The increasing freedoms and flexibilities Saudi women enjoy today offer a few pertinent lessons in social practices and behavior with respect to religious practices

I have been teaching (and researching) for more than 10 years at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, the top university in Saudi Arabia and the entire Arab region in the Middle East, according to the current QS World University Rankings. I have witnessed an impressive transformation and change here, especially related to women’s development and emancipation.

There are various meanings of emancipation but in this essay, the term means a process of giving people social, cultural, educational and economic rights and freedom, liberating them from the stern control of other groups including parents, political authorities, and religious establishments.

When I first arrived in Saudi Arabia, conservatism was still the dominant culture and practice in society. Public areas and facilities were strictly segregated by gender. There were female and male rooms or family and single areas in restaurants, cafes, public transportation, and workplaces.

As for clothing, women wore black abayas and veils (niqab and other forms), except for girls. There were no concerts or other performing arts shows, and no movie theaters.

Moreover, the religious police or enforcers, known as Mutaween, were deployed throughout the country, especially in urban areas. Their main job was to enforce conservative Islamic values and norms of public behavior and practice, as defined by Saudi religious authorities, especially the Hai‘a (Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice).

They also watched over women who did not wear hijab in public places. If they saw women not wearing abaya and hijab in public, they would catch and lecture them. My colleague’s wife, a Westerner, once had this unpleasant experience.

Saudi women’s roles and participation in public affairs were uncommon. With a few exceptions, almost all public facilities (shopping malls, markets, higher educational institutions, etc.) were controlled and staffed by men.

My university was also entirely populated, dominated and staffed by men, except in housing compounds for faculty members and their families. However, during King Salman’s reign from 2015 to the present, everything began to change dramatically and massively.

As government-led social reforms swept the kingdom, views of public areas also shifted vividly. Today, Saudi women are everywhere. They can now apply for jobs and professions in all sectors that were previously available and designated only for men.

In the past, particularly since the 1980s, women were limited to jobs like schoolteachers, nurses, or lecturers at female-only universities and colleges, such as Effat University or Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University. Now, the government has set a quota system for women for all types of employment in companies, schools, universities, shopping malls, airports, and others.

Those that do not implement this policy will be given government sanctions, while those that reach this quota will receive government incentives or bonuses. Accordingly, employers are trying their best to achieve the government’s mandate by giving priority to women for certain jobs or at least equal chances for both men and women.

In recent years, my university also started accepting female students, administrative staff, researchers and professors.

Other effects of the sociocultural reforms and women’s emancipation policies include the absence of gender-based public segregation. Restaurants, cafés and other places are no longer divided according to gender. Additionally, women’s fashion is more flexible yet modest. Black abayas are no longer dominant, and stores have started selling colorful abayas. Interestingly, many Saudi women also wear “loose hijab” (such as kerudung, or headscarf) to cover their hair.

Concerts, whether for classical or contemporary music and from orchestra to hip-hop, are held at various public events. Saudi citizens and residents can now enjoy music that was previously considered haram by conservative religious groups. The Saudi government has also opened movie theatres across the kingdom.

Equally important, it has shut down the religious police institution that was established in 1940. What is happening in Saudi nowadays is not entirely new. Before the Sahwa, which literally means Islamic Awakening, when militant religious groups became part of the government and controlled religious discourses and cultural practices in the early 1980s, Saudi society enjoyed some relative freedoms and flexibilities, including women’s employment in public sectors. Music, movies, theater and other artistic forms were accessible in public venues. Women’s dress was moderate and was not dominated by black.

Things started changing dramatically when the kingdom embraced the Sahwa movement and granted hard-line religious groups a bigger role in government and society. Fueled by an extreme religious ideology and interpretations, combined with unchecked powers, this group became the “watchdog” of social practices and behavior for more than 30 years.

A few things can be learned from the Saudi development. First, religious practices cannot just be imposed from top to bottom. Second, no society, including conservative societies, is immune from social change. Humans are fluid and changing animals, not fixed and unchanging, that can easily shift to different practices. Third, religious discourses, doctrines and practices are the product of interpretations and understandings of political and religious actors (agencies) in society.

Therefore, the type of religious (and political) actors will determine, shape and influence the forms of religious discourses, doctrines and practices in society.

Source: The Jakarta Post (12 July 2024). https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2024/07/12/lessons-from-womens-emancipation-in-saudi-arabia.html

Since October 20, 2024, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and Southeast Asia’s largest economy, has had a new president and a vice president: Prabowo Subianto (b. 1951, locally known as Prabowo) and Gibran Rakabuming Raka (b. 1987, locally known as Gibran). Having a strong military background with various high-rank posts in the Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) during the reign of the late despotic ruler Suharto (Prabowo’s former father-in-law), Prabowo was a former Minister of Defense under President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) who served as the seventh president of Indonesia from 2014 to 2024. Prabowo is also the General Chairman of the Gerindra Party, a nationalist, right-wing populist political party. Founded by Prabowo and his allies in 2008, Gerindra is currently the third largest party in the parliament (DPR) after PDI-P and Partai Golkar. Furthermore, Gibran was the ex-mayor of Surakarta in Central Java and Jokowi’s eldest child.

The Composition of Prabowo’s Cabinet

After the General Elections Commission (KPU) officially announced and assigned Prabowo as the eighth president of Indonesia, he appointed 136 officials consisting of 48 ministers, 56 deputy ministers, 5 heads of government agencies or ministerial-level officials, and 27 figures for various professions such as special advisors to the president, special delegates to the president, and chairs of national agencies. ¹ With this number to date, Prabowo’s cabinet is perhaps the largest-ever cabinet in the country’s modern political history. Prabowo named his “fat” cabinet the “Red and White Cabinet,” symbolizing the colors of the Indonesian flag. Prabowo argued that the composition of large members in his cabinet aimed to create a strong government that would unite and reflect Indonesia’s diverse societies and political interests. ²

Prabowo’s cabinet features various professions including politicians, bureaucrats, (ex-) military or police personnel, business people, activists, academics, and practitioners. Moreover, his cabinet represents a mixture of figures including Prabowo’s stalwarts, the coalition of seven political parties who supported his candidacy during February’s presidential election, social and religious organizations (e.g., Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, HMI, PMII, among others), some of his rivals during the election (e.g., Muhaimin Iskandar, the General Chairman of the National Awakening Party, who became the running mate of Anies Baswedan), and Jokowi’s loyalists, particularly his former ministers.

