

In fact, the reality is that education in secular science subjects is actually more dominant in the Middle East. What is meant by secular science study here is non-Islamic sciences, such as “hard sciences” (physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, etc.), “soft” sciences (social sciences and humanities) and other fields of study (eg computer science, business, management, engineering science, medicine and nursing, geoscience, petroleum science, agricultural science, information systems and technology and so on).

Now, various well-known universities in Middle East are aggressively opening study programs in the field of smart technology to welcome the era of the fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0, the Digital Revolution), such as artificial intelligence (AI), internet of things (IoT), robotics and blockchains. In order to welcome this era of the Digital Revolution, my campus has also opened more than 30 new study programs, in addition to dozens of research institutes and various courses related to smart technology.

Trends in secular sciences

The results of my research show that the trend of education in secular sciences is not only dominant in the Gulf Arab countries, which are regarded as wealthy regions, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, but also in other countries, such as Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and so on.

In Saudi Arabia, for example, only three universities were originally or historically designed specifically to study Islamic sciences, namely the Islamic University (Medina), Umm al-Qura University (Mecca) and Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University (Riyadh). The rest, the main focus of campuses in Saudi Arabia, are in the field of secular sciences. Indeed, these campuses offer Islamic studies, but they are very minor and complementary.

Since the 1970s or 1980s, Indonesian students have generally studied Islamic sciences at these three campuses, including LIPIA in Indonesia, which is the branch campus of the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University has done the same thing.

Interestingly, as time passes, the three universities have also opened faculties or study programs in the field of secular sciences. For example, the Islamic University of Medina has opened faculties of engineering, computers and science (such as the exact sciences). At Umm al-Qura University, more new faculties have been opened, such as the faculties of medicine, pharmacy, nursing, engineering, computer and information systems, applied sciences, business administration and social sciences. Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University has done the same thing.

The King Abdullah Scholarship Program, a government scholarship program for Saudi sons and daughters who wish to study at top campuses abroad (especially the United States, Canada, Australia, countries in Western Europe and Scandinavia, or China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore) also focuses on the study of secular sciences.

Why do universities (and the government) in Saudi Arabia (as well as other Middle Eastern Arab countries) focus on the study of secular sciences, with even three universities that were initially “designed” specifically for the study of Islamic sciences also changing and “reforming” themselves?

Market and job demand

One of the main factors is because of the needs of the times and the demands of the job market. Alumni of Islamic sciences education find it difficult to find jobs in accordance with their scientific disciplines due to limited market share and job vacancies. The professions usually filled by alumni of the Islamic sciences are takmir (mosque preachers), judges, sharia police or Islamic studies teachers at schools. Everything is limited. Schools also teach a lot of secular sciences. They also cannot arbitrarily create their own schools/madrasas or recitation institutions because the state’s pattern is “king-centric”, while the sharia police have been disbanded.

The jobs that are most abundant are in the industrial and other sectors that require expertise in non-Islamic sciences. Because of this factor, high school alumni in Saudi Arabia compete to enter public universities to study secular sciences. The favorite campuses that are sought after by students to study secular sciences are King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, King Abdulaziz University, King Saud University, and so on. This trend, once again, is not only happening in Saudi Arabia, but also in other countries in the Middle East.

Islamic education and radicalism

The next factor that is no less important is that Islamic science studies, if they are mismanaged, have the potential to produce alumni who are conservative, militant, rigid, close-minded and even extreme radicals who are opposed to modernity, the changing of eras, technological progress and socio-cultural development. This can hinder the government’s efforts to realize Saudi Arabia as a developed, modern, inclusive, moderate and advanced technology-based country, as proclaimed in Saudi Vision 2030.

Saudi Arabia has proven and experienced this. The radical-conservative Islamic education model that was designed by the hardline Wahhabi faction and the Muslim Brotherhood militant group from Egypt and Syria who fled to (and were accommodated by) Saudi Arabia have given birth to a new variant of Islam. “Hybrid Islam” with militant-extreme characteristics, such as the Sahwa group, which is anti-modernity and culture.

Why study secular sciences?

As with the trends in Middle Eastern Arab society, Indonesian people, if they want to study at a Middle Eastern university, would find it better and more beneficial to study secular sciences, such as petroleum studies, economics and business, and social sciences. The Indonesian government scholarships managed by a number of ministries should also be directed to this field of non-Islamic studies. The teaching staff also come from various ethnic groups and countries, including Western countries, China and elsewhere.

