Does Religion Matter in Violence?

Penulis

In response to a spate of religious violence that broke out in some parts of Indonesia, such as the recent attack on the Shia community in Madura, Religious Affairs Minister Surya-dharma Ali claimed that such riots had nothing to do with religion.

It is not clear whether his statement aims at creating stability, preventing recurring disturbances or avoiding the “real” problems facing Muslims in the region. This is not the first time that the minister has issued such a “silly” statement, and he is not the only political leader that claims there is “zero connection” between religion and violence, although in some cases, religious discourse, institutions and actors did figure into the turmoil.

Rather than investigating religious networks in sectarian conflict settings, social scientists also tend to look at political and economic dimensions of the collective riots. For most of them, religion is considered a peripheral issue. Indeed, observers from secular traditions generally find it difficult to acknowledge the degree to which different logic and moralities affect behavior in religious communities, and they consequently underestimate the degree to which religion underwrites violent conflict on its own terms.

Academic observers also tend to downplay the role of religion in the riots, insisting that what appears to be a religious conflict is, upon closer analysis, really motivated by political interests as well as socio-economic and territorial grievances that are mobilized and manipulated by greedy elites, outside provocateurs or agents of conflict.

Taking the same line, moderate religious leaders and scholars also tend to refuse identification of violent conflict with religion, noting that religion teaches peace not violence, tolerance not intolerance, love not hate, and the like.

Unfortunately, however, many cases show otherwise. Many violent conflicts throughout the world, including Indonesia, have been cloaked in religious garb. What the moderates think of or idealize as religion might differ from the conceptions of radicals. While moderates denounce radicalism as “irreligious” or “un-Islamic,” extremists regard and believe that violence is a part of a “sacred mission” and strongly rooted within their religious traditions, beliefs, doctrines and teachings.

Does religion matter? If so, why does it matter?

There are a number of reasons why religion does matter in some cases of communal violence, including but not limited to, the numerous cases of communal conflict in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

The first reason is that, as prominent religion historian R. Scott Appleby noted in The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, religion’s confessional loyalty translates into a clearly defined and durable community, its model of faith counters rational calculation and enlightened self-interest, it cultivates a righteous sense of persecution and provokes passion against evil that fuels the excesses of group hatred.

Although religions were indeed manufactured or invented within particular historical and political contexts of thousands of years ago, their creeds, Appleby (2000: 57-61) has argued, are represented as fundamental truths, providing security in times of uncertainty, and countering the challenges of relativism and secularism of late modernity. This is precisely what Salafi, Wahabi and other religious radical groups have held up in Indonesia and other parts of the world.

Second, religion, Islam included, possesses a stock of material metaphors and military imagery, and promises rewards for violent sacrifice. The concept of some transcendental authority — the “will of God” — which translates into the absolute authority of church officials, and religious myths of election (e.g. the concept of the “chosen people” or the “best religious community of believers”) and persecution, provides a powerful alternative to the delusional formation of paranoia, which transforms victimhood into vengeful action. This is among the reasons why “religious culprits” and doers of violence never regret their inhuman, violent acts.

Third, religion potentially transfers secular differences between a particular “us” and “them”, the known and the unfamiliar, to the cosmic plane and thus into a moral struggle between the amorphous forces of order and chaos, and good and evil, for which the ultimate sacrifice — murder or martyrdom —is possible.

Fourth, religion did matter during the anti-Shia or anti-Ahmadiyah campaigns since it provides a more powerful and effective force for mobilization than other forms of collective identity partly because, according to Chris Wilson in his From Soil to God, religion is “not only strongly linked to a sense of self, but also provides a far-reaching and uplifting ideology, powerful institutional structures and an enduring and clear-cut definition of an ‘other.’” Rioters, unsurprisingly, often were discovered to be driven by religious zeal. The mobilization of ordinary people in the riots was full of religious symbolism. Some religious institutions became primary conduits for the mobilization of people for violence in the name of God, faith or even particular schools of thought (mazhab). These institutions, moreover, exercised vast emotional influence over some adherents of Islam, as well as provided social meeting places, communication networks and pools of resources.

Fifth and finally, religion provides the concept of a “sacred territory” and a set of ready materials and symbolic targets, which if attacked provokes intense feelings. Accordingly, mosques were destroyed, religious centers desecrated, sacred texts and beliefs were ridiculed, prophets or religious figures were slandered and other symbols of faith violated.

To conclude, while religion never acts autonomously as a cause of conflict, ignoring its role completely would preclude a proper understanding of much of the violence in Indonesia.

Throughout the many instances of communal violence in the country, religious sentiments, material interests and political motives interacted with one another to magnify and alter the influence each would have had in isolation. Take away one factor, such as religious tension, economic inequality or political competition, the violence would not occur.

This is to say that although religion matters in most outbursts of violence in the nation, it is also too simple to reduce the complexity of the riots to just a matter of religion without investigating the political economy of particular religious followers and groups in the broad and varied social field of Indonesia.

Source: Jakarta Post

Calling for a Religious Dialogue

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

At first, I was beaming with proud to hear the “good news” that Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali would accept the proposal of a dialogue to resolve the “Sampang tragedy” between local Sunnis and Shiites, who were recently involved in a violent conflict that resulted in three deaths, tens of injuries (including women and children), and the destruction of the school and mosque. Other followers of Shia, the targeted group, were found hiding in a forest out of sight from the angry attackers—the Sunnis.

However, I was soon dismayed by his “silly” comments noting that conversion of Shi’a followers to Sunnism is the best solution to avoid further attacks as was the case of Ahmadis (the followers of Ahmadiyah sect) in some places in West Java, who were forcibly converted to Sunnism.

Dialogue, thus, is a means of converting Shiites.

Rather than protecting the religious and individual rights of the Shiites as a minority group and the victims in the “Sampang clash,” the Minister even “terrorized” them, theologically, by denouncing Shia as a deviant Islamic sect, and that the conversion of Shiites to Sunnism, which he believes as a “true and right” Islamic school of thought (mazhab), became an “apt answer” to resolve the intergroup violence in Sampang of Madura and other anti-Shiite riots in Indonesia.

Still, rather than condemning the attackers as human rights criminals that need to be brought to justice, the minister’s insensitive comments seemed to give “endorsement” to the perpetrators.

No wonder then that many human rights activists, interfaith dialogue practitioners, and moderate religious leaders in the archipelago, including Said Aqiel Siradj, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest independent Muslim organizations, strongly criticized the minister, and urged him to publicly apologize and retract his previous statement that denounced Shia as a deviant sect. A graduate of Mecca’s Umm al-Qura University, Said, along with other moderate Muslim leaders, moreover, regarded Shia as part of Islamic religion, which all Muslims, whatever their sects, schools, parties, and organizations, need to show respect.

I agree that dialogue is needed to resolve disputes and achieve reconciliation among the conflicting parties, but its main goal is not to convert the Shiites. Rather, the primary objective of it is to attain mutual respect and understanding between Sunnis and Shiites. No doubt, dialogue is a vital “cultural approach” for establishing inter- and intra-religious harmony and peace. Dialogue in this context does not mean “face-to-face conversations” in seminars, discussions, workshops, or other public debates and formal forums; instead it is an ongoing communication process to understand thoughts, minds, worldviews, teachings, systems of belief, and philosophies of life of other communities.

As its most basic, religious dialogue is a simple concept: persons of different faiths (or different sects and schools of thoughts—mazhab) meeting to have a conversation. But the character of the conversation and the purpose of having the talk are not simple to describe or categorize since they cover a variety of types. Professor of interreligious dialogue at Temple University, Leonard Swidler, as cited by David Smock (2002: 6) in the book Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding, describes religious dialogue as “a conversation among people of different faiths [or the same religion but different sect] on a common subject, the primary purpose of which is for each participant to learn from the other so that s/he can change and grow.” Swidler, moreover, affirms that religious dialogue can operate in three areas: the “practical” (collaboration of different religious groups to help humanity), the “spiritual” (experiencing “from within” by participating in the religious practices of other groups), and the “cognitive” (seeking knowledge and understanding of the others).

Dialogue is, thus, a cultural bridge to air deadlock, to enhance mutual awareness, to foster joint activities, and even to transform relationships between members of conflicting groups. Dialogue is an effective communication tool to create mutual understanding and mutual trust among warring parties. Tensions, disturbances, and conflicts happened because of a lack of communication. Human rights’ violations occur, for the most part, because of a lack of dialogue. Dialogue, then, requires commitment and willingness to seek “other truths,” not to force “our truth to others.”

In brief, religious dialogue can take a wide variety of forms, ranging from joint appeals by high-level religious leaders for an end to fighting, to attempts to develop mutual understanding and the recognition of shared values and interests, to grassroots efforts to encourage repentance and promote reconciliation. These types of ongoing, healthy and constructive dialogue can function as a way to move from the perspective of, in Milton Bennett’s terms, “ethnocentrism” to “ethnorelativism.” In his “Towards Ethorelativism,” Milton Bennett (1993, 1-51) defines the word “ethnocentric” as “assuming that the worldview of one’s own culture is central to all reality,” while fundamental to ethnorelativism is “the assumption that cultures can only be understood relative to one another and that particular behavior can only be understood within a cultural context.”
Those who have actively engaged in interfaith dialogue and cross-cultural encounters realize that moving from an ethnocentric perspective to an ethno-relative one is a lengthy, tiring journey. Here, those involved in the dialogue process need a strong commitment, significant motivation, and sincere intention to totally engage with “outsiders” for the sake of inter-group peace, tolerance, and harmony.

Given the vitality of dialogue for resolving conflict, Hans Kung, president of the Foundation for a Global Ethic, one of international NGOs promoting religious dialogue and peace, noted that dialogue is the key for the creation of global peacebuilding. And the key of successful dialogue, Kung reminds us in his A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, lies in the search of the foundations of each religion. One cannot condemn other religions or sects as deviant or illicit based on his/her own believes.
Only through a religious dialogue, as the way I sketched above, can the Shiite-Sunni conflict in Sampang and elsewhere in Indonesia be wisely resolved. Otherwise, the tension will become a ticking bomb in the years to come.

Source: The Jakarta Post

Blaming Muslims, Scapegoating Americans

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

At any moment in Western history, some people have been targeted for broad-based hatred: Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Anabaptists, Africans, Irish, Slavs, Gypsies, peacemakers, communists, liberals, radicals, homosexuals, and, unfortunately, so forth. Today, anthropologist John R. Bowen wrote in his 2012 book Blaming Islam, the main targets of abhorrence are Muslims.