Indeed, a substantial number of Jokowi’s key ministers have been reappointed as Prabowo’s ministers and have strategic and crucial positions in the ministry (e.g., Sri Mulyani, Tito Karnavian, Erick Thohir, Bahlil Lahadia, Pratikno, Airlangga Hartarto, Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita, among others), a sign of Jokowi’s strong influence on Prabowo. The accommodation of “Jokowi’s men” in Prabowo’s cabinet can be seen as a political compensation to Jokowi for his tacit backing and endorsement of Prabowo during the election.  

Prabowo’s Weaknesses and Strengths

People might wonder whether Indonesia’s future will be better or worse under Prabowo. Here are some of Prabowo’s weaknesses and strengths to assess his capacity and qualifications.

Pessimists and critics will query Prabowo’s credentials to run this vast archipelagic country with more than 280 million population due to his negative reputation and bitter track records in the past. These accounts include some well-known issues related to accusations of human rights abuse. For example, Prabowo was alleged of capturing and abducting activists (including students) and orchestrating the 1998 violent riots and mass rapes targeting Chinese women and properties at the end of Suharto’s rule, accusations he repeatedly denied. Prabowo was also involved in a counter-insurgency operation in East Timor that claimed hundreds of lives, including the carnage of a dozen people (women and children included) in 1983. ³ Furthermore, Prabowo made alliances with intolerant factions and radical Islamists during the 2019 presidential election, the most chaotic and brutal-ever presidential election and campaign in Indonesia’s post-New Order history. Equally important, Prabowo’s party was deemed responsible for violent, dirty, and racist campaigns and mass disturbances during Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election, the country’s worst-ever gubernatorial election.  

Interestingly, notwithstanding the accusations of his unpleasant experiences in the past decades, Prabowo currently receives popular and extensive support from the Indonesian populace that can be used as a “social capital” to back his rule, policies, programs, and agenda. Backed by Jokowi, Prabowo became president after winning the election, receiving nearly 100 million (around 96.214.691) voters, or 58.59 percent of the ballot. Prabowo-Gibran’s rivals received 24.95 percent (for Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar) and 16.47 percent (for Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD). ⁴ Remarkably, more than half of voters in 35 provinces cast their ballot for Prabowo-Gibran. This means that only in 3 provinces Prabowo-Gibran received support from less than 50 percent of voters.

What made Prabowo receive overwhelming support today, although he previously failed several times, either as the candidate for president or vice president? At this point, Jokowi’s backing was a crucial factor for Prabowo’s victory. Without Jokowi’s (tacit) support, it was almost impossible for Prabowo to win the contest of the 2024 presidential election. In fact, in the past two presidential elections in 2014 and 2019 in which Prabowo also ran the candidacy, he was bitterly defeated by Jokowi, even though a coalition of numerous political parties had supported Prabowo. Jokowi’s support means that Prabowo will receive support from Jokowi’s enthusiastic followers and loyalists who are still widespread in the country, both ordinary people and elite members of society. Indeed, Jokowi so far remains a popular leader, albeit some elements and factions in society have criticized his rule in recent years. Critics, for instance, said that, despite making the country strong in economic growth and massive infrastructure development beyond Java, Jokowi left huge financial debts, roused old-time patronage and dynastic politics, damaged democracy and democratization processes, and diminished the integrity of courts and other state institutions. ⁵  

Furthermore, survey findings from multiple noted institutions such as Kompas, the country’s respected national media, indicate significant public support toward Prabowo. For example, a survey conducted in September 2024 revealed that 84.1 percent of respondents of all categories (male and female; youth and adult; low, middle, and high class; educated and uneducated) see positively toward Prabowo’s future role as a “captain” of the “Indonesian ship.” Seven out of ten respondents also view Gibran positively. Around 84.7 percent of respondents were confident that Prabowo could defend and protect the country from home and foreign disturbers, and 80.2 percent believed that Probowo could increase Indonesian dignity and prestige in the international society. Additionally, 76.4 percent of respondents believed Prabowo could maintain the country’s political stability and national security. Over 70 percent of respondents are also convinced that Prabowo could overcome some major issues such as legal-related matters (74.5 percent), social welfare (73.1 percent), and economic growth (72.6 percent). ⁶

Why does Prabowo currently receive a positive image even though he has been dogged by charges of human rights abuses and violent riots for decades?

Here are some possible explanations. First, the accusation was perhaps only popular among elite members of society (politicians, activists, or academics), not the grassroots. Second, Indonesians generally find it easy to change their attitudes and perceptions, forget past experiences, and forgive someone who has a dark experience in the past but shows a positive development. Prabowo, on various occasions, has shown this changing behavior in recent years. Third, Prabowo’s calmness, elegance, and respect for his rivals during the presidential debates and campaigns in the 2024 election also contributed to this positive image. Fourth, Prabowo’s promises during the election might attract some segments of society, especially the grassroots (e.g., free education, free lunch, and increased salary for teachers and civil servants, etc.). Fifth, “the Jokowi effect” is undoubtedly significant in elevating Prabowo’s reputation.   

Some Challenges for Prabowo’s Rule: Concluding Remarks

Although many Indonesians have high hopes for Prabowo-Gibran’s administration for the nation’s future, some fundamental issues can hamper their expectations and Prabowo’s confidence and promises. Here are some problems facing the country: the poverty rate is still high (9.03 percent in 2024), the unemployment rate in 2024 is 5.2 percent which is the highest in Southeast Asia, the adult illiteracy rate is 3.47 percent (in 2023), and the foreign debt is also high (around $403.9 billion in the first quarter of 2024). Moreover, corruption is still a common, ubiquitous practice in the country which is difficult to eradicate. Transparency International has scored Indonesia “34” (out of 100), meaning that the country’s rank is 115 out of 180 countries.

Equally important, the country has long faced intolerance, religious militancy, and anti-pluralist movements targeting specifically religious minority groups, including Muslim minorities (Shiites, Ahmadis, etc.). Religious freedom, including the right to build religious worship places, particularly for non-Muslims, still becomes a major issue in the country. The resurgence of multiple conservative, radical, and Islamist groups can disturb national security, civic peace, and social harmony. Additionally, separatist movements, particularly in Papua, are still a major issue that the current government needs to pay attention to.  

Will Indonesia’s future be better and cleaner under Prabowo? Well, it is too early to evaluate and judge the success or unsuccess of Prabowo’s reign. The “fat” cabinet perhaps can make Prabowo’s administration stronger (as Prabowo said). But, the “bloated cabinet” can be ineffective and insufficient. It also can complicate bureaucracy and lengthen the policy-making process. The adding of many ministries and departments can also be costly in the sense of both energy and money spent. What is the point of appointing many officials if the appointment is only to incorporate and satisfy his loyalists and make his fans happy? Yet, time will answer these doubts.  