There are several basic reasons. First, there are many quality, standardized and international-quality campuses in the Middle East that have a global reputation and are recognized by a number of world campus ranking institutions, such as Quacquarelli Symonds and Times Higher Education. Many of these campuses use English as a teaching-learning instrument (or a mixture of English and Arabic). The teaching staff also come from various ethnic groups and countries, including Western countries, China and elsewhere.

For example, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (Saudi Arabia), the American University of Beirut (Lebanon), the American University in Cairo (Egypt), King Abdulaziz University (Saudi Arabia), Qatar University (Qatar), the University of Jordan (Jordan) and so on. My campus has also in recent years become the best university in the Middle East region, indeed its Petroleum Engineering study program is ranked seventh in the world.

In addition, quite a number of top Western campuses have established branch campuses in the Gulf countries. They can also be a study alternative, for example, New York University, Georgetown University, Texas A&M University, Northwestern University, Virginia Commonwealth University, Sorbonne University, HEC Paris, and many more.

The second reason is that the secular sciences study program is much more beneficial for the people, nation and state of Indonesia. The alumni are expected to be able to contribute to advancing the development of the economy, science, technology, culture and so on.

Third, Indonesia now has a surplus of higher education institutions, both public and private, which focus on Islamic studies. Basically, studying Islamic studies everywhere is the same because the basis is reading and studying texts. Even now, Islamic studies in Indonesian universities appear to be far more advanced than the Middle East because they use a variety of research and scientific approach models as well as varied reading references and across schools of thought.

Fourth, to reduce the production of “militant Islam” and the spread of religious radicalism that endangers the cultural, national and state structure of Indonesia.

I have noticed that many alumni of Islamic education in the Middle East are aggressively declaring the archipelago’s local traditions and culture to be heretical, introducing and imposing religious practices of the “Arabic Islamic model” that are not in accordance with the context, traditions and culture of Indonesian society (for example, forcing the wearing of the veil for schoolchildren). Or even inciting people to challenge the existence and authority of the government system and state foundations (such as the 1945 Constitution and the state ideology of Pancasila) which they regard as “un-Islamic”, “not syar’i” and “infidel products.”

Of course, not all Middle East Islamic education alumni do this. Also, it is not only the alumni of the Middle East Islamic education who do this. The point is that studying secular sciences at Middle Eastern universities will be much more beneficial for the benefit, progress and prosperity of the Indonesian nation and state in the future, as well as to avoid the possibility of a bigger negative impact on society. Therefore, the government and elements of society should consider this matter.

Note: this article was translated and published by Kompas

Taliban, Afghanistan, and Indonesia

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A number of religious groups and members of the political elite in Indonesia seem to be rejoicing at the success of the Taliban military organization in reclaiming power in Afghanistan. They are also urging the Indonesian government to act immediately to show its support for the Taliban regime. I don’t understand what is in their minds. In actual fact, the Taliban have a notorious history in geopolitics and governance that has plunged the Afghan people into fear and suffering. The fact that hundreds of thousands of Afghans have been struggling to flee the country since the Taliban took power shows what or who the Taliban really are.

It is evident that the Afghan people remain traumatized by the previous rule of the Islamist-fundamentalist Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001, which was awash with barbarism and inhumanity. With Afghanistan falling back into the hands of the Taliban, the people are watching the nightmare and horror unfolding before their eyes.

During the previous Taliban rule, with had the support of Pakistan and Al Qaeda, Afghanistan (the Taliban named it the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan after the 1996 fall of Kabul) turned into a horrifying “hell on earth”. Massacres occurred everywhere, not only against ethnic and religious minorities like the Hazara Shia minority, but also any group, rivals and enemies the Taliban considered a threat to their power.

Even North Korea was much better back then than Afghanistan under the Taliban. Poverty, famine and malnutrition were rife while violence continued unabated. Civil war among Islamic factions and tribal groups raged. Massacres occurred everywhere, not only against ethnic and religious minorities like the Hazara Shia minority, but also any group, rivals and enemies the Taliban considered a threat to their power.