Bowen’s observation, on some points, might be right. In the eyes of some non-Muslims and Westerners nowadays, the image of Islam and Muslim societies, more or less, resembles al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other Islamist extremist groups that (1) exert violent means to achieve their goals, (2) advocate oppressing and torturing women, (3) condemn westerners and non-Muslims as infidels, (4) struggle for an Islamic state or application of Islamic Sharia, (5) oppose Western values of democracy, secularism, or liberalism, to name but a few.

The tendency to view Islam as a “religion of the sword” colored by acts of terrorism and violence, it should be noted, is not a new phenomenon that emerged following the attacks of the Pentagon and the WTC on 9/11. Such biased views and stereotypes are deeply rooted in propaganda of media, speeches of conservative evangelists or “radical right wings” of Christians and Jews, and works of (some) early and modern orientalists since the rise of so-called “Western civilization” which regards Islam as a “Green Peril,” borrowing the term of Nader Hashemi, for the existence of Western gestalt. For early or even current “unfriendly orientalists” and “religious propagandists,” Islamic civilization is perceived to be an incarnation of what Western civilization was not. While they considered Western civilization as peaceful, progressive, dynamic, rational, and humane, Islamic civilization was deemed as violent, aggressive, decadent, stagnant, irrational, mythical, despotic, and inhuman.

Such biased perception toward Islam certainly is only partially true. Blaming Islam as a “religion of violence” and Muslims as a terrorist and “uncivilized” group ignored the whole picture of the Muslim world and missed the other widespread facts of peaceful Islam and civilized, tolerant Muslims.

However, unfortunately, such unfair views of Islam have gradually undergone a process of internalization in the minds of some Western non-Muslims people today, and then, have subsequently formed an attitude of hatred, enmity, and prejudice toward Islam and Muslim societies. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Director of the Peacebuilding and Development Institute at American University, Washington, D.C., in his book Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam (2003, 2) reveals that there are some reasons why some Westerners and non-Muslims view Islam and Muslim societies pejoratively. The reasons are, Abu-Nimer said, because of “selective reporting, lack of scholarly works on nonviolent and peaceful issues within Islam, the legacy of colonial subordination of Islamic countries to the West, ignorance of cultural differences, failure of Muslims to convey their messages, and the violent Arab-Israeli conflicts.”

Sadly, Muslims often respond violently toward propaganda and provocation of a handful of non-Muslims such as the recent case of the appearance of Innocence of Muslims, a deliberately provocative and vulgar anti-Islam American made video. The movie, as we can see on the Internet, portrays Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as a buffoon, “bastard,” greedy, bloodthirsty, womanizer, homosexual and child molester. Such negative portrayals of the prophet actually had previously been written in a number of books by some non-Muslims or ex-Muslims (e.g. Ibn Warraq’s edited book, Leaving Islam or Anwar Shaikh’s Faith and Deception). But such rude depiction of Islam never resulted in the massive public protests or popular rage among Muslims. This happens, perhaps, due to limited access to the books and, for sure, no actors that mobilized masses to engage in brutal protests.

Now, with the Internet and You Tube, people can easily post or broadcast any intolerant idea and controversial product that is accessible wide-reaching audience. No doubt, the posting of Innocence of Muslims on You Tube was meant to incite fear, anger, and hatred of Islam and Muslims, and provoke Muslims worldwide, and so it did. The civilian protests—exploited by conservative religious groupings and violent extremists—have spread from North Africa to Southeast Asia, often leading to mob violence and the death of innocent civilians.

While Muslims around the world still protest in streets, French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad. Issues of the magazine, as the Huffington Post (9/19) reports, “hit newsstands with a front cover showing an Orthodox Jew pushing a turbaned figure in a wheelchair with several caricatures of the Prophet on its inside pages, including some of him naked.” No doubt, the cartoons also triggered mass demonstration in France.

Georgetown University Professor of Religion John Esposito said that the terrorist attacks on the US embassy in Benghazi (Libya) and the major riots in Cairo (Egypt) and elsewhere look similar but share in common, namely the incitement and exploitation of popular outrage among many Muslims, as was the case of the Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses novel in late 1980s and Danish cartoons affair in 2005. They, Esposito notes, “exploit deep seated popular anti-American sentiment, based on decades of resentment over U.S. and European foreign policies in the Middle East” (Aljazeera, 9/15). The primary drivers or motives behind the attacks, Esposito claims, are political agendas reflecting the shifting political landscape in the Arab world.

Indeed, as Esposito has noticed, there are some ambiguities with regard to the Muslim protests to the movie. The Muslim protesters and rioters not only denounce the film but also scapegoat American societies and U.S. government which they accused behind the making of the movie aiming at ridiculing Prophet Muhammad and insulting Islam, despite the fact that President Barack Obama and many Americans have condemned the movie. Indeed, Americans have undoubtedly nothing to do with the production of the film.

The men behind the movie have been identified as (1) Alan Roberts, a 65-year-old porn director, and (2) Sam Nakoula, a hardline anti-Muslim Egyptian-American Copt and convicted embezzler. In contrast, Bishop Serapion of the Coptic Orthodox Diocese of Los Angeles denounced the film, and noted that the Christian teaching is to respect people of other faiths. The duo maybe has been paid by some shadowy anti-Islam non-Muslim figures with fat pockets and a hidden agenda to destabilize Arab, the Middle East, or even the “Muslim world.” But still, it is unfair to point their fingers to US government and American people as a whole.

As Esposito has observed, I hence suspect that the initial protests against the movie have been manipulated by some anti-American Muslim hardliners for their political agenda and individual interests. If my suspicions are correct, then the plan of whosoever lurks behind Nakoula and Roberts, as well as America haters may have been successful. It is easy to provoke masses in order to commit violence and hostility, but it is extremely hard to create “peace provocateurs” and incite people for tolerance and harmony!

Source: The Jakarta Post

Ambivalence of Muslim Solidarity

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Every time the Israeli-Palestinian conflict re-emerges on the stage of global politics, Muslim groups in predominantly Muslim-populated countries like Indonesia, but also in the West, the United States included, organize events — from small gatherings in mosques or Islamic centers to large-scale fundraisers.

Some mobilize the masses to condemn Jews or Israelis (and usually also the Americans, seen as masterminds behind the conflict). Others urge international agencies, including the United Nations, to help resolve the seemingly endless clash between Arabs and Jews.

On many websites, furthermore, Muslims post pictures of Palestinian victims and “Israeli savagery,” neglecting casualties on the part of Israel. Many Muslims, moreover, continue to solely blame Israel for the bloodshed, while ignoring violent acts committed by Hamas.

Such “global Muslim solidarity” also occurred when Rohingya in Myanmar and Moros in Mindanao (Southern Philippines), among others, were marginalized and persecuted by non-Muslim regimes.

Certainly, there is nothing wrong with such solidarity. Each people and religious grouping has the right to select those it wants to assist or endorse.

And urgent appeals are indeed needed to help and support — intellectually, politically and financially — the victims of violence and the oppressed worldwide, including the Palestinians, Moros and Rohingya, who the UN describes as among the most persecuted people in the world, with over 80,000 now without shelter and protection from the recent violence in Myanmar.

Notwithstanding Muslims’ notable assistance benefiting their “imagined” religious brethren, one question remains unanswered: why do they so passionately support the Muslim casualties, and not, for instance, Jewish victims?

Instead of Hamas, why do Muslims solely blame Israelis for the aggression and brutality? Why does such “religious solidarity,” or whatever one calls it, only occur when Muslims have been the object of oppression of non-Muslim groups such as those of Palestine (by Jews), Mindanao (Catholics), Myanmar or Southern Thailand (Buddhists), India (Hindus), and Bosnia (Orthodox Serbs)?

Importantly, why doesn’t such similar Islamic solidarity come into view when Muslim communities have been the targets of persecution and injustice by Muslim regimes? Examples abound, like the case of the Kurds (in Turkey, Iraq, Syria), Darfur (Sudan), Shiites (Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan), Sunnis (Iran), Ahmadis (Pakistan and Indonesia) etcetera.

Despite the fact that Islam and the Koran oblige Muslims to reach out to those in need, regardless of their ethno-religious backgrounds, why do most Muslims choose silence when confronted with Muslim extremists and dictatorial rulers maltreating and discriminating against ethno-religious minorities in, to name just a few examples, Egypt, Bangladesh and Iran?

It is obvious that for some Muslim groups the primary question is not “who are the victims?” but rather “who are the perpetrators?”

It is more about “the oppressors” rather than “the oppressed.”

Romanticizing and using double standards, some call for “global Islamic solidarity” simply because the persecution of Muslims is committed by non-Muslims or actors they mistakenly dub “infidels” ( kuffar ).

Such “exclusivist religious solidarity” misreads the historical dynamics and socio-political backgrounds of inter-group conflicts, overlooks the facts of interreligious coalitions for global peace and reconciliation, misunderstands the diversity of societies, and reveals the opportunism of extremists and conservative Muslim political leaders who draw populist support by blaming non-Muslims.

It is worth noting that, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, Arabs (mostly Muslim) make up some 20.4 percent of its population, and these people mostly identify themselves as Arab by nationality and Israeli by citizenship. It is not surprising then that there are Israeli Arabs (or Arab Israelis) who serve in the Israel Defense Forces.

Moreover, there is also a sizable non-Muslim minority in the Palestinian Territories, including Druze, Samaritan, and Christians from various denominations. In fact, Palestine is the birthplace of Christianity. The conversion process to Islam began in the seventh century when Muslims captured Palestine. Studies also illustrate that a majority of the Palestinian Muslims are offspring of Christians, Jews, and other earlier dwellers of the southern Levant.

But apart from this, there are more facts contributing to the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including Jewish opposition against Israeli authorities. There are many anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian Jews and organizations worldwide, including rabbis, activists, and academics, as discussed in David Landy’s illuminating 2011 book, “Jewish Identity and Palestinian Rights: Diaspora Jewish Opposition to Israel.” An Irish-Jewish academic and former chair of the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Landy himself has an activist background.

Moreover, despite the support of some “right-wing” Christians, there are also Christian activists and peacemakers calling for Palestinian liberation and who oppose Israeli policies. These include Palestinian Archbishop Elias Chacour, who has long been working to promote reconciliation and peace between Arabs and Israelis.

Given the historical complexity and dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is quite inaccurate to simply dub it Muslim-Jewish violence. Rather, it is a war between extremist factions in both Palestine and Israel.

The global Muslim solidarity movement, thus, will be more meaningful and successful if it uses “human solidarity” as its basis, instead of a religious-based discourse.

Whoever suffers and is in need of support, deserves to be given a helping hand — whatever their religious affiliation and ethnic background. Isn’t the very fundamental teaching of Islam to be rahmatan lil ‘alamin — a blessing for all humanity? It is the job of Muslim activists to bring this universal message down to earth.