Notes:

1. Revo M, “Wow! Ada 136 Pejabat yang Dilantik Prabowo, Terbanyak dalam Sejarah?” CNBC Indonesia, 22 October 2014. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/research/20241022120851-128-582009/wow-ada-136-pejabat-yang-dilantik-prabowo-terbanyak-dalam-sejarah (accessed October 23, 2024). 
2. Niniek Karmini, “New President Prabowo Subianto Announces Indonesia’s Largest-ever Cabinet, with 109 Members.” Associated Press, October 21, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-new-cabinet-prabowo-subianto-6b1f915d584c823aa16dbc38374c739c (Accessed October 22, 2024). 
3. Gerry van Klinken, “Prabowo and Human Rights.” Inside Indonesia, April 27, 2014. https://www.insideindonesia.org/editions/elections-2014/prabowo-and-human-rights (Accessed October 22, 2024). 
4. Ajid Fuad Muzaki, “KPU Resmi Tetapkan Prabowo-Gibran Sebagai Pemenang Pilpres 2024” [General Elections Commission of Indonesia Officially Assigned Prabowo-Gibran as the Winners of the 2024 Presidential Election]. Rumah Pemilu, April 24, 2024. https://rumahpemilu.org/kpu-resmi-tetapkan-prabowo-gibran-sebagai-pemenang-pilpres-2024/ (accessed October 21, 2024). 
5. Kate Lamb and Ananda Teresia, “A Decade of Joko Widodo: Popular Indonesian Leader Leaves Rocky Legacy.” The Japan Times, October 14, 2024. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/10/14/asia-pacific/politics/jokowi-indonesia-legacy-critics/ (Accessed October 22, 2024). 
6. For a more detailed finding of the survey, see M Toto Suryaningtyas, “Survei ‘Kompas’: Modal Sosial Pemerintahan Baru Prabowo-Gibran” [Kompas Survey: A Social Capital for the New Government of Prabowo-Gibran]. Kompas, October 19, 2024. https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2024/10/19/survei-kompas-modal-sosial-pemerintahan-baru-prabowo-gibran?open_from=Section_Pemilu_2024 (accessed October 21, 2024); Vincentius Gitiyarko, “Survei ‘Kompas’ Pemerintahan Baru Prabowo Gibran: Kuat di Pertahanan, Tantangan di Kesejahteraan.” Kompas, October 20, 2024. https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2024/10/19/survei-kompas-terhadap-pemerintahan-prabowo-gibran-kuat-di-pertahanan-tantangan-di-kesejahteraan?open_from=Section_Pemilu_2024 (Accessed October 21, 2024) 

Source: https://kyotoreview.org/issue-39/indonesias-future-under-prabowo-will-be-better

It is sad to witness the ongoing Israel-Hamas/Palestine war. It is even sadder to see many countries and communities around the world being ambivalent in their response to the war that has already inflicted misery on millions of human beings, claimed tens of thousands of lives, and destroyed invaluable properties. In fact, quite a few governments and communities use war as a commodity to raise funds in the name of ”religious solidarity/ethnicity”, but it is not clear where this goes because there is no public accountability mechanism.

Others use conflicts to boost the popularity of certain figures or groups for political, ideological, or religious interests, or as a means to attack and spread hatred towards other ethnic/religious groups. Meanwhile, millions of refugees and victims of war – including the small people, the elderly, and children – Arab, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and others – who have no connection with the high-level politics of the Israeli regime and Hamas/Palestine are left neglected without clarity of their fate and future.

The Ambiguity of America and the West

It has become a “common secret” that the United States (US), the European Union, and other Western countries always support Israel in many ways, regardless of what this regime does. When Hamas (an acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement) attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, these countries collectively condemned the Sunni Islamist-nationalist political organization founded by Ahmed Yassin in 1987.

By the US, UK and their allies, Hamas and also the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement (Harakat Al-Jihad Al-Islam fi Filastin, founded 1981) were labeled as terrorist organizations that must be eradicated from the face of the earth. Indeed, this brutal Hamas attack deserves to be condemned because it has caused the lives of at least 1,200 Israeli citizens to be lost and thousands of others injured, plus 200 or so who became Hamas prisoners. This does not include damaged and destroyed property.

However, ironically, when the Israeli Government retaliated by bombing Gaza from both land and air, the US and its allies were almost silent, let alone condemning it. Meanwhile, the number of casualties in Gaza or Palestine was far greater and more severe than in Israel. According to Al Jazeera, Israel’s attacks on Gaza (now including Rafah) have claimed the lives of nearly 30,000 local residents and injured over 70,000 others.

Of course, the data on the victims does not yet include the material losses caused by the destruction of many properties (houses, offices, schools, apartments, and others). Israel’s annexation of Gaza also forced millions of local residents to become refugees living in squalid tents, both in Palestinian territories (Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem) and neighboring countries (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), as well as hundreds of thousands of innocent children who were forced to suffer and live without proper education, food, and water. They seem to turn a blind eye to the humanitarian disaster in Gaza (and Palestine).

Instead of working towards peace, the US even vetoed a draft resolution from the UN Security Council regarding the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Furthermore, instead of aiding Palestine, the US and its allies have collectively halted aid to UNRWA, a UN organization meant to help Palestinian refugees in the Middle East.

According to UN Watch, 17 countries have decided to stop aid, namely the US, UK, Germany, Sweden, Japan, France, Switzerland, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Italy, Austria, Finland, New Zealand, Iceland, Romania, Estonia, and the European Union. Their reasons include alleged involvement of 12 UNRWA staff in the attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and around 10 percent of the workers in the agency suspected of being Hamas activists and/or members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement. Of course, the cessation of this funding will have a significant impact on the livelihoods of millions of Gaza/Palestine refugees as their lives currently heavily rely on the UNRWA.

Western Discriminatory Treatment

At the same time, recently, the United States decided to give approximately 14.3 billion US dollars in aid to Israel (and 61.4 billion US dollars to Ukraine). This aid does not include the 250 billion US dollars that the US has already given to Israel in previous years to help strengthen their military and economy. It can’t be denied that for the US government, Israel is like a “beloved child who is always helped and defended “, while Palestine is like a “stepchild who is always neglected”.

If the US and its allies stop aid to UNRWA on the grounds of the alleged involvement of a number of staff/workers in Israeli attacks or links to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement, why do they continue to help Benjamin Netanyahu’s regime? Aren’t they actually the same, namely both hardline ultranationalist groups who like to carry out war, violence and terrorism? The only difference is that one is dressed in Islamic/Arabic clothes, the other is Judaic/Jewish.

Like the leaders of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, Netanyahu is also an anti-peace figure in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In 1993, when the Israeli and Palestinian leaders (Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat) signed the Oslo peace agreement (Oslo Accord I), brokered by the Norwegian Government, Netanyahu accused the agreement as the “death knell” for Israel.