It is important to note that the Taliban regime not only committed human genocide, but also wiped out their spiritual and cultural heritage (Raphael Lemkin referred to this as “cultural genocide”) such as works of art, historical monuments and archaeological remains. They also aimed their wrath at the houses of worship they accused of being the houses of “heretic infidels”, unreligious and erosive to the purity of the creed and fundamental teachings of the type of Islam they held to and believed in.

Under their reign, Afghanistan was cut off from the world. The Taliban regime also shut out UN food aid for millions of starving citizens. They barred the media and prohibited public activities that they deemed potentially interfering with their power. Various cultural activities were labeled as haram, including music, photography, painting, film, and dance.

Women received the brunt of the impacts of the regime’s atrocities. They were forced to wear full-body burkas, barred from going out in public without being escorted by a muhrim (a male relative they may not marry under religious laws), and banned from working in the public sector. Health workers such as doctors and nurses were the only exceptions because male workers were not allowed to attend to female patients. Girls were denied access to school. And there were many more tragic stories. If they violated the rules, women would be flogged publicly.

The Taliban implemented scorched-earth warfare, a strategy to win a war by destroying infrastructure that favored the opposing side. The Taliban also destroyed farmland and burned residential areas. As a result, widespread destruction was inevitable across public facilities, economic resources and industry centers in all regions. The Taliban also destroyed farmland and burned residential areas.

The regime collapsed in 2001 due to the US military offensive following the 9/11 terror attacks, but did not stop the Taliban from waging violence. They incessantly carried out terror bombings and heinous acts in a bid to destabilize the government for the past 20 years (2001-2021), which claimed thousands of lives and caused enormous damage to the country’s infrastructure.

Their terror attacks, usually in the form of suicide bombings, targeted not just security forces or government officials, but also anyone (civilians, journalists, children, women, etc.) and anything (including madrasas and mosques). They were also suspected of being behind the recent attack on the crowds of people flocking to the Kabul airport compound in a desperate attempt to escape the regime.

Greedy for power

Why did the Taliban implement totalitarian and indiscriminate politics that plunged Afghanistan into the depths of suffering and chaos? It is simply because they don\’t understand how to manage a pluralistic population and govern a country.

They lack the knowledge, insight, strategy, and skills to govern and manage the nation and state. They only reveal a lust for power. In an attempt to instill public compliance and make citizens submissive and obedient, what they do is terrorize and threaten the people with harsh regulations and punishments under the pretext of enforcing sharia law. Thus, the Taliban are essentially “bandits in religious robes”.

The Taliban is not a group of intellectuals with broad insights on governance, politics, economics or culture. Historically, the Taliban was a political-religious movement consisting of a group of madrassa students. The schools are typically very strict, rigid, closed-minded, and extreme in their understanding, interpretation and practice of Islamic teachings and tenets.

Taliban means “students” and refers to those affiliated to the Deobandi schools, which are found in many areas in South Asia known to be the bedrock of literalist-revivalist conservatives. The schools are typically very strict, rigid, closed-minded, and extreme in their understanding, interpretation and practice of Islamic teachings and tenets.

The Taliban is a movement that combines the Deobandi schools’ typical revival-conservative Islamic teachings, Al Qaeda-style militant Islamist ideology, and Pasthunwali social norms, the traditional customs of the Pasthun ethnic community from which the majority of the Taliban hail. The Taliban as a movement was formed in 1994 by Muhammad Umar (1960-2013). Known as Mullah Umar, the former Deobandi madrassa student was only 34 years old at the time and a member of the Mujahideen militia in the Afghan-Soviet war (1979-1989).

The Taliban managed to take over Afghanistan by exploiting the domestic chaos that resulted from bickering among Islamic factions, as a result of the failure of the Afghan political-religious elite in reaching an agreement over the national government in the aftermath of the pullout of the Soviet’s Red Army.

The internal conflict between Islamic groups and the political-religious elite then drew Afghanistan back into a massive and devastating civil war. Six Islamic factions (Hizbul Islam Gulbuddin, Jamiat Islami, Ittihad Islam, Harakat Inqilab Islam, Hizbul Wahdat, and Junbish Milli) vied for power even as they were embroiled in accusing each other of betrayal and killings.