Source: Jakarta Globe

A Camouflage for Religious Violence

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

In a press conference after a meeting on the deadly Sampang riots of Aug. 26, Home Affairs Minister Gamawan Fauzi, Minister of Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali, and National Police Chief Gen. Timur Pradopo announced that the attack, in which a group of Sunni Muslims attacked Shiites, killing three, was not driven by religion, but by a family conflict.

Gamawan said “the Sampang incident is a purely criminal case that developed out of a family conflict and later gained momentum within the local community.” It is, therefore, “not an anti-Shiite situation,” as he was quoted in the Jakarta Globe.
Stemming from a sibling rivalry between Shiite leader Tajul Muluk and his brother Roisul Hukuma that has been brewing since 2004, the initial conflict might be interpersonal in nature rather than interreligious. And there is evidence that the clash was triggered by competition over a woman.

The question remains, however, why it degenerated into a religious riot or, more precisely, an anti-Shiite campaign. Why did the mob — made up of Sunni Muslims unconnected to the brothers — angrily assault the Shiite community, resulting in deaths, injuries and the destruction of property? Were the attackers driven by economic-political calculations or religious considerations?

The religious overtones make it difficult to believe that the riot was simply the result of a long-brewing “family conflict” finally boiling over.

Statements from the government, such as Gamawan’s, might have a calming effect on the masses and reduce tension, but they do not address the “real” problems of Shia-Sunni relations. It is significant to note that the Sampang tragedy was not the first time Shiites have been attacked in Indonesia. And anti-Shiite riots are not unique to Indonesia.

Violence against Shiites occurs all over the Muslim world, particularly in countries where followers of the Shia branch of Islam have been a religious minority group. Anti-Shiite violence has been reported in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Malaysia, to name but a few.

Graham Fuller and Rend Francke, two experts in Shia history who co-authored “The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims,” wrote that in the Arab world and the Middle East, particularly in countries where Sunnis are the dominant religious group, Shiites have been the “object of systematic, official, legal religious discrimination.” This is not to suggest that Shiites have never attacked Sunnis. In countries like Iran, Lebanon, or today’s Iraq, Sunnis have been targeted for discrimination and persecution based on their beliefs.

If the violence in Sampang was an overblown family feud, as the government alleges, it is still difficult to ignore the signs that point to the prolonged history of Sunni-Shiite antagonism. These two Islamic sects have been coming into conflict since the earliest days of the religion, meaning that Islam has almost always contended with inter-sect violence.

In brief, the Sampang incident should be seen as belonging to broader Sunni-Shiite conflict, one that is deeply rooted within their religious traditions and socio-political history.

Given the historical roots of the Sunni-Shia conflict, Minister Gamawan’s official statement on the matter seems like a calculated move to simplify the Sampang riot.
Gamawan’s remark, “It just so happens that the two are of different sects — one is a Shiite and the other is a Sunni, ” reflects the government’s oversimplification of the conflict. Seen from another perspective, Gamawan’s words neglect the facts of the history of rivalry between the two sects.

It is time for the government, then, not just to detain those who took part in or instigated the attack, but also to protect religious minorities. Unfortunately, rather than making attempts at reconciliation and the creation of mutual understanding between the two groups, Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali, based on a fatwa issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI), condemned the Shiites as a deviant religious sect.
It is the job of our leaders to provide security for every citizen, offer asylum for refugees, create stability in the nation, guard the interests of minorities and, most importantly, act swiftly and firmly with those who break the law and seek to spread religious intolerance. Such offenders need to be brought in front of a judge and if they are found guilty, thrown in jail.

Muslim religious leaders, moreover, need to come together to denounce any act of violence, whether on behalf of religion, differing schools of thought, sects and other divisions in religious life. Violence is violence. There is no legitimate or sacred violence.
Muslim leaders and ulema, furthermore, need to instill a culture of religious tolerance by supplying pluralist Islamic materials to Islamic schools, actively teaching democratic and pluralistic forms of Islam, and spreading the significance of unity, harmony and respect among religious believers.

Above all, government and religious authorities need to endlessly endorse a process of dialogue between Shiites as the victims and Sunnis as the offenders. As the noted scholar Daniel Philpott said in his new book, “Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation,” by promoting a process of dialogue and reconciliation among victims and offenders, a community that was once in conflict could “respect one another as citizens and commit themselves to civility.”

Source: Jakarta Globe

The 2019 Election in Indonesia: The Battle between “Jokowi Lovers” and “Jokowi Haters”

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Indonesia makes history, again. On Wednesday, 17 April 2019, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and one of Asia Pacific’s vibrant democracies held the most complex and largest single-day presidential and legislative elections on earth, involving more than 190 million voters at home and abroad. This year is the first time Indonesia held its presidential and legislative elections simultaneously.

Two candidates ran for the 2019 presidential election. The incumbent President Joko Widodo (b. 1961) picked the Muslim cleric, Islamic scholar and politician KH Ma’ruf Amin (b. 1943) as his running mate. Contesting him was retired military general Prabowo Subianto (b. 1951), who chose entrepreneur Sandiaga Uno (1969) as his running mate. This is the second time for Prabowo Subianto to challenge Joko Widodo in the presidential elections. Previously, five years ago, in 2014, Prabowo Subianto had contested Widodo in the presidential election.

Both Joko Widodo–Ma’ruf Amin and Prabowo Subianto–Sandiaga Uno tickets were endorsed by a mixture of secular, nationalist, and religious / Islamic political parties. Joko Widodo and Ma’ruf Amin were supported by the secular/nationalist parties PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, Hanura, and PSI as well as the traditionalist, religious/Islamic moderate parties PKB and PPP. Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, on the other hand, were backed up by a coalition including but not limited to secular/nationalist parties Gerindra, Demokrat, Berkarya, and Garuda as well as the Islamist PKS and PAN, a coalition of religious and non-religious groups.

Although the General Election Commission (KPU = Komisi Pemilihan Umum) will give an official announcement on the elections’ results in May 22nd, a dozen of reputable survey institutions (such as SMRC, Indo Barometer, Poltracking Indonesia, Cyrus Network, LSI, Charta Politika, Indikator Politik Indonesia, CSIS, and Litbang Kompas) have forecasted the victory of the incumbent President Joko Widodo with more than 10 percent difference, bases on quick count outcomes they have conducted. Quick Count (QC) or Parallel Vote Tabulations (PVTs) is a survey method adopted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to help citizens monitor their election processes, and its results are usually congruent with those of the real count.

While Joko Widodo seem to trail ahead according to quick count results, his contender Prabowo Subianto, the former Army general,, claimed his victory. In doing so, he rejected survey organizations’ quick count outcomes and accused them of manipulating pollsters and the elections data, and of being partisan supporters of the incumbent Widodo – he had done this in the 2014 presidential election as well. After receiving an estimated of 55 percent of the vote, based on quick counts results of the multiple credible survey institutions, Joko Widodo announced his re-election as an Indonesian President. Not admitting defeat, Prabowo also claimed he won 62 percent of the vote based on his campaign’s own counts and held mass prayers with his loyal supporters in celebration of his claim to victory.

Public Enthusiasm about the Elections

The turnout rate for the elections stand over 80 percent – higher than the participation rate for the 2014 presidential election, which was 69 percent. These figures demonstrate extraordinary eagerness of Indonesian voters to participate in the democratic process since the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian rule in 1998 and since the archipelagic country held its first direct presidential elections in 2004.

The 2019 elections showcase a considerable reduction in absenteeism (better known as “Golongan Putih”– “the White Group”– or “Golput” for short) in Indonesian elections over the past decade. For instance, in the 2004 election, 25 percent of voters went Golput and the number went up to 28 percent in the 2009 election.

What made Indonesians so enthusiastic about this year’s elections, then? One of the most important driving factors contributing to the electorate’s unprecedented enthusiasm is that the majority of Indonesians see the elections as a critical moment to change or defend the country’s governmental regime, foundational state ideology (known as Pancasila), and its constitution (known as UUD 1945).

Those who are eager to see a change in these three areas are labeled “Jokowi haters”, while those who want to defend them are labeled “Jokowi lovers.” Jokowi is a nickname for President Joko Widodo. It is imperative to note that both “Jokowi lovers” and “Jokowi haters” consist of both secular and religious groups, religious conservatives and moderates, and Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

It is hence misleading to say that the 2019 elections symbolized a fight between conservative or religious Muslims and progressive or secular Muslims. This is because supporters of both candidates were composed of a mixed set of ideologically non-homogenous actors and not unified blocs. The 2019 elections, then, were indeed a battle between “Jokowi lovers” versus “Jokowi haters.” Why so?

“Jokowi Lovers” versus “Jokowi Haters”

As stated earlier, “Jokowi lovers” are a group of Indonesian people who want to defend Joko Widodo as the Indonesian President, while “Jokowi haters” are those who are keen to replace his presidency. Who make up these two camps?

Jokowi lovers are mainly made up of the following groups.

The majority of Jokowi lovers are Indonesians who are satisfied with his political performance, individual credibility, social commitment, cultural reforms, economic growth, and national development during 2014–19 presidency. It is true that since Joko Widodo took power in 2014, he was able to elevate the reputation of Indonesia globally in many fields. The World Bank and the Asialink Business, for instance, have reported that Indonesia has registered impressive economic growth and that it is Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the 16thlargest in the world, since overcoming the Asian financial crisis of the mid-1990s. The country’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has also steadily and significantly risen. An emerging middle-income country, Indonesia is now the world’s 10thlargest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, a member of the prestigious G-20, and has made impressive gains in poverty reduction. Joko Widodo has also been credited for being able to maintain relative socio-political stability, despite the extant high tension among diverse ethnoreligious groups.

Militant nationalists and human right activists who are afraid of Prabowo Subianto since he brings a bad human rights record – he is accused of human rights violations during his active military service and has long been questioned on his integrity, promise and commitment for the development and advancement of Indonesia.

Anti-New Order factions that fear the comeback of loyalists and cronies of Suharto (1921–2008), Indonesia’s dictatorial ruler who had been in power for 32 years between 1966-1998. Prabowo Subianto was Suharto’s ex-son-in-law, and in fact, Suharto’s children and families (e.g. Tommy Suharto, Titiek Suharto, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, etc.) have been Prabowo’s backers in the presidential elections.
Muslim moderates and traditionalists, especially those linked with Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim social organization, who are worried about the rise of Islamist, puritan, and Salafi groups, including advocates of an Islamic state and the caliphate system, who support Prabowo’s candidacy.