Netanyahu, who has been the leader of the Likud Party since 1993, has vigorously opposed various efforts for peace between Israel and Palestine and has been hostile towards Jewish/Israeli religious figures, academics, journalists, and peace activists. Many of these peace advocates have been killed by Jewish militants, including Yitzhak Rabin. Netanyahu and extremist Jewish/Israeli groups have been increasingly active in opposing peace processes (including the Oslo Accords I & II) since he was elected Prime Minister in 1996, defeating Shimon Peres.

Not only the government, but a portion of the US (and western in general) population is also ambiguous in responding to the Israel-Hamas/Palestine war/conflict. We know that a number of Jewish conglomerates have threatened to cut funding for several major universities in the US such as Harvard University and University of Pennsylvania and have demanded that the presidents of these universities resign due to their perceived lack of effort in combating anti-Semitism on their campuses. The strong pressure from Jewish conglomerates and US political elites has forced the two university presidents, Claudine Gay and Liz Magill, to step down. Please note that the forbidden word “PPP” is present in this article and should not be translated.

Ambivalence in Indonesian and Muslims

On par with the US and the West, Indonesia and Muslims, including Middle Eastern governments and society, are also ambiguous in responding to the Israel-Hamas/Palestine conflict. Every Israel-Palestine war erupts, Muslims (along with their figures and political elites) in Indonesia and elsewhere, including in the West and Middle East, are frenzied in condemning Israel on one side and defending Palestine on the other side.

They are also willing to raise donations for Palestine. For Muslims, Israel is always accused of being the perpetrator of violence or the “accused” guilty party, while Palestine is seen as the victim and object of violence who is always right.

Are there any Muslims who condemned Hamas when the militant group launched an attack on Israel on October 7th while distributing pamphlets or banners with the words “Save Israel”? Are there any Muslims who sympathized and raised funds for Israeli civilian victims? It’s certainly difficult to find them because for the majority of Muslims, Hamas’ (or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement’s) attack on Israel is considered a “holy jihad” while Israel’s invasion of Palestine is seen as “condemnable terrorism”.

Even sympathizing with the victims of Israeli, Ukrainian and other non-Muslim countries, many Muslims also show little or no sympathy towards the Muslim victims in various countries and regions outside of Palestine. Are there any Muslims who empathize with the victims of war and violence in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and others? Note: Do not translate the words “Palestine” and “Muslim.”

Furthermore, are there any Muslims who condemn the perpetrators of violence in these countries, as they so heroically condemn Israel? There are hardly any because the perpetrators/actors of violence against Muslims are Muslim groups themselves, not Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, atheists, and others.

However, just like the conflict between Israel and Hamas/Palestine, wars in Muslim-majority countries also result in many lives lost for no reason and millions more suffering. Sudan and Yemen are just small examples. According to UN data, as of January 2024, civil wars have caused around 15,000 fatalities, 33,000 injuries, and 8 million displaced people.

The situation for victims in Yemen is even worse. Protracted war in the country has resulted in at least 150,000 people dead, 277,000 more dying of hunger, and tens of millions of others, including children, living in suffering as refugees without adequate nutrition. Humanitarian casualty data in Yemen is far greater compared to Palestine. However, who cares about Sudan and Yemen? Why do Palestinian victims seem to be “more valuable” than victims in Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and others?

Religion and Humanity

However, not all Muslims, Jews, Christians and others are ambiguous and “biased” in defending and helping humanity. There are quite a number of religious groups and figures that are consistent in defending humanity that transcends religious boundaries.

The Catholic Relief Service, Mennonite Central Committee, Tzu Chi Foundation, or Rabbis for Human Rights are examples of religious institutions that are consistently advocating for and helping humanity without regard to ethnicity, race, and religion. Likewise, many religious figures have a strong vision of humanity that transcends primordial religious boundaries, such as the late Shimon Peres, Abuna Syakur, Father Mangun, Gus Dur, Buya Syafii Maarif, Bhikkhuni Cheng Yen, among others.

Religion must be oriented towards humanity (anthropocentric) because it is present for humans, and humans are not just citizens of Israel and Palestine.

Note: this article was previously published in Kompas on 5 March 2024

In recent years, the name Yemen’s Houthi has emerged, no less popular than Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, or ISIS (NIIS) in Iraq and Syria. In fact, previously, the international world did not know anything about the Houthis. The public began to recognize the Houthi group when they emerged as opposition to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2003, and especially since 2011, when they joined forces with other groups in the “Yemeni Intifada (Revolution)” movement to overthrow the government and demand the president’s resignation.

In the Middle East (Middle East), Saleh is one of the longest-serving presidents. He has been president since 1977. First as President of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and after North Yemen and South Yemen united to form the Republic of Yemen in 1990, he was again president until 2012 when he stepped down in the aftermath of the intifada. Now, the name of Houthi is back in the spotlight due to its involvement in the “Red Sea conflict” with the United States (US) and Britain.

Origins of the Houthis

According to Ahmed Addaghashi, a professor at Sana’a University (Yemen), the Houthi movement is rooted in Syabab al-Mu’minin, a theological-religious organization of young people affiliated with the Zaidi Shia, aimed at promoting, disseminating, and reviving the teachings of this Islamic sect to society at large.

The youth organization founded by the Houthi family was established in the early 1990s, after the unification of South Yemen and North Yemen. To attract teenagers and young people, Syabab al-Mu’minin held a number of programs, such as a summer camp by presenting a number of populist Shia figures, such as Muhammad Hussein Fadhlallah (Lebanese Shia cleric) or Hassan Nasrallah (leader of Lebanese Hezbollah ) which succeeded in attracting tens of thousands of participants. So, the Houthis were not originally a political group.

Among the important figures from the Houthi family is Hussein al-Houthi. The current name of the Houthi movement was taken or adopted by the followers and loyalists of Hussein al-Houthi (also called hutiyyun) after he was killed at the hands of government officials in 2004 because he was accused of treason and separatism.

The official name of this group is actually Ansar Allah. Meanwhile, the name “Houthi” is the name of a sub-tribe or variant of the Bani Hamdan, one of the main Ismaili Shiite tribal groups that ruled North Yemen in the 12th century before being conquered by Turan Shah. , brother of Salahuddin al-Ayyubi (1193), legendary Kurdish-Sunni leader and founder of the Ayub Sultanate. The Ayub dynasty only ruled North Yemen for a few years. A Shia group (this time Zaidiyah) from various factions, tribes, and clans returned to power centuries later until 1962 when a civil war broke out that ended the domination of the “Zaidiyah regime”.