In fact, these Islamic radical groups, with US support, had united as mujahideen fighters against the Soviet invasion. Once the Soviets had been repulsed, they started fighting amongst themselves for power. After the civil war left Afghanistan in chaos, the Taliban emerged as the “dark horse” that succeeded in pushing their forces to control two-thirds of the Afghan enclaves, declaring the new government of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan in 1996.

Did their declaration bring an immediate halt to civil war? Of course not. Civil war continued to rage between the rival groups, including the “Northern Alliance” formed by warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud that consisted of ethnic communities like the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, Turks, and Pasthuns.

Beware of “Indonistan”

So the story of the Taliban elite violating a clause of the peace agreement with the then Afghanistan government (and the US), as observers have suggested, is not new. The ongoing power takeover by the Taliban after 20 years of guerrilla warfare is just a repeat of the old story.

Anyone who has studied the history of Afghanistan will know that this country that spans Central and South Asia is rife with conflicts, wars, and power struggles against not only external (non-Afghan) groups, but also fellow citizens of different Afghan communities. Ambushes, killings, fighting between groups, whether religious, ideological, ethnical or tribal, and infighting among familial clans (for example, northern vs. southern Afghanistan) are common. Long before Islamic groups emerged on the Afghan political scene, communal conflict over power was deeply ingrained.

What lessons can we learn from the “horror drama” of Afghanistan and the militant Taliban regime? One thing that should not be ignored is that we must not underestimate radical-conservative religious groups. These groups may initially operate only in non-political areas such as preaching religious morality and creeds, but when the opportunity arises with the support from outsiders, they can turn into a violent religious-political militant group that are extremely savage and radical in their political and religious approaches.

Taliban members may not exist in Indonesia. However, there is quite a large group of Muslims that lean towards a Taliban-like mindset. They are insidious towards political parties, mass organizations, educational institutions, and religious institutions, even the government. The government and those people who are concerned about the future of peace, tolerance, and the diversity of the Indonesian nation and state need to be vigilant over their movements. Members of law enforcement and security forces should not lapse in their vigilance. If this Taliban-leaning group is not handled prudently and thoroughly, it could transform into an “Indonesian Taliban” and turn this country into “Indonistan”.

Note: this article was translated and published by Kompas

Prospects of Interreligious Relations in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia

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At a time when Indonesia is undergoing serious tests and challenges regarding the development of inter-religious and intra-religious relations lately, Saudi Arabia has even shown interesting and encouraging developments that deserve appreciation. The serious tests and challenges related to the development of inter-religious and intra-religious relations in Indonesia have appeared due to the emergence of a wave of militant-religious conservative groups and sectarian elites since the fall of the New Order.

The international community and institutions, (for example, the International Religious Freedom Report, which is issued periodically by the United States Government), consider the largest and most powerful kingdom in the Gulf and Arab Middle East region to be negative and very bad in terms of building relations and dialogue between and within religious communities. It is also judged badly in terms of its treatment of religious minority groups, including Muslim minorities, such as Shiites, even though this does not always reflect the reality in the country.

The poor assessment by the international community is based on a number of things. For example, in the Middle East region, Saudi Arabia is the only country that does not allow the construction of non-Muslim places of worship. Freedom of religious expression or celebrating religious rituals in public spaces for non-Muslims is severely restricted and subject to severe sanctions (imprisonment or deportation) if there are violations.

In reality, the population of non-Muslims is quite large in Saudi Arabia. They are expatriates or immigrants who work in various sectors, mostly in the “informal economy” sector. More than 33 percent of the total population in Saudi Arabia are migrants. They come from many countries in Africa, Asia (especially South and Southeast Asia), or the Middle East itself.

In terms of religion, the migrant workers are very plural, not only Muslims, but also Protestants, Catholics, Hindus and others. According to estimates by the Global Religious Futures Project, there are more than 1.4 million Christians who come from a number of countries: Lebanon, Egypt, the Philippines, Syria and countries in Africa. There are also Christians from Western countries who work as professionals.

Because there are no special places of worship, they carry out their rituals of worship in their respective homes or in Bahrain, a neighboring country near Saudi Arabia in the far east that can be reached by road.

It is important to note, even though there are no physical buildings for non-Muslim places of worship and non-Muslim worship is prohibited in public places, it does not mean that Saudi Arabia is “apathetic” and does not carry out “engagement” with non-Muslim communities. It is proven that in the field of employment in the education, industry and business sectors, they accept or absorb a lot of labor from non-Muslim or Shiite circles. At the university where I teach today there are also many non-Muslim or Shiite staff members and lecturers.