Nahdlatul Ulama is the strongest opponent of the Indonesian brand of the ideology of Islamism (see below more detail on Indonesia’s Islamism and Islamist movement) and the sturdiest advocate for moderate Islam (wasatiyya).
Non-Muslims, either followers of established faith traditions (Christianity, Buddhism, or Hinduism) or of local beliefs, who are afraid of the growth of intolerant, anti-pluralist Islamic movements..
Last but not the least, villagers and ordinary people in the countryside who simply see Joko Widodo as a humble, people-loving, and hard-working president.

Who, then, are the Jokowi haters? They primarily consist of following groups.

Loyalists, cronies and families of Suharto and his former New Order regime that see Joko Widodo as a nightmare for their future political and economic careers. In fact, Joko Widodo, since he took power in 2014, has frozen many assets linked to Suharto’s cronies and families – a major reason why these groups fully supported Prabowo. Elites, activists and members of political parties, mainly PKS, Gerindra, PAN, or Demokrat, which are not granted strategic positions in Joko Widodo administration’s ministries and other important government posts.
Islamist groups that accuse Joko Widodo as an “anti-Islamic ruler” and “pro-non-Muslims” due to the shutdown of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a transnational Islamist political organization.

These groups allege that Widodo has backed former Christian governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, or that he has formed alliances with Christian elites. Another accusation against Widodo is that he has bought into the police allegations that Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, founder of Islamic Defender Front, a notorious paramilitary group, is a suspect of multiple crimes, including insults against state ideology

Victims of hoaxes, propaganda, and black campaigns through multiple media and tools.

Whereas Jokowi lovers see Jokowi as a common friend, Jokowi haters view him as a common enemy. Moreover, while Jokowi lovers see the elections as an opportunity to defend Jokowi’s presidency, Jokowi haters, in contrast, view the elections as an opportunity to topple Jokowi.

However, it is vital to note that both the Jokowi-lovers camp and the Jokowi-haters camp are composed of internally diverse groups with different motives, goals, and agendas. Some Jokowi lovers want the incumbent to continue his major success and reform-driven outlook in various fields, especially in economic, political, and cultural sectors, others want him to protect the country’s pluralistic state ideology and constitution from Islamist groupings that are keen to change them. Others, however, have an interest in keeping Indonesia’s “unity in diversity” as enshrined in the national motto: Bhineka Tunggal Ika.

Jokowi haters also have multiple, diverse set of agendas. Some are driven by secular reasons, while others by religious motives. Some view Joko Widodo as a real peril standing against their interests, others as a road-block before their agenda to establish an Islamic state, caliphate-based governmental system, or to replace the country’s constitution with the Qur’an and Islamic law. Still, others see the incumbent as impeding their ambitions to reoccupy the government.

Islamist Factor in the Elections

Although multiple factors played a role to create public enthusiasm about the elections, the rise of Islamism in contemporary Indonesia has been one of the key driving forces for Indonesian people’s significant participation and motivation in the presidential election. Bassam Tibi, in his Islamism and Islam, defines “Islamism” a political ideology based on a reinvented version of Islamic law. Frequently used to describe the ideology of political Islam, Islamism seeks a greater role for Islam in the government, economy and society. Islamism’s central agenda is to make the state actively promote enforcement of sharia and to uphold Islamic values and principles. Practitioners (individuals or groups) of Islamism are called Islamist.

Islamist movement is not new in Indonesia. However, Islamist mobilizations became more noticeable in the country’s political stage after the late President Suharto stepped down from his thrown in 1998, following financial and economic crises that hit the country. For the Islamists, Suharto’s downfall was seen as a great impetus to express their religious, cultural, ideological, political and economic interests partly because during his reign, this group was sternly controlled by the dictatorial regime.

The democratic atmosphere in the post-Suharto era provided room for the Islamists to flourish. A variety of Islamist groups have established Islamic centers, organizations, schools, and even political parties across the archipelago. They freely produce Islamic books and other publications (and distribute them to the society through their extensive networks) that are in line with their Islamic ideas and interpretations , as well as their socio-political agenda. Although these groups enjoy living in a democratic system, many if not all of them, paradoxically, use these Islamic institutions to disseminate intolerance, ethnocentrism and anti-pluralism, as well as to oppose democracy which they see as a Western-secular product.

Various Islamist groups had enjoyed democratic freedoms, particularly during the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (r. 2004–14), who was dubbed the “Islamist incubator” due to the regime’s silence towards Islamist violence and intolerance as well as its coalition with PKS (The Justice and Welfare Party), one of the main supporters of the Islamist groupings, which since 2014 has been Prabowo Subianto’s main ally. It was during Yudhoyono’s rule, as Human Right Watch has noted, that Islamist and militant Salafi groups, the main actors of various intolerant and anti-pluralist agendas, had grown significantly and proliferated across the country.

The Islamist groups started to gain momentum during Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 2017, when they were able to mobilize ordinary Muslim masses to topple the incumbent Christian–Chinese governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), and set up their desired candidate of Arab origin, Anies Baswedan. Baswedan had mainly been supported by Gerindra and PKS, the two political parties that endorsed Prabowo Subianto in the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019. As I highlighted elsewhere, Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial election was the worst episode in Indonesian experience with democratic elections because it was preceded by violence, tension, uproar, terror, hatred, intimidation, racism, ethnocentrism, and vicious Islamist mobilization propelled by multiple Islamist groups.

The Islamist groups wanted to “copy-paste” their success in the Jakarta election to the national level during the presidential election. It is true that the Islamist groups used the same patterns, strategies, tactics, propaganda, and dirty campaigns as they used during Jakarta’s gubernatorial election by manipulating Islamic texts, discourses, and symbols to win the heart and minds of everyday Muslims and to support their candidate: Prabowo Subianto.

Islamist and Salafi groups do not actually see Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Sandiaga Uno as their preferred candidates since the two are considered not devout Muslims or even confident enough about their Islamic identity. But they were forced to support them due to the lack of internal candidates running for the presidential ticket. Previously, PKS nominated other internal candidates such as Salim Segaf Al-Jufri (Chair of Shura Council of PKS) and Abdul Somad (Islamic preacher) to be Prabowo’s running mate. But in the end, Prabowo chose Sandiaga Uno as his running mate since Uno had the financial resources to fund the presidential campaign. Moreover, elite members of Prabowo’s Gerindra party, both secular Muslims and non-Muslims, used Islamist groups mainly as a vehicle or “ladder” for their boss’ victory to become the RI-1 (i.e. Indonesian President).

The previous Islamist success in Jakarta (as well as in North Sumatra) created public anxiety and fear, especially among non-Islamist Muslims, moderate Muslims, nominal Muslims, traditionalist Muslims, and non-Muslims. These groups mainly perceived the emergence of Islamist factor in Indonesian politics as a “green peril,” threatening their existence, survival, and continuity. For these reasons, they were keen to block the Islamist factions’ ambitions by casting vote for Joko Widodo, which proved to be successful.

Lessons from the Indonesian Elections

There are at least three important lessons to take from the 2019 elections in Indonesia. First, the emergence of public Islam and Islamism in contemporary Indonesia in which religion (Islam) has played a great role in shaping country’s public sphere and politics. It is true that both supporters of Joko Widodo and of Prabowo Subianto used religion (Islam) to underscore their political legitimacy, developed Islamic narratives and discourses to mobilize voters behind their political ambitions.

” It is true that both supporters of Joko Widodo and of Prabowo Subianto used religion (Islam) to underscore their political legitimacy, developed Islamic narratives and discourses to mobilize voters behind their political ambitions.”

The only difference is that Prabowo’s Islamist Muslim supporters (i.e. advocates of Islamism) used Islam as a tool not only to replace Widodo but also to transform the state’s political system, ideology, and constitution which they dubbed “un-Islamic.” Islamism, which was previously “mummified” and “buried” under the New Order rule, and was practiced clandestinely by its devotees, now became publicly viable since Suharto’s collapse.

In contrast, Widodo’s non-Islamist Muslim enthusiasts (i.e. moderate, nominal, and traditional Muslims) utilized Islam as a medium to defend the incumbent whom they view as pro-Muslims and non-Muslims alike as well as the country’s political system, ideology, and constitution which they see in-line with basic Islamic principles, the Qur’an’s universal values, Sharia Law, and the example of the Prophet Muhammad.

The second lesson is that the 2019 election results seem to resemble with those of the 1955 election in which Prabowo Subianto, who was endorsed by Islamist groups, did well in areas including West Java (including Banten) and Sumatra, as did Islamist party Masjumi in 1955. Prabowo also gained significant vote in South Sulawesi, one of main bastions of Islamist groupings outside of Java. Accordingly, it is not an exaggeration that a specialist of Indonesian studies, Mark Woodward, in an online chat with me said that in the 2019 elections, divisions along ethnic lines emerged to be as important as religious polarization did in 1955. In other words, ethnoreligious identity is still a significant factor in Indonesian politics.

The third significant lesson is that non-Islamist political parties – whether secular, nationalist, or religious based – are still the dominant bloc and they will continue to be major players in the future’s Indonesian politics. There are 19 political parties that are involved in the political contest in the 2019 legislative election, of which only two parties whose main members and fans came from Islamist and Salafi groups, namely PKS and PBB. Based on the quick count outcomes of the noted survey institutions, PKS received some 8.5 percent, while PBB obtained 0.76 percent. The majority of Indonesian people still casted vote for non-Islamist parties, some of them nationalist-secular and others nationalist-religious such as PDIP, Golkar, PKB, Nasdem, Gerindra, Demokrat, PPP, Perindo, PSI, Hanura, and so forth.

As long as Islamist political parties do not take control of Indonesian politics, legislature, and government, there is still a big hope for Indonesia’s democracy, peace, civil tolerance, and civic pluralism in the years to come.

Source: Maydan (George Mason University)

Umat Kristen Jumatan di Bahrain

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Percaya nggak percaya, setiap hari Jumat, umat Kristen di Bahrain juga Jum’atan layaknya umat Islam Sunni. Kok bisa? Bisa dong. Apa sih yang nggak di dunia ini. Orang bodong aja bisa nyapres; orang pekok juga bisa nyaleg…

Maksudku begini, karena di Bahrain (seperti umumnya di kawasan Arab Teluk) Minggu hari kerja sementara Jumat itu hari libur, maka umat Kristen melakukan “ibadah Mingguan” di Hari Jumat.

Suatu ketika, saya dan kolegaku mengunjungi sebuah gereja bernama “Sacred Heart Church“ atau “Kanisah al-Qalb al-Muqaddas” di Bahrain yang kebetulan bertepatan dengan hari Jumat. Saya lihat ada banyak sekali umat Kristen dari berbagai negara yang berada di gereja itu untuk silih berganti mengadakan kebaktian.