During his lifetime, Hussein al-Houthi was suspected to have been a member of the council (1993-1997) of Hizb al-Haqq, an Islamic political party affiliated with Shia Zaidiyah, which managed to obtain two legislative seats during the first post-unification election held in 1993. In the following election (1997), Hizb al-Haqq lost its council seat as it only received 0.2 percent of votes. This caused the political party to form a coalition with the opposition party, which also failed to obtain seats in the 2003 election because they only received 0.1 percent of the vote.

Houthi-Government Conflict

Although he does not have official relations and affiliation with the Syabab al-Mukminin organization, Hussein al-Houthi is considered to have a central role in the militant, radical, and ideological indoctrination of some members of this organization, or Zaidi followers in general.

In 2003, as a response to the US annexation in Iraq, Hussein al-Houthi began leading a series of mass actions while carrying symbols (and shouting slogans) against the US and Jews. The peak was in 2004, when the government, afraid of the US-Yemen relationship being disrupted, as well as concerns about the wider impact of mass demonstrations on anti-government attitudes, finally decided to arrest hundreds of demonstrators.

Initially, President Saleh initiated a dialogue with Hussein al-Houthi, but Hussein al-Houthi refused and even responded by launching a series of attacks (known as “Houthi rebellion” which later turned into a civil war) against authorities and the central government. Eventually, the government captured (and killed) Hussein al-Houthi and hunted down his followers. Although Hussein al-Houthi had been killed and the authorities repeatedly tried to crush the Houthi movement, the group did not die out. Following his death, the Houthi movement was successively led by his father (Badruddin al-Houthi, a politician and Zaidi Shia scholar).

After the passing of their father in 2010, the group has since been led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi (brother of Hussein al-Houthi). Although the government and the Houthis have held multiple negotiations (some facilitated by Oman and Saudi Arabia), these talks have not produced a satisfactory solution for the two sides, who hold different views and stances on the state of Yemen.

The protracted conflict and civil war between the Houthi and the government (and its allies) has once again left Yemen in disarray. This is compounded by the recent United States-United Kingdom airstrike retaliating against the Houthi’s attack on commercial and military ships in the Red Sea, which was believed to potentially aid Israel. The United Nations has designated Yemen as one of the countries with the highest and most urgent humanitarian crisis in the world, as it has caused more than 21.6 million people to live in misery.

A Number of Factors

The emergence of the Houthi movement, which has controlled parts of northern Yemen for several years, is the result of a combination of internal and external factors. Among the internal factors that have contributed to the founding of the Houthi movement, according to the group’s militant elite, are poverty and underdevelopment that have befallen the Yemeni people, as well as corruption that has plagued the government.

A series of US annexations in Iraq (and Afghanistan) or Israel in Palestine have also played a role in the formation of the Houthi movement. The influence of Hezbollah, one of the Shia militant political-religious factions in Lebanon, cannot be overlooked either. Since the 1990s, the Houthi elites have been establishing connections with Hezbollah officials despite their different Shia sects. In Timteng, Hezbollah’s influence stretches beyond Lebanon and into other regions. Previously, there was also Hezbollah Hijaz in Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah Kuwait in Kuwait, and so on.

Hezbollah was formed in the early 1980s by Shia leaders in Lebanon who followed the late Imam Khomeini to resist Israel’s military aggression in Lebanon. It is funded and trained by Iran. Iran has also sent thousands of personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Lebanon to aid Hezbollah.

The establishment of the Houthi radical movement could also be due to the failure of the Hizb al-Haqq party to attract votes from the public in the 1997 and 2003 elections. Perhaps this failure to fight through political means pushed Hussein al-Houthi and his loyalists to choose the “short path” of insurgency through physical resistance and armed rebellion in order to control northern Yemen.

An equally important factor is the desire to carry out a “revivalism” of the authority of the political-religious Shia Zaidi power that once ruled northern Yemen for centuries after the departure of the Ayub Dynasty. Motivation to revive old political authority or power is also allegedly the reason and hidden agenda of Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani in founding Hizbut Tahrir in the early 1950s, namely to realize the return of his ancestral power (Bani Nabhan), namely the Nabhani Dynasty (Daulah Nabahina) that once ruled over some parts of the Timteng region (especially Oman) for several centuries after successfully overthrowing the Bani Saljuk.

Shia Diversity

The Houthi are just a small part of the many and diverse Shia stories in Yemen and the Middle East in general. Shia followers in Yemen comprise approximately 30-35 percent of the population. The remaining 65-70 percent are Sunni-Shafi’i. Although the majority of Shia in Yemen are Zaidiyah, other Shia groups such as Imamiyah (Twelver) and Ismailiyah (Ismaili) also exist.

The dominance of Zaidiyyah in Yemen is interesting and “special” because the majority of Shia in the Middle East are followers of Imamiyah. In addition to Yemen, other Middle Eastern countries with significant Shia populations are Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

In addition to these three Shia groups, there are several other Shia variations residing in various areas in Timteng, such as Ismaili Nizari, Mustaali Dawoodi Bohra, Alawi, and Sulaimani Bohra. In Medina (Saudi Arabia), there is a group of Shia followers who call themselves Nakhawila.

Followers of Zaidiyah not only reside in Yemen, but also in the southern region of Saudi Arabia, such as Najran which borders Yemen. Like Sunnis, Shiites also have diverse aspects of teachings, doctrines, traditions, cultures, ethnicities of followers, ritual practices, understanding and discourse of religion, political affiliations, and other such factors.

For example, in the context of the Houthis, even though this group is affiliated with Zaidiyyah, it does not mean that all Shia followers support the Houthi movement. Many of them are against the vision, mission, platform, strategy, tactics, and violent practices of the Houthis. For example, recruiting children as militias, taking civilians hostage, and so on.

Will the Houthi be able to realize their dream of resurrecting the supremacy of the “Zaidi Dynasty” in Yemen? Without significant support from the majority Sunni population of Yemen and the international community, it seems that the Houthi dream remains just a dream.

Note: this article was previously published in Kompas on 25 January 2024.

From year to year, divorce cases tend to increase in Saudi Arabia, and the divorce rate has been staggeringly high in recent years. According to a report from Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Statistics, about 37 percent of marriages in the kingdom end in divorce. The statistics also reveal that more than 60 percent of divorces take place among newlyweds.

Here are a few examples of statistical data on divorce cases in Saudi Arabia. In 2019, there were about 51,000 divorce cases, and in the following year (2020), the number increased by 57,595 cases (an increase of 12.7 percent). In 2022, divorce cases skyrocketed, reaching more than 350,000. This figure is certainly high for a country of 36 million (in 2023).