Historical breakthrough

With regard to this inter-religious relationship, in the last several years there have been important changes in Saudi Arabia. An important figure who became an innovator and pioneer behind efforts to build harmonious relations between religions (Muslim and non-Muslim) or intra-religious (Sunni and Shiite) was King Abdullah (died in 2015), who was known to be very moderate and an advocate of reform and positive change in various social, cultural and religious issues in Saudi Arabia.

The various socioreligious reforms or improvements that he pioneered were later followed up by his younger brother, King Salman, and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS). Several very important historical breakthroughs made by King Abdullah in terms of efforts to knit harmonious relations with non-Muslims or Shiites and non-Hanbali Sunni residents are as follows.

In 2007, King Abdullah met Pope Benedict XVI at the Vatican. A year later he invited about 500 religious leaders from a number of countries to hold an interfaith meeting in Mecca. King Abdullah (along with leaders from Austria and Spain) also sponsored the establishment of the Vienna-based King Abdullah International Center for Inter-Religious and Inter-Cultural Dialogue. Also, King Abdullah initiated the establishment of the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue (majlis al-hiwar al-watani), a forum for “national dialogue” in Saudi Arabia that involves various groups, including moderate Shiite leaders and non-Hanbali ulemas.

Efforts to build harmonious inter-religious relations that were initiated by King Abdullah were continued, strengthened and expanded by King Salman and MBS, who intensively held meetings with religious leaders, especially from Christian circles, both Catholic and Protestant, both in Saudi Arabia and in other countries, such as Egypt, the United Kingdom and the United States. For example, in 2017, King Salman and MBS received a visit from the supreme leader of the Lebanese Maronite Church, Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, and his entourage. Then, in 2018, King Salman and MBS held a meeting in Riyadh with Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran (along with his delegation), President of the Pontifical Council for Inter-faith Dialogue (PCID), Vatican.

The PCID, now led by Miguel Angel Ayuso Guixot, who is an expert in the study of Islamic history and the Middle East, is an important institution of the Catholic Church that was established by the Vatican to promote inter-religious dialogue in accordance with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council (especially the declaration of Nostra Aetate) in order to create global peace and the spirit of mutual understanding and respect between Catholics and non-Catholics in this universe.

Later, in 2019, King Salman and MBS again met with Christian leaders from the United States Evangelical Church led by Joel Rosenberg. Not only in Saudi Arabia, MBS in his visits to the US, the UK, Egypt and other countries also frequently took the time to meet with Christian leaders. In this era of the Covid-19 pandemic, Saudi Arabia has also held several inter-faith virtual conferences. In 2017, King Salman and MBS received a visit from the supreme leader of the Lebanese Maronite Church, Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, and his entourage.

It was widely reported in the news that the various meetings with Christian leaders (Catholics, Maronites, Copts, Anglicans, Evangelicals, etc.) were not merely “friendship formalities”. Furthermore, these meetings are also to build a more concrete interfaith dialogue so that the government\’s efforts to build, change or transform Saudi Arabia into a modern, moderate and open kingdom-state become more solid, have the support of the international community and are more comprehensive; not only in the areas of economy, science, technology, culture and women\’s emancipation, but also in the religious sector.

Religious moderation

For the last several years, the government has indeed intensively carried out a campaign of “Islam wasatiyah” or “middle-line Islam” (read, moderate Islam), which is neither “extreme left” nor “extreme right”. The government\’s seriousness in efforts to carry out “religious moderation” or realize “moderate Islam” is marked by various programs and fundamental policies.

The programs and policies, among other things, change the educational curriculum (especially religious textbooks), abolish the “sharia police”, which have become the “scourge” of society, and restructure the functionaries of important Islamic institutions, such as imams and preachers of mosques or ulemas who sit on the Hay\’at Kibar al-Ulama Council.

All are replaced with clerics or ulemas with moderate and inclusive views. Preachers and religious teachers who have a radical-militant orientation are also “put in order” so that they do not spread and become an outbreak in the community. Now, there are circulating rumors, based on the results of talks and meetings with Christian leaders, the government has allowed churches to be built on its territory so that 1.4 million Christians in Saudi Arabia can freely worship.