Kami sempat ngobrol dengan beberapa pendeta dan petugas. Menurut mereka, kebaktian memang dilakukan silih berganti karena memakai bahasa yang berbeda-beda sesuai dengan jemaat Kristen. Kalau jemaat Kristen Arab, maka kebaktian dan khutbah memakai Bahasa Arab; kalau India pakai Bahasa Hindi, Pakistan pakai Bahasa Urdu, Filipina pakai Bahasa Tagalog, begitu seterusnya.

Bahrain, yang jarak tempuhnya dari tempatku tinggal cuma sejaman pakai jalur darat, adalah satu kawasan di Arab Teluk dengan populasi non-Muslim yang cukup banyak (sekitar 30% dari total jumlah penduduk di Sensus 2010). Umat Kristen di Bahrain bukan hanya kaum migran non-Arab tetapi juga umat Kristen Arab, baik yang berpenduduk Bahrain maupun dari kawasan Arab lainnya di Timur Tengah.

Mungkin karena populasi ekspat dan kaum non-Muslim yang cukup banyak itulah kenapa aturan hukum cukup fleksibel. Di Bahrain juga ada kawasan khusus bule. Meskipun secara formal, negara memberlakukan Syariat Islam tetapi praktiknya cukup longgar.

Anda bisa dengan mudah mendapatkan aneka jenis minuman keras disini. Mungkin hanya minuman keras jenis cong yang, sopi, tuak cap jenggot, atau minuman keras cap tikus saja yang susah didapat disini. Selebihnya gampang sekali segampang menemukan Mamat-Mimin di Jakarta.

Baca Juga:

Kolegaku yang hampir tiap Minggu ke Bahrain juga mengatakan ada tempat-tempat khusus untuk menikmati B2 alias babi sate, huling, rica-rica apapun namanya. Bukan hanya itu saja, klub-klub malam ala Jakarta atau Los Angeles yang lengkap dengan hiburan apem-apem bohai juga bertebaran disini.

Karena banyak hiburan di Bahrain, maka jangan heran kalau setiap weekend jalan raya menuju Bahrain dari Saudi ramai sekali. Orang-orang ingin menikmati aneka hiburan mulai nonton bioskop dan “klebing” sampai ngebir, mbabi dan ngapem kalau mau.😋

Prinsip pemerintah Bahrain:

“Yang penting ente diem, nikmati saja, nggak usah rewel dan banyak bacot. Aman deh”.

Teladan Buat Pemimpin Bangsa

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Namanya Umar Bin Abdul Azis. Kita, umat Islam khususnya, hampir dipastikan mengenal tokoh sejarah yang luhur ini. Ia populer dengan sebutan Umar II. Umar I-nya adalah Umar Bin al-Khaththab: seorang sahabat nabi sekaligus khalifah di zaman Khulafaur Rasyidin. Ia dikenal sebagai panglima perang yang saleh, jujur, tegas, pemberani dan bersahaja. Meskipun jika ia mau, ia dapat menumpuk harta dan menyimpan ribuan dinar. Tapi Umar tidak. Begitupun dengan Umar II, Umar Bin Abdul Azis.

“Umar Junior” ini adalah seorang khalifah (pemimpin tertinggi negara) Dinasti Umayyah pada akhir abad ke-7 M yang dikenal dalam literatur Islam klasik sebagai pemimpin yang adil, bersahaja, jujur dan tak kenal kompromi. Makanannya adalah makanan rakyat biasa, dan ia hanya membelanjakan 2 dirham sehari.

Umar tidak membangun rumah pribadi dan lebih suka tinggal di kemah kecil. Sementara istana kepresidenan yang megah diserahkan kepada pendahulunya, Sulaiman Bin Abdul Malik beserta keluarga, untuk ditempati. Umar II juga menolak pengawalan bahkan membubarkan 600 personil pengawal (semacam Paspampres) karena merasa pengawalan ketat hanya akan membuat jarak khalifah dengan rakyatnya. Sebelum menjadi khalifah, harta penghasilan pribadinya 50.000 dinar per tahun. Tetapi segera setelah menduduki kursi kepala negara, ia menyuruh hartanya dilelang dan diserahkan ke Baitul Mal (semacam kas negara). Pendapatannya kemudian merosot menjadi—hanya—200 dinar setahun.

Suatu hari, Umar II mengundang makan malam beberapa pejabat tinggi Umayyah. Sebelumnya dia sudah menginstruksikan para koki agar menunda dulu penyajian santapan. Ketika para undangan mulai tampak kadang-kadang menyentuh perut mereka (pertanda lapar), barulah Umar menyuruh agar para pelayan menyiapkan makan. Tapi lebih dulu agar disajikan roti bakar. Makanan sederhana itu langsung disantap Umar yang kemudian diikuti oleh para tamu. Tak berapa lama santapan makan terhidang. Sang Khalifah mempersilakan. Tapi para tamu menolak lantaran sudah kenyang. Disitulah Umar berkata, “Saudara-saudara. Jika kalian bisa memuaskan nafsu makan dengan makanan sederhana, mengapa harus serakah, sewenang-wenang sampai-sampai harus merampas milik orang lain?”. Hadirin yang merupakan para petinggi negara pun dibuatnya kecut, tertunduk malu. Itulah Umar: adil, tegas dan sederhana.

Keadilan dan kesederhanaannya itulah yang membuat ia setelah meninggal (w. 719 M) disesali banyak orang. Ia meninggal di Darus Siman—sebuah kompleks pesantren di dekat Himsh dan Homs. Ketika wafat, ia hanya meninggalkan harta pribadi 17 dinar. Itupun dengan wasiat agar sebagiannya dibayarkan untuk sewa rumah tempatnya tinggal dan sebagian lagi untuk membeli tanah makamnya.

Seorang Raja Bizantium (Romawi Timur) berkomentar dengan murung, menyesali kematian Umar, “Saya tidak terlalu heran melihat pertapa meninggalkan kesenangan duniawi agar dapat hanya menyembah Tuhan. Tapi saya sungguh kagum menyaksikan seorang pemilik kesenangan duniawi, yang tinggal mengambilnya dari telapak tangan malah menutup mata dan memilih hidup dalam kesalehan. Setelah Yesus, kalau ada orang yang mampu menghidupkan orang mati, Umar-lah orangnya.”

eorang Raja Bizantium (Romawi Timur) berkomentar dengan murung, menyesali kematian Umar, “Saya tidak terlalu heran melihat pertapa meninggalkan kesenangan duniawi agar dapat hanya menyembah Tuhan. Tapi saya sungguh kagum menyaksikan seorang pemilik kesenangan duniawi, yang tinggal mengambilnya dari telapak tangan malah menutup mata dan memilih hidup dalam kesalehan. Setelah Yesus, kalau ada orang yang mampu menghidupkan orang mati, Umar-lah orangnya.”

Umar memang berprinsip bahwa agama hanya dapat dipelihara dengan baik bila terdapat keadilan dan kebajikan. Suatu saat ia pernah menulis surat kepada Gubernur Kufah, “Jangan coba-coba mengurangi apa yang menjadi hak rakyat. Jangan paksa rakyat melakukan sesuatu diluar kemampuan mereka.” Kekuasaan di mata Umar adalah “titah Tuhan” yang harus dipelihara dan dijaga dengan baik. Kekuasaan bukanlah hadiah atau rizki nomplok yang bisa dibuat apa saja. Tapi ia—kekuasaan itu—adalah mandat yang suatu saat akan diminta pertanggungjawabannya baik oleh rakyat dan lebih-lebih oleh Tuhan—sang pemberi mandat. Sebagai mandat Tuhan, maka sudah seharusnyalah jika para pemimpin bersikap adil, jujur, tegas dan sederhana.

Keadilan, kejujuran, ketegasan dan kesederhanaan adalah komponen-komponen dasar untuk menyelenggarakan sebuah kekuasaan agar berjalan dengan baik. Kata-kata Umar itu bukanlah sejenis “kata mutiara” yang kosong-hampa tanpa makna yang dilontarkan seorang pemimpin di atas menara gading seperti kebanyakan pemimpin di bumi ini tetapi betul-betul dipraktekkan dalam tindakan nyata.

Kehadiran Umar dalam panggung kepolitikan Umayyah saat itu seperti air di tengah musim paceklik yang panjang atau di tengah gurun pasir yang kering-kerontang. Kita tahu, Umayyah adalah salah satu kerajaan Islam klasik yang didirikan di atas basis militerisme yang bengis dan kejam. Para pemimpin Umayyah sejak Mu’awiyah Bin Abu Sofyan dikenal dalam lembaran sejarah Islam sebagai pemimpin yang bengal dan tiran yang tidak segan-segan memanipulasi simbol-simbol agama untuk kepentingan pragmatis kekuasaan.

Rakyat dipaksa tunduk mengikuti logika-logika kekuasaan tiranik yang dikembangkan para khalifah dan jaringannya. Di tengah negeri yang hampir bangkrut dan di saat rakyat mengalami keputusasaan itulah, hadir Umar Bin Abdul Azis. Sedikit demi sedikit ia menata negeri Umayyah dari puing-puing kehancuran: ekonominya, politiknya, kebudayaannya. Ia mencoba menghidupkan kembali sistem demokrasi yang dimatikan oleh rezim Umayyah. Sayang kekuasaan Umar hanya beberapa tahun saja namun demikian ia telah memberi pelajaran berharga buat para pemimpin sampai hari ini.

Kisah Umar adalah kisah kegetiran sekaligus harapan. Getir karena Umar hidup dalam sebuah masyarakat yang persis seperti digambarkan dalam cerpen Anton Chekhov, yang penuh kebusukan: sogok-menyogok, korupsi, konspirasi, penipuan, kekonyolan terjadi di hampir semua tingkatan masyarakat dari pejabat tinggi sampai pegawai rendahan—sebuah gambaran hidup yang juga menimpa masyarakat kita sekarang. Kisah Umar juga menyimpan sebuah harapan meskipun barang kali hanya secuil. Meski kita hidup dalam keterpurukan di semua level, kita tidak boleh menyerah pasrah, emoh politik, apriori terhadap kekuasaan. Sikap eskapisme (termasuk aneka pementasan atau “pameran spiritual” yang marak akhir-akhir ini) tidak akan menyelesaikan sebuah persoalan bangsa yang menggunung ini. Kita harus berbuat “sesuatu” bukan malah “pasrah-bongkoan” kepada Tuhan.