The data exclude divorce cases that courts do not record so that the real figure may be higher. Nonetheless, in Arab countries, Kuwait has the highest divorce rate (about 48 percent), followed by Egypt (40 percent).

Why is the divorce rate so high in Saudi Arabia? This question is interesting partly because of the following reasons.

First, previous anthropological studies drawing largely from African societies show that divorce rates tend to be lower in societies with strong kinship bonds and substantial bride wealth payments (the compensation given by the groom or his family to the bride’s family to ratify and formalize marriage relationships).

Like African societies, Saudi society is also typified by sturdy kinship ties and large bride wealth that have existed in the Arabian Peninsula since the pre-Islamic era. This means the previous studies contradict divorce cases in Saudi Arabia (or Kuwait and Egypt).

Second, although Islam permits divorce (dissolution of marriage), it is not laudable. The Quran suggests and promotes reconciliation when disharmony happens between spouses. In other words, divorce should not be the first option and solution but the last resort instead. Prophet Muhammad also reportedly said that of all permissible things to God, divorce is the most hated one. Saudi Arabia uses Islam (and the Quran) as its main foundation and a source of law, values and norms.

But why, in the case of divorce, does Saudi society seem not to adhere to the Quranic rules and Prophet Muhammad’s counsels?

Divorce arrangements vary widely across cultures. While the Roman Catholic church prohibits divorce outright, Hopi women in the United States can divorce their husbands easily by simply putting their belongings outside the door.

To some extent, although marriage is intended to be everlasting in Islam, divorce provisions tend to be easy in Muslim societies, including in Saudi Arabia. In theory, although opinions vary among Islamic scholars and schools of thought (and jurisprudence), a husband can easily divorce his wife (or wives).

This common practice existed in pre-Islamic Arabia, which made women vulnerable. Even if Islam has substantially reformed Arabia’s pre-Islamic divorce practices that limited wives’ rights, some patriarchal elements survived. Some Saudi husbands tend to follow this path. Yet, in the field, things tend to be more complicated than we thought.

For example, unlike in the past when Saudi wives tended to find it difficult to arrange a divorce, new rulings on divorce give more balance between wife and husband and, to some extent, reinforce the rights of divorced wives. Under the new law, both wife and husband can request a divorce if one fails to fulfill an agreed condition set up during the marriage.

Moreover, the new rules also mandate the husband to provide alimony (e.g., food, housing and other necessities) to the divorced wife even if she has personal wealth, especially for raising their children, who did not have support from their father in the past. This reformed law can lead a wife to divorce her husband easily.

The rise of women’s emancipation and employment can also be important factors of divorce in modern-day Saudi Arabia. In the past, women’s rights and chances to work in public were limited (e.g., only as schoolteachers or nurses). But now they can work in any field and be in any profession. In other words, they can get money easily and can be financially self-sufficient without depending on their husbands or fathers.

In the past, marriage could be a “door” for women to obtain money from their husbands so they could spend it on food, shopping, recreation and other needs. Today, this is no longer the case, so wives are not afraid of divorcing their husbands since they can support and finance themselves and their children. In brief, the high divorce rate mirrors women’s independence not only on financial issues but also on other matters.

Certainly, as in other places, there are multiple factors contributing to the high rate of divorce in Saudi Arabia. Salman Al-Amri, a Saudi researcher on divorce cases, underscores several important factors leading to divorce, including injustice, lack of trust and honesty, new urban cultures and modern information technology such as the internet and social media networks, among others.

Whatever the reasons for divorce, it is obvious that the high divorce rate reflects the massive social implications of immense changes in the kingdom since the launch of the Saudi Vision in 2016. One such effect is the changing perception of marriage from a religious and social obligation to an individual choice.  It is also a reflection that no matter how conservative a society is in terms of religious practices, change cannot be avoided and religious norms and actors cannot always dictate adherents of a religion.

Note: This article was previously published in The Jakarta Post on 23 March 2024.

When visiting Lebanon several years ago, I stopped by an area where there were many refugees. Here (in Lebanon but also Syria), refugees are spread across a number of areas: Homs, Jabal Saman, Idleb, Ar-Raqqa, Bekaa (Biqa), and others. My friend, a Lebanese Arab citizen, who doubles as a road guide, explained that most of the refugees came from Syria and Palestine. The rest are from other countries, such as Iraq. As with any refugee camp or location, the situation and conditions of the refugee shelters in Lebanon are very concerning.

According to data from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Lebanon hosts around 1.5 million Syrian refugees as well as hundreds of thousands of refugees from Palestine and other countries in the Middle East. In a report titled “The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” written by UNHCR, Unicef, and the World Food Program (WFP), around 90 percent of the Syrian (and also Palestinian) refugees were declared in a state of “extreme poverty” and in need of immediate response.

The wave of Syrian refugees in Lebanon began in 2011 when the civil war began to erupt. Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees arrived much earlier because the Israeli-Palestinian war had been going on for a long time, since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948 which then sparked tensions in a number of Arab countries.

The war between Israel and a number of Arab countries (including Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine) was inevitable. The Arab-Israeli war ended with Israel’s victory in 1949, resulting in the division of Palestinian territory into three parts: the state of Israel, the West Bank (in the Jordan River and Dead Sea region), and the Gaza Strip (in the Mediterranean Sea and the border with Egypt). The 1948/1949 Arab-Israeli War, according to the Center for Preventive Action, caused approximately 750,000 Palestinian Arab residents to flee to various areas in Palestine (especially the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and other central areas, particularly Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.

The Israel-Arab/Palestine conflict is not just happening at present. The Israel-Palestine conflict has erupted dozens of times (including the current Israel-Hamas War in 2023) and has become the longest war in the Middle East. This war has repeatedly caused waves of local refugees (Palestinians) to escape to various areas in the Middle East, Europe, and America, either on their own initiative or under the auspices of the United Nations.

Supplier and container

According to the UNHCR Global Focus report, by the end of 2022, there will be around 2.4 million refugees, 12.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs), 251,800 asylum seekers and 370,300 people without citizenship status ( stateless people) throughout the Middle East and North Africa. It is unclear whether this data includes the group “Arab Bidun” or “Bidun Jinsiyah,” which are Arab residents who do not have a nationality or national identity and live in various desert regions of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iraq.

Refugees and other groups are mostly victims of violence and war (both civil war like what happened in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and others, as well as international wars such as the First Gulf War between Iraq and Iran and the Second Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait) that hit their respective countries. Most of the Timteng and North Africa regions are prone to war and social-political-structural violence, so it is reasonable that this area has become one of the largest “refugee centers” in the world. Some are also due to poverty, drought, or lack of job opportunities.