In the past, there used to be a church on the Arabian Peninsula that is now part of Saudi Arabia, namely the old church in Jubail, which was built in the 4th century AD (known as the Jubail Church or Kanisat al-Jubail). There are also sources who say that in Jeddah there is an Anglican church built by the British a century ago.

The Najran area in southern Arabia used to be also known as a Christian center, and even the Prophet Muhammad was said to have developed friendships with the Christian leaders of Najran. So, if the Saudi government decided to allow the construction of churches, it actually has a solid historical basis.

If the construction of churches (or other non-Muslim places of worship) could be carried out, this would be an extraordinary “historical event”. As its global impact, Saudi Arabia will be increasingly supported by the international community in its efforts to modernize its country and moderate its society.

Important lessons

There are a number of important lessons that the Indonesian government and people can learn from Saudi Arabia. Among other things, efforts to realize tolerant and harmonious inter-religious relations will be difficult to make if there are many closed-minded militant-conservative religious groups and political elites who have and perform sectarian and ethnocentric views in various lines of life.

Therefore, the government and elements of society need to be seriously vigilant and then handle firmly, carefully and thoroughly the phenomenon of the development of conservative, militant, intolerant, sectarian and ethnocentric groups in Indonesia. This group needs to be diruwat (attempt to return to one’s true self) and “be put in order” as Saudi Arabia did. If not, they can become a “stumbling block” for the government in its efforts to realize “religious moderation” and make Indonesia a moderate, tolerant and pluralist country in the future.

Note: this article was translated and published by Kompas

Malaysia and Indonesia in the Eyes of the Middle East Arab Community

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There is a striking difference in the perception of the Arab community, especially in the Gulf Arab region, which is a rich and prosperous region in the Middle East, toward Malaysia and Indonesia.

After a long time pursuing an academic career in an “Arab country” in the Middle East and researching the intricacies of society and culture in this region, I have noticed that their view toward Malaysia is far better than that toward Indonesia. In the eyes of the Arabs of the Middle East, Malaysia’s image is much better than that of Indonesia, even though many Muslim groups in Indonesia praise the Arabs of the Middle East.

Indonesia’s status as a Muslim majority country with the largest Muslim population in the world and the largest contributor to the haj pilgrimage, is unable to boost the image of this archipelagic country. In other words, “Islamic identity” is not enough to change the image of Indonesia in the eyes of Middle Eastern Arabs, or change the perception of the people of the Middle East toward Indonesia.

Multiple Indicators

There are several indicators as to why Malaysia is considered better. First, many Arabs study at various universities in Malaysia, for undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate programs. The results of the R Hirschmann survey from 2020 show that there are tens of thousands of students from the Middle East studying in Malaysian universities. Many Indonesian students also study in Malaysia.

Most of the students are from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Iraq. Meanwhile, it is difficult to find those who study on Indonesian campuses. In general, Arab people come to Indonesia not for studying, but for vacation or recreation, as well as small businesses. Popular locations for them are Bali and Bogor, which they know as “Puncak” (the peak).

In Southeast Asia, in the eyes of the Middle East Arab community, the reputation of Malaysia’s higher education is only inferior to Singapore, which has long built a good and quality academic base.

I have written several letters of recommendation to colleagues or former students who wish to pursue a doctoral program in Malaysia in the field of social science studies and others. In Southeast Asia, in the eyes of the Middle East Arab community, the reputation of Malaysia’s higher education is only inferior to Singapore, which has long built a good and quality academic base.

The second indicator is Malaysia (besides Singapore) is also one of the main destination countries for the King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP) in the Southeast Asia region. Again, Indonesia is not included as a scholarship destination country. KASP is a massive scholarship program from the government of Saudi Arabia, which since 2010 has provided scholarships for Saudi youngsters who want to study abroad in the field of non-Islamic studies, especially engineering, business and related fields.

The KASP program has dispatched hundreds of thousands of students to a number of countries that are considered advanced in the field of education. Based on a study of Sidiqa Allah Murod and Sahel Zreik in 2020, the majority were sent to campuses in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Australia. For Asia, China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), Japan and South Korea are the main destination countries, in addition to Singapore and Malaysia.