Bagi kita, bangsa Indonesia, yang saat ini hendak memilih presiden dan wakil presiden secara langsung, kisah Umar bisa menjadi pelajaran yang sangat bernilai bagi rakyat juga buat pejabat negara. Bagi rakyat ada sebuah pelajaran supaya kita dalam memilih pemimpin negeri nanti tidak asal-asalan, hanya didasarkan pada pertimbangan ideologis-pragmatis saja tidak didasarkan pada pertimbangan integritas, kapabilitas atau singkatnya kompetensi personal sang calon pemimpin. Sejarah membuktikan, pemilihan berdasarkan pertimbangan ideologis-pragmatis lebih banyak menimbulkan madlarat (baca, kerugian/kemunduran) ketimbang manfaat/maslahat. (baca, keadilan sosial). Pilihlah sosok pemimpin yang memiliki kompetensi personal memadai sehingga mampu mengangkat bangsa ini dari keterpurukan.

Pemilu Juli mendatang adalah momentum berharga buat rakyat Indonesia untuk memilih sang pemimpin yang memiliki kualifikasi integritas dan kapabilitas memadai bukan pemimpin yang hanya bisa berkampanye dengan suara lantang dan bergemuruh tapi kosong tak bermakna, pemimpin yang mengobral janji mau dekat dengar rakyat miskin atau bahasa sekarang “merakyat” tetapi hidup di rumah mewah dan bergelimangan harta sementara tetangganya hidup melarat tak terurus. Kalaupun mereka sekarang mau blusukan ke pasar menemui pedagang atau nelayan atau petani hanya sebatas untuk mengais dukungan publik dan jangan lupa supaya dianggap “merakyat” itu tadi.

Lalu apa pelajaran kisah Umar buat para pemimpin? Tidak lain, buat siapapun yang terpilih sebagai pemimpin di negeri ini, Umar adalah sejarah yang berharga. Ketegasan, keadilan, kejujuran dan kesahajaan adalah prinsip hidup yang dipraktekkan Umar sehingga mampu memulihkan citra Umayyah yang bopeng. Prinsip inilah yang hendaknya juga dijalankan para pemimpin terpilih nanti agar krisis yang melanda bangsa ini segera berakhir. Tetapi apakah mereka mampu?.

Retorika Gombal Anti-China

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Sejumlah kelompok yang menggalang kampanye anti-Cina dan, menurut mereka, kalau Prabowo menang maka Indonesia akan menjadi negara berdaulat tanpa intervensi China sebetulnya adalah propaganda murahan kelas pasar loakan. Hanya orang-orang yang otaknya ketinggalan di kandang kambing atau kandang sapi saja yang terbuai dengan kendobolan mereka.

Kelompok menengah-elit yang memobilisir massa untuk anti-China sebetulnya juga tahu kalau Indonesia butuh China. Mereka juga tahu dan sadar kalau mereka berbobong untuk ndobosi masa-masa kelas “kambing congek” saja agar tidak memilih Jokowi.

Kalau misalnya paslon yang mereka dukung itu jadi, mereka nanti akan secepat kilat merapat dan berbulan madu dengan China. Itu juga yang dilakukan oleh “Wan Abud” di Jakarta, meskipun waktu kampanye gencar propaganda anti-China.

Para tokoh China tahu betul semua itu hanya gombal-gombalan saja dan ulah para makelar politik saja. Pemerintah PRC juga paham betul kalau para burung blekok-pekok itu cuma sedang berkicau untuk menipu barisan bebek kwek-kwek.

Dulu, waktu kampanye di AS, “si jabrik” yang pernah selpi dengan “si ozon” itu juga gencar sekali menyerang Muslim dan negara-negara Arab Timur Tengah. Ia lakukan itu hanya untuk menyenangkan sebagian pendukung fanatiknya yang anti-Islam/Muslim, yaitu golongan “Mamat-Mimin Mamarika.”

Setelah terpilih, kunjungan perdananya ke negara-negara Arab Teluk sambil membawa proposal permohonan dana dan menagih “pajak keamanan”😁

***

Dunia saat ini hampir susah untuk melepaskan diri dari kekuatan superraksasa PRC. Jangankan Indonesia yang kelas ceke-reme, Ngamerikah saja termehek-mehek karena tersangkut gunungan utang dengan PRC.😊

Karena sadar kekuatan raksasa ekonomi PRC, maka negara-negara Timur Tengah (juga negara-negara di Afrika, Asia Selatan seperti Pakistan dan India, negara-negara di Asia Tengah yang mayoritas berpenduduk Muslim, dlsb) pun sadar lebih baik kerja sama dan membangun mitra strategis (partneran) yang saling menguntungkan ketimbang konfrontasi dengan PRC. Melawan PRC sama saja dengan membenturkan tubuh peot ke Piramid Mesir.

Hasilnya? PRC menjadi salah satu pemain dan kekuatan ekonomi terbesar di Timur Tengah, khususnya di negara-negara Arab Teluk. Hampir tidak ada satu jentil sektor pun yang luput dari sentuhan China.

Di Saudi, China juga sangat mendominasi proyek-proyek pembangunan di berbagai bidang: transportasi, telekomunikasi, perumahan, otomobil, konstruksi, dlsb. China juga yang membangun rel dan KA-nya dari Medinah ke Mekah. Sejak dua dekade silam, produk-produk China–dari mobil, tipi, hengpon sampai sajadah, tasbih, dan boneka onta–membanjiri negara-negara di kawasan Arab Teluk.

Jadi, tidak usah sok-sokkan bergaya anti-China lah, karena sejatinya kalian itu ngegombal, nggedebus, dan berbohong dan membohongi umat belaka. Bagaimana kalian mau anti-China sementara tipi, hengpon, pakaian sampai sempak, cawet, dan kutang kalian itu buatan China.😱

Baca Juga:

Jabal Dhahran, Jazirah Arabia

Pak Prabowo, Terorisme Bukan Soal Kemiskinan

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Menurut Prabowo, problem terorisme bisa diselesaikan dengan swasembada pangan. Ini pandangan kuno. Sepertinya Pak Prabowo kurang update info, kurang wawasan, dan kurang bacaan. Para aktor, aktivis, dan arsitek terorisme di berbagai negara banyak yang berasal dari kalangan terdidik dan kelas menengah-atas yang sangat mapan secara ekonomi.

Ingat Osama Bin Laden itu orang kaya raya yang kekayaan keluarganya bisa untuk membiayai 7 juta codotmen dan codotwomen beserta keluarga dan bayangannya demo setiap hari di Monas sampai Upin-Ipin lulus kuliah S3!

Lihat juga di Indonesia: orang-orang yang radikal-militan juga banyak dari kalangan yang gendut perutnya dan bodong wudelnya.

Tolong tim sukses Prabowo-Sandi minta paslon membaca buku “Engineers of Jihad” yang mengisahkan bagaimana keterlibatan kalangan terdidik dan kelas menengah dalam aksi-aksi jihadisme dan terorisme. Sementara untuk penanganan terorisme, bisa dibaca buku mantan kolegaku, “Uniting Against Terror”.

Menganggap penanganan terorisme dengan program swasembada pangan sama dengan menganggap orang-orang miskin sebagai ekstrimis dan teroris! Ini sungguh terlalu Ani.

Bukan begitu Ferguso?

Baca Juga :

RUU Perlindungan Tokoh Agama? – Telek Benyek!

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Dengar-dengar, PKS (bukan Partai Kardus Sejahtera) sedang memperjuangkan pembentukan Rancangan Undang-Undang Perlindungan Tokoh Agama (dan simbol-simbol agama).

Beberapa hal yang ingin saya sampaikan:

Pertama, Indonesia itu negara hukum, jadi konsekuensinya, siapapun yang diduga bersalah dan melakukan pelanggaran hukum, harus diproses secara hukum tanpa padang bulu, baik bulu ketek maupun bulu jembut: tak peduli tokoh agama kek, tokoh politik kek, tokoh adat kek, tokoh masyarakat kek, tokoh preman kek, dan seterusnya.

Lagi pula, kenapa hanya tokoh agama yang mau “dilindungi”? Apa sih istimewanya tokoh agama itu dibanding tokoh-tokoh lain sehingga perlu dilindungi kayak hewan-hewan langka saja? Kenapa tidak bikin RUU Perlindungan tukang ojek, petani, atau begenggek misalnya? Apa istimewanya tokoh agama dengan rakyat biasa? Mau pakai lebel tokoh agama pun, kalau bejat tetap saja bejat.

Kedua, apa definisi dan kriteria tokoh agama yang dimaksud PKS? Dalam antropologi agama, ada ratusan definisi tentang “agama”. Apa yang mereka maksud dengan “agama”? Apa kriteria sebagai “tokoh agama”?

Karena faktor politik dan kepentingan tertentu, banyak orang yang pantasnya sebagai “penjual toko” kemudian ditokohkan, banyak orang yang sebetulnya kriminal kemudian diulamakan atau dipacaki atau didandani ulama sementara yang bener-bener ulama malah dikriminalkan, tukang demo jalanan dianggap tokoh Muslim, preman dianggap ustad, tukang pukul dianggap penceramah, tukang jualan obat dikira ahli Islam, tukang bacot dan fitnah dianggap habib, dlsb.

Sementara yang bener-bener kiai, tokoh Islam, dan alim-ulama atau “habib ori” yang mumpuni malah dikafir-sesatkan, difitnah, dan dicaci-maki hanya karena beda pilihan politik, beda kepentingan, beda mazhab, beda tafsir, beda pandangan, beda ormas, beda parpol, atau bahkan beda pilihan paslon.

Ketiga, harus diperjelas mau memperjuangkan RUU perlindungan tokoh agama atau tokoh Islam? Mau memperjuangkan perlindungan simbol-simbol agama atau simbol-simbol Islam?

Sering kali orang-orang Indonesia, apalagi penggedenya, menggunakan kata “agama” itu, dalam praktiknya, yang dimaksud dan berlaku itu hanya “Islam”, bukan agama-agama lain, baik agama impor maupun yang produk dalam negeri.

Karena itu, dalam “UU Penodaan Agama” misalnya, yang dimaksud atau dalam praktiknya “UU Penodaan Islam”. Jadi, kalau ada kasus yang dianggap “menodai Islam”, barisan odong-odong yang somplak ndase langsung bergerak secepat kilat melebihi kecepatan cahaya.

Tapi ketika ada kasus-kasus yang menodai agama-agama lain (Kristen, Buddha, Hindu, atau agama-agama lokal), seperti biasa, mata mereka mendadak picek, kuping mereka mendadak budeg, dan ingatan mereka mendadak pikun.

Karena itu, sudah bisa ditebak kemana arah para begundal tengik petualang politik berkedok agama itu ketika mau merancang RUU Perlindungan Tokoh Agama yang kata mereka untuk melindungi para tokoh agama dan simbol-simbol agama.