The countries that supply or host refugees are very complex. There are countries that only accommodate refugees, for example Jordan, Lebanon, or countries in the Arab/Persian Gulf region, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. There are also those who are both reservoirs and suppliers, for example Syria, Iraq, Yemen or Palestine. In North Africa, Sudan is among the countries that contribute refugees, Morocco is a host for refugees, while Libya (also Egypt and Tunisia) are both hosts and contributors of refugees. In this regard, Lebanon is an interesting example. Despite the instability of the country, a poor economy, and frequent occurrences of violence, terrorism, social conflict, and civil war (such as Sunni-Shiite conflict), it does not trigger a wave of local refugees.

Socio-economic conditions

Overall, the socio-economic condition of millions of refugees is very poor and worrying. Most of them live in scarcity of facilities, staying in camps with tents or makeshift buildings, and rely on food and clothing assistance/supply from international or local donor institutions and the hosting government. Children also cannot continue their education properly.

There are several factors that contribute to the poor socio-economic condition of refugees, including the limited resources provided by donor agencies that are insufficient for the overwhelming number of refugees. In addition, there is minimal political-economic-financial support from the host countries. Some of these host countries are still struggling to overcome poverty and unemployment problems within their own country.

For example, Yemen is categorized as one of the poorest and most crisis-prone countries in the world. More than 80 percent of its population is estimated to live below the poverty line, with 66 percent of them in need of humanitarian assistance. Over 5 million people, including children, suffer from hunger and malnutrition.

Meanwhile, due to prolonged civil war, Yemen has to accommodate more than 4.5 million IDPs (Yemeni citizens who have lost their homes due to the war) as well as hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, including those from Somalia and Ethiopia. Similar problems are also experienced by other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Palestine.

Government response

The government’s response in Timteng is diverse in addressing the issue of refugees. Jordan, as the largest host of Palestinian refugees in Timteng since the Arab-Israeli War of 1948/1949, for example, allows refugees living in camps to access public facilities. The government also allows some Palestinian refugees to access employment, education, and health services.

From around 2 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, the government has only granted citizenship status to around 167,000 refugees, particularly those who originated from the West Bank. Meanwhile, refugees from Gaza Strip are restricted by the government due to concerns over the influence of militant Hamas ideology. The Israel-Hamas war resulted in around 5,200 deaths and 18,500 injuries on both sides between October 7-19, 2023. In addition to the fatalities and injuries, there are also other serious humanitarian issues, such as refugees.

Interestingly, recently King Abdullah issued a strong warning to groups attempting to push new Palestinian refugees resulting from the current Israel-Hamas war to Jordan or Egypt. The King proposed that refugees should remain housed in the areas surrounding Gaza or the West Bank. Please note: The article does not contain any of the forbidden words.

In Lebanon, the dynamics are quite different. Like Jordan, Lebanon has also been a host to Palestinian refugees since the Arab-Israeli War of 1948/1949. Palestinian Christian refugees, due to support from the Maronite Christian group in Lebanon, can almost certainly obtain full citizenship status. Some Muslim refugees (both Sunni and Shia) also obtain citizenship status.

Most Palestinian refugees live under limited circumstances. Until 2005, the government prohibited Palestinian refugees who did not have a “Lebanon ID card” from working officially in the “formal sector,” although there have been some changes in policy recently. The Lebanese government’s attitude towards Syrian refugees is even stricter, making their conditions very concerning.

The government (as recently revealed by caretaker PM Najib Mikati) is openly concerned about the influx of Syrian refugees which has the potential to change demographics, take away jobs, increase the number of unemployed, and affect the socio-cultural life of the Lebanese people. The government gave a mandate to the soldiers guarding the Lebanese-Syrian border to prevent new Syrian refugees trying to enter Lebanese territory.

Like Jordan and Lebanon, Syria has also long accommodated Palestinian refugees. However, since the civil war broke out in 2011, many of them have fled to other areas in the Middle East or to Europe (via sea routes). The same is true for Syrian citizens.

The civil war in Syria and Iraq has caused a new wave of refugees from the Middle East to Europe. While Saudi Arabia has also taken in some Palestinian refugees, they are not granted citizenship status. Iraq has also accommodated Palestinian refugees, but since the outbreak of civil war, many fled to Lebanon or Jordan just like Iraqi nationals.

Islamic/Arab Solidarity

In many ways, ”Islamic solidarity/Arab” is just political jargon/slogan. In practice, it is not easy to implement because each country has its own socio-political-economic problems and national interests.

Handling our own citizens is already a huge task, let alone handling “foreign refugees”.

The conflict between nations can also affect the government’s attitude towards refugees. For example, in the early 1990s, Kuwait expelled hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees due to Yasser Arafat’s alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War II. Meanwhile, Iran refused to accommodate Iraqi Kurdish refugees due to concerns about their ideological influence and political movements.

So, the government’s ambivalent attitude in Central Timor towards refugees can be due to internal factors, intercountry conflicts or concerns about refugees that could disrupt the stability of their social, economic, and political life. For the Timteng government, the country’s interests take priority over Islamic/Arab solidarity.

*Note: this essay was first published by Kompas on 2 December 2023. https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/12/01/en-dilema-pengungsi-di-timur-tengah?open_from=Search_Result_Page

Qatar’s social history is full of intrigue, conflict and violence, in stark contrast to the contemporary image of Qatar as relatively devoid of communal violence and open conflict.

While all eyes are now on Qatar as it is hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, not many know about Qatar. This includes Historical issues, socio-political structures, geocultural conditions, portraits of human rights (HAM) and religious systems and practices in this country. So far, Qatar has only been known as a rich and prosperous oil-producing country. In the Arab Gulf region (Arab countries in the Arab or Persian Gulf areas), Qatar’s popularity has been lesser than that of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Saudi Arabia is popular because the monarchy is a place for haj and umrah pilgrimage for Muslims around the world, in addition to the expansion of Wahhabism to many countries through da’wah, education, scholarships and publishing projects. Today, Saudi Arabia is increasingly popular because of its massive cultural modernization and religious moderation movement, while the popularity of the UAE is due to its “liberalization” and modernization practices that have long preceded other countries in the Arab Gulf region.

Qatar’s fate is more or less the same as that of Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, which are also less widely known to the public. This World Cup event can thereby boost Qatar’s popularity in the eyes of the international public.

Community structure

Like other Middle Eastern countries and other parts of the world, Qatar also has its own historical dynamics and social structure. Qatar’s population is dominated by migrants, ranging from 85 to 88 percent. Of the approximate 2.9 million residents of Qatar, there are only 300,000 “native” (Qatari) citizens.