Other countries in the Middle East including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Libya that have scholarship programs similar to KASP also include Malaysia – not Indonesia – as one of the education or scholarship destinations.

Admittedly, the quality of higher education in Malaysia, among others, can be seen from the high interest of the Arab community to continue their studies in the “neighboring country”, in addition to the absorption of market share (jobs) for the Arab community who are alumni of Malaysian universities.

Third, various universities in the Middle East can accept teaching staff (Arabs or not) who are alumni of doctoral programs at universities in Malaysia. Meanwhile, as far as I know, no alumni of a doctoral program from an Indonesian university has been accepted to the campuses of the Middle East. Even if there are Indonesian lecturers who teach at Middle Eastern universities, like me, they are alumni of doctoral programs in North America (the US and Canada), Western Europe (the UK, Germany and France), Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Finland) or Australia.

Applicants whose doctorates were obtained from campuses in China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore are also considered and taken into account. Almost every year I am involved in the recruitment team for new teachers who apply to the campus where I work today, so it is enough to understand the internal dynamics.

Fourth, the attitude of the Arab community in general – the public attitude – toward Malaysians and Indonesians is also different. For example, if they see a “Malay face” who is a lecturer at a university, they will usually think of him or her at first as Malaysian.

What causes the perception of the Middle East Arab community towards Malaysia and Indonesia to differ?

Maybe they think of the Indonesian “class” as not lecturers, but workers in the informal economy, for example unskilled workers such as drivers, construction workers and the like for men, or housekeepers for women. What causes the perception of the Middle East Arab community towards Malaysia and Indonesia to differ?

Fundamental factors

I see there are several factors underlying this difference. First, Malaysia is seen as successful in building a quality higher education sector but at a relatively affordable cost. For the Arab community of the Middle East, especially those who are not accepted or are reluctant to study at Western campuses because of certain religious or cultural reasons other than being expensive, or for those who do not want to study on campuses in developing countries for the reason that his diploma would not sell well in the market, higher education in Malaysia can be a promising alternative.

It must be admitted, compared to Indonesia, a number of universities in Malaysia such as Universiti Malaya, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and Universiti Putra Malaysia are seen as successful in building quality academic reputations at the global level. The indications can be seen from the QS World University Ranking and others. Meanwhile, well-known Indonesian universities are still scrambling to build a brand at the international level. Compared to Indonesia, Malaysia has also long applied the teaching-learning model in English which has also influenced and boosted the image and reputation of its higher education at the global level.

Second, Malaysia is seen as a Muslim country that is advanced in the economic field, while Indonesia is still considered an “undeveloped country” even though various changes and development breakthroughs have been made. Of course, it is difficult for the Arab community of the Middle East to send students to countries that they consider to be economically undeveloped.

Third, Malaysia is not a country that exports “unskilled labor” to the Middle East and other regions so it is natural that their image, reputation and credibility are considered more authoritative than Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s predicate is still strong as a supplier of unskilled labor to Middle East Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar or Kuwait, in addition to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia.

Because it has been going on for decades, since the early 1980s, it is very difficult to erase the image of Indonesia in the eyes of Middle Eastern Arabs as a country “that exports coolies and babu [domestic helpers]”. Because of this factor, it is difficult to raise the reputation of the Indonesian people in the eyes of the Middle Eastern Arab community.

Serious effort

For this reason, I see that in the future it is necessary for the Indonesian government to make serious efforts so that their “dignity” is higher and they are more authoritative and respected among the people of the Middle East and the global community as well. The improvement of the economic and technological sectors is very important to do this. Countries with advanced economic and technological levels tend to be more authoritative and respected.

I see that the government has worked hard to develop the economic, technology and education sectors even though the results have not been widely appreciated by the international community.

Cultivating the higher education sector with “international quality” is also important and must be done seriously. I see that the government has worked hard to develop the economic, technology and education sectors even though the results have not been widely appreciated by the international community.

Finally, the government must gradually stop the program of “exporting” manual labor to other countries, including to the Middle East, and replace it with, if necessary, professional workers. Of course, this is not easy to realize in the near future and it is difficult homework, especially since Indonesia’s economic condition has not yet progressed and employment opportunities are still limited so the unemployment rate is high. However, do not ever get fatigued by this, and give up trying to be the best and foremost. Nothing is impossible under this moon.

Note: this article was translated and published by Kompas