Dalam praktiknya nanti, RUU tersebut pasti digunakan sebagai alat untuk melindungi tokoh-tokoh Islam dan simbol-simbol Islam tertentu, lebih khusus lagi tokoh-tokoh Islam yang pro, sevisi-misi, sekroni, dan mendukung mereka meskipun melakukan kejahatan dan kebejatan, serta untuk menjerat orang-orang dan tokoh-tokoh yang kontra dengan mereka.

Jelasnya, RUU Perlindungan Tokoh Agama itu gombal mukiyo, nggedebus, dan ndoboli rakyat dan umat saja. Juga supaya ada kesan kalau PKS itu memperjuangkan Islam dan para tokoh agama. Telek benyek!

Jabal Dhahran, Jazirah Arabia

Dukunglah Paslon Idamanmu dengan Cara Elegan

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Wahai para pendukung fanatik Pak Jokowi maupun Pak Prabowo, dukunglah calon idola kalian dengan cara-cara yang waras, wajar, dan elegan.

Di alam demokrasi yang bebas-merdeka ini (ingat: hal seperti ini tidak ada di “alam khilapah”!), kalian boleh milih calon siapa saja yang dianggap “wokeh” dan “kece-bade”. Tapi tentu saja harus dengan cara yang waras.

Jangan korbankan kepentingan rakyat, bangsa, dan negara yang begitu berharga itu hanya karena soal coblos-mencoblos capres.

Jangan korbankan ikatan pertemanan dan persaudaraan hanya karena beda pilihan paslon. Jangan sampai saling bermusuhan apalagi sampai cerai hanya karena beda calon idaman.

Tak perlu. Sama sekali tak perlu.

Pula, kalian wahai rakyat kebanyakan, tak perlu mengfitnah, menghina, mencaci-maki, gontok-gontokkan, menyebar berita-berita hoaks, dan seterusnya hanya karena ingin paslon Anda menang di kontes Pilpres atau Pilkada.

Kalian itu “rakyat biasa” hanya dijadikan sebagai “kayu bakar” saja oleh para makelar, “tim sukses”, atau petualang politik yang ngaceng kekuasaan dan jabatan.

Jadi untuk apa atau ngapain kalian sampai berantem hingga benjal-benjol jontar-jontor lambe dan raimu hanya karena mendukung paslon tertentu? Untuk apa? Coba pikir…

Yang kalian dukung mati-matian itu, seandainya kemudian menang pun, belum tentu nanti ingat pada dirimu yang babak-belur dan modal-madil.

Jadi, jangan hanya karena uang recehan atau janji-janji gombal paslon, kalian kemudian “gadaikan” akal sehat dan hati-nurani lalu berantem dengan sesama warga, tetangga, teman, dlsb.

Lagi pula, apalah artinya sebuah kemenangan yang diraih dengan cara-cara kotor, biadab, keji, dan munkar seperti yang terjadi di Pilpres di AS atau Pilgub di Jakarta? Kalaupun, misalnya, paslon Anda kemudian menang dengan cara-cara kotor itu, mereka tak akan mampu memenangkan akal sehat dan hati-nurani mayoritas rakyat yang masih waras.

Jadi, sekali lagi, dukunglah paslon idola Anda dengan cara-cara yang santun dan elegan. Dukunglah capres yang visioner dan kerja keras untuk kemakmuran negeri, serta optimis yang kira-kira mampu membawa Indonesia ke depan menjadi negara yang lebih dahsyat dan disegani oleh bangsa-bangsa lain, bukan capres yang nglokro dan pesimis yang meramalkan kemelorotan, kebangkrutan, dan kiamat Indonesia yang kita cintai di kemudian hari.

Jabal Dhahran, Jazirah Arabia

Pancasila State Serves Muslims Better Than Elusive Islamic One

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Some 68 years ago, a group of nationalists and religious leaders from various ethnicities and regions across the East Indies archipelago gathered in Jakarta to discuss a philosophical foundation for the future Indonesian state. Organized by the Japan-sponsored Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI), members of the group included founding fathers of the nation such as Sukarno, Supomo, Mohammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, Abdul Wahid Hasyim, Radjiman Wedyodiningrat, Alexander Andries Maramis and Johannes Latuharhary.

After days of discussion and debate, Sukarno on June 1, 1945, proposed Pancasila as the state’s ideological basis — thereby making June 1 Pancasila Day.

Literally, Pancasila means “five principles.” The term was first used in the book of Sutasoma by Mpu Tantular, a great scholar during the time of the Java-based Majapahit Kingdom in the 14th century. Indonesia’s national motto bhinneka tunggal ika (“unity amid diversity”) was also rooted in this book. Inspired by the ideas of Mpu Tantular, whose work and life were dedicated to the unity of the religiously diverse population of Majapahit, Sukarno and the other founding fathers of the nation proposed Pancasila as the ideal foundational stone of modern Indonesia, which like the Majapahit Kingdom, also consisted of various ethno-religious groups.

Although the founding fathers agreed on Pancasila as a state ideology, opinions varied regarding the content. Which five principles would form Pancasila?

Tensions between nationalists and religious leaders rose as some Muslim leaders wanted to insert the phrase “with the obligation of its Muslim adherents to carry out Islamic Shariah” right after the first principle, “Belief in the one and only God.” On Aug. 18, 1945, however, the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) changed the formulation of the first principle of Pancasila by removing the Shariah reference.

Historian and former Muhammadiyah leader Ahmad Syafii Maarif has said that this removal was meant to accommodate other faiths and to show respect for non-Muslim religious groups that also greatly contributed to the struggle for independence. It is true that the creation of the Indonesian nation-state was the fruit of massive collaboration of diverse groups from all over the archipelago, including Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Confucianists, secularists and adherents of many indigenous beliefs.

[quote author=”Sumanto Al Qurtuby, Nahdlatul Ulama chairman in North America”]There is no religious law or God’s law, partly because all laws are the product of human efforts and intellectual interpretations.[/quote]

And as for ethnic groups, the Javanese were not the only ones who took part in the struggle for sovereignty. The Sundanese, Betawi, Sumatrans, Madurese, Ambonese, Manadonese, Chinese, Batak and many others worked hand-in-hand to fight the colonial Dutch and Japanese.

To achieve “unity amid diversity,” the founding fathers rightly drafted an open and inclusive state ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which both reach beyond ethno-religious boundaries.

Unfortunately, however, despite majority support for Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, a small group of conservative Muslims continue to challenge this pluralist nation-state by promoting the establishment of an exclusive Islamic state based on principles of Shariah. In so doing they have made various political efforts to replace Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution with Islam and the Koran. These conservative-radical Muslim groups, moreover, claim that the founding of an Islamic state is “God’s mandate” for all Muslims.

Let me restate my opinion and argument regarding this claim. As I have explained elsewhere, including in “The Black Hole of Religion: Countering Islamist Radicalism” and “Post-Liberal Islam: Religion, Freedom, and Humanity,” as a Muslim I believe that to coercively enforce the implementation of Shariah as a public law and public policy is to contradict the prophetic missions of Islam to establish religious liberty and global peace, oppose the very foundation of the Koran as a “blessing for all humanity,” and resist the universal ethical values of this religion.

Instead of erecting “God’s words,” as radicals routinely claim, their attempts, in fact, repudiate the foundational role of Islam and the Koran.

Shariah principles, it should be noted, cannot be enacted and enforced by the state. If such enactment and enforcement is attempted — and this did happen in some areas of the country and other parts of the Muslim world — the outcome will necessarily be the political will of the state or government and not the religious law of Islam, much less “God’s laws.”

As a matter of fact, there is no religious law or God’s law, partly because all laws are the product of human efforts and intellectual interpretations.

In other words, echoing leading scholar of Islamic law Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na’im in his “Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a,” “whatever the state enforces in the name of Shari’a will necessarily be secular and the product of coercive political power and not superior Islamic authority.”

Moreover, those who passionately campaign for an Islamic state with the belief that the establishment of such a state is a “sacred order” of God contradict the fact that this notion is in fact a postcolonial innovation based on a European model of the state.

The idea of an Islamic state is a critical response proposed by Islamist groupings against Euro-American types of secular states. Since the idea of an Islamic state is a human invention, accordingly, the concept of an Islamic state is not a “religious” but rather a secular one. Indeed all forms of states, kingdoms, sultanates, caliphates or whatever, are all political institutions and secular inventions of human beings, and not a sacred product of God.

In essence, the idea of an Islamic state represents an oppressive view of order, law and public policy as instruments of social engineering by the ruling elites. Once the propagandists of an Islamic state succeed in establishing their rule by manipulating the masses, they will soon govern the state based on the economic and political interests of the ruling regime, away from the spirit of tolerant, just and peaceful Islam.

Instead of serving the poor and defending the oppressed, these rulers in fact protect the corrupt elites and become the oppressors. Examples of such despotic “Islamist regimes” abound from Pakistan and Iran to Saudi Arabia and Sudan. This is an important part of the reason why notable scholars of Islam such as Ali Abd al-Raziq, Abdurrahman Wahid, Abdelwahab el-Affendi, Fazlur Rahman, Khaled Abou El Fadl — among many others — refuse the idea of the founding of an Islamic state.

Indonesia and Muslims don’t need an Islamic state. Those who are in need of this kind of “Islamic state” are only a small group of Islamists and Muslim hard-liners, aiming to cover their greed with creed.

What Indonesia and Muslims need, instead, is a secular state: a political institution typified by neutrality of faith, assurance of civil liberty and religious freedom, the guarantee of all human rights, and the protection of minority groups. All elements of Indonesian society should stand up against intolerant groups to defend Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution from false propaganda of people who sell Islam for worldly ends.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is deputy chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama in North America and a research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Obituary: Ashgar Ali Engineer, a Life for Peace

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

I paused my work upon hearing the gloomy news of the death of Asghar Ali Engineer, one of the world’s greatest scholars of Islam, last Tuesday, after a prolonged illness.

Born in 1939 in the town of Salumbar in the western Indian state of Rajasthan, Engineer was a prolific writer who authored more than fifty books, many of which have been translated into many languages — including Indonesian — and he wrote innumerable book chapters, journal articles and columns.

But there is more. Engineer was also a daring peace activist who had been at the vanguard of civil society movements against religious tyranny and radicalism. Also, he was a truly passionate liberal Muslim thinker whose ideas on Islamic theology of liberation, secular democracy, Islamic ethics of social justice, women’s rights, religious tolerance and pluralism, non-violence, peace building, communalism and secularism have shaped many scholars and activists around the globe.

Since Engineer’s writings cover broad issues and themes, it’s difficult to decide which aspects of his work are the most important. As the scientist Ram Puniyani has aptly pointed out, “there is a deeper integration in deferent facets of the work [Engineer’s].”