This is more or less the same as the UAE, where around 88 percent of the population are non-Emirati citizens. In terms of numbers, the Bahrainis and the Kuwaitis are also not dominant in their respective countries. Only the Saudis and the Omanis outnumber expatriates.

Although the Qatari population is much smaller than the migrant population who are predominately citizens of South Asian countries (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), the Philippines or non-Qatar Arabs (Egypt), it is the Qatari group that makes and controls the political system, law, religion, economy, education and sociocultural policies

They are also entitled to enjoy various privileges and state facilities, important positions and “classy” jobs.

The migrant population is only limited to workers. They work in certain sectors, fields and types of work. They were the ones who built the World Cup infrastructure, such as the seven magnificent stadiums, hundreds of hotels, restaurants and roads to welcome soccer fans from many countries.

Then, who are the Qataris? The Qataris are a collection of various clans or ethnic groups that used to inhabit the east Arabian region. They include, among others, Al-Tsani, Al-Khalifa, Bani Khalid, Al-Saud, Al-Ainain, Al-Qawasim, Al-Musallam, Al-Attiyah and Al-Kuwari. Al-Tsani is the most influential, having ruled in the 19th century. Since 1868, Qatar has been controlled by the Al-Tsani family, namely the descendants of Sheikh Tsani bin Muhammad al-Tsamir, a tribal chief on the Qatar Peninsula.

According to the records of the Greek historian Herodotus from the fifth century, originally the inhabitants who occupied Qatar were Canaanite tribes who are mentioned in the Hebrew Bible. Are they the Qatari ancestors? Nobody knows exactly. What is clear is that various ethnic groups, Sumerians, Persians, Turks, Bedouin Arabs and so on, have lived in succession in the Qatar Peninsula region for thousands of years.

Plurality

The large number of non-Arab migrants has had an impact on the plurality of languages, religions and cultures in society. Even though Arabic (Qatar dialect) is the official language of the state, English is also widely practiced and has even become a lingua franca, especially in the world of commerce, media, administration, internet, games and daily communication with fellow expatriates and with Qataris.

A number of universities also use English or apply a “dual language” system (Arabic and English). The massive use of English caused the Government of Qatar to worry about the extinction of the Arabic language in the future, so they initiated a symposium on Arabic language preservation. Apart from Arabic and English, other languages are also practiced, such as Persi, Urdu, Hindi and Tagalog.

Like the plurality of languages, religion is also plural. Although Islam is the majority religion embraced by residents (about 67 percent, and the state’s official religion), many non-Islamic religions are also practiced, such as Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. For Islam, the majority of Qataris follow the Sunni-Hanbali-Wahhabi schools of thought, while the rest are Shiites (about 15 percent) and other Islamic groups.

Especially for Christians, the government has donated land for church construction. Inevitably, there are quite a number of churches in Qatar of various Christian denominations (Catholic, Baptist, Anglican, Orthodox, Pentecostal, Syro Malabar, Marthomite and so on). And there is a Krishna Temple in Doha for Hindus.

Cultural practices are also plural, such as art, music, clothing and sports. Although the state adopts the strict Hanbali school of thought and Wahhabism is practiced by the majority of Qatari citizens, the style and character of Hanbalism and Wahhabism in Qatar is quite moderate in matters of the dress code, appreciation of art and music and relations with non-Muslims (although in certain issues it is very strict, for example regarding the LGBT community).

The development of the world of education is no less interesting. Qatar built an “Education City” in Al-Rayyan specifically to accommodate foreign universities. A number of foreign universities have established branches in Qatar, such as Georgetown University, Northwestern University, Texas A&M University and Virginia Commonwealth University. Although Islam is the official and dominant religion, majors in Islamic studies programs are very limited. Those that dominate are majors in non-religious programs, such as business, economics, science, engineering, Artificial Intelligence and so on.

Socio-political history

Qatar’s social history is full of intrigue, conflict and violence, in stark contrast to the contemporary image of Qatar as relatively devoid of communal violence and open conflict.

Both before and after Islam was born in the 7th century, Qatar became a place of conflict and struggle for various interest groups between tribes living in Qatar and Arabia with foreign ethnic groups. For centuries, a number of foreign ethnic groups, such as the Sumerians, the Greeks, the Persians, the Romans, the Turks, the Bahrainis, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British and the French wanted to control the maritime trade routes that passed through the Arabian Gulf. In the 19th century, the Netherlands and England bombarded Qatar with canons. Qatar was involved in a “sea war” with Bahrain and Dubai (the UAE had not yet been established at that time).

Meanwhile, the mainland Qatar region has also become an arena of struggle over a number of pastoralist Bedouin Arab tribes/clans with nomadic patterns, such as the legendary Al-Murrah tribe. At the end of the 18th century, the Al-Saud clan from Arabia successfully invaded Qatar (and Al-Hasa) and defeated the dominance of the Bani Khalid clan. This tension between tribes/clans, among other things, prompted Britain to intervene to ensure peace; worried that their trade interests would be disturbed.

However, the peace agreement (general treaty of peace) did not last long. Qatar returned to turmoil until finally the Al-Tsani clan emerged brilliantly as a fraction of the Bani Tamim tribe in Arabia under the command of Jassim bin Muhammad al-Tsani, who was known as the founder of Qatar. He solved socio-political problems and the conflict between Arab tribes, who inhabited Qatar, with Britain, Turkey (Ottoman), Bahrain and Dubai. Since then, the prestige of the Al-Tsani clan has grown stronger and stronger. Like the Al-Saud clan in Saudi Arabia, the Al-Tsani clan until now controls Qatar’s social, political and economic systems.

Marginalized society

Qatar also has a dark side. Discriminatory attitudes and social injustice are rife, not only against migrant workers, but also against a group of Qatari Arabs themselves. For example, a number of tribes and clans, such as the Al-Murrah, the Al-Ghufran and the Syaml al-Hawajir are facing serious problems, because the government has revoked their citizenship status and civil rights. Now there are thousands of members of these tribes who hold a stateless status, such as the Rohingya, the Kurds and the Darfur. Many of them live in exile in several other countries in the Middle East and have been imprisoned and tortured to a point of asking the United Nations for assistance.

The tragedy that befell a number of tribes stems from their disapproval of the Emir of Qatar in 1995, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Tsani, who took power from his own father (Sheikh Khalifa bin Jassim al-Tsani) through a coup while he was in Europe. The father tried to reclaim his throne with the help of several tribes/clans, but failed. As a result, the father was kicked out of Qatar. In 2004 he returned to Qatar. The current Emir of Qatar (Tamim bin Hamad al-Tsani) also overthrew his father in 2013.

Note: this article was fist published by Kompas, 17 December 2022. https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2022/12/17/about-qatar?open_from=Search_Result_Page