However, it seems that Engineer’s fame, which goes far beyond his homeland, was primarily for his work on or, more precisely, against violent conflicts, particularly those committed in the name of religion, including Islam.

The first dreadful event that shook Engineer very deeply was the bloody Hindu-Muslim violence that broke out in Jabalpur, in Madhya Pradesh state, in 1961. This was the first major communal riot between the two religious groups after the mayhem of 1948, which followed the partition of the Subcontinent into India and Pakistan.

Born in a Bohra orthodox priestly family of Shiite Ismaili Muslims, Engineer was a student when he witnessed the tragedy. For him, violence in the name of religion was anathema in part because he had been soaked in spiritual and peaceful dimensions of Islam from his childhood. Engineer was taught by his father, Shaikh Qurban Hussain, who was a scholar of Islam and a Shiite-Ismaili leader, that Islam is a religion of peace and that no religion preaches violence.

But following the Jabalpur riots, Engineer began to wonder: if Islam — or any other religion — doesn’t teach violence and hate, why, then, were Muslims and Hindus in India fighting each other in the name of religion?

Indeed, India has witnessed a prolonged series of bloody communal violence from the Mumbai riots of 1893 to the more recent carnage in Gujarat and other areas resulting in countless deaths. Most incidents took place between Hindus and Muslims. But riots also occurred between Sunnis and Shiites or between factions within Sunni and Shiite Islam, or between Hindus and Sikhs or Christians, etcetera.

Engineer devoted his life to the study of these seemingly religiously-inspired conflicts and his research findings formed a crucial contribution to conflict and peace studies and to our understanding of the underlying factors of communal turmoil. Engineer, it should be noted, not only conducted fieldwork, analyzed data and wrote up research findings from his desk, but he also mentored and trained peace practitioners and human rights activists, and marched down in the streets to fight against violence and promote communal harmony.

He thought that there was a something wrong with the beliefs and practices of some his fellow Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, etc. who espoused extremism and intolerance. In his autobiography, “A Living Faith: My Quest for Peace, Harmony and Social Change,” Engineer stated that his father taught him to be peaceful and open-minded and show great respect for other religions. In his childhood, he wrote, Hindu Brahmin priests used to come and talk with his father to exchange views on each other’s beliefs with deep esteem.

Inspired by his father’s tolerant teachings and peaceful actions as well as by the spirit of philosophical and spiritual Islam and the universal ethics of the Koran, Engineer worked hard to create a “new India” (or a “new world” generally) which would be free from brutality and bigotry. To do this, he thought it necessary to create research centers, reinterpret Islamic/Koranic foundations for interreligious peace and develop movements dedicated to non-violence. For his tremendous efforts in promoting inter- and intra-religious understandings, he was given numerous awards including the Right Livelihood Award (also known as the Alternative Nobel Prize) and the National Communal Harmony Award by the government of India.

Another of Engineer’s great legacies is that, from 1972 until his death, he had been a strong voice for Islamic reformation. He led the Progressive Dawoodi Bohra movement and although he was devoted to Shiism, Engineer strongly criticized its clergy system and Shiite leaders who manipulated lay believers by injecting “blind religious dogmas of the past” for their own political and economic interests. Islam, for Engineer, was primarily a “liberating force” and a means to achieve social justice.

Engineer compared today’s India to Mecca in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, during which oligarchy thrived due to greed as well as ignorant tribal rule, and, as a result, nobody took care of orphans, widows, the old and the poor.

Engineer used the socio-political settings of Arabia and the tribal leaders’ ill-treatment of Muslims during the time of Muhammad to analyze Indian contexts, and then developed an Islamic theology of liberation, rooted in the concept of tawhid (Oneness of God), as a religious foundation to resist the Shiite clergy in his country. Just like Latin American Catholic leaders who used Biblical traditions to advance a liberation theology to oppose violence and oppression (like Gustavo Gutierrez), Engineer used Koranic texts and Islamic teachings and values, combined with the prophetic practices of Muhammad, as a means of mobilization, reformation and protest against what he considered the politics of injustice of the Shiite religious establishment.

Engineer declared that a religious person must continue to wage jihad against all forms of exploitation, discrimination, and injustices.

Due to his strong criticism of Shiite clerics, however, he put his life (and his family’s) at risk and became the routine subject of insults and fatwas accusing him of sacrilege. Despite the threats, however, he continued to spread and advocate a form of liberating, tolerant, just and peaceful Islam.

Just like India, Indonesia currently faces many problems: from terrorism, intolerance and radicalism to corruption and other social illnesses. It is high time for this nation to educate more “Engineers” and boost progressive understandings of Islam that oppose theocracy (including the Islamic state) and at the same time support secular democracy, the rights of women, homosexuals and non-Muslims, freedom of thought and expression, and the general notion of progress.

Only by implementing such ideas can the pluralistic character of Indonesia be maintained in the future — and protected from the false propaganda of some radical Muslim groups.

Rest in peace, Dr. Engineer.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is a research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana.

Interfaith Dialogue Is Not Enough

Penulis

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

From Tuesday until Friday, Indonesia is hosting an interfaith conference of Asian Christian and Muslim leaders, jointly held by the Indonesian-based International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), the Indonesian Bishops Conference (KWI), and the Indonesian Church Association (PGI). The Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences and the Christian Conference of Asia also support the gathering.

This interfaith dialogue, for sure, is not the first to be held in this country. There have been numerous interfaith initiatives and meetings across the archipelago aimed at airing tensions and establishing interreligious harmony.

Despite frequent meetings of Christian and Muslim leaders, however, the question still remains: why is religious violence, including anti-Christian campaigns in some areas of the nation, still continuing? What went wrong with previous Christian-Muslim dialogues?
There are a number of reasons why such interfaith dialogues have so far had only little success in overcoming religiously-inspired conflicts.

First, many, if not most, interfaith dialogues are merely formal, ceremonial conversations, often taking place in luxurious hotels. As a result, with few exceptions, such interfaith meetings are a waste of time and money, and little more than “feel-good talk-fests” that do not fully grapple with real problems of interreligious relations and intergroup tensions on the ground. Worse yet, the meetings usually only involve “moderate factions” of both religions, and do not engage with the “real actors” of religious violence: the extremists.

Strengthening the moderates, while at the same time marginalizing the militants, is not the best strategy. In order to become successful, such interfaith meetings must bring leaders of conservative-militant groups of both sides to the negotiating table. This does not have to be an official gathering, but can also be a series of informal meetings. In many cases, such an informal approach is more productive than the formal one. Cases of interreligious violence across the globe, from Mozambique to Northern Ireland and Maluku, have ended in peace after a series of regular, untiring interfaith engagements involving opposing groups.

This is the essence of dialogue: an ongoing communication process to understand thoughts, minds, worldviews, teachings, systems of belief and philosophies of life of other communities. Dialogue should be a cultural bridge to tackle deadlock, to enhance mutual awareness, to foster joint activities and even to transform relationships between members of conflicting groups. An effective communication tool to create mutual understanding and mutual trust among warring parties, an interfaith dialogue, as professor of interreligious dialogue at Temple University’s Leonard Swidler reminds us, requires commitment and willingness to seek other truths, not to force our truth onto others.

The forms of religious dialogue vary: ranging from joint appeals by high-level religious leaders for an end to fighting, to attempts to develop mutual understanding and the recognition of shared values and interests, to grassroots efforts to encourage repentance and promote reconciliation. These types of ongoing, healthy and constructive dialogue can function as a way to move from the perspective of, in Milton Bennett’s terms, “ethnocentrism” to “ethnorelativism.” To achieve such quality, one needs more than, and must go beyond, a formal interfaith huge conference.

The second reason why interfaith meetings tend to fail is the inability of participants to diagnose real issues facing conflicting groups. Many, perhaps most, people think cases of religious clashes are mainly rooted in non-religious factors.

ICIS secretary general Hasyim Muzadi, for instance, said in the Jakarta Globe that part of the agenda of the current interfaith conference is to address conflict, tensions and intolerance involving Christians and Muslims in Indonesia. This, according to him, is deeply rooted not in religious fanaticism, but in socioeconomic and political interests. In other words, the conflict is more about “greed” than “creed.”

This kind of reasoning — looking at the political economy of conflict — has been dominant since the rise of so-called modernism or secularism. Religious moderates, liberal skeptics and secular-minded scholars and policymakers have shared and echoed this argument, albeit for different reasons and objectives. While the “secularist-liberals” dismiss the positive function of religion, dubbing it as a pre-modern, undemocratic, intolerant and violent worldview, the religious moderates think of it in opposite terms: a source of peace, justice, tolerance and democracy.

However, looking at interreligious conflicts worldwide, one will find that such cases are about more than merely political economy. In large part, radicalism is not even rooted in poverty. And it is worth noting that many poor people in this country and other parts of the world do not share extremist views. And many poor areas in this nation have no record of communal violence whatsoever.
Conversely, as a recent study by Dutch scholar Martin van Bruinessen shows, Islamic radicalism and militancy in Indonesian is an urban middle class phenomenon.

Accordingly, those concerned with interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding need to stop focusing on poverty and economic issues — because such frameworks are not only unfair and biased but also, for the most part, misleading.

In the case of Christian-Muslim conflicts in some parts of West Java, for instance, one needs to take into account the rivalry between Christian evangelicals and Muslim hard-liners who compete for largely the same souls: migrant workers, urban populations and street children. Conservative-militant Muslim groups have contributed to the exacerbation and escalation of interreligious tensions, but hard-line Islamists are not the only agents of conflict.

Some Christian evangelical groupings, many of which have been supported by American-based evangelist churches and organizations, also have played crucial roles. As reported by International Crisis Group, US-based evangelical groups that supported “Christianization” and missionary activities in Indonesia included the Joshua Project, Partners International, Frontiers and the Campus Crusade for Christ.

The harsh competition between Muslim hard-liners and Christian evangelicals, and insensitive proselytization efforts by both groups, has indeed led to violent conflicts between religious communities. Moderate religious leaders need to pay attention to — and find productive ways to solve — the increase of Islamic vigilante groupings and various like-minded alliances that have become a public order menace as well as aggressive Christian proselytizing in Muslim strongholds.

The future of interfaith and Christian-Muslim relations in this country will depend on the serious, positive collaborations between actors in both state and society.

The ongoing religious clashes and tensions in large part are due to the failure of the government and state authorities to bring perpetrators to justice and to prevent or effectively prosecute incitement and intimidation committed by radical groups against religious minorities.

As long as the ruler remains silent, the social drama will continue.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is a research fellow at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

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